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IMPERIAL CROSSROAD: THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAR EAST ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1933-1939

BY

GREG C. KENNEDY ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CLASSICS

Edmonton, Alberta

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled IMPERIAL CROSSROAD: THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAR EAST ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1933-1939 submitted by GREG C. KENNEDY in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. in History.

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ABSTRACT

The problem investigated by this thesis is the degree to which Far Eastern foreign and defence issues influenced the formation of closer Anglo-American relations between 1933 and 1939. It is based on a wide array of primary documents from the United States, Great Britain and Canada. There is also an adequate amount of secondary literature used to supplement the primary research.

The major conclusions to be drawn from this study are many. First, is the point that both the American and British strategic foreign policy-making elites were interested in the maintenance of a balance of power to protect their interests in the Far East. That balance was concerned not only with the position of Japan and China, but also the Soviet Union. Second, the periodization traditional used to investigate this issue is not correct and a more comprehensive picture is created by using the period from 1933 to 1939. Third, the basis for the Grand Alliance of 1941-1945 between Britain and the United States can be found in their common interests in the Far East. Fourth, Anglo-American relations in general where moving closer and on better terms from 1933 to 1939. Finally, the primacy of the British Foreign Office and American State Department in the construction of each nation's strategic foreign policy is confirmed. The is especially important on the British side of the investigation, where the workings of the machinery responsible for the formulation of an strategy to defend the realm has been highlighted. That aspect of the work sheds new light on the historiographical question of who held the dominant position in that process: the Treasury or the Foreign Office.

Some other inferences that are in the study are that a similar policy-making elite system was in charge of the creation of a strategic foreign policy in both the United States and Great Britain at this time. As well, both of those groups held similar strategic views of important Far Eastern events.

Overall, the study calls for a re-interpretation of the importance Far East in the construction of the "Special Relationship", claiming that

the Far East was just as important, if not more so, than the events in Europe from 1933-1939 in drawing the two western powers together.

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As always, the final responsibility for what has been written here and any errors or omissions that have been made are the author's and his alone.

Greg Kennedy
Kinston, Ontario
July, 1997

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IMPERIAL CROSSROAD: THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAR EAST ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1933-1939.

INTRODUCTION

> ...action is far the most difficult point on which to make recommendations, for America is the despair of the diplomat. In her remoteness, both physical and political, she resembles a prize fighter with a very long reach. He stands with his left arm stretched far out, and the opponent may dance round and round in the ring and never come to close quarters.[1]

Inter-war Anglo-American strategic foreign relations, in the sense of any significant commonalities in foreign or defence policy, were centered primarily around Far Eastern issues. Isolated from European affairs after the First World War, American foreign and military interests focused on the possibility of a threat to world peace emanating from the Pacific. Based on a desire to establish an international acceptance of its view on how international relations were to be conducted (the Wilsonian legacy), America possessed a philisophical empire in the Far East which required defending, as it denounced the use of naked aggression by nations for their own benefit. Japan's use of force to expand its territorial possessions in China in 1931 and 1932 was a direct challenge to those American ideals. That challenge created a need for the United States to develop a Far Eastern policy: would it become more active in Far Eastern affairs or would it abandon the region to its own fate. However, because of America's military weakness and its diplomatic isolation from the League of Nations, the Roosevelt Administration would have to rely on an old-fashioned balance of power approach to dealing with the Far Eastern crisis. Naturally enough, because of her pre-dominant position as a major trading power in China and the Far East, as well as a protector of Far Eastern Dominions, Great Britain's position in that balance of power scheme was a key consideration in the construction of America's Far Eastern strategic foreign policy.

After 1932, the British Empire also saw itself facing the possibility of attack from an ambitious Japan. With the Soviet Russian empire incapable of checking Japanese expansion on the mainland, with the

Chinese divided and industrially weak, and with the Empire hobbled by the horrors of the First World War and constant, unreasoning cries for disarmament and peace, British strategic policy-makers also realized that the survival of British interests in the Far East required a balance of power in that area. For the Foreign Office, the primary creator and conductor of British strategic policy, the question was how did the United States fit into that regional balance of power, as well as the global balance of power which was used to protect the entire Empire? Thus, for Britain, the United States, as a potential major naval power in Pacific, as a major trading nation, as a democratic, capitalist country dedicated to the ideas of individual freedom, and as a nation with economic and strategic interests in the Far East, was an important element in the final formulation of that strategic balance.

This study is a charting of how the two nations' individual strategic needs created a 'parallel but not joint' relationship towards the Far Eastern as the crisis in international relations evolved in that region. In short, it is a look at how the two nations developed similar views of the Far Eastern crisis and 'got along' with respect to accomodating one another on certain strategic and diplomatic issus so that they could become more confident of one another in any potential showdown with Japan. The evidence presented reveals that, because of the Far Eastern question, the 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain was indeed a reality before it was allowable to even admit that such a relationship existed. With parallel goals, similar strategic evaluations and common approaches to the problem of what to do about Japan, the British Empire and the United States began to work together towards establishing and maintaining that balance of power scheme in the Far East. Those ties, forged in the troubled waters of the Pacific, were the first crucial steps in the construction of the more famous Churchill/Roosevelt 'special relationship' and as such are the true origins of the Grand Alliance.[2] For the purposes of this study that 'special relationship' refers to a long-lasting circumstance that created friendship through understanding, networking, intellectual affinity, financial ties, family or blood relations, empathy and mutual fear of deception but was a sentiment which was not a formal or public expression.

Why should a study of Anglo-American relations in the Far East concentrate on the period from 1933 to 1939? There are several reasons. First, there is little to be gained from studying, as is often done, the development of Anglo-American relations in that region from 1937 to 1941.[3] Such an approach denies the reality of the development of that special relationship before 1937 and jumps ahead in its analysis because of the historian's certainty that World War Two will definitely arrive.[4] The Eurocentric, as well as enivitablity aspects of such an approach has led to a simplification of the international situation in the period from 1933 to 1939. In that paradigm Germany is the only enemy Great Britian and the United States considered being worthy of serious attention as a threat to global peace and all other possible conflicts except the European are relegated to second class status. While Japan was indeed a second class power in terms of industrial ability and modern war-fighting when compared to Germany, the historical record cannot assume glibbly that the Far East did not consume an equal or even greater share of the time spent by British, and certainly American, strategic planners in those six years.

Second, while one could plausibly look at Anglo-American relations either from the point of view of separate administrations (either British or American) or through the lens of major international crises, one cannot cross over the divide which is the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. Once a European war became a reality, all prewar contingency planning was subject to dealing with the exigencies of that new reality. Liklihoods were actualities and relations with non-combatants, such as Japan, the United States and the USSR would have to be made within that wartime context. Finally, there is a more reasonable way of looking at the development of Anglo-American in the Far East: acknowledging that the period 1933 to 1939 forms a discrete contextual unit.

The creation of such a unit was the result of inter-war events. From 1919 to 1932 a state of relative calm existed in the Far East. But, after 1932, in the aftermath of a failed attempt at cooperation by the Americans and British to check Japan's first aggressive moves in the region, a number of changes took place that make the period from 1933 to 1939 a separate block, as far as strategic foreign policy planning within a Far Eastern balance of power environment are concerned.[5] The coming to power of a new Administration in the United States, a British move to rearm (with the Far East being the catalyst for that rearmament), a continuity of characters in the policy-making elite on both sides of the Atlantic, and the absolute change brought about in strategic planning by the outbreak of a European war all combine to prevent the historian from linking events events before September 1939 with the eventual bombing of Pearl Harbor. The period from September 1939 to December 1941 is a distinct era that has some ties to the prewar era, but, when considered with respect to the efforts made by Great Britain and the United States to create and maintain a balance of power in the Far East to contain Japan in the preceding six years, must really be seen in the context of an entirely different set of circumstances. The Nazi-Soviet Agreement of August 1939, the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, the fall of France in June 1940, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April, 1941, British warship losses in the first two years of the war, the American embargoes against Japan, and the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, were some of the "new realities" that forced both American and British policy-makers to modify their Far Eastern policies. Therefore, pre-war Anglo-American ideas of working together to contain Japanese expansion can only be understood when they are left in the natural historical and chronological period bounded by the years 1933 to 1939. Understanding the difference between that period and the two years that followed also helps explain the reasoning behind some of the policies that did emerge from September 1939 to December 1941.

Many of the questions surrounding the study of Anglo-American relations and events in the Far East in the 1930s are rooted in a even more difficult argument: was Great Britain still the only global power throughout this period? Any discussion of this argument demands a renewed and rigorous investigation. A greater depth of analysis is particularly important when the comparison that is being drawn is between Britain, one of the pre-war Great Powers, and the United States, the latter the acknowledged Super Power since 1945. To make such a comparision, one needs to consider economic, military, diplomatic, and social matters, as well as personal perceptions and cultural elements. Only then can one gauge accurately what were the essential indicators of power and its effect on relationships. Here, Paul Kennedy is to be congratulated for his attempt to outline these elements in a comprehensive form. Kennedy argues that Britain's status as a Great Power was in a state of steady and inevitable decline following the turn of the century. He sees faster-growing, younger, expanding nations, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, as overtaking the tired, inefficient and obsolescent British Empire in financial and industrial terms.[6] However, the "declinist" interpretations of Kennedy and other scholars of a similar mind have been the object of a recent challenge over the nature of power and the relationship between Great Britain and other nations in the twentieth century.

This new school takes many of Kennedy's conclusions to task, particularly his economic determinist approach to Britain's status during the interwar period.[7] In particular, the school points out that the declinists do not address adequately the issues of policy-makers' perceptions, circumstance and national will, all elements that make power a relative matter. Critics charge that the declinist model does not consider the broader criteria that make a nation a pre-eminent power.

This caveat is especially true with regard to the elements required for a nation to be a pre-eminent maritime power. However, is the anti-declinist model, which attempts to find a point of transition (when did America take from the failing hand of Great Britain the trident of world power) and argues for a 'supreme' power, really adequate for the multi-polar situation which was the reality of the inter-war period?

The answer is no. The argument that Great Britain was the greatest of the great powers is largely a false one. Great Britain existed as a great power in the 1930s precisely because of the balancing forces exerted by the other European Great Powers. As David French and others have argued, Great Britain was never really able to stand alone against any other great power, and certainly not against any combination of powers.[8] However, no other power was able to stand alone against a coalition either. The very nature of the great-power system was such that it demanded alliances and balance of power combinations that ensured that no one nation could remain above the others. Here, Britain was fortunate at the end of the First World War to be left stronger than the other European nations. But, as Italy and Germany regained their strength and continued to claw their way further up the Great Power ladder, Britain was forced once again to look for allies. By 1933 - in sharp distinction to the years before 1914 - Britain faced a hostile Japan and an unreliable Soviet Russia. Further, her remaining pre-1914 partner, France, was weak and hesitant. Given this alignment, the Empire's search for allies or friends amongst the more powerful nations of the world naturally tended towards the United States, Britain's last First World War ally.

What needs to be considered is where was the focus of Anglo-American relations. The enormous economic financial and potential military power displayed in the First World War by the United States was not part a permanent part of the European great power system. This divorced position made America only a potentially effective force in European wars. However, in the Far East, the United States was a vital military element in the Far Eastern balance of power.[9] The US had no interest in becoming involved in European affairs and often was reluctant even to acknowledge her need to deal with Far Eastern matters during the inter-war period.[10] This situation makes it necessary to return and consider once more another aspect of the declinist versus anti-declinist debate. Many historians fail to recognize that Anglo-American relations in the interwar period did not have any solid foundation, with regard to European affairs, until well after Roosevelt's re-election in the fall of 1936. Europe did not matter for the Americans in terms of a global balances of power until well after that point because the isolationist tendencies that made America so very different from European nations were still dominant.[11] America was not thinking of a global balance of power. It is only after 1936 that one can begin to detect the emergence of a process of education in the US, aimed by the Roosevelt Administration at the American public in the hope of awakening the masses to the need to participate in global matters, particularly the Far East.[12] It would take a Europe suffering from the Abyssinia problem, the Spanish Civil war, German expansion, and finally Munich, to build a momentum that could shift America from its lethargy towards the continent. Instead, it was the Far East, therefore, that was the critical common ground for Anglo-American relations in the interwar because that region was really the only one in which America was engaged in any military or diplomatic initiatives that placed them side by side with the British Empire, both facing a potential threat.

Another problem with the existing studies is one quite distinct from arguments about decline. Many non-American historians critical of the United States' lack of support for the British Empire in the inter-war have laboured under a number of mistaken liberal notions. Those range from the assumption that the United States was under some common cultural obligation to cooperate with the British in all circumstances, to the idea that there was some form of common outlook or formula among British and American policy-makers that could be applied in all circumstances to all

Anglo-American interactions. While many who follow this type of analysis claim to be furthering the study of the role of personality along the lines of the work pioneered by Donald Cameron Watt and J-B. Duroselle[13], what in fact has happened has been the creation of generalized archetypes -- Atlanticists, Imperialists, anti-American, anti-British, pro-American, pro-British, and so on -- into which people are thrust in Procrusteon fashion. This method is simplistic. For example, was Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary of the foreign office from 1933-1938, anti-American? The answer is yes, with regard to the America refusal to become engaged in the European balance of power which annoyed Vansittart immensely. However, Vansittart could not be called anti-American in all situations and circumstances, particularly those concerning the Far East. The question is thereby clouded by the reality of the historical record: on some matters and in certain situations Vansittart was hostile and suspicious of the United States, on others he was not. Alternatively, was Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, anti-British? The answer is no, but Hornbeck was at all times aware of how American interests would have to take priority over British concerns, for in his eyes Anglo-American relations were second in importance to furthering American interests in the Far East.[14] However, he also realized that good Anglo-American relations in the Far East would in fact further American interests in that region.

Both Vansittart and Hornbeck formulated their attitudes towards each other's Far Eastern policy around the desire to protect national self-interests through the maintenance of a balance of power. Therefore, both men were flexible in their assessments and attitudes towards the other's strategic foreign policy. Those strategic requirements made both men complex, multi-faceted characters, and not simplistic, one-dimensional administrators. What is required instead of a simple labelling is a careful look at the individuals involved in and the exact circumstances surrounding a given issue, so that an accurate policy-making picture can be taken without implying some permanent pattern or scheme existed. It was in this environment, of individual prejudices and biases, departmental directives, and political desires, that American and British strategic foreign policy planners created the "mental maps" of each other and their Far Eastern policies. Those charts and the picture that they drew were crucial to the creation of any 'special relationship' between 1933 and 1939.

It is not only the periodization of Anglo-American relations that needs to be determined, but also the nature of the relationship itself. The mental map that a nation's policy-making elite develops of another country determines the basis of international relations.[15] That relationship is ultimately concerned with the power of a nation and how that nation will utilize its power. The elements influencing how a nation's power manifests itself include domestic, foreign and defence policies; economic, financial, and trade issues; ideological, political, religious and cultural systems of belief. These elements also influence the relationship that is the working reality when nations attempt to create mental images of one another.[16] From 1933 to 1939, the United States and Great Britain developed mental maps charting each other's Far Eastern policy and how the other would meet the perceived crisis in the Far East. Would the other nation use its power to meet the Japanese threat and if so, how? Would each nation use its power in conjunction with the other, or would it be used separately? Those are questions related to the formulation of British and American mental maps of one another that are dealt with in the chapters which follow. Also found below, however, are two other sets of mental maps, inter-woven into the tracing of that strategic foreign policy construction process as a sub-text. One of those sub-sets is the tangential recognition of the similarity between British and American policy-makers and their mental maps of Japan's strategic foreign policy. The other, less traditional usage of the idea of mental maps, concerns British attempts to manipulate Japan's mental map of the Anglo-American relationship. British Far Eastern policy-makers were concerned constantly with how Japan viewed the balance of power in the region. They manipulated the Japanese fear of a possible British alliance with the United States, and the Soviet Union, continually, in order to create a deterrent to further Japanese expansion and aggression.[17] That manipulation was in fact one of the key elemeents of the 'no-bloc' policy of the British Foreign Office, which is discussed in greater detail below. Within that no-bloc policy, the British were not adverse to attempting to make the Japanese believe that the Anglo-American relationship in the Far East was perhaps more than it officially appeared, so long as that perception would not panic the Japanese into an attack designed to prevent encirclement

Also, for the purposes of this study, the mental-mapping process must be seen to take place on a number of sub-levels, such as the Departmental and Embassy level, as opposed to just the Cabinet or Presidential or Secretary of State level. That also means that the idea of a policy-making elite must be taken down through departmental and staff levels to see where ideas and policy originate from and why they were either accepted or rejected and at what level. High-level officials rarely 'make' policy, they simply approve or disapprove of the recommendations. Only by adopting this method of investigation can a complete picture of who formed policy and why they did so be determined. Many detailed issues need to be considered: who knew whom in the various embassies? were they friends or antagonists? who was a friend of which important civil servant? what groups or individuals could get information out of or into the right office or department? The answer to such questions determine the nature of an "informal relationship" and those are the type of personal relations that need to be explored if a clear picture of how and why particular attitudes and policies were formed is to be gained. 'Great Man' appreciations of such a complex and intricate interaction will simply not suffice.

How mental maps were formed and how they affected policy is complicated and took place over time. In this period both the United States and Great Britain were conscious of the need to support the other at the most fundmental level, but also aware of the various strengths and weaknesses of their own and their neighbor's position. In practice, from 1933 to 1936, what existed were strained but not ruptured, Anglo-American relations. During this time, the British Government came to grips with Roosevelt's foreign and domestic policies and their ramifications for the British empire, while the Roosevelt Administration decided what its Far Eastern policy was to be and how best to go about achieving that policy. Ray Atherton, a very astute and accurate assessor of the British Government's attitude and policy, on staff throughout the period under study at the American Embassy in London, summed up the circumstance nicely in March 1933:

> In conversations it is frequently brought out that the British Cabinet is increasingly conscious of England's political responsibilities as a European nation and, after surveying the field for Anglo-American cooperation, has reluctantly come to the conclusion that while Anglo-American aims may coincide in their general outlines, any policy of effective cooperation is practically unattainable in view of conflicting interests. 1. Thus, England and the United States both desire peace, but they have so far failed to agree on the nature of the cooperation essential to maintain peace. 2. England and America are both seeking a revival of world propriety. However, the more important methods whereby England hopes to raise world commodity prices seem directly to clash with the interests of the United States.[18]

All this changed in the period from 1936 to 1939. By early 1936, the two sides had been forced to forge new bonds of trust that helped overcome those differences. Also, as a second-term president, Roosevelt was much more confident of his ability to push isolationist America towards greater involvement in Far Eastern matters, as were the State Department and other American defence planners, particularly in the Navy. By 1936, those three groups were very aware of the fact that they would require British assistance in the Far East if American interests and its Far Eastern foreign policy was going to survive and succeed.

Given the above, how, did the creation of this special and informal relationship proceed? In order to dissect some of the forces working on the formulation of Anglo-American relations in the Far East, this thesis focuses on three major areas of Anglo-American relations: maritime-naval relations; foreign-policy-making elite relations; and assessments of the strategic situation in the Far East. The first has been chosen because of the geographic realities of fighting a war in the Far East.[19] If there were to be any meaningful cooperation between the two nations, at either a formal or informal level, then each had to come to an acceptance of both the other's naval strength and its security needs.[20] Therefore, John Hattendorf's observation that "In the twentieth century, both Britain and America have used maritime strategy as a subset of grand strategy in order to deal with balance of power issues." must be put at the core of Anglo-American relations for the Far East.[21] Achieving maritime harmony was not easy. As Britain and the United States had been bitter naval and shipping rivals in the period immediately following the end of the First World War, Anglo-American naval relations had been sorely tested up to 1933. However, under the pressure of having to react to Japan's aggressive actions, the United States and Great Britain established an informal, but solid, acceptance of and respect for the other's maritime strength, acknowledging the need to accommodate one another in order to meet the strategic challenge in the Far East.

Linked to this is the need, when assessing Anglo-American relations in the Far East, 1933-1939, to establish a more comprehensive definition of maritime power than that which is usually implied by the terms 'naval power' or 'sea power'. While many non-American efforts to do so have been enlightening,[22] most studies have suffered from conceptual problems, mainly an over-dependence on declinist theories and an over-reliance on the assumption of an inevitable war in Europe.[23] On the other hand, American attempts to write the history of their maritime efforts, especially in the Far East during the inter-war period, have been totally unsatisfactory.[24] These failures have been the product of several things: an attempt to project into the past certain perceptions of American power during the Cold War, a backlash against military and diplomatic studies in the 1960s and 1970s, and a refusal to leave behind the narrow Mahanian ideas concerning the definition of maritime power.[25] Thus, it is necessary that American maritime strength in the interwar period, especially with regard to the Far East, be properly re-evaluated.[26] Further, because of the unbreakable link between a nation's naval policy and its foreign policy, the foreign-policy-making elites of the two countries must also be paid more attention.

American and British foreign policy-makers had developed a healthy distrust of one another from 1919 to 1932. Woodrow Wilson's delay in entering the First World War, the failure of the US to join the League of Nations, and the inability of Sir John Simon and Henry L. Stimson to form a united front to contest Japan's actions in Manchuria, rekindled, on both sides of the Atlantic, suspicions of the other's motivations, especially amongst non-elected officials in the Foreign Office and State Department.[27] As a result, these governmental organs, the two most responsible for the development of mental maps and strategic foreign policy, had to overcome that legacy of distrust and suspicion if a 'special' relationship was to be established.[28]

A final matter that needs attention is the issue of how both nations saw the balance of power in the Far East. One strand of this concerns American and British views of Japan. Both the United States and Great Britain made assessments of Japanese intentions and power, and both had a sound respect for Japanese military and naval strength.[29] While, when discussing Japan's pre-1941 ability to make war, some historians have confused tactical or operational competence and innovation with strategic superiority,[30] the primary documentation leaves little doubt that British and American interwar planners accurately gauged the industrial, resource, economic and financial weakness that plagued Japan's strategic planning in the age of total war.[31] More importantly, British and American policy-making institutions recognised what most historians of the inter-war Far Eastern situation have not: that the primary adversary for the Japanese was Russia, that the main theatre of operations would be China, and that the main naval foe for the Imperial Japanese Navy, until 1939, was the Royal Navy.[32] Whether policy-makers in either western nation acted on or believed such information is another, albeit crucial, matter. A consideration of this latter point leads to the question of why it was that such information was not acted on or accorded greater significance. The oft-cited and simple answer, that all resulted from racial prejudice, does not bear the test of empirical evidence.[33]

A second strand of American and British thinking about the balance of power in the Far East is their less well-known, but more important evaluation of the role of the Soviet Union. The literature dealing with either American or British views of Soviet Far Eastern policy is very scanty.[34] However, since the Soviet Union was an important, if not the most important actor, in the Far Eastern balance of power, such an historiographical blank spot is a serious omission. The significance of Russia's place was not lost on American and British assessors of the Far East. And, significantly, the two western powers shared their views about the worth of the Soviet's with one another. What did the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, between Japan and Germany mean for the balance of power in the Far East? What effect did the Soviet military purges have on the Russians' ability to act as a strategic counter-weight to Japan's desire for further expansion on mainland China? These were some of the questions that both the American and British strategic planners had to consider. They did so individually, but also in a cooperative manner that helped give each nation a better appreciation for the other nation's overall view of the Far East.

British and American views of Japan and Soviet Russia are part of the basis then for an exploration of how the strategic policy-makers of the two nations saw the Far East. Was their vision sufficiently similar to allow avenues of cooperation to be explored, in an attempt to counter Japan's expansionist policies? For, if cooperation between and coordination of Anglo-American Far Eastern policies could exist, then an informal, yet stable alliance relationship could be formed. Therefore, understanding the consensus created over these three separate areas in the strategic policy-making bodies of the American and British systems, creates a clear evaluation of the nature of Anglo-American relations towards the Far Eastern crisis and how that specific relationship provided the basis for the growth of the 'special relationship'.

ENDNOTES

1.FO 371/20651/A2378/38/45, very confidential despatch from Sir Ronald Lindsay (British Ambassador to the United States) to Anthony Eden (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Mar.22, 1937.

2.The literature on the 'special relationship' is immense. Some of the standard works are: Martin Gilbert, *Road to Victory: Winston Churchill, 1941-1945*, (London, 1986); Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Boston, 1948); Herbert Feis, *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and The Peace They Sought*, (Princeton, 1967); Joseph P. Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941*, (New York, 1976); Francis L. Loewenhiem, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas eds., *Roosevlet and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, (New York, 1975).

3.See: G. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939*, (Edinburgh, 1979); R. Shay, *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits*, (Princeton, 1977); Bruce Strang, " Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938-39", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol.5, 1994, pp.107-137; R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, (London, 1993); idem., "Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939 - A Preliminary Study," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol.10, 1975, pp.637-647; R.J.Q Adams, *British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39*, (London, 1993); John Charmley, *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace*, (London, 1989); William R. Rock, *Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and Its Critics, 1938-1939* (Archon books, 1966); Gaines Post Jr., *Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937*, (Ithaca, 1993); Ian M. Drummond, *British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939*, (London, 1972); Anthony Howard, *RAB: The Life of R.A. Butler*, (London, 1987); David Dutton, *Simon*, (London, 1992); James Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1937-1941*, (Chapel Hill, 1977); William Rock, *Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940*, (Columbus, 1988); Malcolm Murfett, *Fool-Proof Relations*, (Singapore, 1984); David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941*, (London, 1981); idem., "Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, vol.73, 1983, pp.1-65; William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945*, (Oxford, 1978).

4.Works specific to the Far East in this vein are Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, (Cambridge, 1975); Peter Lowe, *Britain in the Far East*, (London, 1981); idem., *Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937-1941*, (Oxford, 1977); Aron Shai, *Origins of the War in the East*. (London, 1976); Stephen Lyon Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937*, (Vancouver, 1975); R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones, *British Business in Asia since 1860*, (Cambridge, 1989); Donald Cameron Watt, "Chamberlain's Ambassador's", in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher eds., *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp.136-170; Antony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor*, (London, 1995).

5.In fact, this thesis can best be understood as a continuation and elaboration of Thorne's very early work, "The Shanghai Crisis of 1932: The Basis of British Policy," *The American Historical Review*, vol.75, 1970, pp.1616-1639.

6.The economic determinist, declinist school includes Paul M. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, (New York, 1976); idem., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (London, 1988); Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, (London, 1972); Aaron Friedberg, *The Weary Titan*, (Princeton, 1988); Michael G.

Fry, Illusions of Security, (Toronto, 1972); Max Beloff, Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921, (London, 1969); Christopher Hall, Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921-37, (London, 1987); Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline, (London, 1973).

7.This new school is loosely referred to as the London School, but it may be more precisely seen as the anti-declinist coalition. John Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British strategic Policy, 1919-1926, (Ithaca, 1989); idem., "The Symbol and Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States, and the One Power Standard, 1919-1921", in B.J.C. McKercher ed., Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, (London, 1991), pp.55-80; B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy, (Cambridge, 1984); idem., "Wealth, Power and the New International Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s", Diplomatic History, vol.12, 1988, pp.411-41; Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply, Anglo-Russian Relations, 1914-1917, (London, 1984); idem., Britain and the Last Tsar; David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000, (London, 1990); idem., "'Perfidious Albion' Faces the Powers", Canadian Journal of History, vol.28, 1993, pp.177-88; Gordon Martel, "The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain", International History Review, vol.13, 1991, pp.662-694; Roberta A. Dayer, "Anglo-American Monetary Policy and Rivalry in Europe and the Far East, 1919-1931", in McKercher, Anglo-American Relations, pp.158-186; Greg Kennedy, "The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927-1930", in B.J.C. McKercher ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939, (Westport, 1992), pp.149-172; idem., "Great Britain's Maritime Strength and the British Merchant Marine, 1922-1935", The Mariner's Mirror, vol.80, 1994, pp.66-76; Michael Roi, "'A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude': The British Foreign Office, American Neutrality and the Hoare-Laval Plan", Canadian Journal of History, vol.29, 1994. French, Ferris, Martel, McKercher, and Neilson have a collection of exceptional articles which specifically demolish many of the declinist school's theories. These appear in The International History Review, vol.13, No.4, Nov.1991, and, Canadian Journal of History, vol.28, No.2, August 1993.

8.French, British Way in Warfare.

9.That fact was acknowledged by the need to include the United States in the Washington Treaty system of 1921-22. A collective security arrangement meant to maintain a status quo situation in the Far East with regard to the naval power of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, it also was important for the British in terms of keeping naval races from exploding in the European context as well. See note 19.

10.The need to box or compartmentalize history through the use of -ists is especially true of the American system of historiography which depends to a great extent on codification and trying to shove works into areas of Progressive, Realist, Leftist, Left-Revisionist, Corporatist and New Revisionist, in order to bring some order to interpretation of events. Mirroring internal American academic and domestic development and turmoil, this short-hand system of reference lends itself to generalization, theorization and 'lumping', instead of fostering precision based on factual evidence. The author recognizes the special place such a structure has to the students of American diplomatic history, but refuses to participate in that process by defining where this particular study should go. Important works for the purposes of this investigation and their various schools are: from the pre-1941 to early cold war period (perhaps best described as late-Progressive or pre-Wisconsin School, but usually known as the traditional school) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s multi-volume work, The Age of Roosevelt, (Boston, 1957); Selig Addler, the Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars, (New York, 1965); Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull, 1933-1944, 2 vols., (New York, 1964); Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, (New York, 1940); Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of

Neutrality, (Chicago, 1962); Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York, 1963); Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933, (New Haven, 1957); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, (New York, 1952); Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: A Study in Responsibilities, (New Haven, 1946); idem., President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, (New Haven, 1948); Allan Nevins, The New Deal in World Affairs, 1933-1945, (New Haven, 1950); Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941, (Ann Arbor, 1955); Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy, (New York, 1951); Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War: the Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, (Chicago, 1952).

The Realist school is best represented by Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York, 1948); Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Boston, 1943); Louis Halle, Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1959); Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960, (Princeton, 1962); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, (Chicago, 1951); Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: the Great Transformation, (Chicago, 1953).

From the Revisionist or 'Wisconsin School' see William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy; idem., "The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 1763-1828", William and Mary Quarterly, vol.15, 1958, pp.419-437; idem., The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society, (New York, 1969); Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of the New Deal Diplomacy, (Madison, 1964); Robert F. Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942", in B.J. Berstein ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History, (New York, 1968).

Soft-Revisionist works, also known as Corporatist studies, include Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: the private structure of cooperation in Anglo-American economic diplomacy, 1918-1929, (Columbia, 1977); Dorthy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938; Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933, (Lexington, 1971); Arnold A. Offner, "Appeasement Revisited: The United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 1933-1940", Journal of American History, vol.64, 1977, pp.373-393; J.G. Utley, Going to War With Japan, 1937-1941, (Knoxville, 1985).

Other useful studies for this work, which are concerned with questions of American appeasement, isolation vs intervention, and collective security and cooperation, are Warren Cohen, The American Revisionists: the Lessons of Intervention in World War I, (Chicago, 1967); Geoffrey Smith, To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal and the Coming of World War II, (New York, 1973); Wayne Cole, America First: the Debate Against Intervention, 1940-1941, (New York, 1971); idem., Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, (Lincoln, 1983); Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941, (Oxford, 1974); Manfred Jona, "The United States and the Failure of collective Security in the 1930s," in John Braemen, Robert Bremner, and David Brody, eds., Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy, (Columbus, 1971), pp.241-193; Arnold Offner, American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938, (Cambridge, 1969); Edward Bennett, Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma, (Waltham, 1970).

Some interesting debates which address several of the questions about the utility of this system have occurred over the last two decades. For the historiographic debate, see Michael A Barnhart, "The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific: Synthesis Impossible?", Diplomatic History, vol.20, 1996, pp.241-160; Dorthy Borg, "Two Histories of the Far Eastern Policy of the United States: Tyler Dennett and A. Whitney Griswold", in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds, Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, pp.551-573; "Diplomatic Historians and Their Impact", by Geoffrey S. Smith, Gaddis Smith, Raymond G. O'Connor, Fred Harvey Harrington, and Richard W. Leopold, Diplomatic History, vol.9, 1985, pp.293-327; Ernest R. May, "Writing

Contemporary International History," Diplomatic History, vol.8, 1984, pp.103-113; Richard W. Leopold, "Historians and American Foreign Policy: A New Guide to the Field", Diplomatic History, vol.8, 1984; a special collection of articles, "Writing The History of U.S. Foreign Relations: A Symposium", in Diplomatic History, vol.14, 1990, pp.554-606, the most important of which are Robert J. McMahon, "The Study of American Foreign Relations:National History or International History?",; Emily S. Rosenberg, "Walking the Borders",; Richard H. Immerman, "The History of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Plea for Pluralism",; Thomas G. Paterson, "Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer",; Christopher Thorne, "Diplomatic History: Some Further Reflections". Other such works include: Richard H. Immerman, "In Search of History - and Relevancy: Breaking through the Encrustations of Interpretation", Diplomatic History; Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal", Diplomatic History, vol.10, 1986, pp.363-372; Warren F. Kuehl, "Webs of Common Interests Revisited: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Historians of American Foreign Relations", Diplomatic History, vol.10, 1986, pp.107-120; Gary R. Hess, "After the Tumult: The Wisconsin School's Tribute to William Appleman Williams", Diplomatic History. vol.12, 1988.

11.On the isolationist attitude of the United States, see Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality; Wayne S. Cole, Determinism and American Foreign Relations During the Franklin D. Roosevelt Era, (Lanham, 1995); R. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism and Europe, 1901-1950, (New York, 1991); J.D. Doenecke and J.E. Wilz, From Isolationism to War, 1931-1941, (Arlington Heights, 1991); W.L. Langer and S.E. Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation; M. Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, (Chicago, 1990); G. Kahn, "Presidential Passivity on a Nonsalient Issue: President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1935 World Court Fight", Diplomatic History, vol.4, 1980; P.G. Boyle, "The Roots of Isolationism: A Case Study", Journal of American Studies, vol.6, 1972, pp.41-50.

12.On Roosevelt's use of the media to educate the public to the world's problems, see Richard W. Steele, "The Great Debate: Roosevelt, the Media, and the Coming of the War, 1940-1941", The Journal of American History, vol.71, 1984, pp.69-92; idem., "Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a national Propaganda Agency, 1940-1941", American Historical Review, vol.75, 1970, pp.1640-1653; Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947, (Westport, 1976), pp.1-41. On the British attempts to influence the American public favourably towards aiding Britain, see John Nicholas Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American Neutrality, (Oxford, 1995). For a look at the earlier usefulness of the British Library of Information in New York (BLINY) and its role in monitoring and influencing American media outlets, see, B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929, pp.27, 33 and 66; idem., "'Deep and Latent Distrust': The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919-1929".

13.For a complete explanation of their legacy, see B.J.C. McKercher, "'Our Most Dangerous Enemy': Great Britain Pre-eminent in the 1930s", International History Review, vol.13, 1991, pp.751-783; idem., "Wealth, Power, and the New International Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s", Diplomatic History, vol.12, 1988, pp.411-441, pp.413-414; idem., "A Greater and Higher Ideal," in M.G. Fry ed., Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt, (London, 1992), pp.107-143; D.C. Watt, "America and the British Foreign-Policy-Making Elite, from Joseph Chamberlain to Anthony Eden, 1895-1956," in D.C. Watt ed., Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British foreign policy in the twentieth century, (London, 1965); Michael G. Fry, Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy, 1918-1922, (Toronto, 1972); Alan Dobson, U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946, (London, 1986); Malcolm F. Murfett, Fool-Proof Relations, Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, (Ithaca, 1985). For an interesting study of American appreciation of Britain based on the ideology of the government, see Alan P. Dobson, "Labour or Conservative: Does it Matter in

Anglo-American Relations", Journal of Contemporary History, vol.25, 1990, pp.387-408.

On the American side see, Priscilla Roberts, "The First World War and the Emergence of American Atlanticism, 1914-1920", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.5, 1994, pp.569-619; idem., ed., Sino-American Relations since 1900, (Hong Kong, 1991); Arthur P. Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present, (New York, 1992); William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (Cleveland, 1959); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933, (Ithaca, 1984); Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923, (Pittsburgh, 1969); Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945, (Cambridge, 1981). For a most concise and enlightening discussion of 'the special relationship' see David Reynolds, "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations", International Affairs, vol.65, 1988/9, pp.89-111.

14.On the debate over Vansittart's position in British foreign policy making see Chs.5 and 6 below. For a very pro-Chinese view of what Hornbeck should have done to help China, see Shizhang Hu, Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 1919-1937, (Westport, 1995). For a similar debate as to whether Sir Robert Craigie was pro-Japanese, anti-American or pro-American, or even competent in his role as Head of the America Department in the FO until 1937 and then Ambassador to Japan until Dec. 1941, see D.C. Watt, How War Came, pp.350-360; idem., "Chamberlain's Ambassadors," and Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor.

15.On the idea of mental maps and their importance in international relations see: Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917, (Oxford, 1995), pp.xi-xii and pp.3-50; Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, (Cambridge, 1969); idem., "Elitism and Foreign Policy: the Foreign Office Before the Great War," in B.J.C. McKercher and David J. Moss eds., Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe, (Edmonton, 1984), pp.19-56; Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980, (London, 1981); A.K. Henrikson, "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers," International Political Science Review, Vol.1, 1980, pp.496-530.

16.Three outstanding authors, whose works and attitudes toward the writing of history serve as models for this study, are Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came, (London, 1989); David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance; and Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-45, (London, 1978); idem., The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, The League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933, (London, 1972). For the best definition of power and its implications for relations between nations see David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1991), pp.5-37.

17.Michael A. Barnhart, "Driven By Domestics: American Relations with Japan and Korea, 1900-1945", in Warren Cohen ed., Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, (New York, 1996), pp.190-212, p.205.

18.Confidential US State Department Central File, Great Britain, 1930-1939, 711.41/261, despatch from Atherton to Hull, March 9, 1933. See also, ibid, 711.41/275, Memo of Conversation by Western European Division of the State Dept., July 14, 1934.

19.A collective security arrangement meant to maintain a status quo situation in the Far East with regard to the naval power of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, the Washington Naval Treaty system also was important for the British in terms of keeping naval races from exploding in the European context; see, Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties, (Pennsylvania, 1994); Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, (New York, 1987); Malcolm H. Murfett, "Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922", in B.J.C. McKercher ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament, pp.83-104; Stephen W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol.1, (London, 1968), p.70-75; J. Kenneth McDonald, "The Washington Conference and the Naval Balance of Power, 1921-22", in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan eds., Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, (London, 1989), pp.189-213; Ian H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, (London, 1972); Erik Goldstein and John Maurer eds., "Special Issue on the Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.4, 1993; Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: the Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, (Chicago, 1976); William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, (Austin, 1971).

20.John B. Hattendorf, "The Anglo-American Way in Maritime Strategy", Naval War College Review, Vol.63, 1990, pp.90-100.

21.Ibid, p.98.

22.Some of the better non-American works on maritime strength are Lawrence R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, (Cambridge, 1975); Stephen Roskill, The Strategy of Seapower: Its Development and Application, (London, 1962), G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the War: A Reappraisal of Rearmament, (London, 1988); Donald Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-75, (Cambridge, 1984); Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, reprint edition, (Annapolis, 1988); Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World, (London, 1934); Donald M. Schurman, Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy From Drake to Jellicoe, (London, 1981); idem., The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, (London, 1965); idem., "Imperial Defence, 1868-1887," (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1955); Barry D. Hunt, Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946, (Waterloo, 1982); Gerald Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America, (Toronto, 1950); idem., The Politics of Naval Supremacy: Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy, (Cambridge, 1965); Orest M. Babij, "The Second Labour Government and British Maritime Security, 1929-1931", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.6, 1995, pp.645-671.

Three American scholars who can be placed in the non-American category are Robert G. Albion [R. Reed ed.], Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947, (Annapolis, 1980); J.T. Sumida, "Forging the Trident: British Naval Industrial Logistics, 1914-1918", in John A. Lynn ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, (Boulder, 1993); idem., "British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918", The Journal of Military History, vol.57, 1993, pp.447-481; and David F. Trask, Captains and Cabinets, (Columbia, 1972).

23.The work of British and non-American scholars on what constitutes maritime strength has shown itself to be far more consistent in matters of research, analysis and general scholarly competence. Many, however, have unfortunately followed Paul Kennedy's declinist lead in The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London, 1976) or are a part of the 'Continental Commitment School,' whose most obvious proponent is Sir Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, (Temple Smith, 1972). Stephen W. Roskill's, Naval Policy Between the Wars, vols.1&2, (London, 1968 and 1976), would fall into the latter category, as would Arthur J. Marder's Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, (Oxford, 1981).

24.The American literature has continued to be uninspired, as academics in that country continue to place 'naval history' and the Mahanian quest for a decisive battle at the forefront of any serious maritime study. See various writings of Capt. Dudley Knox, American naval historian and contributor to the United States

Naval Institute Proceedings; idem., A History of the United States Navy, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1936); Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918, (Princeton, 1939); Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires, (William Morrow and Company, 1974); George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None, (New York, 1940); R.G. O'Connor, Force and Diplomacy, (Coral Gables, 1972; idem., Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930, (New York, 1962); William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1919-1922; E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz eds., Sea Power: A Naval History, (Prentice-Hall, 1960); James L. Stokesbury, Navy and Empire, (New York, 1983); Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941, (Newport, 1980); Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis, 1991); Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Admiral Ernest J. King, (Boston, 1980); Goldman, Sunken Treaties; and, although British by birth, Stephen Howarth's survey, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, (New York, 1991) must be included here.

Some exceptions to this trend are Dingman, Power in the Pacific; James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941; Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy, (New York, 1991); George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, (Stanford, 1994); Gary E. Weir, Building American Submarines, 1914-1940, (Washington, D.C., 1991).

25.On the practice and writing of American military and diplomatic schools of thought over this 30 year period and their attempts to explain America's international relations, see B.J.C. McKercher, "Reaching for the Brass Ring: The Recent Historiography of Interwar American Foreign Relations", Diplomatic History, vol.15, 1991, pp.565-598, particularly pp.589-598; Jerald A. Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy, vol.II, (New York, 1986), Chapters.13 & 14; Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations", in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, (Ithaca, 1980), pp.355-387; multiple authors, "Responses to Charles S. Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations", Diplomatic History, vol.5, 1981, pp.353-382; Richard H. Immerman, "In Search of History - and Relevancy: Breaking through the 'Encrustations of Interpretation'", Diplomatic History, vol.12, 1988, pp.341-356; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View", Diplomatic History, vol.10, 1986, pp.357-362; Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal", Diplomatic History, vol.10, 1986, pp.363-372; Warren F. Kuehl, "Webs of Common Interests Revisited: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Historians of American Foreign Relations", Diplomatic History, vol.10, 1986, pp.107-120; Gary R. Hess, "After the Tumult: The Wisconsin School's Tribute to William Appleman Williams", Diplomatic History, vol.12, 1988.

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CHAPTER ONE

I'LL SHOW YOU MINE IF YOU SHOW ME YOURS: ANGLO-AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, WAR PLANNING AND NAVAL COOPERATION, 1933-39

For many historians, interwar attempts to create Anglo-American naval cooperation and intelligence sharing begin and end with the less-than-spectacular efforts of Captain Ingersoll's mission to England in January 1938.[1] The Far East itself and intelligence sharing in the region between the two future allies have seldom been acknowledged as a worthwhile medium for looking at the development of Anglo-American relations. Instead, the focus of such studies have been attempts to prove that American and British intelligence gathering and distribution systems suffered from a narrow, racist, anti-Oriental approach, and therefore were either incompetent or inaccurate. And, those studies which wish to start in 1937, after the Japanese attack on China that summer, fail to appreciate the true nature of the ongoing relationships that already existed between the various intelligence and planning groups that were involved in the policy-making process.[2] Tied into the two other issues of intelligence sharing and cooperation, the idea of naval planning for a war in the Pacific has often, unfortunately, revolved only around such ideas as the preparation of the Singapore base or the American revisions to their War Plan Orange. There have been, fortunately, a few forays into the industrial planning for a war with Japan, which have given some additional insights.[3] But, the net result is a historiography that in most instances does not start early enough in its assessment, and misses the key regions and areas of cooperation.

There are four main geographic locations where sensitive information was passed between Americans and Britons. In Japan, the embassies constantly shared economic, strategic and naval information concerning their host nation. This was particularly true of the naval attaches, as well as the Ambassadors themselves. Close personal and professional ties, in some cases stretching back for decades, were the cement which created the bond that allowed delicate intelligence and strategic appreciations to pass back and forth.[4] In London and Washington, the American and British embassies were another avenue for the exchange of material. The American and British naval and military attaches were given special consideration by their host countries, and allowed to venture places and see things that their foreign counterparts could not. These special considerations also worked to create a sense of trust and cooperation over what were at times delicate and sensitive issues. The Foreign Office and State Department and the various officials within those institutions also passed along information through private channels, at times dropping simple hints or confirming queries. In other instances, open and complete exchanges of positions or appreciations were passed, with the professional understanding that no other foreign service was being given access to such exclusive treatment. In this arena, various intelligence agencies could inter-mingle, trading bits and pieces for gain, or attempting to trap and deceive the other in tests of faithfulness. Was the other side telling the truth about Japan? Did they know what we knew and did they know we knew? If so, shouldn't we tell them? These were the types of questions asked as the two diplomatic groups attempted to formulate a Far Eastern strategy against Japan, all the while keeping a wary eye on one another. Finally, there was the Chinese theatre itself, where both American and British diplomats and naval officers made individual decisions to trust one another and share secrets. There, close bonds and solid relations, based on shared dangers and a proven ability of one set of representatives to be able to trust the other, created important and lasting cooperation based on common cause.[5] Therefore, it is logical to start the exploration of this process at the one of the crucial pivots in that system of information gathering and sharing, the American and British embassies in China.

* * * * *

The head of the American mission in China, Minister Nelson T.

Johnson, respected the British position in that region and liked his British opposite number, Sir Miles Lampson. Both men worked constantly to ensure that Anglo-American relations and cooperation on their stations was a reality.[5] It was Johnson's opinion that, "The evidence of cooperation between the two countries which we were able to present was very gratifying to us, for we are both committed to the feeling that the United States and Great Britain can and should be together in the work of stabilizing the world conditions."[6] When asked whether the British acts of sharing information and close coordination of tactics in the region were really signs of a willingness to cooperate with the United States or simply the artful playing of a waiting game that would protect their Imperial interests, Johnson revealed an insightful and lucid understanding of the British situation in the Far East:

> ...so far as Great Britain's representative in China was concerned, he and I worked together very intimately and closely throughout all of this difficulty. There is in England...a body of conservative opinion which has, and still regrets [the end of] the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. There is no doubt in my mind that the British Government has had to carry water between that camp and the other camp which has been playing the game with us.[7]

Other British officials in China were in close and intimate contact with the American legation, sharing confidential and secret information about the deliberations of the Lytton Commission in 1932. The Commission, set up by the League of Nations to investigate the origins of the Sino-Japanese dispute of that year, was chaired by Britain's Lord Lytton. During its deliberations (which eventually reached the same conclusion as the British Foreign Office and branded Japan as the aggressor nation in that dispute [8]), Lord Lytton's secretary, a Mr. Astor, leaked confidential documents concerning the Commission's debates, through an American member of the Commission, Dr. G.H. Blakeslee, to Johnson.[9] Johnson then commented on the Commission's proposals, allowing Blakeslee to take his unofficial 'American' perspective back with him for the group to consider. The close communications between the Commission and the American diplomats in China allowed that British-dominated body to have the unofficial, yet useful, exchanges of the opinion that helped them avoid antagonizing the Americans, or proposing anything that would be unacceptable to America's Far Eastern foreign policy.[10] Johnson, in particular, counselled the Commission not to entertain the idea of a Chinese-Japanese alliance over Manchuria based on the idea of one coming to the other's aid if attacked by a third party. That proposal was obviously aimed against the Soviet Union, and Johnson's argument was that any such action was dangerous and would result in creating a position that was "a challenge and a certain invitation to war."[11] American concerns and pressures were, therefore, displayed through a discreet route while the Commission went about its task.

That sort of exchange of information, useful for keeping the other nation in the game and allowing it to voice any concerns unofficially before anything became policy, also occurred in Japan between the British and American embassy staff. In July, 1933, the Foreign Office was concerned that the Americans might have been negotiating an arbitration treaty with the Japanese. The US embassy alleviated those fears by allowing one of its Counsellors, Edwin L. Neville, to show a British Counsellor, Mr. Cunningham, the telegrams which had been passing back and forth between Ambassador Grew and the State Department.[12] That openness and the evidence in the confidential memoranda and telegrams not only convinced the British that there was no plot on the part of the American State Department to freeze the British out of any negotiations with Japan, but also reinforced the traditional strong ties of cooperation and liaison that had existed between the two embassies. Neville also maintained close and intimate contact with T.M. Snow, Counsellor in His Majesty's Embassy in Tokyo, whose views on Japan and Russia were held in high regard by the Foreign Office and other embassy members, including Sir Francis O. Lindley, the British Ambassador. The maintenance of such lines of communication allowed the British embassy confidently to assess what the American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, was trying to do in his dealings with

Japan. Snow, after many discussions with Neville about what direction the embassy planned to go in trying to improve American-Japanese relations, gave a widely-read and valued report that outlined how the Americans were trying to improve those relations, indicated what the American embassy's views on whether the US should be involved in the Pacific were, and, argued how Britain's position and relations with Japan could be affected.[13] Even after Lindley returned to England, and was replaced by Sir Robert Henry Clive, on May 18, 1934, the new abassador maintained very warm and close relations with Grew.[14] Armed with such insights, the Foreign Office had the opportunity to compare notes with other departments and sources, to try and put together an accurate map of American perceptions of the region. The same process was true for the State Department, and for the Royal and US navies.

Both the British and American representatives in Japan and China kept in close and constant touch with their respective senior naval commanders in the region. Lampson, Lindley, Johnson and Grew all maintained good relations with Admirals such as Frank Brooks Upham (USN), Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), Asiatic Fleet and Sir Frederic C. Dreyer (RN), C-in-C China Squadron in 1933.[15] This close-working relationship between the naval and political representatives was also continued by the men who followed. Lampson kept Johnson well informed of Admiral Dreyer's study of the Anglo-Japanese question and his attempts to foster better relations between the RN and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The Americans were interested to know whether the Royal Navy was willing to accommodate Japanese demands for a larger navy. By keeping a watch on Dreyer and how he approached the Japanese, intelligent deductions about British naval policy towards Japan could be made by the Americans.[16] As well, the American and British navies had their own strong tradition of informal cooperation in the Far East.[17]

In late 1933, Dreyer and Upham had collaborated to construct a simple code for communication between themselves in the event of any trouble arising.[18] The feeling between the two Admirals was that "...we should have at our disposal a ready means of concerting action for the protection of our respective national interests without first announcing to all the world what we intended to do."[19] The need for such a code was related to trouble not only with the Japanese, but also with the Chinese. It marked a distinct attempt, however, for the two navies to cooperate in the face of threats to common interests. However, a fear that such collaboration would be seen by other powers as a more significant pact or formal agreement caused Dreyer to ask Upham to forgo the idea of using the code and to destroy his copy of it.[20] Besides some knowledge of British codes, Upham was also privy to the discussions held in Singapore on January 23 and 24, 1934, which saw RN and Dominion senior naval officers and staffs debate whether the British should withdraw from Hong Kong and Singapore. Those talks had larger consequences. The British decision to bring forward the completion date for the Singapore naval base to 1938, and the Royal Navy's fears of an American withdrawal from the Philippines and the resulting decline of the US as a naval power in that region, were relayed by Upham to Admiral William H. Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).[21] Upham's recommendations to Standley and his assessment of the situation concerning how to deal with Japan reflected several themes which were common to American Asiatic Fleet commanders: the United States should make a firm committment to establishing itself as a serious naval power in the Pacific, or, failing this, to withdraw; force would be required to meet the Japanese threat and that threat would best be met in conjunction with the British and any other powers with interests similar to the Americans.[22] Clearly, early in Roosevelt's first administration, there was a desire on the part of the two western navies to accommodate each other and cooperate to a large degree, even if their national visions were not identical. Service rivalry and the need to protect sensitive technical and strategic information were still obstacles to complete Anglo-American naval cooperation in 1933, but they were obstacles which were being continually eroded.[23]

During the first year of Roosevelt's presidency, the Admiralty extended "....exceptionally unrestricted latitude to visit activities in the shore establishment of the Royal Navy..." to the American naval attache and his staff in London.[24] The Director of Naval Intelligence, Sir Oswyn A.R. Murray and others in charge of the Admiralty's intelligence organization, in accordance with general Admiralty policy, were determined to make Anglo-American naval relations, at this informal level, as close and cooperative in tone as possible. The Admiralty gave many special courtesies and made gestures to the American Naval Attache, Captain A.L. Bristol and his Assistant, Captain H.S. Howard in 1933, things ranging from visits to facilities to offers of cruises with Royal Navy vessels. Bristol was wary of the attention, fearing that he might be placed in a compromising position. He, as well as Captain (USN) Hayne Ellis, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), were concerned that if Bristol accepted too many of these 'generous' offers, then the USN would be put in the position of having to offer reciprocal visits.[25] When, taken on a tour of the Gunnery School (Whale Island), the battlecruiser NELSON, the Torpedo School (DEFIANCE), and a thorough look around the heavy cruiser DORSETSHIRE, (just shortly after presenting himself to the Admiralty), Bristol wrote Ellis specifically to let him know that "...there was no particular request for these inspections on my part."[26] When a suggestion of a short cruise on a RN ship was hinted at by Bristol's friends in the Admiralty, he asked Ellis for clearance and explained the Admiralty's thinking about their relations with him:

> The farther one gets from London the more free and easy the British Navy becomes, particularly towards Americans. Here in London, the idea is constantly to the fore that anything that they do for me will be found out and they will be in the position of having to extend the same to the Naval Attaches of other countries. Such a visit, if I accepted, would unquestionably carry with it reciprocity treatment at some time in the future.[27]

Ellis informed Bristol that the DNI was not worried about the reciprocity aspect and such a cruise would be good for relations.[28] The Admiralty's desire to woo Bristol also extended to his being allowed to tour the Royal Navy aircraft carriers COURAGEOUS and FURIOUS in December, 1933.[29]

In return, Captain (RN) A.R. Dewar, the British naval attache in Washington, asked Ellis for permission to visit the New York Navy Yard. Ellis had no objection to reciprocating the Admiralty's treatment of the American naval representatives in London and quickly gave his consent, with the proviso that Dewar not be shown anything of a secret nature or any "...late types of confidential material."[30] The DNI specifically instructed the Commandant of the Third Naval District to withhold information concerning

> (1) Remote control searchlight installations or developments. (2) All matters connected with radio and sound equipment and developments. (3) Remote control of AA guns. It is planned to negotiate an exchange of information with the British Admiralty in regard to the following: (a) Latest British practice with respect to air pressure in firerooms, pressure drop through burners, oil pressure used, etc. Also on British water gages, draft gages, feed regulators and CO2 indicators. Also difficulties of operation or maintenance of British boilers. (b) British condenser installations, operations difficulties, etc. (c) British propeller design for high speed ships, all types. (d) British submarines. and conversations on these subjects should be limited to matters of general nature.[31]

In an effort to benefit from the high standard of British naval construction and expertise, close technical cooperation was certainly on the mind of the DNI and others within the USN.[32] On the other hand, the Admiralty was more interested in trying to get a handle on whether the American navy was capable of fighting a war in the Pacific.[33]

In late 1933, Dewar approached the Americans about a tour of various industrial plants and naval facilities on the West Coast and Hawaii.[34] The object of the tour was to ascertain the ability of the United States Navy to support a Fleet in the Pacific. Dewar wished to begin his tour in late February, 1934 and to continue on until the end of May.[35] Japanese requests to see Pearl Harbor had just been denied by the DNI, but Ellis was quick to make special arrangements for the British attache.[36] On December 4, 1933, Ellis informed Dewar that all the installations the attache wished to see were approved unconditionally, except Pearl. Ellis did not, however, close the door on the British request. If certain conditions were met, then Dewar would be allowed access to that sensitive base:

> It is our policy to not grant permission for foreign officers to visit those stations. However, I have discussed the matter with the Chief of Naval Operations and we have decided that in view of the friendly relations existing between our two countries and in anticipation of similar exceptions from your government to our Naval Attache, we will be glad to arrange for you to make those visits. We ask, however, that you give as little publicity as possible to the fact that you are being permitted to visit Pearl Harbor.[37]

In preparation for Dewar's tour, and to improve Anglo-American naval relations for that future exchange of information, Ellis helped pave the way for the attache, sending personal requests to the Commandants of various Naval District to give special treatment to the RN Captain. He informed Rear Admiral D.F. Sellers, the C-in-C, US Fleet, that it would be all right to show Dewar through the aircraft carrier SARATOGA, because the American attache in London had been granted a visit to one of the British carriers, during which "...he went over it very thoroughly."[38] The DNI also hinted to Rear Admiral W.T. Tarrant, Commandant of the 11th Naval District, that, regarding Dewar's visit to facilities in San Diego, it would be acceptable to give him special treatment in this case because "For your information only - we work very closely with the British Attaches."[39] These grantings of exceptions, especially with regard to allowing a foreigner to tour one of the large aircraft carriers and its sensitive technical equipment (especially anything to do with the arresting gear), signaled that a very special relationship at this informal level was a reality indeed.[40]

The tour itself allowed for a fairly free exchange of information and certainly allowed the affable Dewar the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with various high-ranking American naval officers. During his visit to the US Naval Air Station in San Diego, Dewar confirmed a number of facts about British carrier operations for the Commanding Officer of the Station, even though the later did not think Dewar knew or was particularly interested in aviation matters.[41] Dewar was reported to have confirmed that the British were somewhat behind the Americans in the development of arresting gear and had recently resumed development of such devices along the lines utilized by the USN. Some of the results of that development were already in service, but not in any general way. Dewar also informed the Americans that the new carrier under construction would probably around 20,000 tons, similar to the YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE in size. As well, on the matter of flush deck versus island construction, he was of the opinion that the latter was the style preferred by the RN. As for the tactical use of carriers with the British fleet, the attache had revealed that

> ...they [the British] had been much concerned over the necessity for launching carrier airplanes into the wind when tactical considerations were such as to make this a most undesirable direction into which to steam. The impression was obtained that as a matter of policy they had adopted a compromise of keeping their carriers sufficiently remote from the battle line to permit such maneuvering.[42]

Reports from Pearl Harbor, Mare Island, Puget Sound, and San Diego indicated that Dewar was interested in information that would allow him to judge the level of support the Americans had prepared on the West Coast for the Pacific Fleet. He asked for, and was given information on labour forces, new shore construction, dredging work, dry docks, shop areas of the bases, technical details of ship construction, plant production capacity, funding schemes, and building programs. At the same time, he golfed and dined in the company of the American naval officers, spreading the message of good relations between and common interests of the USN and RN.[43] The relationship between the British naval officers in America and the American naval officers with whom they came in contact appeared to be based on a mutual trust that neither afforded any other nation's naval representatives, even as early as 1933-34. If matters were sensitive, they were avoided. For the Americans, at least, the general tone of the informal Anglo-American naval relationship was one in which the British were almost always as honest and forthcoming as they could be. That sense of trust and confidence certainly carried on into 1935, even when such characters as the Naval Attache and American DNI changed.

The Admiralty's appointments to the Washington embassy were usually divided into two groups: a "salt" sailor and an engineering officer. The Naval Attache was the "salt", while the Assistant Naval Attache was the engineering officer. In September, 1935, Captain F.C. Bradley became the British Naval Attache. His Assistant, replacing Orr in December, 1934, was Commander A.L.P. Mark-Wardlaw.[44] Captain W.D. Puleston had become DNI by December, 1934. Under this regime, the British attaches were still given access to aircraft and naval plants, as well as to industrial laboratories. The nature of their visits suggests that their efforts were aimed not so much on the collection of specific technical data, but, instead, at an ongoing attempt to evaluate the USN's mobilization and infra-structure developments for fighting a war with Japan.[45] Certainly, the Foreign Office had requested the Washington Embassy to find out whether the official American position was to 'scuttle' out of the Far East or to stay and fight to defend the Philippines and their other interests in the region.[46] Puleston was aware of this ongoing assessment process, and did a great deal to make the task as easy as possible.[47] While an unwillingness to divulge all technical or policy information was present in relations between USN and RN representatives, a willingness to work with one another, much more so than with any other navy, was present in the relationship. British actions designed to establish sympathetic relations with American naval officers were also aimed at countering the increased Japanese propaganda campaigns, which all had an anti-British tone. These Japanese productions caused some concern among Foreign Office officials, but were thought to be containable, especially given the lack of fertile ground in the United States from which any pro-Japanese movement could sprout.[48]

By the end of 1934, the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC), under the leadership of Major (later Sir) Desmond Morton, an organization within the Committee of Imperial Defence umbrella which utilized material from political as well from as service departments, was able to submit a detailed evaluation of the American ability mobilise its industry in time of war.[49] The IIC was of the opinion that in a Far Eastern war the Americans possessed the natural and industrial resources to maintain a large Navy with no serious difficulty. If a large military effort, that is to say, the raising of a great Army were required, then some difficulties could arise. The key problems for the Americans, according to the IIC, were limitations in certain capacities: a shortage of precision instrument and optical industries, a deficiency in railway rolling stock, a lack of a proper appreciation of the financing necessary for a national mobilization scheme, no educational or preparatory orders for armament stores were being placed with civil industry in peace time, the holding of small reserves of finished armaments, and no reserves at all of special purpose machine tools, jigs and gauges. These factors all combined to create the possibility of a great time-lag occurring in American mobilization before the required levels of output could be achieved. In short, there was some doubt as to how seriously the United States approached the idea of naval and industrial rearmament, especially given the natural safety provided by geography.[50] If properly organized, especially in man-power and material production, the US would have no equal. Such a power, especially in the age of industrialized warfare, was not a force to be ignored or alienated. During the preliminary and actual discussions of the 1935 London Naval Conference, those British agencies tied to manufacturing and to monitoring Anglo-American relations, especially naval relations, were well aware of the vast naval potential that lay still dormant in the United States.

In November, 1934, American policy-makers felt there was some chance that Great Britain was attempting to re-create the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in order to protect imperial interests in the Far East.[51] That was a critical period in the development of Anglo-American naval relations, as both sides worked to establish a sense of trust and security with each other's Far Eastern policy and naval position. Rear-Admiral G.C. Dickens (RN), the DNI, warned the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) against letting pro-Japanese commentators attack the course of the preliminary naval conversations. He feared that such commentary, if aired, would add fuel to the fire of American suspicions. The BBC agreed with his attempt to prevent the talks from being permanently damaged, and also offered to use any person that the Admiralty wanted to talk on the naval conversations.[52] Aware of the chance to publicly counter anti-British American newspapers, the Foreign Office prepared a speech for the secretary of foreign affairs, Sir John Simon, to give in case such action was required. He gave the speech in mid-December as the preliminary stages of the talks wrapped-up, wanting to ensure that an image of progress and cooperation were presented to both the British and American public .[53] Any possibility of a public display of pro-Japanese or anti-American sentiment was avoided, thus allowing the further development and improvement of Anglo-American relations.

American naval intelligence sources in Great Britain responded well to British initiatives to create a friendly and cooperative atmosphere. While various American political and diplomatic sources were catering to the idea that there was a great risk of the British and Japanese reuniting, Captain W.S. Anderson, the US Naval Attache in London, reassured the USN that there was probably not that much to worry about. Anderson told the DNI that

> Not just in connection with the approaching conversations, but in general, there seems to be a current belief that the British policy at present contemplates paying particular attention to friendship and good understanding with the Japanese. To my mind this does not mean that the British are entirely pleased with everything the Japanese have said or done, but that the British propose to follow what seems to them the only practicable policy, that is, friendship - what may be called stressed friendship.[54]

Anderson, like so many American officers who had any sustained contact with their British counterparts, was willing to grant a certain degree of pragmatism to Great Britain's naval situation. Indeed, by the end of 1935, Anderson was of the opinion that the Admiralty offered him better access to officers of high rank than was afforded his counterparts in Washington:

> Summing the whole situation up, so far as I am personally concerned I have found the higher officers and officials the most communicative, as there is a zone of rank below senior Captains dow to, say, Lieutenant Commanders which, if at the Admiralty, apparently feels some inhibitions in talking with a Naval Attache on certain subjects. It is difficult to make comparison, but I believe our relations with officers of authoritative rank and position surpasses those enjoyed by our opposite numbers in Washington, whereas they have probably more intercourse with officers of more junior ranks.[55]

But, if good relations between the two navies was important, it was equally vital that the American politicians were subjected to a similar dose of kindness by the British Admiralty, so that they, too, might develop that spirit of acceptance of Britain's strategic requirements.

Dickens and the Admiralty intelligence community were instrumental in wooing President Roosevelt himself in 1935, in order to garner what goodwill they could. Their approach was not to lecture on or promote the British position to the President. Instead, they catered to one of his private loves: naval history. Roosevelt was very interested in the British expedition of 1777, which had gone down the Hudson River and bombarded what was now Hyde Park and burnt part of Kingston, New York. In December, 1933, Roosevelt had asked the American Ambassador to England, Robert W. Bingham, if he could get the documents and logs of HMS PRESTON and DEPENDENCE. The President hoped to re-create the movements and campaign of the British warships, which had left a number of cannon balls planted in his ancestral grounds.[56] Dickens and the Admiralty complied with FDR's request, providing the logs and documents in question. Those actions earned Dickens and his colleagues the President's undying gratitude, as he raved about the material and instructed Bingham to take advantage of Dickens' generous nature and secure more information.[57] That exchange, while not a supreme act of intelligence sharing or Anglo-American cooperation, came at a critical time, when Roosevelt was reflecting on whether to accept and trust Great Britain's naval and Far Eastern position. While a direct connection between any later acceptance of the British situation cannot be shown, it is not unnatural to credit these small acts with having some effect on how FDR viewed the RN and its strategic needs.

In the Philippines, relations between the British Consulate in Manila and various American military and diplomatic figures stationed there provided the Admiralty and Foreign Office with another source of information and an avenue for the dissemination of opinion. Not under the watchful eye of a full Ambassador and his staff, and removed from close control by the Foreign Office or State Department because of its secondary status in the region, Manila provided a Far Eastern equivalent to Lisbon, as a place where free, if discreet, conversations could be had. In May, 1935, Foreign Office officials were still trying to assess whether the United States planned to abandon the Philippines and scuttle out of the Far East, or would challenge Japan's expansion. The British Acting Consul-General, A.P. Blunt, conducted confidential discussions with Major General Frank Parker, the General Officer Commanding United States troops in the Philippines, in order to try and clarify the picture. The General informed Blunt that it was his opinion that the American flag would remain in the Philippines for some time to come. Parker also was emphatic in his statements to Blunt about how the Anglo-Saxon races needed to cooperate in their Far Eastern policies.[58] Those views were echoed by Rear Admiral A.H. Allen (USN), who commanded the American naval base at Cavite and Joseph R. Hayden, the Acting Governor General. Both men expressed the belief that it would be at least ten years before any American withdrawal from the Philippines was achieved.[59] Furthermore, both Parker and Allen offered Blunt "...access to any 'intelligence' at their disposal."[60] By August, that offer had been translated into action. During a call to Colonel J.B. Richardson, the chief of the Intelligence Section of the US Army HQ in Manila, Blunt was told how and why General MacArthur was coming to the Philippines and what the future military strength of the islands was to be. Because of his good relations with Parks, Blunt believed that he was being told the truth, as did the American Department of the Foreign Office, who placed great store in Blunt's ability to procure accurate information.[61] Such close relations allowed both nations to draw a clearer map of where their paths in the Pacific were leading.

In 1936, after the successful conclusion of the Second London Naval Conference, Anglo-American cooperation, at the formal and informal levels, on Far Eastern and naval matters increased. Now driven by concerns over possibly having to deal with the Italian and German navies in Europe, British strategic planners hoped to get a firm committment from the United States to help safeguard the Far East, thus allowing the RN to concentrate on European waters.[62] Therefore, Admiralty and Foreign Office officials kept the American embassy informed of the technical aspects and developments of the Anglo-Soviet bilateral naval agreement talks, which began in March, 1936.[63] The new British DNI, Rear Admiral J.A.G. Troup, also maintained a close relationship with the American Naval Attache, discussing problems of mutual interest.[64] Captain Anderson was treated to a Mediterranean cruise by the Royal Navy in the spring of 1936, although with certain conditions:

> When this trip was broached to the Admiralty and their approval requested, it was represented that the Naval Attache would exercise great reserve in speaking about the trip, that it would ostensibly be a holiday trip, and that if ever forced into a position in which he had to speak about it to his colleagues or anyone else he would adhere to the proposition that it was a holiday trip. These reports are accordingly all confidential and it is hoped that nothing will be said about this trip in Washington which might compromise it. The Admiralty distinctly desire that they not be approached for approval of similar trips by all Naval Attaches.[65]

In particular, the Admiralty did not want to have to fend off requests from the Japanese Naval Attache for similar tours. Nor did they wish to arrange a reciprocal exchange of information on the methods of detecting and destroying submarines as Anderson had also suggested.[66] However, the American Attache's cruise had more to do with Anglo-American relations than simply making better contacts with the RN.

In setting up the cruise, Anderson had met with the British DNI. During that meeting, he had broached the idea of increased cooperation in intelligence between the RN and USN, mentioning the reciprocal visit and submarine ideas. Besides those two rejected ideas, which had been "informal and unauthorized requests," Anderson had made two specific requests for the reciprocal exchange of information on (1) the Japanese Mandated Islands in the North Pacific, and (2) unexpected movements of the Japanese Navy or mercantile fleet which might give a warning of an impending war. The Admiralty had no objection to such an arrangement, as it was seen to be "...advantageous from the strategical point of view."[67] There was, of course, the danger that the Japanese would find out about the arrangement and take offense. Although the Admiralty thought the risk of such discovery was slight, they desired the Foreign Office's view.

The American Department led the debate within the Foreign Office as to whether this was a good time to move closer to the United States through such action. P.H. Gore-Booth, a senior official in the American Department whose views on the United States were well respected within the FO, started the ball rolling with a paper outlining the pros and cons of taking up Captain Anderson's offer. On the con side, Gore-Booth pointed to the American idea of trying to manufacture an Anglo-American joint policy or declaration aimed specifically at Japan. Norman Davis, the chief negotiator for the United States during the 1935 London Naval Conference, had been particularly insistent on trying to get such an arrangement.[68] There was also fear that the State Department would leak the news of such intelligence cooperation to the press in order to further their own position: "...the United States would not fear the consequences of a disclosure of such an arrangement, since the Americans are not particularly popular in Japan anyhow, whereas we have still some capital of friendship to lose in that country, and discriminatory measure by us would be ill-received and to some extent harmful."[69] On the pro side, Gore-Booth summed up the general Foreign Office attitude towards the United States admirably, arguing that

> It is a broad political fact that there is a constant danger of our acting on the once-bitten-twice-shy principle and taking United

> States suggestions of this kind too pedantically. I venture to think that sooner or later what might be called "special relations" ought to and will subsist between the British Commonwealth and the United States, if indeed they do not subsist already, and anything which tends to further this special relationship, be it assistance in the suppression of liquor smuggling or exchange of naval information, seems to merit consideration from a general as well as the special point of view. For that reason it would be a pity, I suggest, to reject any suggestion of this kind from the United States side out of hand, on grounds of an appearance of immediate impracticability, - and one cannot believe that this suggestion is just a bright idea of Captain Anderson's.[70]

Gore-Booth's suggestion for working around the dual problems of the Japanese discovering matters or the State Department trying to steal a march was to have a verbal understanding only. The extent of information that would be exchanged would be left open, with much of the maintenance of the agreement left to the personalities of the attaches. J.M. Troutbeck (who would become head of the American Department in 1937 when Craigie left to become the Ambassador to Japan), thought that the paper did not properly emphasize the advantages to be had by moving closer to the US. It was his view that, given Great Britain's need for an ally in the Pacific, it would be foolish to refuse the American offer.[71] Other departments in the FO concurred. The Far Eastern Department rejected the idea of a formal agreement to exchange information, but it too favoured dealing frankly with the Americans in an informal and safe fashion that avoided the usual diplomatic machinery.[72]

Others empahsized caution. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent undersecretary of state, objected most strenuously, calling such a move dangerous. His suspicions of the United States caused him to believe that sooner or later the arrangement would be given away by the Americans. Without any formal agreement for support in the Far East from the US, Vansittart was unwilling to chase too far after better relations if there was any danger Great Britain might find herself facing an irritate Japan alone. However, he, too, was torn in his desire for better relations with the US in order to alleviate the growing dangers facing Great Britain's strategic position around the globe. His suggestion was simply to let the matter drop for now and wait to see if Anderson returned to the matter.

If the American Naval Attache brought it up again, Vansittart then agreed to follow Robert Craigie's suggestion as to what action to take.[73] Craigie acknowledged Britain's need to keep its distance from the United States on matters regarding Japan, but argued in favour of cooperating with the Americans at some level. He suggested that Great Britain had just as much to gain from such an arrangement as did the United States and that an oral exchange was the best course to take. Tied to the understanding that had been reached with the Americans during the Second London Naval Conference talks, Craigie felt such an exchange could be justified as being beneficial to the Empire. What was important was to not let a situation be created where it appeared as if Japan were being singled out by both western nations.[74] Sir John Simon, former secretary of state for foreign affairs also agreed with Craigie as well, telling the new secretary of state, Anthony Eden, that he needed to be cautious not to be put into a position where the US could leave Britain "holding the baby" in the Far East.[75] The end result was Eden approved letting the matter drop temporarily because of the uncertainty of whether the Americans were really serious about cooperating with Great Britain against Japan. He acknowledged the benefits such actions could have on Anglo-American relations, but was still concerned about Japan's appearing to be the target of such cooperation. If Anderson brought the matter up again, however, then the Attache would

> ...simply be informed orally that the recent conclusion of the London Naval Treaty, coupled with the re-affirmation of the intention of the United States and the United Kingdom to abstain from any form of naval competition, appear to His Majesty's Government to justify a free exchange of information between both countries on all questions which seem likely to affect that Treaty.[76]

While this settled matters at the FO, other service departments had to deal with similar problems. The Admiralty also avoided being drawn into any exact definition of the scope of any information to be exchanged.

Apart from prodding the Foreign Office into having to think about greater intelligence sharing with the United States, Anderson's cruise with the RN was a very useful exercise. The RN allowed Anderson to inspect a triple sixteen-inch turret on the NELSON, a double fifteen-inch turret on the older battleship BARHAM, a double eight-inch turret on the heavy cruiser LONDON, and a double six-inch turret on the light cruiser GALATEA.[77] The American Attache also asked about and was given information on developments in British anti-submarine warfare. The responses he received made him believe that the RN, like the USN, had not solved the problem of detecting and destroying of the undersea vessels and it remained a troublesome problem. Anderson also discussed gunnery fire control methods, spotting doctrine, camouflage paint, and visited the bases at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Haifa and Malta. Despite the Admiralty's rejection of the idea of closer, open relations, Anderson was much impressed by his special treatment and the information and insights afforded him. His report to the DNI included information on valuable and open talks with senior British officers on a variety of topics. Overall, his assessment was that

> In general it an be said that the trip was highly satisfactory. The Naval Attache received every possible courtesy and consideration. He feels his knowledge of the British Navy has been definitely increased by the enlarged circle of contacts and the numerous visits to British ships resulting from this trip. It is suggested that a similar visit to the British Mediterranean Fleet and Bases, including at least Gibraltar and Malta, could with advantage be made by each Naval Attache accredited to London, say, after he had been at this post in London for about a year to establish acquaintances which would be of value to him on such a trip....It is proper to state that the British had their necessary reserves with regard to what was shown, just as we have. For example, at Gibraltar the vessels went out for a "Queen Bee" firing which the N.A. had no opportunity of witnessing. It is a fact, however, that the N.A. was on various occasions shown particular items which our Regulations do not permit to be shown to foreigners or others than individuals in our military service.[78]

Anderson's criticism of the level of access given his British counterparts in Washington certainly applied to the Admiralty's attempts to acquire information on American carrier operations.

In mid-1936, in the midst of the Ethiopian crisis, in the aftermath of the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and with Anglo-Soviet naval discussions ongoing, the First Sea Lord, Admiral A. Ernle M. Chatfield, began to push for great improvements to the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm (FAA).[79] To help in the fight to strengthen the FAA, the RN attempted to obtain as much information as it could from the USN on its carrier operations, particularly on technical items such as aircraft design, arresting gear and catapults.[80] As a first step, then, and as a quid pro quo for the openness shown to Captain Anderson, the Admiralty directed the Naval Attache and his staff in Washington to ask for admittance to the American vessels. How this initiative was dealt with was representative of the ongoing exchange between the RN and USN of technical information on battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, as well as naval bases and support facilities, that grew in size and scope from 1936 until September, 1939, after which it expanded even more rapidly.

Captain Anderson and his staff in London had been very careful to avoid touring an British carriers specifically, in order to be able to avoid setting a precedent for reciprocity.[81] However, the previous visits by Captain Bristol had to be acknowledged by the USN. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William H. Standley, knew that American naval personnel in London had visited the British carriers, and therefore did not hesitate to allow Captain Bradley to visit two older carriers, the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, a privilege not extended to any other nation's Naval Attache. While the British Naval Attaches were being given preferential treatment, they were still not allowed on board the new RANGER or any other American carrier. Even on the old carriers "The chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics has no objection to such an inspection provided details of arresting gear are not shown and no information be given as to time factors involved in getting off and taking on planes."[82] The DNI, Puleston contacted Anderson to fill him in on the special treatment being given the British and what they were being allowed to see. He instructed the Attache that

> In general, it is the policy of the Navy Department not to authorize visits of foreigners to aircraft carriers. Special circumstances may arise however where it appears advantageous to make a particular exception in the case of the older carriers, but no exceptions

> whatever will be made in the case of new carriers, including the RANGER.[83]

Puleston told Anderson, that therefore, it would be a good idea not to encourage any attempt by the Admiralty to get him aboard a British carrier. However, this attitude would change quite dramatically over the next two and a half years, especially after the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937 and Hitler's aggressive moves in Europe in 1938. But, in the meantime, other attempts were made to garner information about the performance of American carriers.

Captain Bradley did indeed visit the SARATOGA in 1936 and again in 1937, but he was not the only British naval officer to 'pump' the Americans for information on carrier operations.[84] In February, 1938, Group Captain G.C. Pirie, the British Air Attache, paid a visit to the LEXINGTON. He compared notes with the Americans, commenting particularly on the larger compliment of aircraft on the American carriers. Pirie told the Americans that British carriers operated with their aircraft on the hanger deck due to the more severe weather conditions under which they operated. The Americans could keep their aircraft on deck because of the relative calm of the Pacific, their main theatre of operations.[85] Admiralty attempts to unearth insights into planned American carrier operations in the Pacific continued with the visit of Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten (RN) to the US Air Station in Pensacola in May. Mountbatten told his hosts that British torpedo planes were considered to be a very valuable tactical asset, and was quite open in the information that he provided his host about the RN's utilization of such aircraft:

> He stated that the British had an extremely satisfactory torpedo but had been generally unsuccessful in coordinating attack with surface light forces. He thought that torpedo planes were very vulnerable during attack and doubted the value of smoke in masking attack....The Captain said that British were taking steps to increase the number of planes on board their carriers. He further stated that we change personnel of carrier squadrons much oftener than in British practice and that our squadrons do not spend so much time embarked. He wondered if our carrier squadrons could be considered ready for war according to European standards.[86]

Immediately following Mountbatten's visit, Commander John Caspar (RN), a member of the British Air Mission touring the United States under Lord Weir, also visited Pensacola as well. He, too, was most interested in naval aviation, especially in American training and operational procedures. Caspar continued to question the Americans along the same lines as had Mountbatten. How could the Americans think that they were ready to fight a war in the Pacific when so much of their training and time was spent on shore, especially when compared to the British system? Caspar was also very free in his discussions of the operations of the new British carrier, the ARK ROYAL. According to Caspar, the new carrier contained no catapults and had arresting gear and a barrier, a new departure for British carrier operations.[87] These types of visits and exchanges of technical and operational data, as well as the increased fear of Japanese and German aggression, paid off for the British. By the summer of 1939, the Admiral D. Leahy, CNO, was allowing British naval officers full access to formerly secret carrier operation information. In July, Captain R.M. Ellis (RN) was allowed to spend time in the carrier gear section of the Bureau of Aeronautics, going through plans and talking to experts.[88] This gear, improved by the USN's years of experimentation on the RANGER, was a vital part of American carrier operations, especially with regard to the speed with which landing aircraft could be captured and then stowed so that the next plane could land. Rapid recovery of aircraft was vital to the operation of US aircraft carriers. After his time in the Bureau, Ellis believed that he needed a demonstration, in order to monitor flight operations and the arresting gear on the SARATOGA. The American response underlined the high level of Anglo-American cooperation. Leahy instructed the C-in-C US Fleet that:

> He [Ellis] believes that a two day demonstration of actual flying on and off the SARATOGA will be all that he needs and that one or two days inspecting the gear and its plan, while SRATOGA is at anchor during the following week, will be sufficient. Whether the above days of actual demonstration and of inspection of the gear prove sufficient will, of course, depend on the facility with which he learns. As stated in paragraph 4 of reference (a), he is at liberty to witness flight operations and to inspect the gear until satisfied.[89]

The years of informal cooperation and information sharing by the various naval attaches and their respective navies had paid off. By the summer of 1939, Anglo-American naval cooperation was a reality. But, importantly for Anglo-American relations as a whole, this type of sub-official liaison and cooperation had also been encouraged in other areas.

In China, Nelson T. Johnson had had some trouble adjusting to the departure of Lampson. Lampson's replacement, Sir Alexander Cadogan and his counselor R.G. Howe, had not immediately established the same intimate relations as had Lampson and his Counsellor E.M.B. Ingram. Instead, Johnson thought that the British embassy (the American and British mission were given embassy status in 1936) had not been as communicative as it had once been. Part of the reason for this was the lack of knowledge and experience the two British officials had of China. This was also due "... partly to the fact that they were both fresh from Europe where the relations between our several representatives are perhaps not as informal and cordial as they were here under the Lampson regime."[90] Johnson felt that Cadogan, while always showing the Americans the files or documents requested, never ventured to give out such information on his own. While confidential information still continued to pass between the two embassies and there was not a rift between them, the free and open atmosphere that had been a hallmark of Anglo-American relations in China at that level had been strained. Johnson looked forward to a new British representative arriving in late 1936 to replace Cadogan, who had been called back for bigger and better things in the Foreign Office.[91] On the other hand, in London, relations between Ambassador Bingham and his chief liaison with the British, Ray Atherton, had continually improved. The Second London Naval Treaty talks and ongoing naval and Far Eastern matters were topics about which the Foreign Office, usually through Sir Robert Craigie, had no trouble talking openly and confidentially to the Americans.[92] Now, with the spirit of trust and cooperation created by those talks, when the United States Army approached Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington, about information sharing, the response was rather different than that given to Captain Anderson just six months earlier.

In October of 1936, the US War Department initiated informal conversations with Ambassador Lindsay and his Military Attache, Colonel W.W.T. Torr, about the possibility of exchanging material on mechanization and other technical subjects, including the newest information on the latest models of tanks.[93] This was not entirely a new initiative. Lindsay had acted as an unofficial link between the War Department and the British War Office for some time, sending a good deal of information to the director of Military Operations and Intelligence (M.I.2) over the preceding months.[94] The Americans were now pushing harder to see whether the British would be willing to begin a large-scale exchange, particularly on information concerning industrial mobilization.[95] Once again, the question of 'what if Japan found out' came up in the debate around whether such an exchange was warranted. This time, however, the Foreign Office had no hesitation about or dissention in its proposal to the War Office that the American offer should under no circumstances be rebuffed. Troutbeck, Craigie, and Vansittart, all were animated in their desire to see such cooperation take place. Gone were fears of leaks to the Japanese or the dangers of being left "holding the baby." Instead, Vansittart wrote to the to Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Cyril J. Deverell himself, emphasizing the political importance the Foreign Office placed on accepting the American advances.[96] Vansittart's friend, Lindsay, had himself petitioned the permanent undersecretary to ignore any reservations from Col. Torr about the Americans not having much to trade or leaking material to other countries, and to press the War Office to agree to cooperate.[97] It was the Ambassador's belief that "By and large, if Anglo-American cooperation is important, as I believe it is, the most promising way to get the most of it is to foster it carefully in all those fields where Congress does not have direct control. Cooperation between Government Departments is one of the most important of those fields."[98] Anthony Eden lent his hand to the effort to ensure greater Anglo-American cooperation became a reality by lobbying both the Secretary of State for War, A. Duff Cooper, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, to support the American offer.[99] The Foreign Office's efforts were rewarded in late November, 1936, when the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, informed Eden that the War Office had agreed to go ahead with the exchange. In fact, the CIGS had no misgivings or doubts about the validity of such an endeavour at all and had in fact already initiated "...action to meet the United States' views in the more strictly military matters."[100] The final details of the actual information sharing needed to be worked out and put into effect, but the important decision had taken place. Both sides had shown themselves willing to be forthcoming and open about cooperating at the departmental level, an act, as Lindsay had pointed out, that was sure to make for better overall relations.[101]

Those relations became even closer after the Japanese attack on China in July, 1937. During that crisis, British naval forces on the Yangtze River earned the respect and admiration of many American diplomats, naval officers and civilians. Both Ambassador Johnson and Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, worked very closely with the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen and Admiral Sir Charles J.C. Little, C-in-C China Squadron during and after the emergency. When Sir Hughe was shot by strafing Japanese aircraft, it was an American marine who supplied the blood for a transfusion. For his part, in return, Yarnell was very impressed with the response of the HMS CUMBERLAND in assisting the American merchant ship HERBERT HOOVER, when the later was bombed.[102] As the crisis continued, Yarnell and Little shared information and ideas about their own plans and their nations' attitude towards the Japanese. According to Yarnell, the two worked "...like two kittens in a basket." He thought the British Admiral was a fine officer, of rare good judgement, and delightful personality: "There is about the British naval officer an aura of solidity and reliability which is a great comfort to those who are associated with them in times of stress."[103] Because of his close association with senior British naval commanders, Yarnell continuously prodded both the Navy Department and the State Department to work closely with the British in the Far East. It was his belief that

> With reference to our own policy, it is my firm conviction that we should stick with England and France. It is inconceivable to me that we as a nation are going to give up our rights of trading or living in China and confine our activities to our own continental limits. As for pulling chestnuts out of the fire, England stands to pull just as many out for us as we do for her. If these three countries stand together they can dominate the situation in the Far East. If they do not, they will be defeated singly and in detail.[104]

Yarnell was aware of the need to be careful in dealing with the British, in order to avoid provoking State Department officials, some of whom still were worried about being trapped into "pulling Britain's chestnuts out of the fire". Embarrassing his political masters would not help his position. But he did not hesitate to tell Little his views when the later was leaving his post, in the obvious hope that they would be passed on to other RN officers. The C-in-C Asiatic told Little that the cordial relations that had existed between the two fleets was one of the most pleasant features of his cruise.[105] The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Leahy, was also advised of Yarnell's views of Little.[106]

Out of the fires of the undeclared war in China came closer and better Anglo-American naval relations, based on shared dangers and a mutual hatred of the Japanese. Leahy's own attitude towards whether or not he thought there was close cooperation with the British against Japan was revealed in February, 1938, during questioning by the Congressional Naval Committee. The CNO, under oath, intimated the same view that he had earlier in the month disclosed to William Castle; that there was an understanding between the RN and USN that each would have its special duties in case of war. Hull and Roosevelt were forced to limit the damage such an intimacy might do in the hands of isolationists and denied such a relationship, even though the truth of the matter was not acknowledged.[107] The two navies now began to share even more information about their building programs, as well as information about and opinions on Japanese shipbuilding and modernization.[108] Because of the inextricable link between naval and foreign policies, that cooperative spirit also spilled over into the strategic and political realms, working to soften attitudes that had previously been hardened against Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East. The process was, however, a difficult one.

In November, 1937, after an hour-long discussion with Secretary Hull, the CNO, Admiral William D. Leahy had a completely informal unofficial talk with the British Naval Attache, Captain Bradley, about the possibility of a joint naval demonstration in Asiatic waters.[109] The idea of naval planning discussions never materialized, but the simple act of thinking about such a project created tensions on both sides of the Atlantic.[110] Both the State Department and the Foreign Office were frightened of revealing too much, for fear of allowing the other side a glimpse of their own sensitive code-breaking abilities.[111] Progress was being made, however, in the area of the informal exchange of sensitive information between the two groups. For examplte, Sir Alexander Cadogan, who took over as PUS from Vansittart on January 1, 1938, was authorizing the release of secret Foreign Office papers and reports on Britain's assessment of Japan's Southward expansion to the American embassy in London. This was thought necessary in order both to gain the trust of the State Department and to educate that institution about the British view of the Far Eastern situation.[112] Cordell Hull was doing his own informal feeling out of the British. In January, 1938, the Secretary of State had a long and confidential chat with Lindsay on Anglo-American relations and the Far Eastern situation. Unwilling to allow the public to see the drawing together of the two nations in opposition to Japan, such unofficial methods became the normal substitute for regular diplomatic channels.[113] The same was true in Japan, where both embassies worked together to oppose Japanese actions, bringing their respective staffs into even closer proximity.[114] In fact, the new British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, had a long history of working with the Americans, from his time a Britain's chief naval negotiator. The US embassy had a useful agent of its own, in the form of Counselor Eugene Dooman, a man whose own career had paralleled Craigie's closely, the pair moving from naval conference to naval conference from 1927 to 1936. Craigie and Dooman's knowledge of one another certainly did not hurt the ability of the two embassies to communicate with one another easily and confidentially, even if they held very different views of how best to deal with Japan..

Ease of communication at the informal level took great steps in 1938 and 1939, especially in the areas of sharing information and code breaking. The flow of material from the United States to the IIC allowed that body to make some very detailed examinations of the America's war making potential.[115] As for the Americans, their Naval Attache accompanied the Royal Navy on exercises in the North Sea, observing anti-submarine operations.[116] The American Naval Attache in Japan was also doing his bit to further better Anglo-American relations, sharing with his British opposite number information on the two new, and very large, battleships the Japanese were building. The Foreign Office was most careful to ensure that no questioning of the Japanese on the two vessels would lead to their intelligence source being compromised.[117] In March, 1938, the Foreign Office and Admiralty, in a highly confidential manner, let the American Charge d'Affairs Herschel Johnson 'know' that they were able to read some of the Japanese diplomatic codes.[118] A year earlier, the War Office had told the US Military Attache in London that the American consular messages were being tapped by the Japanese.[119] The Americans repaid the favour in March, 1938, by letting the British embassy in Washington know that the Japanese were reading Great Britain's diplomatic codes in the Far East. While the accuracy of the information was in question, there was no doubt that the Americans were repaying the

British for their confidence of a year earlier. The American information confirmed something the Foreign Office had suspected for some time: that the Japanese could read the "R" cyphers used in diplomatic communications. An exchange of secret code-breaking information had been established, and another act of confidence building established in the Anglo-American strategic relationship.[120] Such a willingness to allow an intimacy of this sort signaled that a solid, stable, relationship had been developed between the two nations with regard to strategic planning for the Far East. Further evidence of the closeness of that relationship came about in 1939, as the British tried to re-establish naval conversations with the Americans.

In March of that year, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord Halifax, instructed Sir Ronald Lindsay to inquire if the United States Government were willing to resume an exchange of naval views in a continuation of Captain Ingersoll's mission.[121] Halifax was anxious to have the Americans understand clearly that His Majesty's Government, with its involvement in any conflict in Europe, "...might not be able at once to reinforce on a large scale their naval forces in the Far East, and that might affect US naval dispositions."[122] Two days later Lindsay reported that Sumner Welles had made a secret visit to the British embassy to give him President Roosevelt's reply. The President was indeed anxious to have the talks resumed, but the open procedure used in 1938 could not be repeated. Fears of the press finding out about Anglo-American naval cooperation demanded that the utmost secrecy had to be maintained. If word of such talks got out the leak would compromise seriously the pending neutrality legislation. FDR suggested that an officer not higher than Captain be sent as the Naval Attache to Washington to conduct the conversations along the lines of talks the President had witnessed between the RN and USN in 1915.[123]

Roosevelt's quick agreement to talks had caught the Admiralty and Foreign Office by surprise. Neither department had any solid plan for how such talks were to be conducted, as the initial query had been made as an almost reflexive action by Sir Alexander Cadogan, when asked about the idea by Halifax.[124] The Naval Attache position had been filled just six months previous, so any change in that post would evoke immediate suspicion from the press, as well as foreign observers. Lindsay told Welles that this was the British view, but to no avail. Lindsay then suggested that the Admiralty consider sending an officer with no connection to the embassy, to live in another nearby town, communicating with the Americans through the embassy, while the present Naval Attache, Captain L.C.A. Curzon-Howe, was recalled temporarily to London on the premise of taking leave.[125] No action was taken on the matter for a month, however, as the Admiralty tried to establish what the object of such talks would be, and then, to find a suitable method for conducting the talks.[126] Also, President Roosevelt's agreeing to send the American Fleet ahead of schedule back to the Pacific after exercises in the Atlantic, as a warning to Japan, had raised questions as to whether such talks were necessary.[127] Lord Chatfield, now the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, considered the American decision to move the Fleet back to the Pacific a clear and very welcome warning to the Japanese. His opinion was that now, after such a signal had been given, there was a need to discuss two areas concerning that American action: a precautionary deployment of the US Fleet to Hawaii; and what to do in case of an actual war. Chatfield was willing to abide by the instructions Welles had given to Lindsay, as well as the suggestions made by the Ambassador on how such talks could be arranged. The point of greatest concern to Chatfield was, however, that "... as it was we who are most anxious for these conversations, we should make every effort to be accommodating. If we did not and simply raised objections the Americans might say that perhaps it would be better not to hold conversations just now."[128] While the debate continued in London, Lindsay, impatient and annoyed that Roosevelt's initiative had been ignored for so long, demanded, on May 2nd, to know why nothing was being done on such an important matter.[129] Three days later the Admiralty and Foreign Office finally instructed Sir Ronald to tell Welles that they were most willing to establish talks, but that the method of removing the Naval Attache and replacing him with another was not sound. Instead, they were willing to abide by Lindsay's plan or to wait until June, when a vacant post might be filled at the American embassy in London by a new Naval Attache capable of continuing the 1938 discussions.[130] Lindsay was to sound out the Americans on which method they preferred and then get the ball rolling to establish talks.

On May 8, Lindsay told Welles that it would not be possible to replace the British Naval Attache in order to start the talks. Welles in turn informed the British Ambassador that the Americans did not wish to hold the talks in London. To ensure the secrecy of the talks only three or four officers in the USN were allowed to know what was happening. The need to communicate from London would widen the circle of USN officers who would know about the talks and the danger of a leak would be increased considerably. Such a leak would be fatal to the development of Anglo-American naval cooperation, said Welles. Lindsay then made the proposal

> Competent officer should come from the admiralty if necessary under false name. Plausible pretext for the journey should be provided, e.g., he might appear as official of some shipping company or as an officer sent to inspect munitions on order here for His Majesty's Government. His papers should be sent separately by bag to New York but on the same ship as himself. His headquarters in America might shift, sometimes in Baltimore. No objection to a night or two in Washington. He could safely use the telephone for communicating with Naval Attache about appointments etc. Actual conversations would take place in private house of American naval officer. His papers might have to be kept in the Embassy or by the Naval Attache. ... my Naval Attache should return to London for a short visit ... that it might be useful for him to have a spell in the plans division so as to be able to continue conversations later.[131]

The under secretary of state agreed with the plan, as did President Roosevelt. The President did not want the British officer to travel under a false name, however, but did suggest that the visit of the British cruiser EXETER to Baltimore on June 7th might be a useful screen.

On May 22, the Foreign Office informed Lindsay that Commander T.C.

Hampton would travel to the US in early June as Mr. Hampton, a land agent going to America on business. It was expected that the talks would begin after the Royal visit to the United States was complete, around June 11th, and that the discussions would be done by June 21st at the latest.[132] The maintenance of absolute secrecy was of the utmost importance to both the Americans and British, as arrangements for the talks were to be made directly with Admiral Leahy and that the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence was not to be informed of the visit.[133] Hampton's instructions from the Admiralty were straight-forward and wide-ranging. He was to explain to the Americans how the changing situation in Europe was affecting Britain's ability to send a major Fleet to the Far East, if Japan decided to take advantage of a war in Europe. Under no circumstances was he to propose an initiative for a combined strategy. That sort of proposal had to come from the Americans. If the US authorities did ask about the possibility of naval cooperation aimed at Japan, he was to inform them that British policy-makers preferred that the Americans concentrate their naval forces in the Pacific. Singapore would be made available for their use, if it was required, and Great Britain would also welcome any assistance the USN could give to putting cruiser forces in the Western Atlantic.[134] Hampton began his talks with American naval officers on June 12th.

The talks took place at Admiral Leahy's home, with Leahy, Admiral R.L. Ghormley (Director of Plans), Captain Curzon-Howe and Hampton. No one else, except Welles and Roosevelt, knew anything about the talks. Hampton told the Americans that if Japan took aggressive action in the Far East, the Admiralty did not know when they would be able to send a fleet to the Far East, nor what the composition of such a fleet would be. This was a change from the talks held with Captain Ingersoll in 1938. Leahy told Hampton that it was his opinion that if a war broke out in Europe, it was the President's intention to move the US Fleet to Hawaii as a deterrent to Japan. That action would prevent the Japanese from attacking

New Zealand and Australia, said the CNO, but he agreed that the USN was not in a position to conduct offensive operations against Japan itself. Questions about the distribution of signal books and cyphers were also brought up at this first meeting.[135] On June 14th a second meeting was held, with the same participants. This time Leahy and Ghormley told Hampton that they were satisfied that the exchange of signal books and cyphers that had taken place would "... enable all U.S. units to co-operate with British units throughout the world in case of necessity. Some further copies of signal books, codes and cyphers would be required as and when U.S. ships in reserve were brought forward."[136] Leahy then went on the explain his "personal views" of how the two fleets would cooperate in case of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan. The US would concentrate on the Pacific and leave forces in the Atlantic as well. The U.S. Fleet would move to Singapore in sufficient force to defeat the Japanese Fleet, a force that would consist of at least ten capital ships. The CNO was opposed to sending any weak or small for to Singapore. The size of the US Fleet despatched, however, would depend on the size of fleet that the British were willing to send. American public opinion would not tolerate such actions by the USN unless there was a suitable British force in the region as well. That British force did not have to be as large, but it had to be an "adequate token force" containing some capital ships. Ghormley told the British representatives that the American Plans Division was now working on a scheme for the movement of an American fleet to Singapore, as no such detailed plans had existed prior to that. As for the time needed to collect and transit such a fleet, Leahy informed Hampton that if the British planned on the Americans relieving Singapore it would take at least 120 days. The CNO also suggested that any British units working with the Americans in the Far East should be placed under the strategic control of the American Commander-in-Chief, but did not press the point. Hampton told the American naval officers all he knew about the condition of Singapore in terms of docking and repair facilities, hinting that if the Americans based their fleet there approximately 2,500 semi-skilled and skilled personnel and laborers would be required. In return, Hampton was informed that the USN expected to fight for the Philippines but not hold them, and therefore, would not base their Fleet in the islands.[137] The talks ended quickly and quietly, as Hampton returned to the Admiralty to relay his findings.

Hampton reported that, overall, he thought that President Roosevelt was far ahead of the public in his desire to assist Great Britain and the other democracies. Admiral Leahy was also thought to be "extremely pro-British" and was in close and intimate communication with the President. Leahy's being relieved in the near future by Admiral Stark as CNO was not seen as an event which would create any change in the Anglo-American relationship, as he was felt to be pro-British as well. While the American navy had no detailed plans for cooperating with the RN, Hampton's opinion was that there was a fundamental agreement on the broad conduct of a war at sea between the USN and the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.[138] Thus, by the summer of 1939, American and British strategic planners had managed to create an
atmosphere of close and friendly exchanges on sensitive information which allowed each to more confidently judge any future actions of the other in the Far East.

While the informal avenues of information sharing in the Anglo-American strategic relationship still contained sensitive areas and some suspicions, a dramatic improvement at all levels had taken place from 1933 to 1939.[139] Both the Royal Navy and the United States Navy had moved forward in their ability to share techinical and strategic information. As well, the diplomatic machinery of the policy-making process had established a rapport that also allowed for important information on the Far East to be shared in an unprecedented fashion. Such openness had allowed each nation to paint a better mental map of the other's Far

Eastern policy and to anticipate how the other would react under certain conditions.[140] At the war planning level, mobilization techniques and plans had been exchanged, allowing the United States and Great Britain each a better understanding of how the other would react to a war in the Far East.[141] The net result was that, through a multitude of channels, a system of informal and discreet cooperation on various issues had been established to help coordinate the Far Eastern policies of the United States and the British Empire.[142] By the end of 1939, the cooperation of the two nations in Far Eastern matters, while still tempered by the need to protect national interests, was very close. A parallel but not joint policy was indeed a reality.

The intelligence and strategic planning arena was not the only area where a better understanding of each other's strategic concerns fostered better overall Anglo-American relations in that six year period. Besides the attempt to build closer Anglo-American relations through information sharing and strategic planning, specific issues, which in 1933 were the cause of considerable Anglo-American tension, had to be overcome before the effective coordination of strategic cooperation in the Far East could occur. Merchant shipping and control of the markets serviced by that shipping was one such contentious point between the United States and Great Britain. War planning for the Far East had obvious requirements for support from merchant shipping. As well, the question of blockading Japan raised the issue of how to deal with any neutral shipping in the region. If America and the British Empire were to work successfully together against the Japanese in the Far East then some sort of understanding over merchant shipping would have to be established in that maritime relationship.

ENDNOTES

1.David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, (London, 1981), p.60; James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1937-1941, (Chapel Hill, 1977), pp.15-28; Paul Haggie, Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931-1941, (Oxford, 1981), pp.115-120; Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939, (Stanford, 1973), pp.92-94; Aron Shai, Origins of the War in the East: Britain, China and Japan, 1937-1939, (London, 1976), pp.131-32; Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War, (Cambridge, 1996), p.18; Malcolm Murfett, Fool-Proof Relations: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Chamberlain Years, 1937-1940, (Singapore, 1984); Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942, (Oxford, 1993), p.192; Dorthy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, (Cambridge, 1964), pp.497-499, p.509, p.512, p.542; Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol.II, (London, 1976), pp.366-168, p.460, p.476.

2.Two very fine exceptions to that rule are Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-1941, (London, 1995); and Aldrich, The Key to the South. Other useful works on intelligence and the Far East are: Antony Best, "Constructing an Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall's Perception of Japan, 1931-1939," Intelligence and National Security, vol.11, 1996, pp.403-423; John Ferris, "'Worthy of Some Better Enemy'": The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army, 1919-1941, and the Fall of Singapore," Canadian Journal of History, vol.28, 1993, pp.224-256; idem., "A British 'Unofficial' Aviation Mission and Japanese Naval Developments, 1919-29," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.5, 1982, pp. ; idem., "From Briadway House to Bletchley Park: The Diary of Captain Malcolm Kennedy, 1934-46," Intelligence and National Security, vol.4, 1989, pp.48-70; Arthur Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941, (Oxford, 1981); R.J. Aldrich, "Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia," Intelligence and National Security, vol.3, 1988, pp.5-55; J.W.M Chapman, "Commander Ross R.N. and the Ending of Anglo-Japanese Friendship, 1933-1936," in Ian Nish ed., Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations, (London, 1985), pp.33-56; D.C.S. Sissons, "More on Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, 1994, vol.9, pp.373-379; Thomas G. Mahnken, "Gazing at the Sun: The Office of Naval Intelligence and Japanese Naval Innovation, 1918-1941," Intelligence and National Security, vol.11, 1996, pp.424-441; Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: the US Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945, (Annapolis, 1983); David Kahn, "The United States Views Germany and Japan in 1941," in Ernest R. May ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars, (Princeton, 1984); Waldo H. Heinrichs Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, (New York, 1973); John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, (New York, 1995); Malcolm Muir Jr., "Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Naval Intelligence and the Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936-1945," Journal of Military History, vol.54, 1990; Geoffrey Till, "Perceptions of Naval Power Between the Wars: the British Case," in Philip Towle ed., Estimating Foreign Military Power, (New York, 1982); Ian Cowman, "Main Fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the Admiralty, and Force Z," The Journal of Strategic Studies,
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3.See Strategic Planning in the U.S. Navy; Its Evolution and Execution, 1891-1945, Navy Basic Plan-Orange, Vol.IV, on microfilm, National Archive, Washington, D.C., Change No.3, W.P.L. 16, July, 1933; Edward S. Millar, War Plan Orange: the US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis, 1991); War Office (hereafter WO) [PRO, London], 106/5136, Imperial Defence College, Exercise No.3, 1934; Robert J. Young, "Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s," European History Review, vol.6, 1976, pp.473-489; Ian Cowman, "Defence of the Malay Barrier? The Place of the Philippines in Admiralty Naval War Planning, 1925-1941," War in History, vol.3, 1996, pp.398-417; D.E.H. Edgerton and S.M. Horrocks, "British Industrial Research and Development Before 1945," Economic History Review, vol.2, 1994, pp.213-238; and for a post-war confirmation of those pre-war assessments see "Reports of the U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, 1945-1946," on microfilm, Operational Archives, U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C. For the Allied assessments and responses to Axis war production capability see Sebastian Ritchie, "A New Audit of War: The Productivity of Britain's Wartime Aircraft Industry Reconsidered," War and Society, vol.12, 1994, pp.125-147, which has some interesting lessons for those studying a Pacific air war, and, Joseph A. Maiolo, "'I believe the Hun is cheating': British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39," Intelligence and National Security, vol.11, 1996, pp.32-58; Robert W. Love Jr. ed., Pearl harbor Revisited, (New York, 1995); Rainer Tamchina, "In Search of Common Causes: The Imperial Conference of 1937," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.1, 1972, pp.79-106; Ann Trotter, "The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey's Tour in 1934," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.2, 1974, pp.318-333.

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4.A very enlightening explanation of how this system worked is given in, Sir Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters, (London, 1944), pp.7-42.

5.Nelson T. Johnson Papers (hereafter NTJ Papers), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 7, letter from Johnson to Sir Harry Armstrong, British Consul General in New York, Jan.19, 1928; NTJ Papers, Container 17, Folder A-L, letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Johnson, June 3, 1932; NTJ Papers, Container 17, Folder A-L, letter from Johnson to Lampson, July 18, 1932; NTJ Papers, Container 19, Folder A-G, letter from Johnson to Grew (US Ambassador in Japan), July 7, 1933.

6.NTJ Papers, Container 18, Folder M-Z, letter from Johnson to Dr. Cloyd H. Marvin, President of George Washington University, May 19, 1932.

7.NTJ Papers, Container 18, Folder M-Z, letter from Johnson to Dr. Marvin, August 18, 1932.

8.William Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*, (Oxford, 1971), pp.199-201; Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, (Cambridge, 1975), pp.1-22; Ian Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, (Cambridge, 1982), ch.2.

9.NTJ Papers, strictly confidential record of conversation between Dr. G.H. Blakeslee and Johnson, June 13, 1932.

10.The Chinese were also quick to try and play the Americans off against the British, trading secrets for support. For Johnson's intimate knowledge of the complete workings of the Commission, see NTJ Papers, Container 17, Folder A-L, letters from Johnson to Stanley K. Hornbeck, Aug. 16th and 30th, 1932; *ibid*, confidential letter from Johnson to Hornbeck, Sept.13, 1932; NTJ Papers, Container 18, Folder M-Z, letter from Robert E. Olds to Johnson, July 6, 1932.

11.NTJ Papers, strictly confidential record of conversation between Dr. G.H. Blakeslee and Johnson, June 13, 1932.

12.FO 371/16618/A5619/5619/45, confidential despatch from Snow to FO, July 1, 1933.

13.FO 371/16618/A7537/5819/45, despatch from Snow to FO, Sept.15, 1933 and minutes.

14.Clive described Grew as a "...diplomatist by profession and a man of tact and charm." FO 371/18169/F5975/57/23, despatch from Clive to FO, Sept.11, 1934.

15.NTJ Papers, Container 21, Folder O-Z, letters from Johnson to Upham, August 8 and Oct.30, 1933; FO 371/18175/F507/233/23, from Admiralty, "Visit of Commander-in-Chief, China to Japan," and FO minutes, Jan.26, 1934; FO 371/18175/F5028/233/23, from Admiral Dickens to Charles Orde [Head of Far Eastern Department], "Proposed Visits to Japanese Ports, Autumn, 1934," May 22, 1934.

16.NTJ Papers, Container 19, Folder A-G, letter from Johnson to Grew, July 7, 1933; NTJ Papers, container 21, Folder O-Z, memo for Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, June 12, 1933.

17.Admiral M.M. Taylor, Upham's predecessor, had been on very good terms with his British opposite number, Admiral Kelly. On the eve of Kelly's departure as C-in-C China Squadron, Taylor reported to his Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W.V. Pratt, that "...I'll be sorry to see him go. We have gotten quite close and talk quite freely about our common troubles." Admiral Montgomery M. Taylor MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 2, Folder Jan.-Feb., 1933, letter from Taylor to Pratt, Jan.28, 1933.

18.Franklin D. Roosevelt-Official Files (hereafter FDR-OF), [Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York], Navy, Folder: Adm. William D. Leahy, letter from Assistant Secretary of the Navy, H.L. Roosevelt to Marvin H. McIntyre, Assistant Secretary to the President, Mar.16, 1934. Enclosed were letters from Dreyer to Upham, Jan.13, 1934 and from Upham to Admiral William H. Standley (USN), Chief of Naval Operation (CNO), Feb.4, 1934.

19.FDR-OF, Navy, Folder: Adm. William D. Leahy, letter from Dreyer to Upham, Jan.13, 1934.

20.Ibid.

21.Ibid, letter from Upham to Standley, Feb.4, 1934.

22.Ibid.

23.Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn transcript, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Oral History, p.48.

24.RG 38, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Division of Naval Intelligence, General Correspondence, 1929-1942 (hereafter RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, letter from Ellis to Commandant, Third Naval District, July 18, 1933.

25.Bristol thought Britain was being forced into a position of opposition against Japan in the Far East, a circumstance the British disliked and distrusted. See RG 38, Office of the CNO, Correspondence of the London Naval Attache, 1927-40 (hereafter CNO-LNA, 1927-40), National Archive, Washington, D.C., Box.7, Folder: Office of Naval Intelligence, US Navy Dept., letter from Bristol to Ellis, Feb.21, 1933.

26.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), letter from Bristol to Ellis, May 1, 1933.

27.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), letter from Bristol to Ellis, Aug.1, 1933.

28.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), letter from DNI to Bristol, Aug.11, 1933.

29.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), memo from DNI to Commander Battle Force, Dec.27, 1933.

30.Ibid.

31.Ibid.

32.John C. Niedermair (naval architect) transcipt, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, p.140.

33.The good relations between the British embassy's naval representatives and the DNI even managed to weather a minor incident when a retired British naval officer, Hugh Wake, gained entrance to certain US naval facilities under false pretense. Mr. Wake, who it turned out held a subordinate position in the British Consulate in New York, was in desperate financial straits and living with his wife and family in a old chauffeur's lodge on an estate on Long Island. He gained entry to naval ships, establishments and concerns manufacturing for the USN in New York and Philadelphia by representing himself as a British Naval Officer. His exploits were seen as being acts of desperation, done for British Admiralty Intelligence in return for money. See RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 17, Folder A2-14/EF13/OQ, vol.3, confidential letter from DNI to Commandant, Third Naval District, June 19, 1933; ibid, confidential letter from DNI to Commandant, First Naval District, Aug.14, 1933.

34.This tour would follow one made by the British Assistant Naval Attache, Commander J.S. Orr (RN) in early 1933. See RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.3, confidential letter from Orr to Ellis, Feb.15, 1933.

35.Dewar's list of things to see included: the Naval Operating Base, Fleet Aircraft Base, Naval Training Station, and Destroyer Base, all in San Diego; the Fleet Base and Fleet in San Pedro; Mare Island Navy Yard in San Francisco; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. at Hunter's Point; the Naval Operating Base and Naval Air Station at Pearl Harbor; the Bremerton Navy Yard and the Naval Air Station at Puget Sound; the Great Lakes Training Station and Naval Reserve Aviation Squadron in Chicago; and the Ford Assembly Plant and General Motors Laboratory in Detroit. RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, letter from Dewar to Ellis, Nov.21, 1933.

36.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, note on file covering slip, Nov.23, 1933. On American attaches' exploits in Japan and effect Japanese attitude towards American Naval Attaches had on Japanese access in America, see: RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 57, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(W), memo from Ellis to Chief Bu-Aero (Ernest J. King), Dec.1933; ibid, letter from Capt. Fred Rogers, US Naval Attache Tokyo to Ellis, Feb.9, 1934.

37.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, letter from Ellis to Dewar, Dec.4, 1933.

38.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, letter from Ellis to Rear Admiral D.F. Sellers, Feb.17, 1934.

39.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, letter from Ellis to Rear Admiral W.T. Tarrant, Feb.17, 1934.

40.Dewar was not shown anything to do with the arresting gear or catapults at this time, nor anything of a confidential nature, but he did go through the stack and bridge structures, the flight deck, the main deck, officers' quarters, sick bay, the hanger deck, the main control room, one fireroom, and the general machine shop. See RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, confidential letter from Commander R.K. Turner to DNI, Mar.31, 1934.

41.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, confidential letter from Commanding Officer, US Naval Air Station, San Diego to DNI, Mar.27, 1934.

42.Ibid.

43.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.4, confidential letter from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, Navy Yard Pearl Harbor to DNI, undated; ibid, confidential letter from Commander E.D. Almy, Commandant's Office, Mare Island Navy Yard to DNI, Apr.26, 1934; ibid, confidential letter from Capt. H.M. Cooley (USN), of Puget Sound Navy Yard to DNI, May 7, 1934.

44.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, various.

45.On one occasion, Commander Mark-Wardlaw toured the building ways at Mare Island, showing a particular interest in welding techniques. He informed his hosts that they were far in advance of Great Britain in that method of construction. The RN was experimenting with a combination of welding and riveting in the construction of some of its new destroyers, where the first 100 feet of the those ships was being constructed almost entirely by welding. He also told the Americans that the Royal Navy was endeavoring to reduce weight in some of their latest ships, particularly destroyers, using a method which required thinner shell plating and framing of special alloy steel that reduced the weight of the ship without necessarily sacrificing strength. After that exchange, the American Assistant Naval Attache, Capt. H.S. Howard was allowed to see an all-welded cargo ship under construction at Swan, Hunter and Wigham Richardson Limited at Wallsend-on-Tyne. See, RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.6, confidential report from Commandant, Mare Island Navy Yard to DNI, Apr.25, 1935; RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), letter from Anderson to Sir Oswyn Murray, June 13, 1935.

46.FO 371/18186/F2996/652/23, draft of secret telegram from Charles Orde (Head of Far Eastern Department of the FO) to Osborne (Charge d'Affairs, Washington), Aug.28, 1934.

47.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC), Box 15, Folder A2-14/EF/EN3-11, vol.5, report from Inspector of Naval Material, Schenectady, New York, to DNI, June 29, 1934; ibid, vol.6, letter from Mark-Wardlaw to Puleston, Feb.18, 1935.

48.FO 371/18184/F546/546/23, letter from A. Fletcher (British Library of Information, New York) to R.A. Leeper (Head of News Department of the FO), Jan.19, 1934.

49.Robert J. Young, "Spokesmen for Economic Warfare," European History Review, vol.6, 1976, pp.473-489. The views of this group were circulated to the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Foreign Office, Department of Overseas Trade, Board of Trade, M.I.5 and other lesser departments.

50.FO 371/17590/A7943/428/45, IIC Report, "Industrial Intelligence in the United States,", Oct.5, 1934.

51.See Chapter 5 below.

52.FO 371/17602/A10254/1938/45, letter from Dickens to Robert Craigie (Head of American Department in the FO), Nov.14, 1934.

53.Ibid, copy of speech, delivered Dec.19, 1934.

54.RG 38, CNO-LNA, 1927-40, Box.7, Folder: Office of Naval Intelligence, US Navy Dept., letter from Anderson to Puleston, June 11, 1934.

55.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GD, Box 58, Folder A2-14/EN3-11(X), letter from Anderson to Puleston, Dec.21, 1935.

56.FDR, President's Personal File, 1933-45 (hereafter, FDR-PPF), Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, PPF file 716, Robert W. Bingham, letter from FDR to Bingham, Dec.15, 1933.

57.FDR-PPF 716, Bingham, letters from FDR to Bingham, June 11 and July 5, 1935.

58.FO 371/18763/A5630/722/45, very confidential despatch from Blunt to FO, May 15, 1935.

59.Ibid.

60.Ibid.

61.FO 371/18764/A7829/722/45, secret telegram from Blunt to FO, August 5, 1935; ibid, Craigie minute, Sept.12, 1935. Charles Orde (Head of the Far Eastern Dept. of the FO) did not agree with Parks' ideas on the Far East, thinking the General simple-minded in his views. Parks had a long conversation with Admiral Dreyer on the Pacific situation during the C-in-C China Squadron's visit to Manila in late January, 1935. See FO 371/19359/F2366/483/23, "Secret: Notes of some remarks made by Major General F. Parker to Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer at Manila in January, 1935," Apr.8, 1935; ibid, Orde minute, April 16, 1935.

62.See Chapter Six below.

63.Those talks eventually led to an agreement which allowed the Soviets to build freely against the Japanese but restricted the size of the fleet they would build against any European power, especially Germany. See RG 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations, Record of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), 1882-1954, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1882-1954, Intelligence Division - Naval Attache Reports, 1886-1939 (hereafter DCNO-ONI-NA, 1886-1939), National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 456, Folder: London Treaty, 1936, for Limitation of Naval Armament, US Naval Attache's report, June 14, 1936; ibid, US Naval Attache's Report, August 1, 1936; ibid, memo from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Bingham, Sept.20, 1936.

64.Ibid, Box 457, "memo for DNI, Report on England by Commander Baker (USN), April 4, 1936.

65.RG 38, CNO-LNA, 1927-1940, Box 11, Folder: Naval Bases - Great Britain, Naval Attache's Report, June 9, 1936.

66.FO 371/19836/A2494/2494/45, secret letter from Phillips War Plans to under secretary of state for foreign affairs, Mar.25, 1936.

67.Ibid.

68.FO 371/19836/A3291/2494/45, FO minute by Gore-Booth, Mar.30, 1936.

69.Ibid.

70.Ibid.

71.Ibid, Troutbeck minute, Mar.31, 1936.

72.Ibid, Orde minute, Apr.1, 1936.

73.Ibid, Vansittart minute, April 10, 1936.

74.Ibid, Craigie minute, Apr.9, 1936.

75.Ibid, Simon minute, Apr.9, 1936.

76.Ibid, draft of secret letter to Admiralty from FO, April 24, 1936.

77.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.7, confidential memo from CNO (William H. Standley) to C-in-C, US Fleet, June 27, 1936.

78.RG 38, CNO-LNA, 1927-1940, Box 11, Folder: Naval Bases - Great Britain, Naval Attache's Report, June 9, 1936.

79.Roskill, vol.II, pp.392-415; Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, vol.II, (London, 1947), pp.102-110; Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, pp.8-62; CAB 53/28, Chiefs of Staff Papers (hereafter COS Papers), Public Record Office, Kew, London, No.477, "Problems Facing His Majesty's Government in the Mediterranean As A Result of the Italo-League Dispute," June 18, 1936; CAB 53/31, COS Paper No.571, "Review and Organisation Of And Responsibility For Naval Air Work," Apr.4, 1937; CAB 53/7, Minutes of the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff (hereafter

COS Meeting), PRO, Kew, London, No.205, May 6, 1937; CAB 53/7, COS Meeting No.206, May 18, 1937.

80.The Americans were well aware of the fight between the RAF and RN for control over the FAA, as well as a great deal about the performance of British aircraft and equipment. See material in RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Security Classified Records of the London Naval Attache, 1937-53, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 25, Folder: "Fleet Air Arm - Organization, Control, Etc.", and Folder: "Aircraft, Fleet Air Arm,"; ibid, Box 26, Folder: "Fleet Air Arm - Personnel, Admiralty."

81.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder: A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.7, confidential letter from Anderson to DNI, Aug.3, 1936.

82.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder: A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.4, confidential memo from Standley to C-in-C US Fleet, June 27, 1936.

83.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder: A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.7, confidential letter from DNI to US Naval Attache, London, Sept.2, 1936.

84.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder: A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.7, confidential letter from US Fleet Aircraft Battle Force to DNI, Sept.2, 1937.

85.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 16, Folder: A2-14/EF13/EN3-11, vol.7, confidential report from US Fleet Aircraft Battle Force to DNI, Feb.24, 1938.

86.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 17, Folder: A2-14/EF13/OQ, vol.6, confidential letter from Rear-Admiral William H. Halsey, Commandant US Naval Air Station, Pensacola to DNI, May 2, 1938.

87.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 17, Folder: A2-14/EF13/OQ, vol.6, confidential letter from Commandant US Naval Air Station, Pensacola to DNI, May 19, 1938.

88.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 18, Folder: A2-14/EF13/OQ, vol.7, confidential memo from Leahy to C-in-C US Fleet, July 26, 1939.

89.Ibid.

90.90.NTJ Papers, Container 29, Folder: A-E, 1936, letter from Johnson to Hornbeck, Aug.25, 1936.

91.Ibid,; Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), vol.IV, The Far East, 1936, despatch from Johnson to Hull, Apr.1, 1936, pp.95-98.

92.Some examples of that relationship are: FRUS, vol.IV, memo by Atherton, July 13, 1936, pp.241-243; FO 371/19829/A9447/180/45, record of conversation between Craigie and Bingham, Nov.19, 1936; FO 371/20286/F7926/303/23, record of conversation between Cadogan and Atherton, Dec.22, 1936.

93.FO 371/19842/A9153/8480/453, secret letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Nov.10, 1936. See also, Richard A. Harrison, "Testing the Waters: A Secret Probe towards Anglo-American Military Co-operation in 1936", International History Review, vol.7, 1985, pp.214-234.

94.FO 371/19842/A8480/8480/45, no distribution telegram from Lindsay to FO, Oct.24, 1936.

95.FO 371/19842/A9036/8480/45, secret letter from Col. W.W.T. Torr, British Military Attache in Washington to M.I.2, Oct.27, 1936.

96.Ibid, secret letter from Craigie to Major-General R.H. Haining at the War Office, Nov.23, 1936; ibid, Troutbeck minute, Nov.18, Craigie minutes, Nov.19 andd 20, and Vansittart minute, Nov.20, 1936; FO 371/19842/F9193/8480/45, Vansittart minute, Nov.18, 1936; ibid, letter from Vansittart to Deverell, Nov.19, 1936.

97.FO 371/19842/F9193/8480/45, secret letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Nov.10, 1936; ibid, personal letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Nov.10, 1936.

98.Ibid.

99.FO 371/19842/A9193/8480/45, letter and attached copy from Eden to Duff Cooper, Nov.18, 1936; ibid, note and attached copy from Eden to Chamberlain, Nov.18, 1936.

100.FO 371/19842/A9471/8480/45, letter from Inskip to Eden, Nov.26, 1936; ibid, draft of secret telegram from FO to Lindsay, Dec.7, 1936. See also FO 371/19842/A9486/8480/45, letter from G.D. Roseway of the War Office to Hoyer Millar, FO, Nov.27, 1936.

101.The American mission that was supposed to come to England for the exchange was cancelled because of changes to the American Industrial Mobilization scheme. While some suspicion existed that the US Army had gone too far too fast for its Administration, in the FO the delay was not seen as being anything significant. See FO 371/19842/A10126/8480/45, no distribution telegram from Lindsay to FO, Dec.22, 1936; FO 371/20659/A3212/228/45, confidential letter from Haining to Troutbeck, Apr. 29, 1937.

102.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 117, Folder: A4-5/FF6, restricted report from Yarnell to CNO, Aug.31, 1937.

103.Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell Papers (hereafter the Yarnell Papers), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 4, Folder: C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, Far Eastern Situation, 121-135, letter from Yarnell to Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly (RN) ret., Nov.28, 1937. Bayley had pushed through the idea of offering the American squadron in the Mediterranean the use of Malta and Gibraltar as bases for their ships with the free use of the dockyards. The idea passed through the Admiralty and Foreign Office without a hitch, with only passing remarks on not playing the matter up too much in order to avoid giving American isolationist any ammunition. See FO 371/20662/A5298/228/45, letter from Bayley to Admiralty, July 26, 1937; ibid, A6519/228/45, letter from Admiralty to under secretary of state, Sept.8, 1937.

104.Yarnell Papers, Container 3, Folder: Leahy 37-45, letter from Yarnell to Leahy, Dec.22, 1937.

105.Yarnell Papers, Container 4, Folder: C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, Far Eastern Situation, 146-160, letter from Yarnell to Little, Jan.2, 1938.

106.RG 38, CNO-DNI-GC, Box 117, Folder: A4-5/FF6, restricted report from Yarnell to CNO, Jan.16, 1938.

107.Castle Diary, entry for Feb.19, 1938.

108.FO 371/20649/A7332/6/45, Fitzmaurice (American Department) minute, Oct.12, 1937; FO 371/20649/A8110/6/45, letter from Admiralty, Captain Phillips (War Plans) to under secretary of state, Nov.11, 1937; FO 371/20650/A9302/6/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Dec.22, 1937; FO 371/20650/A9363/6/45, note from Herschel V. Johnson (Charge d'Affaires US embassy) to Eden, Dec.28, 1937; CAB 4/27, CID Paper 1389-B, "Size of Japanese Capital Ships," Dec.28, 1937; RG 38, DCNO-ONI, 1882-1954, Box 456, Folder: London Treaty, 1936, for Limitation of Naval Armament, Confidential US Naval Attache Report, May 26, 1938; ibid, confidential US Naval Attache Report, Apr.13, 1938.

109.William D. Leahy Diary (hereafter Leahy Diary), entry for Nov.28, 1937.

110.Leahy Diary, entry for Nov.29, 1937.

111.FO 371/21028/F10616/26/23, N.B. Ronald minute, Dec.4, 1937; ibid, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.30, 1937.

112.FO 371/21041/F11265/615/23, secret despatch from Consul-General Fitzmaurice (Batavia) to FO, Nov.12, 1937; ibid, Cadogan minute, Jan.16, 1938.

113.FRUS, vol.III, The Far East, memo of Conversation between Hull and Lindsay, Jan.20, 1938 pp.38-39; FO 371/21525/A651/64/45, secret despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.26, 1938.

114.NTJ Papers, Container 33, Folder: A-C, despatch from Grew to Hull, Sept.15, 1937; FRUS, vol.III, The Far East, telegram from Hull to Grew, Sept.2, 1937, pp.505-508; FRUS, vol.III, The Far East, telegram Grew to Hull, Aug.18, 1938, pp.265-266; FO 371/22181/F10611/71/23, telegram from FO to Craigie, Oct.13, 1938.

115.FO 371/21490/A1469/1/45, IIC report, "US material resources and industry in their bearing upon national war potential," Feb.24, 1938; FO 371/21546/A9426/1202/45, IIC Report, "Economic situation in the US in the event of war," Dec.14, 1938; FO 371/22813/A2173/98/45, IIC report, ""US Protective Mobilisation Plan," Mar.21, 1939; CAB 56/2, Joint Intelligence Committee Papers (hereafter JIC Papers), PRO, Kew, London, Most Secret No.28, "Far Eastern Appreciation,", Mar.5, 1937.

116.RG 38, CNO-LNA, Box 1, Folder: British Naval Exercises and Maneuvers, US Naval Attache's Report, July 27, 1938.

117.FO 371/21518/A426/55/45, J.G.S. Beith (American Dept.) minute, Jan.19, 1938; ibid, A537/55/45, confidential telegram from Craigie to FO, Jan.21, 1938; ibid, A552/55/45, Vansittart minute, Jan.24, 1938; FO 371/21519/A644/55/45, Vansittart minutes, Jan.22, 1938.

118.RG 38, DCNO-ONI, 1882-1954, Box 456, Folder: London Treaty, 1936, for Limitation of Naval Armament, confidential US Naval Attache's Report, Mar.15, 1938.

119.FO 371/21494/A2548/1/45, letter from Capt. Little (War Office) to A. Holman (American Dept.), April 1, 1938.

120.120.FO 371/21493/A2458/1/45, letter from Torr to the War Office, Mar.18, 1938; ibid, most secret letter from Gladwyn Jebb (Cadogan's Private Secretary) to Lindsay, Mar.23, 1938.

121.Lawrence Pratt, "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East", International Affairs, vol.47, 1971, pp.745-763.

122.FO 371/23560/F2879/456/23, telegram from FO to Lindsay, Mar.19, 1939.

123.FO 371/23560/F2880/456/23, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Mar.21, 1939.

124.FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, Cadogan minute, May 2, 1939.

125.FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, most secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, Mar.25, 1939.

126.Ibid, N.B Ronald minute, Apr.28, 1939.

127.FO 371/23560/F2942/456/23, important, most secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, Mar.24, 1939; FO 371/23560/F2963/456/23, draft telegram from FO to Lindsay, Mar.24, 1939; FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, N.B. Ronald minute, Apr.28, 1939. See also Leahy Diary, entries for April 11 and April 14, 1939.

128.FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, Ashley Clarke minute, May 1, 1939.

129.FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, May 2, 1939.

130.FO 371/23560/F2943/456/23, most secret telegram from FO to Lindsay, May 5, 1939; CAB 2/8, Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter CID), Minutes of Meetings, PRO, Kew, London, 355th meeting, May 2, 1939.

131.FO 371/23561/F4366/456/23, most secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, May 8, 1939.

132.FO 371/23561/F4519/456/23, draft of most secret telegram from FO to Lindsay, May 22, 1939. On the Royal visit and its impact on Anglo-American relations see: Benjamin D. Rhodes, "The British Royal Visit of 1939 and the 'Psychological Approach' to the United States", Diplomatic History, vol.2, 1978, pp.197-211; David Reynolds, "FDR's Foreign Policy and the British Royal Visit to the USA, 1939", Historian, vol.45, 1983, pp.461-472.

133.David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41, (London, 1981), pp.61-62; Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, pp.33-36; FO 371/23561/F7010/456/23, most secret report of meeting on 14th June, June 14, 1939.

134.FO 371/23561/F4962/456/23, most secret orders for Commander T.C. Hampton, May 22, 1939. Hampton was to destroy these orders before he sailed from England.

135.FO 371/23561/F7010/456/23, most secret report of meeting held on 12th June, 1939, June 12, 1939.

136.FO 371/23561/F7010/456/23, most secret report of meeting held on 14th June, June 14, 1939.

137.Ibid.

138.Ibid.

139.An example of the reluctance to go too far in information sharing involved an American request for statistical data on the supply capability of Singapore. Because the Americans had no similar operating base in the US (San Francisco being in embryonic stage) they were cautious in their request. Their fears were justified when the British approved their request, but only if the British were allowed a tour of Pearl Harbor in return. The Americans refused to go along with the trade. See RG 38, CNO-LNA, Box 11, Folder: Singapore Supply Facilities, letter DNI to US Naval Attache in London, June 30, 1938; ibid, letter DNI to US Naval Attache in London, Oct.19, 1938. As well, it was highly unlikely that the British told the Americans that they could read the Dutch codes, and thereby gained information on American naval movements through that method. The Chief of Intelligence Staff, Singapore, reported to the Admiralty, who then passed it along to the FO, that the USN was sending the carrier LANGLEY and 12 submarines to the Philippines to preserve US neutrality in October, 1939. That information came from Dutch sources. See FO 371/22802/A6911/63/45, copy of telegram from Chief of Intelligence Staff, Singapore, from DNI to FO, Oct.6, 1939. The two navies did share information over German U-boat sightings however. See RG 38, DCNO-ONI, 1882-1954, Box 481, Folder: American-British relations various, 1935-39, US Naval Attache's Report, Brazil, Nov.1, 1939.

140.FO 371/21536/A1229/293/45, despatch from Lindsay and attached note from Hull, Feb.8, 1938.

141.An American mission sailed to England in August, 1939, to gather information regarding Britain's plans for industrial mobilization. The outbreak of the war in Europe in September interrupted the mission, which did a quick survey and returned as soon as possible. See RG 38, DCNO-ONI, 1882-1954, Box 493, Folder: Comments on Geneva Protocol, confidential report of American mission to Britain, Nov.25, 1939.

142.CAB 56/1, Minutes of Meetings of Joint Intelligence Committee, (hereafter JIC Meetings), PRO, Kew, London, Meeting No.30, July 7, 1939.

CHAPTER TWO

AMERICAN AND BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPPING: COMPETITION AND PREPARATION

An important, but often ignored, issue in Anglo-American maritime relations in the 1930s was each nation's attitude towards the other's merchant marine. As competing economic and commercial rivals, both nations looked at their merchant marines as a vital element in their overall national effort to win such a contest. Laden with powerful historical precedents that permeated the very fabric of each nation's identity, and, dealing with the financial concerns of powerful contemporary special interest groups (shipowners, shipbuilders, labour, and such organizations such as the Navy League), the comparative strength of each nation's merchant marine was a contentious issue that had to be overcome if better relations between the two were to be constructed.[1] At the very least, Great Britain and the United States would have to agree to disagree on merchant marine matters lest those differences create ill-will that would complicate more significant matters.

The merchant marine represented a powerful force in each nation. For Great Britain, her merchant marine represented a crucial strategic and economic life-line over which military reserves and materials were transported to and from the far-reaches of the Empire. Just as important, this strategic resource transported the vital goods and material Britain required to maintain one of the world's strongest economies and to obtain the raw materials which fed a modern industrial society.[2] In America, powerful citizens, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt were enthralled by the Mahanian constructs popularized in Theodore Roosevelt's day. These 'fundamental truths' of what a nation required to be considered a great power had been put to the test in the American experience of the First World War. Caught without an adequate merchant marine at a time of international crisis, the United States had been dependent on the British merchant marine for the transportation of its troops and material.[3] On taking up the office of President, Roosevelt was determined that the corrupt and incompetent United States Shipping Board (USSB), the Government institution charged with the guidance of the American merchant marine since the First World War, would be replaced, and, that the US merchant marine would be strengthened and increased to such a level that it would be an important American global, strategic tool.[4] This upgrading of the merchant marine was not only aimed at improving America's ability to compete commercially with other maritime-shipping nations, but also was intended as part of Roosevelt's plan to improve the strategic and operational ability of the USN.

Any government support of the US merchant marine, however, was a potential threat to the British dominance of that industry. Therefore, suspicions over merchant shipping issues had a tendency to create an irritation that also affected any attempts to better Anglo-American relations. Tensions over the merchant marine often manifested themselves over Far Eastern and Pacific matters, where emerging markets, a growing shipping industry on the American West coast, and fluctuating oriental economies created the greatest opportunity for competition between the two merchant fleets.

In 1933, Great Britain was clearly the world's merchant shipping leader.[5] This was the result of several things. The United States had led the world in scrapping ocean-going cargo vessels since the First World War. Operating costs also put the American vessels at a great disadvantage, with various British surveys showing that in comparison to the operating costs of foreign ships, American ships were experiencing a growth in operating costs and therefore becoming even less competitive.[6] That lack of competitiveness was of important note to foreign observers, particularly British observers. Robert L. Craigie, the Head of the Foreign Office's American Department (AD) and a naval expert, was one of the British permanent officials most familiar with the Anglo-American rivalry over maritime matters. His opinion reflected the general attitude of the other members of his Department, as well as other departments and individuals in the British policy-making elite, such as the deputy under secretary of state Sir Victor Wellesley, the permanent under secretary of state (PUS), Sir Robert Vansittart, the Department of Overseas Trade (DOT), and the Board of Trade (BoT). Craigie's opinion of the USSB was not high. He considered it to be an inefficient organization that was attempting to build up an American merchant marine in the most uneconomic manner possible.[7] And this antagonism was detached and cool compared to the heated vitriol that regularly flew back and forth across the Atlantic between the various shipping magnates and leaders of the two nations. One such battle set the tone for Anglo-American merchant marine relations in 1933.

In early January, 1933, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald C. Lindsay, alerted London to a growth in rhetoric between the merchant marines. Comments made by Sir Alan Anderson, Chairman of the Orient Line, that British shipping was having a difficult time competing with the Americans because of unfair subsidies and government support had been reported in the United States.[8] Such charges sparked an outraged response from T.V. O'Connor, the Chairman of the USSB, who raiseed a familiar defence. He claimed that the American Merchant Marine was essential to the development of US industry and commerce, as well as part of the nations defenses. He denounced Anderson's claims as foreign propaganda bent on scuttling the American merchant fleet.[9] Senator Copeland of New York also took up the fight against British shipping, stating to the 6th National Congress on the Merchant Marine that British shipping interests had "stacked the deck against the United States in the fight for the supremacy of the seas."[10] This exchange of vitriol illustrated the usual animosity that existed between American and British shipping interests over their merchant marines, an animosity which had been prominent during the 1932 presidential election. The triumph of Franklin D. Roosevelt threatened to change the hitherto lackadaisical approach the American Government had maintained towards its merchant marine.

Well-schooled in the Mahanian view of naval history that a nation required a strong merchant marine in order to be a world power, Roosevelt also had his own first-hand maritime experiences from World War I and service in with the Department of the Navy to draw from. At that time, American merchant shipping shortages had made the United States dependent on Great Britain for the movement of the American Expeditionary force and its supplies, a situation that weakened the overall post-war American bargaining position *vis-a-vis* Britain.[11] The needs of the US merchant fleet were constantly put forward to FDR by the company he kept, especially his close friend Vincent Astor, a director on the boards of the United States Lines Co., the International Mercantile Marine Co., American Lines Col, and Roosevelt Steamship Co.[12] Those early lessons and contemporary needs were not forgotten by FDR, who, as President, made an immediate effort to make the American merchant marine a viable maritime force.

The British Foreign Office, and particularly Sir Robert Vansittart, kept a close eye on the Roosevelt administration's attitudes toward merchant shipping. Of special importance was the attitude of the US Congress. While in the United States as part of a British economic mission in early 1934, Vansittart was given a memorandum by the American Department warning of the number of bills coming before Congress relating to the need for discriminatory US action against foreign shipping.[13] The AD pointed out that the present Congress was quite likely to be very nationalistic in its approach to the shipping subsidies issue. If such were the case, then there was cause for concern, since it was not known whether President Roosevelt would be able to keep those pressure groups at bay. While the memo acknowledged the possibility that Congress would move the American Government to support continued, and, perhaps bigger subsidies (such as mail carrying subsidies), such action was preferable to the Americans' practicing flag discrimination, an act that could quickly enflame Anglo-American maritime relations, as well as general relations.[14] That there was a fear of the United States punishing British shipping interests through the use of flag discrimination was demonstrated by the Foreign Offices's delaying of a Board of Trade White Paper on shipping subsidies in April, 1934.[15]

The FO, in the form of Craigie, Wellesley and Vansittart, did not object to the material in the BoT's White Paper itself, but only on the timing of its release. The BoT wished to produce a document that would support British claims against American practices at the World Economic Conference, a goal supported by the FO. However, as the next war debt payment was scheduled for June 15th, the FO thought that the best policy was to delay issuing the White Paper in order to avoid adding any extra fuel to the fire of anti-British groups in America.[16] The BoT and FO both agreed that, having to chose between the prospect of American subsidies and flag discrimination, the former was the lesser of two evils. However, either could quickly raise the temperature of Anglo-American relations.[17] Part of the problem for the British during this transitional period between American Governments was that London was not sure what the new American administration's attitude towards the American merchant marine would be. That uncertainty was ended in May, with the appointment of FDR's handpicked candidate, Admiral Hutch I. Cone as Chairman of the US Shipping Board.

Cone wasted little time before making an eloquent and forceful case for the needs of American merchant shipping. On April 28th, at the Twentieth National Foreign Trade Convention in Pittsburgh, Cone denied British charges that the US was 'dumping' shipping into the industry, and claimed that the ills of the shipping industry were not the fault of the United States, but had been brought about by a combination of factors: an unprecedented decline in international trade; the construction of unneeded tonnage by competitors; and the failure of other maritime nations to scrap obsolescent ships in the American fashion.[18] The last two items were clearly aimed at the British shipping industry, but the tone of the speech was designed to silence internal, domestic critics, who would object to government assistance to the shipping industry.[19] By taking a more dispassionate, sophisticated and informed tone in his arguments, Cone caught the attention of the American Department staff. They considered him a dangerous man, whom they might have reason to fear in future merchant marine matters.[20] Cone's most effective and dangerous tactic was to point out the shortcomings of American shipping competing in foreign trade, to blame many of the problems on unfair foreign practices, and to then appeal to a sense of nationalism in order to see the tables turned.

Two of the greatest disadvantages that American shipping engaged in foreign trade faced were the higher construction costs of American-made vessels and their higher operating costs in general. Cone acknowledged that such was the case and that the industry required aid from Congress in order to compete. He called for support by means of mail-carrying contracts and construction loans.[21] Never again would the US be beholden to foreign carriers for the transportation of its commerce, nor would it lose valuable market share to other nations on the trade routes of the world. However, by Cone's own admission, the US merchant fleet was far inferior both to Great Britain and to many other nations:

> The records show that during the past ten years Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, and the United States have built 2100 ocean-going ships, each of 2000 gross tons or over, totalling 14,000,000 gross tons. To this formidable number our own modest contribution has been less than 100 ships, of about 850,000,000 gross tons. Great Britain heads the list, with nearly 1400 ships of 8,500,000 tons, outranking us in number of ships by 14 to 1 and in tonnage by 10 to 1.[22]

Clearly then, he argued, the United States Government would have to remain a strong supporter of the American Merchant Marine if that organization were to have any chance of future success.

Cone's attack on British shipping practices found a ready ally in the US Congress in the form of New York Congressman, Robert L. Bacon, who sounded the same alarm against foreign shipping practices and their effects on the American merchant fleet.[23] Ships, argued Bacon, more than any other agency, established and maintained foreign markets. In a very detailed and comprehensive presentation, Bacon demonstrated how British lines were able to build, maintain and operate vessels at far cheaper costs than could their American counterparts. According to the Shipping Board's own figures, the British were able to build cargo vessels for sixty percent less; tankers for 59 percent less; and passenger and cargo vessels for 54 percent less than could American yards.[24] Added to this advantage was the fact that British capital and operating differentials also favoured Great Britain. Finally, American wages were almost twice as much as their British equivalent, with American seamen being paid on average 69 to 79 cents an hour, as opposed to the British seamen's earning 30.5 to 34.6 cents. Between 1922 and 1932, American vessels carried less than one-third of the United States' foreign commerce, while British vessels transported one-third of that trade and other flagged vessels the other third. The US merchant fleet was inferior to other powers in tonnage and speed. Further, it was obsolescent. Little new tonnage was being produced, especially new tonnage with competitive commercial speed.[25] Finally, Bacon postulated that if American trade and commerce was to prosper, England was the target nation which had to be beaten in this war to win mercantile marine independence:

> Compared with Great Britain, our ocean-going tonnage is only one half as great, and that part of it in foreign trade is only one sixth. Even if we were never to attempt to compete with Great Britain in the carrying trade between foreign countries, we should at least,...carry a larger portion of our own. Before the war British ships carried 52 percent of total world trade, 92 percent of her empire trade, 62 percent of the trade between the empire and other nations, and 30 percent of the trade between foreign nations. She still today holds the dominant place on the ocean, with her ships taking care of 45 percent of world commerce, 60 percent of her own, and 30 percent of ours. Her maritime success is attributed to her strong industrial position with access to raw materials, her far-flung empire with coaling stations and seaports, her large coal exports compensating for the importation of foodstuffs, and her intelligent policy of government encouragements to shipping. We must not, however, permit these factors in her favor to reduce us again to a mercantile colony.[26]

The Foreign Office viewed Bacon's attack on the British shipping practices and the question of American shipping subsidies as a very serious matter. Such views, if widely held and defended in the powerful circles of the American Government, and, if put forth strongly in such venues as the up-coming World Economic Conference, could create an enormous barrier to the development of closer Anglo-American relations, particularly in commercial and maritime matters. American Department clerks were particularly worried about the internal arguments used by Bacon about defending American tax dollars, particularly as Bacon was an acknowledged shipping expert. A.A.F. Haigh, one of the AD's clerks, minuted that he was also worried about the more nationalistic argument Bacon made, that "... the U.S. cannot, in the light of past experience, afford to remain dependent for her overseas trade on foreign services, which may at any time be withdrawn owing to war or other violent disturbances."[27] Haigh's concerns were echoed by Craigie, as well as by D.V. Kelly, another American Department clerk. All agreed that the Board of Trade was to be informed of the anti-British tones coming from America concerning shipping issues and that an appropriate defence was to be constructed.[28]

Lindsay's assessment of the American mood towards shipping subsidies was cautiously hopeful. His attitude was in large part the result of his belief that FDR had not yet done anything tangible to support an increase in the subsidies for American shipping.[29] The Ambassador pointed out that the President had issued only an executive order abolishing the old United States Shipping Board on June 10th and the Merchant Marine Corporation had been transferred to the Department of Commerce. While reorganization, economy and streamlining various branches of the administration were given as the reasons for this change, Lindsay suspected that rooting out incompetent and indolent Shipping Board directors, and thereby gaining control of the me[illegible]t marine, was an important aspect of FDR's actions.[30] The final reading of Roosevelt's attitude, according to

Lindsay, was that although the President had publicly declared himself dedicated to the maintenance of an adequate merchant marine and the shipping subsidies necessary to its progress, his utterances were not much more than a desire to conciliate everyone. More important was the fact that "...the United States, in the knowledge of the weakness of their case for 'boosting' their mercantile marine (involving as it does so large a measure of financial assistance), yet feeling that what they do in the matter is their own affair, are so sensitive about it that the President, especially if sentiment here is inflamed by further foreign criticism, may be forced, it is thought, to lend his support actively to the subsidy system."[31] The warning was clear: responding to American attacks on the British shipping system with similar suggestions as to how the Americans should run their merchant marine would run the risk of forcing Roosevelt into some sort of action. Certainly the matter was one that required a delicate touch. Lindsay's reading of the situation displayed his usual well-informed and insightful knowledge of the American Government and its actions.

A delicate touch was not displayed by the Roosevelt administration in its handling of the demise of the USSB. In July, Admiral Cone had pleaded with the President to reconsider his decision to abolish the Board.[32] Arguing that the record of the USSB was one of substantial accomplishment and that the organization had built up the US merchant marine to the second largest in the world, Cone put up a spirited but unsubstantiated defence of that body. Cone's plea prompted Roosevelt's secretary, Marvin H. McIntyre, to look into the transfer of the USSB more closely.[33] His findings revealed that the new Administration was in a state of disarray over the Shipping Board's transfer. McIntyre reported in early November that the Secretary of Commerce, Daniel C. Roper, had created a very serious situation. This stemmed from Roper's dismissal of Captains Todd and Lincoln from the Shipping Board and his replacing them with General Saltzman and Mr. Thomas W. Woodward, all over the vigorous protests of Admiral Cone. Cone's principal objection was that neither of the two new Board members had any knowledge of the shipping game. McIntyre pointed out that the Administration was in for a big row in Congress that fall over the merchant marine because of the great dissatisfaction inside the merchant marine and shipping interests, a mail subsidy debate and a scandal from the regulation, maintenance and development of the American Merchant Marine that revolved around the ocean and air mail contracts. He accused Roper of having mismanaged the issue, and suggested that FDR have a chat with the latter to straighten him out.[34] Such internal problems prevented the Roosevelt Adminstration from providing a clear statement as to what were their goals regarding the merchant marine. But while internal problems may have had the effect of slowing down the reform of the industry, foreign trade matters in the Far East were providing difficulties for both American and British policy-makers.

The British fear of provoking America into using flag discrimination to punish Great Britain was a theme that emerged in another related field that had a direct impact on Anglo-American relations, particularly with reference to the Far East. These concerns revolved around growing tensions between Australian-New Zealand and American shipping interests, which were a constant thorn in the side of attempts to keep Anglo-American merchant shipping disputes at a civilized level. At the centre of the controversy was the American Matson Line and its operation in Australian and New Zealand waters.

The heavily subsidized US Matson Line operated between the US, Honolulu, Fiji, New Zealand and Australia, but British shipping was excluded from the coasting trade of the United States, including the lucrative trade between the US and Honolulu. Thus, Australian and New Zealand shipping interests felt as if they were being unfairly prevented from competing with the Matson Line, and, as a result, demanded that the two Dominion Governments take some sort of action against the Americans.

By the early fall of 1933, the Australian and New Zealand Governments were threatening to pass retaliatory legislation.[35] Foreign Office and BoT officials met on September 29th to discuss the matter. Both were anxious to not let such action come to pass, as each feared what the United States might do in return to British shipping plying the trade between the United States and the Philippines.[36] P.M. Roberts, from the American Department, pointed out that, considering the unresolved war debt situation and the possibility that foreign vessels could be excluded from the US-Philippines trade, it was best to wait while information on just how badly British shipping interests were being hurt by the Matson Line was gathered. G.M. Baker, from the Board of Trade agreed with Roberts' line of argument, adding that there was also a sour mood against British shipping brewing in the US, due to the Shipping Code debates and the subsidies debates, all of which indicated it was best not to push the US unnecessarily on merchant marine matters.[37] In the end, the two Departments decided that it was best to tell the two Dominions that the matter was receiving careful consideration and then to await events. This conclusion was modified slightly on October 14, when, in light of the possible Imperial repercussions, the matter was termed high policy. As such, it was decided that representatives of the four Governments (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain) concerned would meet and examine the subject fully and carefully in London.[38]

The Cabinet was informed of the difficulties and status of the situation in November by Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade.[39] His view, and it was shared by the secretary of state for dominion affairs, J.H. Thomas, was that, Australia and New Zealand could not be pressed any further to refrain from saying or acting as they pleased on the matter. Runciman had recommended to Stanley Bruce, former Prime Minister of Australia and now that nation's High Commissioner in London, that the FO should be informed in advance of any possible actions so that the United States could be given some warning. Runciman also made it clear to the Cabinet that the action taken by the Dominions could very well lead to retaliatory actions from the United States being directed against British shipping.[40]

The Foreign Office, and in particular the American Department, were not pleased with this state of affairs, and were already trying to arrest the supposed freedom of action for the Dominions that had been suggested by Runciman. In a telephone conversation with Victor Wellesley on October 23, Bruce had indicated that he had had a discussion with Runciman and Thomas and was now convinced he had the approval of those departments to give the Australian Government the signal to begin taking action against the Matson Line. Wellesley and Craigie both feared that, as well as taking retaliatory action against British shipping, the United States would link the Australian and New Zealand punishment of the Matson Line to the contentious imperial preference issue and argue that the actions of one member reflected the consent of the whole.[41] Both men were wary of creating a situation that would force Great Britain to enter into a debate with the US over the imperial preference issue, as that could lead to even greater economic tensions between the two.[42] The FO's response was a letter from the Secretary of State, Sir John Simon, to Runciman and Thomas, urging them to consider the impact of Australian or New Zealand actions on the sider aspects of Anglo-American relations. The FO also continued to pressure Bruce and the Australian Liaison Officer, Keith Officer, to describe to the Australian Government just how serious an issue the matter was for British shipping around the world. Both Australian officials were most cooperative and understanding of the British position.[43]

By the end of November, the only action deemed of sufficient stature to ensure that there would be some compliance on the part of the Australian Government was to communicate on the matter from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. The Dominions Office drafted the message, which was sent on to the Australian Prime Minister on November 24th.[44] The message outlined why Britain would like Australia to wait before taking any action against the US, mentioning the danger of retaliation. In particular, the Australian Government was asked not to request that the British Ambassador in Washington bring the matter up with the US Government and to await his further observations on the mood of America with regard to shipping matters.[45] Bruce assisted the British Government by suggesting to Prime Minister Lyons that he accept the British recommendation.[46] On 12 December, the Australian Government, though disappointed at the delay, agreed to the request not to embarrass HMG.[47] The FO was enormously relieved and pleased that it had managed to clean up a potentially disastrous situation created by the Board of Trade and the Dominions Office. More importantly, the Australian compliance was taken by the top FO officials as a positive signal that Australia was willing to cooperate closely with Great Britain on broader imperial issues. The relief was only temporary. It was the American Department's desire to now use the time purchased to try and find some solution, or, if that proved impossible at least to manoeuver into a favourable position before Australian domestic pressure forced action.[48]

Relations with the United States over merchant marine issues promised to be a topic of some interest in 1934. Lindsay viewed Roosevelt as a President bent on eliminating the corruption and scandal of the old Shipping Board, but one who was also committed to providing the subsidies necessary for the American merchant marine to thrive and prosper.[49] At the same time, the British Government was preparing to enlarge its aid to some lines and to consider whether tramp shipping was in need of Government support.[50] The two nations were clearly sailing a collision course as the new year began.

The attention of the American public was being drawn by some of the largest newspapers in the country towards the dire straits in which the US merchant marine found itself. Papers such as the New York Times, the Herald-Tribune and the Washington Post viewed the situation as a threat to the nation's sovereignty over its trade, and they blasted the British shippers as being unfair competitors.[51] The US big-merchant marine supporters had targeted the world's largest merchant marine as an opponent that was to be conquered in order for the US to dominate the industry itself. Even so, while the tone at times was harsh, there was also an undertone that some sort of mutually beneficial arrangement on the matter could be worked out.[52]

The American Administration was in a state of confusion over how to approach the shipping problem. In December, Joseph Scott, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of the National Recovery Administration for matters dealing with changes to the Shipping Code, resigned.[53] In his commentary on and analysis of the resignation, Lindsay explained that

> It is hardly an exaggeration to say that after some three month's labour in an attempt to fashion a code so generally comprehensive as to include every interest in the country connected with the carriage of passengers and goods by water, it is recognised that what amounts practically to a fresh start must be made.... Mr. Scott,... charges that as yet no real effort has been made to present an acceptable Shipping Code, that lawyers representing important groups of the industry have been endeavouring to control it for their own individual benefit and profit, that the normal capital of the industry has been utterly depleted, that management has been left "helpless and hopeless" and that working conditions for labour have become deplorable. The Government, through the dumping of vessels on the market by the Shipping Board at ruinously low prices, is responsible for the plight in which the industry now finds itself and this condition "has been aggravated by the system of Government construction loans and mail contracts that in practice...actually cover inefficiency, lack of planning and even worse conditions.[54]

Lindsay did not believe that Scott's resignation would have much effect, but he did think it provided a useful indicator of the chaos surrounding the Shipping Code matter. Lindsay's final analysis of the situation reflected a Washington Post article, which had quoted Scott as saying that "if ever there were a sick industry in this country it is the American Merchant Marine. The normal $2,000,000,000 capital of the industry, ... has been depleted almost to a point of complete dissipation..."[55] These financial problems, as well as charges of administrative and organizational ineptitude and corruption, sparked a wave of investigation and study by both Congress and the Administration.[56] The result was a scandal and controversy sure to keep America's merchant shipping woes before the eyes of the public.

In late January, the Secretary of Commerce, Daniel C. Roper, began to flesh out the Roosevelt Administration's policy regarding shipping. He stated that the Government would develop policy along sound lines and

> . in a manner consistent with the public interest. There is an excess of tonnage in the industry now and the Government desires to adhere to a policy that will stabilize rather than disturb it....should it be necessary for the protection of the Government's interests temporarily to get further into the ship operating business in pursuance of a policy of protecting government obligations, such action will be taken, though in that event it should be a temporary expedient.[57]

That statement was followed up another in mid-February by FDR himself. In it, he informed the world that the Government would continue the payment of subsidies to American shipping engaged in foreign trade; but that the pretence that such payments covered the carriage of mail would no longer be maintained. Such action was required, said Roosevelt, in order to ensure that the US merchant marine would be able to avoid being driven from the seas because of higher wages and operating costs.[58] Almost immediately, Secretary Roper announce the H.H. Heimann, director of the Shipping Board Bureau, was to begin work on a plan for the readjustment of shipping subsidies along the lines indicated by the President. Supported by Hugh S. Johnson, the National Recovery Administrator,[59] the Commerce Department's main proposals for this plan were that (a) that the old deception that subsidies had any reference to the carriage of mail should be abandoned, and (b) that subsidies be granted on four specific grounds: first, to offset the differences in construction costs between American and foreign vessels; second, to offset differences in operating cost; third 'trade penetration'; and lastly, other conditions bearing on the issue, such as foreign subsidies, and so on.[60] Roper, following the President's lead, also made it very clear that the increased performance of the American merchant marine was directly tied to improving America's national defence capability:

> ...the construction and operation costs of British ships are nearest to the American scale or average, but ship-building costs in American yards are on the average considerably higher than British costs. The higher American costs are largely in labor and materials. Any greater efficiency which may be present in the operation of American vessels is not sufficient to off-set the lower costs of living in other countries....As an economic necessity, the foreign trade development of the United States depends largely upon the use of American ships for carrying American goods. It is essential that we maintain an American Flag tonnage on important trade routes, to serve the needs of our commerce and to safeguard against war and other emergencies which might disturb the normal flow of American commerce. but it is not alone from the competitive and essential economic standpoint that we must view the development of our merchant marine. The merchant marine is an important and, we may safely say, an indispensable factor in our national defense. Obviously, it is not practicable to maintain within the navy all the vessels which might be necessary in event of war. To do so would require a huge outlay of tax-payer's money and might tend to encourage unnecessary defense expenditures....from both the commercial and defense standpoints, it would seem that for the economic self-respect, the military self-respect and the pride of the Nation, an adequate and proper development and maintenance of an American merchant marine is a fundamental necessity.[61]

The Adminstration's tough stance on protection for the American merchant marine was echoed in such newspapers as the New York Evening Post, where a series of hostile and angry articles by Willis J. Ballinger threatened to add fuel to the fire that threatened to burn out of control around Anglo-American relations regarding the merchant marine.[62]

Such statements and actions by highly-placed American policy-makers caused warning bells to sound in the American Department and the FO itself. Paul H. Gore-Booth, and AD clerk, and Victor Wellesley both worried about the possible repercussions of continued American subsidies on American-Australian-New Zealand trade relations.[63] It was becoming clear that some type of action against the American use of subsidies to their shipping would have to be contemplated. Craigie's opinion was that His Majesty's Government would have to take the lead and decide whether the action would be British subsidies of their own, flag discrimination or nothing. The Dominions, he felt, would take their lead from the UK.[64] Wellesley and Vansittart agreed with Craigie, both stipulating that Australia and New Zealand were to be held in check until a committee made up of the President of the Board of Trade, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanley Baldwin, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the

Secretaries of State for the Colonies, the Dominions and India had had time to consider the matter in some detail.[65] Vansittart was most adamant in his views, however, that the Americans not be allowed to bully the British shipping interests.[66] But, as relations between the two nations threatened to sour over shipping matters, informal attempts to bridge some of the difficulties were underway. Such informal approaches emanated from Washington, as a result of the situation within the Roosevelt Administration.

The possibility of an unpleasant clash over these matters was certainly one which the State Department was loathe to see occur. Cordell Hull and the various under secretaries and assistant secretaries associated with the shipping problems recognized the potentially disastrous effects retaliatory or punitive US shipping codes and laws could have on American relations with other nations. Because Hull's plan for world peace hinged on the recovery of global trade, which would require global trade agreements, the Department worried about how relations with Great Britain, the world's largest merchant shipper and global trader, would be affected by an attack on her vital shipping interests.[67] In late February, the assistant secretary of State, Francis B. Sayre, (a man openly in favour of better economic relations with Great Britain) produced an insightful memo on the potential international consequences that could result from the production of a shipping code that was hostile towards foreign shippers.[68] This was one of the first in what would become a legacy of instances over the next four years where the American State Department would fight on the same side as the British Foreign Office and shipping interests in an attempt keep the American shipping code from creating bitter and unbridgeable problems in Anglo-American relations.

Sayre pointed out that proposed code changes would violate Danish and Norwegian treaty rights. As well, while he recognised the American merchant marine's need for help in competing with the cheaper, more efficiently run foreign lines, Sayre's pointed out that the industry gained generous assistance from the mail subventions system. He cautioned that any attempt to regulate the minimum cargoes from American ports by the unilateral enactment of American law would raise some very serious problems for the conduct of American foreign and commercial policy.[69] Any attempt to raise and stabilize the existing shipping rates on cargoes carried from American ports would result, he argued, in a cost differentiaal that would make British ports more attractive. He foresaw that

> In the severe competition between British cargoes and American cargoes in the Far East or in other parts of the world, the result of the proposed enactment might be to enable British shippers to undersell American shipper; and if this were the result of the enactment of the proposed code it would naturally be very much to the ultimate detriment of American shipping. It would seem, therefore, that this fundamental problem of policy should be faced and thought through before the proposed code is enacted.[70]

Sayre also reported that the American Manufacturers Export Association was strongly opposed to the code changes and that some American shippers were threatening to send their shipments through Canadian ports if the offensive code changes were enacted. What was required was an international agreement on ocean rates and the limitation of shipping charges. However, with the legacy of the failure of numerous international conferences, such as the World Economic Conference, still fresh in the minds of administrators, the will for governments to convene such a meeting was not present.[71] There was, however, some room to manoeuver in the realm of informal or institutional meetings.

On March 2, Charles S. Haight, a lawyer with the New York legal firm of Haight, Smith, Griffin and Deming, who represented the tramp shipping interests of Denmark, Finland, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and Greece, wrote to Sayre about the shipping emergency. Haight supported Sayre's call for an international agreement on the problem, and revealed that a powerful British shipping operator was active in trying to arrange some sort of agreement.[72] Lord Essendon, chairman of Furness, Withy and Company, of the White Star Line, was responsible for the operation of about 1,600,000 tons of ships. In Haight's opinion, Essendon was one of the most active and successful operators of British tonnage. Haight reported that Essendon had been meeting and talking with the Steamship Owners' Organizations of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland. Those groups had sought out Essendon after the British government announced its intention to assist British shipping through the granting of subsidies. Fearing a subsidy war in which they were sure to come out the losers, the shipping organizations of the four countries had informed Essendon they were willing to press their governments to join in any reasonable international agreement for the rationalization of ocean shipping.[73] Essendon had informed Haight that advances from such nations did not have much effect on the British Foreign Office or Board of Trade, but felt that if the United States would show interest in such an agreement the British Government would change its attitude and follow the American lead. British owners had been divided, said Essendon, with the majority agreeing with him that some sort of international agreement should be attempted, but the minority was too large to ignore easily. Haight included a outline of how such an agreement could be negotiated, complete with suggesting that Sayre be the negotiator for the US. The information for his outline was provided by Essendon.[74] Obviously, then, British shipping and some American State Department officials had similar, but not identical, views of the nature of the shipping problem and its solution. Sayre, liking what he saw in Haight's letter, sent a copy of to the Department of Commerce in order to obtain their opinion.

Secretary Roper was impressed, but not interested in the United States' taking the lead in any of the proposals outlined, especially the calling of such a conference.[75] Roper repeated his view that the US had led the way in scrapping vessels and argued that if other nations had not overbuilt and had followed the US example the situation would not be so severe. The situation as he saw it was unacceptable, in that the United States -- a leading exporting nation -- was in a relatively inferior position, carrying only 8 percent of the total world trade.[76] Nonetheless, the Department of Commerce held that America would be very sympathetic to any such conference, and that it was not an absolute given that participation in such an event would not be considered. This was fortunate, for Charles Haight had been making progress in Europe towards the convening of just such a conference.

He informed Cordell Hull and the State Department that there was indeed a possibility that such a conference might be possible. Haight claimed that Scandinavian, Greek, German, Italian, Dutch and Baltic shipping owners were in favour of an international conference, so long as Britain took the lead in calling such a meeting. According to Haight, whose view was supported by Lord Essendon, the British Government was in favour of attending such a conference if it was held in Washington.[77]

Such an opportunity for an improvement in Anglo-American relations regarding shipping was made more remote however with President Roosevelt's signing of Joint Resolution No. 207 on March 26th. That resolution required that exports of agricultural or other products financed by Government departments be carried in US registered vessels.[78] The signing of this document was the result of steady pressure from both Houses of Congress on the Administration to take some action that signalled a readiness to support the American merchant marine.[79] As cries for retaliation against the United States' action sounded throughout Europe such action caused great concern among the British ship owners, and at the Foreign Offices. Talk of retaliation held grave consequences for Britain, since London was expected to lead the counter-attack, but it was British trade and shipping routes that would be most exposed in any shipping war with the United States.[80]

The FO, the Board of Trade, the Treasury and British shipping lines and owners were all in a state of confusion as to what action to take, if any. British shipping policy was still under review by a Cabinet Committee on Shipping Policy, which as yet had not made any recommendation.[81] All groups were torn between concern for the vulnerability of British shipping to further American retaliation and the need to demonstrate that British shipping would not tolerate such flag discrimination quietly or calmly. Finally, almost one month after Roosevelt had signed the resolution, Ambassador Lindsay was instructed by the BoT and the FO to broach the matter cautiously with the US government if the British lines should desire him to do so.[82] He was not to lodge any serious protest from HMG at this point, as the strategy to be employed was to wait to see both how far the American Government would go and what recommendations the Cabinet Committee on Shipping Policy would make.[83]

Haight, who had been instructed to represent the British tramp objections to the Enquiry that was pending, gave the US Government a very full description of the British attitude and reaction to the signing of the Joint Resolution.[84] In London Haight had met many high officials and shipping executives who were musing on what actions could or should be taken against the American shipping industry. On April 11 Haight was informed by members of that group that they would use their best efforts to keep any hasty action or heated debate on the matter from becoming a public issue.[85] Returning from Europe on April 19, he immediately met with Sayre. Haight informed Sayre that he had been able to keep the shipping groups in the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Great Britain from launching an immediate counter-campaign against the US. This had been achieved with the help of Lord Essendon and because the State Department allowed Haight to tell those groups that the United States was opposed to the Joint Resolution.[86] His report to the State Department revealed that American action had removed almost all the limited support there had been in British shipping circles for calling any international conference. Furthermore, at a conference of the executives of the most important British lines, a consensus was established as to where the shipping question fit into the overall trade restoration issue. Sir Alan Anderson, head of the Orient Line and President of the Association of

British Chambers of Commerce, and Sir Norman Hill, former secretary of the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, argued that shipping was to be treated as part of the general problem of trade restoration, which was to be handled on the lines of an agreed British policy that could deal with the general principles.[87] They were opposed by Lord Essendon, who thought the two items could be divorced and a rationalization of tonnage found before a wider trade agreement was reached. The end result of the meeting was an agreement

> (a) that all agitation against the Joint Resolution, both in the press and in the House of Commons should be avoided; (b) that retaliation should be kept in reserve; (c) that action by the British lines on the question of an international conference should await a disclosure of the American attitude. If the purpose of the American government was to seek a solution which would be for the general good of all shipping, the British owners would be more than glad to co-operate. If, on the other hand, the suggestion of a shipping conference, even if called by the United States, were to be based upon the theory that the United States must carry at least 50% of the entire trade, it would be far better not to have any conference at all.[88]

Haight had continued to reassure the British that the State Department was both sympathetic to their views and continued to oppose discriminatory legislation. His recommendation to the State Department was that, in the face of all that he had seen and heard, the Joint Resolution could not be allowed to take effect. As well, he urged Washington to call a governmental conference on international shipping.

The State Department remained interested in the idea of an international conference on shipping being called.[89] Sayre instructed the American Ambassador in England, Robert W. Bingham, to keep the Department fully advised of any further possibility that the British Government might issue invitations to such an affair.[90] His instructions to Bingham reflected the fact that the Roosevelt Administration was going slowly on down shipping issues for the present, in an attempt to prevent an excessive degree of negative international reaction. The March 26th Joint Resolution was explained as being chiefly applicable to produce shipped to China under Reconstruction Finance Corporation contracts, and to shipments to Russia and Cuba under credits from import/export banks, whose operations were very restricted. This relieved some of the tensions that the BoT and FO had felt. So, to, did FDR's rejection of the general shipping code that had been proposed by Congress, especially when the President stated that he "...considered that the industry is already subject to sufficient regulating powers.".[91] Immediately after his rejection of the code, FDR appointed Secretary Roper to head a committee to investigate the shipping code legislation. Sayre informed Ambassador Lindsay that the striking of the committee signaled how seriously the Administration took the matter. He added, however, that while the question was a most difficult one for the Government, the British should not fear precipitate American action.[92] Lindsay confirmed that the new American shipping committee was indeed a significant step towards the Americans' sorting out their shipping policy, and informed the FO that the committee would look at the subjects of

> ...subsidies, consolidations of lines, disposal of surplus tonnage, financing of new construction, Army transport procedure, the treatment of laid up men of war, and the "objectives of the proposed shipping code, its application and relation to the Shipping Board Bureau." It is expected that the Committee, which is due to report in the early part of the Autumn, will derive as much assistance as possible from the Proceedings of Senator Black's ocean mail contract investigation.[93]

This committee would be one of the main driving forces behind the eventual creation of the United States Maritime Commission. It was through the appointment of ex-USN senior officers to leadership positions on that commission that Roosevelt would attain his goal of creating a merchant marine that could give valuable logistical support to the expanding USN. However, while the American Administration was creating a committee to investigate what national role its merchant marine should serve, the British Government was presenting the findings of its Shipping Policy Committee to the world.

On June 25, the President of the Board of Trade submitted a memorandum to the British Cabinet on the position of the British merchant marine.[94] The memo pointed out the divided opinion within the British shipping community as to what form of subsidy and what actions were most appropriate, but it also recommended four major points that required Cabinet's approval:

> (i) The Proposal that a fighting subsidy to cost not more than L2 millions and aimed at bringing about the discontinuance of foreign subsidies, should be granted for a year to British ships carrying tramp cargoes, provided a satisfactory scheme for applying the subsidy is produced by the shipowners....
> (ii) The proposal that consideration should be given to the grant of subsidies in special cases to British liners prejudiced by subsidised foreign competition in particular trades if the grant of financial assistance appears to be the best method of assistance.
> (iii) The proposal that financial assistance on lines contemplated by the Cabinet Committee should be made available by the Government for a scrapping and building scheme if and when it appears that such a scheme would be used by the shipping industry.
> (iv) The preparation in due course of legislation to sanction the grant of a fighting subsidy, the grant of subsidies to lines in special cases, the grant of financial assistance for building and modernising on condition of scrapping....[95]

The report also strongly supported the idea of communicating the findings of this committee to foreign nations that subsidized their merchant fleets in order to show them that Great Britain was willing to defend her shipping interests. The matter of calling an international conference was not looked upon with great favour by the Committee; however, the report suggested that British shipping interests would help their case if they could organize a shipping conference that was not government-sponsored.[96]

The Cabinet did not appreciate the speed with which their decision was expected, but continued pressures from Australia, New Zealand, British shipping organizations and the Press required that action on the matter be taken quickly.[97] The Pacific Dominions in particular were anxious for a decision, as the announcement of a policy would relieve them from the British request not to take any retaliatory action against the Matson Line.[98] The report was accepted by the Cabinet and the recommendations in it approved, except for the wording of the 'fighting subsidy'. Both John Simon and the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, feared that the use of such terminology in the phrase would elicit a negative response from the Americans, and might create needless friction with that nation. Runciman argued that the US tramp shipping was practically non-existent, and therefore the subsidy would have little impact on America. Indeed, he assured Simon and MacDonald that, since Roosevelt's vetoing of the draft code for the shipping industry, American threats to British shipping had cleared. Still, pressure coming from both senior Cabinet members to ensure that needless aggravation of America was avoided prevailed, and Runciman agreed to change the phrase to 'defensive subsidy'.[99] Runciman also informed the Cabinet that the two Dominions were now free to take whatever action they deemed fit, with the full knowledge of the risks involved.

While the Cabinet decision gave some indication of the direction that British shipping policy was moving, the FO had some severe reservations about allowing Australia and New Zealand a free-rein in formulating a strategy for dealing with the Matson Line. The FO had been hard at work since May, when advance indications of what Runciman's final report was going to look like had been made available, trying to keep Australia and New Zealand from running off half-cocked to antagonise US shipping groups with retaliatory action.[100] Most of the findings in the BoT material for the compilation of their memo on British merchant shipping were acceptable to the FO, and both departments were agreed that it would be best if no international shipping conference were called, especially if it were to be government sponsored.[101] The BoT itself did not think that retaliation against the Matson Line was worth the candle, but Runciman and J.H. Thomas did. The shipping companies had also informed the BoT confidentially that retaliation against the Matson Line would not help them, but the firms did want to make it clear that they disapproved of flag discrimination and subsidies for the Matson vessels.[102] While the FO realized that Australia and New Zealand might soon technically not be prevented from taking action against the Matson Line, Craigie and the American Department worked hard to get the message across to the Dominion Governments that taking drastic action would not be good for the Empire's shipping as a whole.

The AD played a large role in the drafting of the instructions that were to be sent to the dominions.[103] Craigie, in conjunction with the BoT and the Dominions Office (DO), held the general view that

> ... in order to restrain the Governments of Australia and New Zealand from taking action independently of the rest of the Empire it is advisable to lay before them as forcibly as possible the dangers attendant on discrimination.... For the same reason however we would be glad if it were possible to strengthen the argument still further by inserting some statistical indication of the amount of British which would be directly affected by retaliation.

Utilizing reports and material from the British embassy in Washington, as well as the Board of Trade's own material, the AD and Craigie added cautionary messages to the telegrams that the DO was preparing to send to Australia and New Zealand. All three British departments -- BoT, FO and DO -- were sympathetic to the dominions' indignation and all agreed that the situation was inequitable. However, a great deal was made of the vulnerability of British shipping to American retaliation, in the form of such measures as the recently-defeated King Bill (the effect of which would have been to exclude from United States ports all British ships with Asiatic crews but not, for example, Japanese ships). British shipping was also very vulnerable generally, as it carried a substantial proportion of the trade between the United States and other foreign countries, notably Argentina and Brazil, Cuba and countries in Asia. It was also pointed out that British shipping carried a much larger proportion of the trade between the United States and ports in the British Commonwealth than did United States' shipping. The possibility of unfavourable reactions in connection with the Draft Shipping Code, which was being discussed in New York, was raised, as was the possibility that a controversy on this subject might give the United States a welcome, even if not strictly logical, pretext to raise questions affecting inter-imperial relations as a whole.

The FO was happy for the moment, for they felt that the attitude of Congress towards shipping was still undefined, and, in particular, pleased that the Shipping Codes were still under divided discussion in the United States. With the interests of British imperial shipping in mind, the best advice the FO could give to the two dominions was

> If, however, exclusion of United States vessels from local trades is contemplated your Ministers will observe from foregoing the risks attaching to this course. If negotiations with United States with a view to opening trade between San Francisco and Honolulu to British ships are in contemplation, while such a step at the appropriate time is obviously reasonable, the chances of success do not appear great, nor does it appear certain that if that trade were opened British Lines would thereby be enable to meet Matson competition.

The Australian and New Zealand reply was not long in coming.

By June the New Zealand Government had signaled its reply to the Dominions Office. While it did not know what action to take, and, with full regard for the arguments put forth by the British Government advocating acting in a cautious manner, the New Zealanders felt that the position could not be left as it was. Some steps had to be taken to safeguard the essential interests of the Dominion.[104] The AD seemed pleased enough with this reply, gathering that, while New Zealand was still angry and determined to take some action against the Matson Line, the course of action had not yet been decided because of the splash of cold water represented by the FO's analysis.[105] The Australian and New Zealand need to delve further into the problem was still in evidence by November, when the two finally decided to call a conference on what to do about the Matson Line. The two had agreed by that time to approach the US and see if the latter was willing

> ...firstly to allow British shipping engaged on American Australian routes to take part in the trade between Honolulu and the two United States ports. Secondly having in view the vital interests of British shipping and its adequacy especially when improved service referred to is available to ensure that apart from the two vessels already engaged the Matson Line will not enter into New Zealand Australian trade. In the absence of United States agreement to this request, the Governments of the two Dominions propose to explore at once every possibility of reaching an arrangement having for its object the limitation of the Matson Line in passenger and other trade between New Zealand and Australia.[106]

The Foreign Office was asked for its comments, but Craigie and the AD were resigned to the fact that it now appeared as if the two dominions could only be relied upon to now resort to some type of flag discrimination.[107] But, while the antipodean dominions of the Empire contemplated a conference to decide what to do about the American shipping question. British shippers also were planning conferences. Their conferences were aimed, however, not at adopting an internal policy, but rather at the Americans themselves.

On July 16, Ambassador Bingham was provided with an extensive memorandum on the British view of the international shipping situation by Sir John Simon. Simon asked the State Department to reply to the memo and offer the American view of the situation.[108] The memo outlined the pressures from British shipping interests, some Scandinavian countries and Greece which had been put on Great Britain to take the lead in calling for an international conference to deal with the shipping crisis. The FO had clearly spelled out that HMG did not believe such a conference would meet with much success until "... until it is clear that all the countries interested are ready in principle to join in international measures for remedying the present difficulties and are in general agreement as to the measures to be taken."[109] The memo suggested that it was best if a great deal of the ground-work for such a conference was done by the shipowners themselves.[110]

The memo advised the State Department that, to that end, the British Government had been pressuring its shipping owners to organise an international conference to deal with one of the main problems facing the shipping industry: the restoration of equilibrium in the shipping trade by adjusting the supply of tonnage to actual world requirement.[111] By the end of August, invitations had been sent to the American Steamship Association inviting them to attend an international gathering in London. The American embassy in London confirmed that, while the conference would reflect the concerns outlined in the Foreign Office memo of July, that the event was not government- sponsored.[112] The timing for such a conference was critical. It was called in order to take advantage of what appeared to be a lull in the American press and Congress over shipping matters.

At a press conference in Washington, on August 29, FDR, under attack all week by protectionists, continued to insist that America needed a strong merchant marine for security, as well as economic reasons

> ...he made three other points which give fairly clear indication of his present intention to maintain an adequate mercantile marine. These points were (a) the need of a mercantile marine from the point of view of national defense; (b) the danger of foreign shipping being eliminated in the case of a war to which the United States was not a party; and (c) the fact that on certain trade routes, where there were no United States ships, American exporters had had to pay unduly high rates."[113]

The Counselor at the British embassy in Washington, D.A. Osborne, viewed this as the final statement on the matter, given Roosevelt's previous vetoes and the Administration's growing control over the merchant marine. While the Hearst press could probably be counted on to continue to try and make a major issue out of the situation, Osborne's opinion was that "It now looks as if nothing more of particular importance may be heard of this question for some time to come..."[114] Indeed, the FO and BoT were now becoming resigned to the fact that the Americans would continue to subsidize their shipping. However, so long as the actions taken were not hostile to British shipping interests, there was little that could be done to stop the Americans from building what they considered to be an adequate merchant marine.[115] As well, if a strong merchant marine were necessary to support American naval force in the Far East, then a grudging acceptance of US merchant marine growth was perhaps prudent strategically.

The British shipping firms added a personal touch to the invitation to the American Steamship Association (ASA). Henry M. Cleminson, secretary of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, traveled to America in October to try to persuade the American steamship representatives to attend the conference.[116] The tactic soon paid dividends, as the ASA announced itself ready to participate in initial conversations in London. The chairman of the ASA, John McAuliffe, informed the State Department on November 14 that his association were very grateful for the work the Department had been doing in trying to improve international trade and that they would be sending a delegation to the small preparatory conference on shipping that was to be held in London on January 14.[117] All looked promising.

This new sense of cooperation and common-purpose was soon challenged, however, by a public relations problem concerning whether Sir Ronald Lindsay would represent Great Britain at the Maritime Council's exhibition in New York. This matter provides a clear insight into the delicate nature of the relationship between British and American shipping groups. In a November 15th letter, Lord Essendon informed Sir John Simon that Lindsay had been asked to participate in the exhibition but had refused. Essendon feared that Lindsay's refusal would be taken as a snub by the American merchant marine, and would thereby signal the US press and other anti-cooperation groups to begin a campaign that would jeopardize the planned preparatory conference. The shipping magnate respectfully requested that the ecretary of state for foreign affairs instruct the Ambassador to change his mind.[118] Simon, relying heavily on the AD and Craigie for guidance in the matter, replied that

> As you are no doubt aware, the question of shipping subsidies and shipping policy in general is the subject of considerable political differences in the United States, and there is in existence there a strong body of opinion which is much opposed to any form of international co-operation in this field at all, and which would like to see an almost indefinite expansion of United States shipping at the expense of foreign and particularly British (as being the largest) Merchant fleets. The President himself is understood to favour a situation in which United States goods should preferably be carried in United States rather than foreign bottoms. While, therefore, I fully appreciate the importance to British shipping of an occasion such as that to which you refer, I feel that great care is needed if we are to avoid provoking in American opinion reactions hostile to the cause of rationalization and international co-operation in shipping matters. Official British support on this occasion might, by rousing suspicions in certain sections of United States opinion, start such reactions. I understand moreover that the American Steamship Owners' Association have now so far committed themselves as to authorise the appointment of delegates to a preliminary conference in London. My own feeling is that their task might be made difficult, and the chances of fruitful co-operation on their part might be considerably reduced if it could be represented, however falsely, that they were playing the game of British shipping by agreeing to any circumscription of the activities of the American merchant marine. I do not think these dangers would be materially lessened by the presence of a high official of the United States Government at the meeting on Nov.23 As therefore, it must be admitted that the question is one not without delicacy in its relation to United States public opinion, I am sure you will agree that I cannot do better than rely upon the judgment of His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington. Sir Ronald Lindsay is fully alive to the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to the well-being

> of British shipping, and, I fell sure, will only have taken his decision after a very careful consideration of the issues involved.[119]

Essendon replied to Simon that he understood. Fortunately, the matter had lost some of its importance given Cleminson's success, and Essendon was buoyed by the State Department's sympathetic attitude towards international cooperation.[120]

In the end, Anglo-American cooperation on the matter saved the day in New York. When it became known that the Secretary of Commerce was sending his principal subordinate, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Dickinson, Lindsay deputized the British Consul-General in New York, Sir Gerald Campbell to attend. It was arranged ahead of time, with the cooperation of Mr. Haight, Dickinson, and Mr. McAuliffe, (all strong supporters of the idea of international rationalization of shipping) that the Consul-General would 'speak' at the exhibition. However, while the 'speech' was to look spontaneous and natural when Campbell was pulled from the crowd, in reality he had rehearsed his non-committal, yet flattering remarks carefully and with the coaching of Haight and McAuliffe. The end result was a most successful event that created an atmosphere of Anglo-American cooperation and progress in the arena of international shipping; something that boded well for the January conference.[121]

Anglo-American tensions over the merchant marine issue appeared to be easing as 1935 began. FDR had taken the final report of his shipping committee with him to Georgia during Thanksgiving. The British embassy and FO noted with interest that a naval representative had been added to the committee, but as yet all word of the final recommendations were secret.[122] Two weeks before Christmas, Roosevelt announced that he would not send his merchant marine programme to Congress until after the January meeting in London.[123] What the British Foreign Office and other institutions interested in the shipping problem did not yet realize was that 1935 would see the President launch an attack in support of a stronger, larger, American merchant marine. That attack, however, would not be launched against the British specifically, although their superior position would be used as both example and scapegoat in many cases.

What FDR was poised to do was to seize control over the construction and formulation of a merchant fleet that could act as a legitimate logistical train for a larger American fleet. Roosevelt's rationale for these actions would be the need to make War Plan Orange a viable reality, instead of just an intellectual paper exercise, through the creation of a competent naval reserve and merchant marine. One of the inadequacies of the USN was its lack of the equipment necessary for meeting the logistical demands of fighting a naval war in the Pacific.[124] By 1935, as the international situation in Europe and the Far East worsened, the American desire to build a merchant fleet was more acceptable to British strategic planners. As a possible source of necessary supplies, particularly of oil, and a possible naval ally, the United States' merchant marine position, as it was seen as part of the overall rearmament of the western democracies, became much more acceptable to Great Britain. Also, as the world situation worsened, Great Britain began to increase its merchant-marine capability, especially its tanker tonnage. In such a circumstances, where British building was increasing, criticism of the United States for doing likewise was a hard position to maintain. So, although the Foreign Office, Board of Trade, and other institutions and groups interested in Britain's maintaining her merchant marine supremacy were not happy with the increased competition from the United States, there was little that could be done to prevent the US from going ahead with its programme. The only response would be for British shipping to remain competitive and capable of competing in a still-growing industry. All told, the level of tension and open expressions of hostility that had existed since the end of the First World War over the nations' merchant marine programmes became much less vitriolic, as each began to look inward to defence issues, and, as a greater sense of trust in one another grew in what many perceived to be a darkening and more violent world.

Roosevelt's quest to fulfill his Mahanian vision for a American merchant marine began in April 1935, during the Seventy Fourth Congress. Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee revealed the first parts of the Administrations plan for restructuring the American merchant marine.[125] Senator Royal S. Copeland, Chairman of the Committee, read out the President's vision as to of why America needed a strong merchant marine. FDR's message was a reiteration of the position he had taken earlier, and it stressed three main reasons for having an adequate merchant marine. First, in times of peace, subsidies granted by other nations, shipping combines, and other restrictive or rebating methods might well be used against American shippers. The maintenance of fair competition called for American flag ships of sufficient tonnage to carry a reasonable portion of US foreign commerce. Second, in the event of a major war in which the United States was not involved, American commerce, if there was no adequate merchant marine, would find itself seriously crippled because of its inability to secure bottoms for neutral peaceful foreign trade. Third, if the United States were involved in a war, American ships would be needed not only to serve as naval auxiliaries, but also for the maintenance of reasonable and necessary commercial interaction with other nations. Furthermore, Roosevelt advocated that the US Government openly acknowledge the need to subsidize the US merchant marine.[126] He castigated the past system of hidden subsidies and the lending of money for shipbuilding, which, in his view had been a complete failure, as causing both a legacy of corrupt lending practices and mail subsidies fraud to take root in the merchant marine. With this statement, and the submission of two reports, the one on shipping policy and the other on ocean-mail contracts, FDR had launched his first volley in the battle to replace the US Shipping Board system with his Maritime Commission. These actions had not gone unnoticed by the British Foreign Office and Board of Trade.

The BoT and the FO were very sensitive to the question of American subsidizes to its merchant marine. Both offices watched carefully the drama and debate over the future of the American merchant marine unfold in Congress. Would the Americans want to keep 50 percent of their imports and exports in American bottoms, was one of the key questions that the Chamber of Shipping and the BoT asked Lindsay to keep an eye on in the new year.[127] All indicators, even those provided by American sources, revealed the steady decline that the American merchant fleet had suffered since about 1922. The American Department's analysis was confident that British lines could more than hold their own in trade with American firms, as long as discriminatory action was not taken against foreign shippers.[128] However, reports from Lindsay signaled that both houses of Congress, under the guidance of Senator Copeland and Congressman Bland, were moving the spirit of the legislation from providing an 'adequate' to a 'strong' merchant marine. It was the Ambassador's belief that

> in view of the present extravagant spirit of the Government and of the loud and insistent demands for American merchant vessels for national defence, it seems more than probable that a measure of somewhat herculean proportions will eventually emerge even if, contrary to Mr. Roosevelt's expressed desire, legislative congestion and disorder prevent its passage in the present Congress.[129]

The shipping experts in the American Department rationalized that in light of the rapid and radical changes being made to the proposed legislation, it was best to not protest or comment. Instead a period of observation and assessment was to be the order of the day.[130]

The situation concerning the Matson line was on hold as well, while the Australian, New Zealand and British governments attempted to formulate some strategy for dealing with the matter. Despite continued pressure from the Pacific Dominions, the BoT and FO continued to urge restraint.[131] A Commonwealth committee on the competition of Foreign subsidised shipping with British shipping met on May 31, to discuss the Matson Line specifically. The Australian and New Zealand representatives, R.G. Menzies and G.W. Forbes, respectively drew attention to a memo prepared by the Australian Prime Minster on the need for immediate action.[132] Walter Runciman made the British position clear to the Dominion delegates, stating that Great Britain was

> ... now prepared to say that they would not stand in the way of any action which New Zealand and Australia thought it necessary to take and would risk the consequences of any retaliation by the United States of America against British ships. The position of the United Kingdom Government had changed in two ways since the question first arose. In the first place, it now seemed clear that there was nothing to hope for from the United States in the way of abolition or modification of subsidies. In the second place, a new shipping policy was announced last year under which a defensive subsidy had been given to tramp companies for assistance against subsidised foreign competition, especially on the great Imperial routes such as that between this country and India. Of the three suggestions put forward a the meeting for dealing with the Matson Line, namely, a subsidy to the British ships, or reservation of the trade between Australia and New Zealand, or an arrangement with the Matson Line, he agreed that the third would be the most desirable course.[133]

This statement by the President from the Board of Trade, that there was little that could be done about the US shipping threat, signaled the beginning of a reluctant, yet grudging and competitive acceptance on the part of the British government, that the US merchant fleet was now a major rival.

Immediately following President Roosevelt's statement in 1935 as to why changes to the American merchant marine were necessary, the Administration had launched a strong attack to prove its case. On April 25, J.E. Saugstad, an expert on shipping and trade from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, informed Senator Copeland's committee of the degree to which the British Government susidized its tramp shipping. He also gave a concise and informed account of the condition of Britain's liner services, the monies which the British Government had invested in that shipping since 1928 and an accurate outline of the role of the Board of Trade in formulating British national shipping policy.[134] On May 1, Alfred H. Haag, Chief of the Division of Shipping Research, US Shipping Board Bureau, Department of Commerce, summarized in great detail the shortcomings of the American merchant marine and its lack of performance in comparison with other merchant fleets. His argument painted the British merchant fleet as the main rival that had to be overcome if America were to create a merchant fleet that could sustain itself. Haag emphasised the age of the American fleet, which had few vessels under ten years of age. This age question was one which the committee and Haag both concentrated on, especially in terms of tankers. Recognized as the legs of the fleet, new tankers with speeds above 15 knots were thought to be an important aspect of any future merchant shipbuilding programme.[135] This type of testimony, along with growing pressure from the USN and increasing public support (primarily from those East and West coast states that would benefit from increased merchant shipbuilding programs) for a strong merchant marine helped make certain that by June 29, 1936 a new Government agency - the US Maritime Commission - was created to protect and guide the advancement of the American merchant shipping fleet. Its mission was "...to further the development and maintenance of an adequate and well-balanced American merchant marine, to promote the commerce of the United States, to aid in the national defence, to repeal certain former legislation, and for other purposes."[136]

The first appointments made to the Maritime Commission, Admirals H.A. Wiley and M.M. Taylor, reflecting the close relationship that would exist between it and the USN. They were appointed for four and three year terms, and were later joined by Admiral Emory S. Land. This trio was but the first of a steady stream of retired naval officers who were to work with the future American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Joseph P. Kennedy, the man appointed Head of the Commission in March 1937.[137]

Initial British uncertainty over the exact purpose of the Commission were centered around the question of whether or not this was merely a body that was to deal with subsidy issues, or, was it the guiding hand on the formulation of American shipping policy.[138] It soon became apparent to the Foreign Office, and the British Embassy in Washington, that the latter was the case. The Commission's attitude towards the Pacific shipping problems and their possible effect on Anglo-American relations were quickly sought.[139] On May 6, James Dunn, the Chief of the State Department's Western European Division, took the British commercial counsellor, H.O. Chalkley, to see Kennedy about Pacific shipping questions. Kennedy informed Chalkley that Congress had entrusted him with the duty of getting American ships on the seas with the use of subsidies and that if he called attention to the effect of foreign discriminatory legislation in interfering with the progress of the US merchant marine's development, then retaliatory action would most certainly follow. Such a circumstance could lead to a quota situation which Kennedy said he would deplore as much as the British. But

> On the other hand he [Kennedy] had ample authority and funds to administer new act in manner he judged best calculated to carry out policy of Congress ad hoc and it was his personal inclination to consult rather than conflict with legitimate British interests. He wanted to avoid extravagant and international competition in subsidies based on inflated claims, differential costs and wages. Specifically he wished to propose urgently at the present time that our two governments exchange information in regard to operating costs of ships on particular routes for which he had to award subsidies.... Mr. Dunn supported this proposal on behalf of the United States Government. It was clear from interview that Mr. Kennedy's whole interests is in large problems of future of American shipping, of which lines should be subsidised, and of basis on which subsidies should be awarded. He is inclined to regard Pacific shipping as merely one element of the problem and Tasman question as a minor part.[140]

Ambassador Lindsay sensed an opportunity to put the British shipping position in a favourable light with Kennedy through the sharing of operating cost information. He recommended to the Foreign Office and Board of Trade that Kennedy's requests for sharing such information should be accepted, in order that better relations could be fostered.[141] The FO accepted Lindsay's recommendation and urged the Board of Trade to go along, citing the need to retain the goodwill of the United States as now being a primary concern.[142] The Board of Trade accepted the lead and prepared to survey the British and Imperial shipping communities about their attitude towards the proposal.[143] The BoT submitted Lindsay's views to the Committee on Shipping Questions, which was part of the Imperial Conference taking place in London at that very moment, and asked that body for guidance in the matter.[144] The final outcome was an exchange of views between Kennedy and the New Zealand representative from the Committee on Shipping Questions, the minister of Finance, Customs and Marketing, Walter

Nash, as the he made his way home from the Imperial Conference. Each side restated their position, with Kennedy proclaiming that the United States was definitely placing its merchant fleet in all the oceans of the world and Nash describing the effects unfair American subsidies had had on New Zealand shipping. More talks were scheduled and a wait a see attitude was reaffirmed. Both sides expressed a desire to work the matter out quietly and carefully in order to not excite nationalistic responses from Congress and the Senate.[145] The issue would continue to swirl about unresolved, yet attracting little attention in the public eye, and therefore no longer constituting a major threat which could destabilize Anglo-American relations.[146]

By June of 1936, problems stemming from the Matson Line issue had grown to include Canada, as the American lines threatened to put a New Zealand and Canadian shipping line out of service if action was not taken. The matter was referred to the Imperial Shipping Committee, and a recommendation eventually arose that the New Zealanders and Canadians build two fast, luxurious vessels in Great Britain, at the cost of 2,500,000 million pounds.[147] By December 17, 1937, the situation had not changed much, except for the fact that a more specific accounting of who would pay for what and the terms of the building and place of the two vessels had been provided. The British position was that they had made the United States' government realize that this was a matter between them (the US) and the Dominions. London was more confident that, because the US realized the nature of the problem, there was less chance that the Americans would retaliate against British shipping in general. Besides, the shipping industry was recovering nicely by the end of 1937, and British assessments of the strength of their merchant marine were becoming more positive. The British government was not fearful that the British merchant fleet, the largest and most advanced in the world, would disappear overnight.[148] On the other hand, in the context of overall economic recovery, American competition could have the effect of slowing the rate of recovery for the British economy. This was where the economic rivalry between the two nations continued to exist but, the Pacific shipping problems were allowed to quietly slip into the background of Anglo-American relations without causing a great stir.[149]

While the American merchant marine was a now a potentially serious rival, the British policy-making elite realized that the issue was one which Great Britain could not win through retaliation or punitive action, given the vulnerability of British shipping to US trade.[150] Because of the support which the State Department and Cordell Hull had given to the British position, tensions were also fading over the merchant shipping matter and other issues which had been potential stumbling blocks to better Anglo-American relations in 1934.[151] Even President Roosevelt was thought to be somewhat sympathetic to the British shipping question, even though it was apparent that he was determined to create a larger and stronger American merchant marine.[152] The delicate nature of the shipping issue did not lend itself well to government to government negotiations, because of the potential for nationalistic forces in the US to exploit the situation and use it to poison Anglo-American relations. Both the State Department and President Roosevelt thought it best to try and not put the shipping question into trade agreement talks and to let the matter lie in the hands of the shipping companies concerned and with the newly created United States Maritime Commission.[153] The reality of the situation had to be accepted by the British with grudging ill-grace and continued resolve to, wherever possible, not let the blossoming American merchant fleet displace their shipping.[154] Joseph Kennedy's statements to the Senate and to President Roosevelt towards the end of 1937 indicated, however, that the British merchant marine was still the standard to be met if the American merchant fleet was to attain respectability. But such a goal was still a long way off.[155] Describing the industry as very sick, Kennedy outlined the path the Commission would have to take over the next several years in an attempt to bring the fleet up to speed.[156] The

Commission's quick actions and the appointment to it of so many capable ex-USN officers gave great hope to many senior serving naval officers that a sea breeze was blowing change in the direction of the USN. Those with Far Eastern experience saw the value of a strong merchant fleet capable of reestablishing American maritime prestige in that region.[157] The task was not easily fulfilled. When Kennedy retired from the Commission in early 1938, to take on the Ambassador's job in London, he was pessimistic about his achievements

> I should like to report in relinquishing my post that the ills of American shipping had been cured and that the future is filled with promise. Candor compels me to say, however, that the shipping problem is far from solved, and that it is going to take some exceedingly strenuous measures on the part of the United States to preserve a fleet of anything like the present proportions in either foreign or domestic trade.[158]

Citing the rising cost of labour, the urgent need for replacement vessels, and increased shipbuilding costs as still being major obstacles that had to be overcome if the merchant marine were to compete with foreign shipping, Kennedy was hopeful that the Commission could persevere.[159]

The Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) report on the USA in 1938, confirmed that no new construction had taken place under the Maritime Commission. As well, 85 per cent of the American merchant fleet, excepting tankers, was over 14 years old. Tankers were another story, but even so, 82 per cent were 14 years or over and 92 per cent of those had a speed of less than 12 knots. The Centre reported that "It is estimated that replacements necessary during the next six years to bring the American merchant fleet up to the standard required by the Act of 1936 will be:- Foreign trade fleet (433,000 tons per annum for six years); Tanker fleet (349,000 tons per annum for six years), or 50 to 60 new vessels a year." The report also cast doubt on the ability of America's civil industry to engage in major shipbuilding activity for a sustained period. In fact, for both the merchant fleet and the USN, the IIC's opinion was that "In view of the decay of the shipyards and a severe shortage of skilled labour for the shipbuilding industry, it would certainly be impossible for the United States rapidly to initiate any programme comparable to that of 1917, and it is doubtful if a large additional programme of naval construction could be undertaken. The situation may, of course, be changed in a year or two if the Government programme of encouraging the shipbuilding industry is successful."[160] The challenge was clear for the Americans, and it was now up to the Maritime Commission and the USN to ensure that the work continued apace.

The protection of British shipping interests fell to the British Government, which, to its great displeasure, would now have to play the subsidy game as well.[161] This occurred despite the success which the British tramp shipping industry had had with its conference in January, 1935 and the support which foreign owners had given in attempting to remove the competitive advantages possessed by subsidised and low-cost foreign vessels.[162] Despite this success, foreign subsidies had not been reduced and freight rates had not returned to profitable levels. As well, despite the favourable index of freight rates for October 1935, showing 88.4 per cent, a higher percentage than any other during the last four year, the indications were that the increase was due to temporary political and economic factors and could not be maintained. This was a result of a lack of progress on the two largest factors contributing to the shipping depression still persisting: there was still a decline in world seaborne trade and an excess tonnage still existed.[163]

It is important to remember, however, that, even though the British merchant marine now required government assistance to help it compete and survive, it still remained the world's predominant merchant fleet. By the spring of 1939, tens of millions of pounds were approved to subsidize the British shipping industry and its building programmes over the next five years.[164] The British shipping industry was not contemplating surrendering its predominant position to the United States or any other nation cheaply or easily. Instead it was evolving, improving and preparing to meet and defeat any future rivals.[165] Strategic needs and the threat of war were to provide a boost for the British merchant marine.

The rearmament programme in Britain served to provide a rationale for a strong merchant marine similar to that which Roosevelt had employed.[166] After 1935, the Board of Trade's primary argument for continued subsidies to the merchant fleet was that "A large and efficient mercantile marine is necessary to this country for prosperity in peace and for defence in war."[167] Oil tankers in particular were a high priority item. In such sub-committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) as the Oil Board, American shipping began to be viewed as a vital augmentation of the capacity of British tanker and cargo vessels, especially in a possible Pacific war.[168] The need for American vessels, even if the US were a neutral, was especially vital once British planners began to evaluate what resources were required to fight a war in Europe and the Far East simultaneously. The Admiralty was concerned about not only having enough fuel for the fleet to reach Singapore and then fight, but also having enough stocks on hand for the merchant marine, which, under wartime conditions, would increase its fuel requirements significantly. It was not an option to plunder the Admiralty's fuel oil supply for the merchant marine, and, therefore, oil supplies and tankers had to be guaranteed.[169] Although the British Empire was acquiring less oil from the United States by the end of 1935, the fact remained that the American source was a secure and geographically-accessible resource, so long as the British had enough tankers.[170] It was estimated that, in the first year of a Far Eastern war, the Admiralty's requirements would be 7,582,600 tons. In April 1935, the RN's oil fuel reserve was about 4,448,000 tons.

British imperial resources, primarily in the Middle East and South America, were the primary sources to make good the deficit, but American oil was critical. To maintain civil requirements in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 8,373,490 tons unrationed or 5,245,000 tons rationed would need to be imported from the United States. On the basis of an average cargo capacity of 8,600 tons and seven trips per year, it was estimated that 139 tankers would be required to meet the unrationed rate of consumption and 87 tankers for the rationed quota.[171] These figures also reflected Dominion demands. In the final analysis, the Oil Board figures showed a need for 516 tankers to meet the Empire's needs. There were available to meet that demand 31 Admiralty-owned and 277 British commercial and 110 foreign-owned tankers, for a total of 418. The shortfall of 98 tankers could be cut to 46 if rationing were imposed. However, if it were found necessary to transport aviation fuel from the US, then the shortfall increased to 100 or 48 tankers respectively. It was hoped that in an emergency Canada would get her US oil by rail-tanker or pipe-lines, thus freeing up vital tonnage.[172] With the second largest tanker fleet in the world, at 385 vessels of 2,480,155 tons, with an acknowledged tanker-building programme of its own just beginning, the US was a natural source to look to for shipping assistance in time of war.[173] On the other side of the Atlantic, it was this demand for an increase in modern tankers that drove the British merchant shipbuilding industry to launch a tanker-building programme in the last half of the 1930s. As well, the need for neutral shipping caused the British strategic planners to have to assume that, even in the face of possible neutrality laws, the US tanker fleet would be available in time of war in the Far East.[174]

The exact meaning of the American Neutrality legislation a mystery throughout 1937 for British planners attempting to discern whether American oil and American tankers would be available in a Far Eastern war.[175] The Treasury view was that, given the 'cash and carry' provisions act it would be a little harder but not impossible for Great Britain to obtain oil supplies from the USA.[176] Another assumption was that with an 'unfriendly' United States' oil would still be available through and to Canada. The situation was not as critical for a purely Far Eastern war as it was in a European or general war scenario, but in all cases any easing of tanker demands to the Dominions was useful.[177] By early 1938, however, because of the development of closer overall Anglo-American relations, and a more unstable international situation, those same planners felt secure enough about America's intentions to begin planning with the belief that "It now appears that under the current Neutrality Act which was signed by the President of the U.S.A. on the 1st May, 1937, that in certain circumstances belligerents will be able to obtain supplies from U.S.A. The relevant clause of the Act, however, lapses after the 1st May, 1939, and the situation will then be reviewed."[178] Therefore, there were no modifactions to the allocation of supplies as had already been formulated, although buying up all available tanker tonnage as it came on the market was recommended.[179] A reserve of tanker tonnage was established but, the strategic pressures Great Britain would face in fighting a Far Eastern war, without the US as an ally, demanded that America at least be a benevolent neutral.[180]

British diplomatic efforts towards consolidating better Anglo-American relations in the last half of the 1930s recognized both the material needs of the British Empire and the American contribution to providing these requirements, if Britain were to fight a Far Eastern war. British efforts to obtain a powerful, secure source of supply in the United States were rewarded by the spring of 1939. In March, despite his early fears of American recalcitrance, Vansittart, now chief diplomatic adviser in the Foreign Office, was of the opinion that America could be counted on to supply the required oil and tanker tonnage to make a Pacific campaign possible. During a CID meeting that month, Vansittart agreed with the Oil Board that the United States would be friendly towards and would cooperate with Great Britain in the case of a Far Eastern and European war. That committee's latest assessment of the situation also declared that there was no danger of the US not being friendly towards Britain.[181] Vansittart's view was that he "...did not anticipate any difficulty whatsoever in obtaining oil from the United States in the circumstances envisaged in the report."[182] The situation in the spring of 1939, was that even if the American navy was not a formal ally, then at least the necessary sinews of war would be made available to the RN and other British units by means of the assistance of the American merchant shipping fleet.[103]

The discussions about merchant shipping had influenced Anglo-American relations in many ways. First, debates about world trade, protection and tariff systems, market share and international cooperation to foster recovery had all been part of the merchant shipping issue. Discussions of the latter had created a forum in which the feeling out process on these issues could occur. Second, by 1939, American and British ocean shipping was being developed in an uncoordinated, but parallel manner. Both nations believed, for economic and defense purposes, in being self-sufficient in merchant shipping. They respected each other's positions. Neither attempted unnecessarily to punish the other over shipping matters, as the interconnected nature of the two nations' economies had been clarified during this competition process. Third, the involvement of the merchant marines as part of the defense system of the two countries had led to some interaction between State Department and Foreign Office officials who also worked on such matters a Far Eastern affairs and naval disarmament. The ability of Great Britain and the United States to resolve the issues surrounding the merchant marine, and, in the strategic sense, to profit from the experience, led to a general improvement in other maritime matters. This was particularly evident with regard to the negotiations surrounding the 1935 London Naval Conference.

But before Great Britain could feel more at ease about its strategic position in the Far East its policy-making elite had to first determine the possible intent of the United States to help it, but also whether there were any other powers which the two western powers might be able to work with against Japan. Both American and British strategic foreign policy planners kept a close eye on the Soviet Union and its role in the balance of power in the Far East. Each wanted to know how the Russia bear would affect its own Far Eastern policy and how it could influence the other's behaviour.

ENDNOTES

1.The two most influential works which advocated the need each country had for a strong merchant marine are Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy: With an Introduction and Notes by Eric J. Grove*, (Annapolis, 1988); and A.T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, (London, 1898); idem, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, 21st ed., (Boston, 1908).

2.While opinions vary on whether the British Merchant Marine was as strong as it should have been, some of the best works on the topic are: Martin Doughty, *Merchant Shipping and War: A Study in Defence Planning in Twentieth-Century Britain*, (London, 1982); S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, (London, 1962), Ch.4; Derek H. Aldcroft, *The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939*, (London, 1970), pp.222-230.

3.Greg Kennedy, "Strategy and Supply in the North Atlantic Triangle, 1914-1918," in B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen eds., *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, (Toronto, 1996), pp.48-80.

4.Such attempts at strengthening the merchant marine were not in the purview of only the Roosevelt administration. The attempt to match the strength and ability of the British merchant marine was one which the Hoover administration had also engaged; see, RG 287, Publications of the Federal Government Committees of Congress, House and Senate (hereafter RG 287), Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, 72nd Congress, S.3501, A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 14 OF THE SHIPPING ACT, 1916, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 20 OF THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1930, Mar.4, 1932, National Archive, Washington, D.C., Box Y4-995:Y4.C73 2:Sh6 10.

5.Greg Kennedy, "The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927-1930," in B.J.C. McKercher ed., *Arms Limitation and Disarmament*, (New York, 1992), pp.149-172; idem, "Great Britain's Maritime Strength and the British Merchant Marine, 1922-1935," *The Mariner's Mirror*, vol.80, 1994, pp.66-76.

6.FO 371/16601/A61/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, on United States Shipping Board, Dec.21, 1932. On British costs see, Ian Gazeley and Patricia Rice, "Wages and Employment in Britain between the Wars: Quarterly Evidence from the Shipbuilding Industry," *Exploration in Economic History*, vol.33, 1996, pp.296-318.

7.*Ibid*, Craigie minute, Jan.9, 1934.

8.FO 371/16601/A556/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.6, 1933.

9.*Ibid*.

10.*Ibid*.

11.Kennedy, "Strategy and Supply."

12.FDR Papers, Official Files 99 (hereafter FDR-OF), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, "American Merchant Marine", Box 1, Folder-1933, general correspondence.

13.FO 371/16601/A2783/29/45, FO memo by P.M. Roberts, Apr.12, 1933.

14.*Ibid*.

15.FO 371/16601/A2723/29/45, FO minute record of conversation, Apr. 5, 1933.

16.*Ibid*, Craigie minute, Apr. 4, 1934; Vansittart minute, Apr. 8, 1934.

17.*Ibid*, conversation between Craigie and E.H.S. Marker of the Board of Trade, Apr.5, 1933.

18.FO 371/16601/A3671/29/45, despatch and attached speech from Lindsay to FO, May 2, 1933.

19.*Ibid*, minutes of American Dept. clerks A.A.F. Haigh, May 18 and P.M. Roberts, May 19, 1933

20.*Ibid*.

21.*Ibid*, Cone speech.

22.*Ibid*.

23.FO 371/16601/A4950/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, with copy of Mr. Bacon's speech, June 20, 1933.

24.The issue of working hours and labour costs was also a matter of concern to the USN. See FDR-OF 99, American Merchant Marine, Box 1, Folder 1933, Testimony of Adm. E.S. Land, Chief, Bureau of Construction and Repair and Captain H.L. Wyman, on the shipping code, July 26, 1933.

25.*Ibid*.

26.*Ibid*.

27.FO 371/16601/A4950/29/45, Haigh minute, July 7, 1933.

28.*Ibid*, Kelly minute, July 10; Craigie minute, July 11, 1933.

29.FO 371/16601/A5107/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, July 10, 1933.

30.*Ibid*.

31.*Ibid*.

32.FDR-OF 40, US Shipping Board, folder 1932-34, memo from Admiral H.I. Cone, Chairman of US Shipping Board to Capt. Walter N. Vernou, Naval Aide to FDR, July 7, 1933.

33.FDR-OF 40, folder 1932-34, note from LeHand (FDR's secretary) to McIntyre, July 25, 1933.

34.FDR-OF 40, folder 1932-34, confidential memo from McIntyre to FDR, Nov.5, 1933. Indeed, the Black Committee was a thorough and exhaustive attempt to purge the American Merchant Marine administration of corrupt and incompetent directors, fraudulent loans, unpaid loans and questionable investments in unproductive shipping lines. It stretched on from 1933 to 1935. See FO 371/16601/A7497/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, October 16, 1933; FO 371/16601/A7990/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Oct.24, 1933.

35.FO 371/16601/A7233/29/45, minutes of meeting held at Board of Trade on Sept.29th to discuss the Matson Line question, Sept.30, 1933.

36.*Ibid*. See also FO 371/16601/A7964/29/45, memo prepared by Board of Trade, Nov.4, 1933.

37.*Ibid*.

38.FO 371/16601/A7474/29/45, telegram from Dominions Office to the Prime Minister of Australia, Oct.14, 1933.

39.Cab 24/243, Cabinet Papers (CP), PRO, Kew, London, CP 250(33), memo by the President of the Board of Trade on the Matson Line, Nov.2, 1933.

40.*Ibid*.

41.FO 371/16601/A8030/29/45, Craigie minute, Nov.1, and Wellesley minute, Nov.1, 1933; A8031/29/45, American Dept. memo, Nov.7, 1933; A8332/29/45, FO memo, Nov.8, 1933; A8484/29/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.24, 1933.

42.*Ibid*.

43.FO 371/16601/A8484/29/45, telegram from Lindsay, P.M. Roberts (AD Clerk) minutes, Nov.25, 1933.

44.FO 371/16601/A8541/29/45, secret telegram from Dominions Office to Australian Prime Minister, Nov.24, 1933.

45.*Ibid*.

46.FO 371/16601/A8660/29/45, telegram from Bruce to Lyons, Nov.23, 1933.

47.FO 371/16601/A9030/29/45, copy of telegram from Dominions Office, Dec.12, 1933.

48.*Ibid*, Dec. 15th minutes by P.M. Roberts; Dec.19th minute by Craigie; Dec.19th minute by Wellesley, both 1933; minute by Simon, Jan.14, 1934.

49.FO 371/16601/A9121/29/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Dec.8, 1933.

50.CAB 24/245, CP 293(33), "The New Cunard Liner, Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer", Dec.11, 1933; and CP 298(33), "Report of the Chamber of Shipping Special Committee on Tramp Shipping, Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade," Dec.11, 1933.

51.FO 371/17571/A16/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Dec.21, 1933.

52.*Ibid*.

53.FO 371/17571/A235/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Dec.28, 1933.

54.*Ibid*.

55.Ibid. Lindsay's and Scott's comments on the Shipping Board losing enormous amounts of money at a regular rate are borne out in the minutes of the Shipping Board trustees themselves. See Record Group (hereafter RG) 32, Records of the United States Shipping Board, National Archives, Washington, D.C., "Monthly Financial Statements", Vol.22-Vol.26, from Jan., 1934 to Oct.25, 1936 when the Board was dissolved and the US Maritime Commission took its place. See also FO 371/17571/A868/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.18, 1934.

56.Here, in particular, the work of Senator Black's Committee on US shipping subsidies and mail contracts is important. No good secondary source on the US merchant marine and such events is available for this period. See FO 371/17571/A462/16/45, Washington Chancery to American Department, Jan.4, 1934; FO 371/17571/A694/16/45, letter from Lindsay to Craigie, Jan.11, 1934 in which both Craigie and the BoT ask Lindsay to keep a close eye on the Black Committee.

57.FO 371/17571/A1099/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.25, 1934.

58.FO 371/17571/A1322/16/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Feb.15, 1934.

59.Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter, FRUS), Vol.1, General and British Commonwealth, 1934, letter from Hugh S. Johnson to under secretary of state, William Phillips, Feb.16, 1934, pp.687-689.

60.FO 371/17571/A1394/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.26, 1934; FO 371/17572/A2315/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Mar.7, 1934; FO 371/17572/A2409/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, copy of letter from Roper to S.O. Bland, Chairman of House Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio and Fisheries, Mar.15, 1934.

61.FO 371/17572/A2315/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, copy of official text of wireless broadcast by Secretary of Commerce, D.C. Roper, Mar.7, 1934.

62.FO 371/17572/A1901/16/45, letter from A. Fletcher (British Library of Information. New York, hereafter BLINY) to R.A. Leeper, News Department, FO, with articles attached, Feb.15, 1934; FO 371/17572/A1902/16/45, letter from Fletcher to Leeper, Feb.20, 1934.

Ballinger charged that: "(a) That the United States lines were taken over by the International Mercantile Marine for the purpose of suppressing competition. (b) That the I.M.M. was organised in 1902 to protect British shipping, and merely camouflaged by American ownership, and that this provides the reason why American, and not British ships were laid up or scrapped when the United States Lines were taken over.... (c) that through the I.M.M., which, he says, receives subsidies from the British Government, the latter has attempted to drive the American merchant marine out of business. (d) That British propaganda, by cajolery and the use of so-called economic arguments carried on with the greatest activity, partly in alliance with a large section of the American business community, set out to bring the United States Lines to the auction block as quickly as possible." See, FO 371/17572/A1901/16/45 above.

63.Ibid, minute by Gore-Booth, Feb.16; minute by Wellesley, Feb.17, both 1934.

64.FO 371/17572/A1959/16/45, FO minute by Gore-Booth, Mar.2; Craigie minute, Mar.5, both 1934.

65.Ibid, Wellesley and Vansittart minutes, Mar.5, 1934.

66.FO 371/17572/A2705/16/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Apr. 5; Vansittart minute, Apr. 9, both 1934.

67.On Hull's economic plan for securing world peace, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol.1, (New York, 1948); B.M. Rowland, Commercial Conflict and Foreign Policy: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1932-1938, (New York, 1987); "Statement by Cordell Hull at the 7th International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Dec.15, 1933," in Richard D. Challener ed., From Isolation to Containment, 1921-1952, (London, 1970), pp.69-70; "The Basic Principles of American Foreign Policy, Address by Cordell Hull, Washington, March 17, 1938," Ibid; Richard S. Kirkendall, The United States, 1929-1945: Years of Crisis and Change, (New York, 1974), pp.166-168; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, (Boston, 1958), pp.188-191, p.253, and pp.254-255; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, Vol.1, (Cloucester, 1970), pp.7, 9, and 17; Norman A Graebner ed., Ideas and Diplomacy, (New York, 1964), pp.561-592; Robert Dalleck, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, (Oxford, 1979), pp.33-34; James C. Thomson, "The Role of the State Department," in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, (New York, 1973), pp.85-86.

68.FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, memo by Sayre, Feb.26, 1934, pp.690-693.

69.Ibid.

70.Ibid.

71.Ibid.

72.FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, letter from Haight to Sayre, Mar.2, 1934, pp.693-699.

73.Ibid.

74.Ibid.

75.FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, letter from Roper to Sayre, Apr. 2, 1934, pp.701-703.

76.Ibid.

77.FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, letter from Sayre to Hull, Apr. 5, p.703.

78.FO 371/17573/A2884/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Mar. 30, 1934.

79.FO 371/17573/A2946/16/45, "Senate Document no.161, Direct Aid to American Vessels in Foreign Trade" Mar. 20, 1934. The author of the report was Mr. John Nicolson, a former prominent member of the US Shipping Board.

80.FO 371/17573/A2970/16/45, letter from Leith Ross to Craigie, April 4; Gore-Booth minute, April 5; Craigie minute, April 9; Wellesley minute, April 9; and Vansittart minute, April 9, all 1934. FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, letter from Haight to Sayres, Apr. 19, 1934, pp.709-710.

81.FO 371/17573/A2971/16/45, confidential record of conversation between Gore-Booth (AD) and Mr. E.H.S. Marker, BoT, Apr. 11, 1934.

82.FO 371/17572/A2705/16/45, Vansittart minute, Apr. 5, 1934; FO 371/17573/A3103/16/45, draft telegram from BoT to Lindsay, Apr.20, 1934.

83.Ibid.

84.FO 371/17573/A3101/16/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Apr.23, 1934.

85.FRUS, vol.1, letter from Haight to Sayre, Apr.19, 1934.

86.Ibid.

87.FRUS, vol.1, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Hewes) and Haight, Apr. 20, 1934, pp.709-716.

88.Ibid.

89.FRUS, Vol.1, 1934, letter from Hewes to Haight, June 22, 1934, pp.722-723.

90.FRUS, vol.1, despatch from Hull to Bingham, May 23, 1934, p.721.

91.FO 371/17574/A5349/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, June 21, 1934. See also: FRUS, letter from Hewes to Haight, June 22, 1934; FO 371/17574/A4913/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, June 20, 1934.

92.FO 371/17574/A4288/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, May 17, 1934.

93.FO 371/17574/A5471/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO and enclosure, June 27, 1934. The committee, before Secretary Roper was appointed to it, was originally composed of South Trimble Jr., Solicitor to the Department of Commerce, Chairman; Mr. H.H. Heinmann, Director of the Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce; Mr. Thomas Hewes, Special assistant to the Secretary of State, Joseph B. Weaver, Deputy Administrator in Charge of Shipping Matters at the National Recovery Administration; Turner Battle, executive assistant to the Secretary of Labor; Harllee Branch, Second Assistant Postmaster-General; and L.R. Edminster, representing the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

94.CAB 24/249, CP 161(34) "The Position of the British Mercantile Marine", June 25, 1934.

95.Ibid.

96.Ibid. See also FO 371/17574/A5338/16/45, Board of Trade Communication, draft reply to Parliamentary Question for Runciman, and minutes by D.V. Kelly (AD clerk) and Wellesley, July 5, 1934.

97.CAB 23/79, Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, (hereafter CAB 23), PRO, Kew, London, Cabinet Meeting 26(34), June 27, 1934.

98.FO 371/17574/A5169/16/45, record of conversation between Runciman and High Commissioners from Australia and New Zealand, from Marker to Craigie, June 27, 1934.

99.Ibid.

100.FO 371/17573/A3699/16/45, Most Confidential FO minute, record of conversation between Gore-Booth and Marker, May 11, 1934.

101.Ibid, minutes by Craigie, Wellesley and Vansittart, May 4, 1934.

102.Ibid.

103.The following paragraph, except where indicated, is based on FO 371/17573/A3667/16/45, draft telegram from BoT to FO, May 5, and minutes by Kelly, May 14, 1935; FO 371/17573/A3699/16/45, see note 100; FO

371/17573/A3899/16/45, letter and draft telegram from Stephenson (Dominions Office) to Gore-Booth, May 14, and letter from Gore-Booth to Marker attached, May 16, 1934; FO 371/17574/A3949/16/45, draft copy of telegram from Dominions Office, May 21, 1934, FO 371/17574/A3965/16/45, letter from Marker to Craigie, May 18, and attached letter to Stephenson from Marker, May 18, 1934.

104.FO 371/17574/A4850/16/45, telegram from NZ Governor General to the DO, June 15, 1934.

105.FO 371/17574/A5467/16/45, despatch from Osborne (Charge d'Affaires Washington embassy) to FO, with copy of compilation of National Council of American Shipbuilders, "Foreign vessels in indirect trade of the United States," June 27, 1934; Kelly minute, July 27, 1934.

106.FO 371/17575/A9539/16/45, telegram from Lyons (Australian PM) and Coates (New Zealand PM) to Sec. of State for Dominion Affairs, Nov.27, 1934.

107.Ibid, Craigie minute, Nov.30, 1934.

108.FRUS, vol.1, note and memo by the FO enclosed from Simon to Bingham, July 16, 1934, pp.723-727; Ibid, despatch from Ray Atherton, Counselor (American embassy in London) to Hull, July 18, 1934, p.723.108.

109.FRUS, FO memo, July 16, see note 108.

110.The calling of such a conference was part of the requirement that the industry had to meet in order to get the 2 million Pound subsidy from the Government.

111.Ibid.

112.FRUS, vol.1, despatch from Atherton to Hull, August 24, 1934, pp.727-728.

113.FO 371/17575/A7211/16/45, despatch from Osborne to FO, Aug.29, 1934.

114.Ibid.

115.FO 371/17575/A7410/16/45, letter from P.M. Broadmead (Secretary Washington embassy) to P. Broad (clerk in AD), Sept.4, 1934. See also Gore-Booth minute on same, Sept.20.

116.FO 371/17575/A8211/16/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Oct.17, 1934; FO 371/17575/A9164/16/45, despatch and attachment from Consul-General Campbell (New York) to FO, Oct.2, 1934; FO 371/17575/A9045/16/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.14, 1934.

117.FRUS, vol.1, letter from McAuliffe to Hull, Nov.14, 1934, pp.729-732; Ibid, letter from R.J. Baker (President of ASA) to Hewes, Nov.24, 1934, p.732.

118.FO 371/17575/A9099/16/45, letter from Essendon to Simon, Nov.15, 1934.

119.Ibid, letter from Simon to Essendon, Nov.16, 1934.

120.FO 371/17575/A9856/16/45, letter from Essendon to Simon, Nov.19, 1934. Simon also informed Runciman of the developments on the international cooperation front, see draft telegram, Simon to Runciman, Dec.7, Ibid.

121.On the preparations for Campbell's charade see FO 371/17575/A98713/16/45, despatch from Chancery (Washington) to FO, Nov.27, 1934; Ibid, letter from Campbell to H.O. Chalkley (commercial counsellor in Washington), Nov.26, 1934; FO 371.17575/A10445/16/45, despatch from Chancery (Washington) to FO, Dec.17, 1934.

122.FO 371/17575/A9585/16/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Nov.21, 1934.

123.FO 371/17575/A10318/16/45, US shipping notes (these are newspaper clippings that the commercial counsellor collected and sent on a weekly basis to the FO) from Chalkley to FO, Dec.14, 1934, Journal of Commerce, article.

124.On War Plan Orange see, William R. Braisted, "On the American Red and Red-Orange Plans, 1919-1939," in Gerald Jordan ed., Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1977), pp.167-185; Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis, 1991); Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941, (Newport, 1980); Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, US Navy: A Sailor's Life (Washington, 1974), pp.325-362; Steven T. Ross, ed., American War Plans, 1919-1941, vol.2, Plans for War Against the British Empire and Japan: the Red, Orange, and Red Orange Plans, 1923-1938, (New York, 1992); Craig L. Symonds, "William Veazie Pratt, 17 September 1930-30 June 1933, in Robert W. Love Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations, (Annapolis, 1980), pp.69-86; Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, (New York, 1985), Ch.1 and Ch.3; Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy, (New York, 1991), Ch.11; George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy, 1890-1990, (Stanford, 1994), Ch.7; idem., "US Naval Strategy 1890-1945", Naval War College Review, Vol.XLIV, 1991, pp.6-33; Nathan Miller, "The American Navy, 1922-1945," in Keith Neilson and Jane Errington eds., Navies and Global Defense: Theories and Strategy, (Westport, 1995), pp.139-160.

125.This paragraph is based on, RG 287, Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 74th Congress, on S.2582, 'A Bill to Develop a Strong American Merchant Marine, to Promote the Commerce of the United States, to Aid National Defense, and for other purposes,' Apr.24, 1935, Box Y4-986, Senate Commerce Committee, Folder Y4.C73/2:M53/5-26.

126.See also Lindsay's appreciation of FDR's views in FO 371/18747/A2606/282/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Mar.8, 1935.

127.FO 371/18747/A297/282/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Dec.31, 1934; FO 371/18747/A1067/282/45, despatch and enclosure from Lindsay to FO, Jan.25, 1935; FO 371/18747/A1370/282/45, letter from BoT to Vansittart, Feb.12, 1935.

128.FO 371/18747/A2606, Gore-Booth and Craigie minutes, Mar.22 and 27, 1935; FO 371/18747/A2918/282/45, letter from E.J. Foley (under-secretary BoT) to Under Secretary of State, Mar.27, 1935.

129.FO 371/18748/A4109/282/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Apr. 26, 1935; FO 371/18748/A4305/282/45, despatch from Lindsay plus attached articles, May 1, 1935.

130.FO 371/18748/A2298/282/45, FO Memo (prepared by Gore-Booth) and minutes by Gore-Booth and Craigie, May 14, 1935.

131.FO 371/18748/A4766/282/45, Board of Trade Memo (from Foley) to Craigie, May 23, 1935; FO 371/18748/A4913/282/45, Board of Trade Report, May 25, 1935.

132.FO 371/18748/A4914/282/45, Secret, P.M.(S.S.)(35) 1, Meetings of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Memo by Australian PM, May 29, 1935; FO 371/18748/A5343/282/45, P.M.(S.S.)(35) 1, minutes of first meeting, May 31, 1935.

133.FO 371/18748/A5343, May 31, see note 132.

134.RG 287, Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 74th Congress, on S.2582, testimony of J.E. Saugstad, April 25, 1935.

135.*Ibid*, testimony of Alfred H. Haag, May 1, 1935. The Foreign Office credited Haag with being the primary driving force and architect behind the structure and creation of the US Maritime Commission.

136.RG 32, Minutes of the US Maritime Commission, Vol.1, Sept.29/36-April 15/37, p.1. See also, "Merchant Marine," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, (hereafter USNIP), Sept. 1936, pp.1349-1353.

137.RG 32, Vol.1, Sept.29, 1936; "Professional Notes," *USNIP*, May 1937, p.742.

138.FO 371/20654/A995/88/45, letter from Dominions Office to Australian Prime Minister, Dec.23, 1936; FO 371/20655/A1559/88/45, draft telegram from FO to Lindsay, Feb.22, 1937.

139.FO 371/20655/A2944/88/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, April 13, 1937, and minute by A. Holman, American Department, April 27. In this report Lindsay describes the newly appointed Chairman of the Maritime Commission Joseph Kennedy as "...a man of unusual ability, wealthy, businesslike, and devoted solely to the public interest. As head of the security Exchange Commission he achieved a remarkable success in circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, and there is no man in this country better able to deal with the almost hopeless question of American shipping."

140.FO 371/20655/A3354/88/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, May 6, 1937.

141.FO 371/20655/A3366/88/45, important telegram from Lindsay to FO, May 7, 1937.

142.*Ibid*, draft telegram from American Dept. to Mr. Weston at the Board of Trade, May 11, 1937.

143.FO 371/20655/A3668/88/45, Foreign Office Minute on meeting with Board of Trade, May 21, 1937.

144.FO 371/20655/A3828/88/45, minutes of and papers submitted to the 1st meeting of the Committee on Shipping Questions, {E.(S)(37)}, May 18, 1937.

145.FO 371/20655/A3988/88/45, minutes of 3rd meeting of Committee on Shipping Questions, May 27, 1937; FO 371/20655/A5148/88/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, July 20, 1937; FO 371/20655/A5356/88/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO with record of conversation between Kennedy and Nash, July 20, 1937.

146.The Board of Trade expedited the matter of sharing information on costs of British and US shipping in Feb.1938, in order that American differential subsidies would be exact. There was reason for the Board to hope that with such evidence being made available, and with relations being much more amicable, American shippers might see the savings to be had in building their ships in Great Britain. See FO 371/21533/A1050/249/45, letter from Mr. Weston (Board of Trade) to Holman, American Dept., Feb.9, 1938; *ibid*, minute by J.G.S. Beith (AD clerk), Feb.10; FO 371/21533/A1968/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Mar.8, 1938; FO 371/21533/A2348/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Mar.18, 1938; FO 371/21533/A2983/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Apr. 15, 1938, and minute by Beith, Apr.15; FO 371/21533/A3438/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Apr.22, 1938; FO 371/21533/A3443/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Apr.26, 1938; FO 371/21534/A3617/249/45, letter from Weston to Beith, May 7, 1938; FO

371/21534/A4277/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO and attached press release by Max Truitt (member of the US Maritime Commission), May 25, 1938; FO 371/21534/A4404/249/45, letter from Weston to Beith, June 2, 1938.

Those hopes would not be fulfilled however, no matter how well maritime relations had developed, FO 371/21534/A4605/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, June 7, 193; FO 371/21534/A5424/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, July 5, 1938.

147.CAB 24/262, C.P.163(36), "Note by the President of the Board of Trade on British Shipping in the Pacific", June 13, 1936.

148.See CAB 24/273, C.P.313(37), "Joint Memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the President of the Board of Trade on British Liner Communication Across the Pacific", Dec.17, 1937; FO 371/20654/A90/88/45, minutes of meeting on United Kingdom and New Zealand Commercial Relations, Dec.21, 1937.

149.CAB 24/256, C.P. 157(35), Secret Economic Advisory Council (EAC) Paper, "The Economic Outlook for the Next Few Years," July 29, 1935. This Committee on Economic Information supplied such reports and guidance to the Cabinet in a regular monthly report, compiled by some of Britain's top economic thinkers: Sir Josiah Stamp, G.D.H. Cole, H.D. Henderson, J.M. Keynes, Sir Alfred Lewis, Sir Arthur Salter, Sir Ernest Simon, and, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.

150.Improving Anglo-American relations regarding international trade also made for better attitudes towards the merchant marine question. As the British Foreign Office began to respect the job Cordell Hull was doing to further a better global trade environment, good relations and mutual support between the two departments became more usual; see, FO 371/18757/A4546/331/45, Lindsay despatch to FO, May 4; minutes by Gore-Booth, May 21; Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, head of the Foreign Offices economic relations section minute, May 23; and Craigie minute, May 27, all 1935; FO 371/18757/A5080/331/45, despatch and enclosure from Lindsay to FO, May 28; as well as minutes by Gore-Booth, June 18, and Ashton-Gwatkin, June 20, all 1935.

151.For specific Foreign Office indications that the merchant shipping matter was already fading from Anglo-American relations and that the State Department support was recognized and appreciated by the Foreign Office, see, FO 371/18760/A8993/33145, FO Memo by Gore-Booth, Oct.12; minutes by Craigie, Oct.22; Vansittart, Oct.23; Orde, head of Far Eastern Dept., Nov.7; and A.W.G. Randall, Far Eastern Dept., Nov.7, all 1935. While minutes show great doubt at that point as to how far the US would be willing to support British interests in the Far East, the assessment of the shipping matter was that, along with the areas of naval disarmament, arms traffic, appendix tonnage certificates, Near and Middle Eastern Problems, coal quotas, liquor smuggling, and copyright, things had improved or been solved. The memo shows the importance of incidents in building or easing tensions between nations, and it concludes: "It will be seen therefore, that in general we have less cause to be aggrieved with the United States Government over small matters than we had about a year ago and, whether by chance or for any other reason, the United States Embassy here have of late sent fewer notes to the tone of which exception could legitimately be taken. In general, also, where our desiderata do not conflict directly with legitimate United States interests we seem generally to be assured of a sympathetic hearing from the State Department when the British case is stated in any connexion, though this must not be taken as meaning either that Congress or even that the President (or, e.g., the Secretary of the Treasury) will take the same line. But it is at least satisfactory that there has been decrease in the small incidents, the irritation caused by which makes proper co-operation in more important matters correspondingly more difficult." As well, the role of J.E. Saugstad, an expert on shipping and trade from the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, and his efforts for the State Department in keeping

American nationalistic sentiments in Congress and the Shipping Board from creating great problems in Anglo-American relations over the Matson Line issue were appreciated by the Foreign Office, see FO 371/20654/A537/88/45, confidential despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.11, 1937.

For the American side, see FRUS, vol.1, General, Near East and Africa, British Aide-Memoir to the State Department, April 4, 1935, pp.471-472; Ibid, Resolution Adopted by the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy," May 10, 1935, pp.474-475; Ibid, letter from the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Bland), May 15, 1935, pp.477-479; Ibid, Memo by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements (Deimel), August 16, 1935, pp.479-480.

152.FO 371/19828/A3150/170/45, letter from Sir Arthur Willert to Craigie, April 9, 1936. Willert was a close friend of FDR's and had stayed with the President in January and March when on a tour of the US. Willert reported to Craigie that during one of their many talks on Anglo-American relations, FDR had responded to Willert's questions on American subsidies and their effect on intra-Imperial carrying trade with the answer that "...sooner or later we ought to get together and see what can be done about such complaints on both sides." Willert went on to comment that FDR was definitely sympathetic to the British position and that FDR's outlook was that of an old British Liberal of wealth and birth. The AD was hopeful and supportive of those views, but Vansittart, in his usual fashion, was suspicious of the President's position. On ibid see minutes of Holman, April 20, Craigie, April 22, and Vansittart, April 23.

153.FO 371/20654/A537/88/45, confidential despatch from Lindsay to FO and attached memo on negotiating shipping questions with the United States, Jan.11, 1937.

154.The Matson Line issue, for example, never really reached any satisfactory conclusion before the war began in 1939, although Australia and New Zealand did take some punitive measures against American trade and there were some fear of a shipping war erupting between the United States and Great Britain. For events and cooperation of State Department in trying to prevent the matter from getting too far out of hand, see, Kevin H. Burley, "The Imperial Shipping Committee", The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.2, 1974, pp.206-225, pp.216-217; FO 371/19831/A1891/228/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Feb.25; Wilson Young minute, March 12, 1936; FO 371/19832/A8110/228/45, draft telegram from Mr. Amery in Dominions Office and minutes by J.M. Troutbeck (AD), Oct.12, 1936; FO 371/19832/A8624/228/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Oct.29, 1936; FO 371/19832/A8688/228/45, Memo from Mr. Carter of the Imperial Shipping Committee to Troutbeck, Nov.3, 1936; FO 371/19832/A9115/228/45, letter from Mr. Foley at Board of Trade to American Department, Nov.17, 1936; FO 371/19832/A9574/228/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, Nov.24, 1936; FO 371/20655/A4498/88/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO, June 15, 1937.

Contemporary reports of British attempts to fight the Matson Line are in "Professional Notes," USNIP, June 1936, p.899; "Professional Notes," USNIP, May 1937, p.74. On the fears that the British have of the Americans creating a merchant marine greater than their own see, FO 371/19831/A6143/228/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO and minutes, July 15, 1936; FO 371/19832/A8461/228/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO and minutes by A. Holman, AD clerk (Oct.27), Oct.23, 1936.

155.At the end of 1937, the United States operated 3,037 steam and motor vessels of 100 gross tons and over, for a total gross tonnage of 11,881,234 tons. By the end of the same year the British empire operated 9,084 of those types of vessels, for a total of 20,398,157 gross tons. Particularly telling was the British lead in steam and motor ships and the youth of its modern shipping. As well, on June 30, 1937 the United States had only 62 such vessels of 198,654 tons under construction, while the British empire had 308 of 1,238,228 tons. Clearly the

US had a long way to go before Great Britain's imperial merchant fleet was overtaken. See FO 371/21535/A8506/249/45, despatch from Lindsay to FO with US Merchant Marine Statistics, from Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation attached, Nov.3, 1938.

156.RG 287, Hearing before the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Education and Labor, US Senate, 75th Congress, on Bill S.3078, "A Bill to Amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and for Other Purposes," Dec.8, 1937, Kennedy's testimony is Dec.1; FDR-OF 1705, US Maritime Commission, Box 1, Folder 1937, Memo entitled "Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine"; ibid, note from Kennedy to FDR, dated Nov.8/37 and reply note from FDR to Kennedy, Nov.9/37.

157.For the new-broom mentality that the appointment of the ex-naval officers to the Commission made, see RG 32, Vol.2, Minutes of US Maritime Commission, April 16 to June 30, 1937. For the immediate interest the Commission had in getting enough tankers built for the USN, see Ibid, Vol.3, July 1 to Sept.30, 1937, entry for July 30/37, p.1335. Admiral Land announced that the Navy, through the Commission, was going to subsidize the national defence feature of extra speed tankers. The Navy wanted 16 and one-half knots speed which would add anywhere from $400,000 to $800,000 to a tanker's construction cost. The understanding was that the Navy would pay this differential and the private owners the balance, but in an emergency the ships belonged to the Navy. For the reaction to the Commission among senior USN officers see, Papers of Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Library of Congress (hereafter Yarnell MSS), Container 1, Folder-General, Dec.23/36 to Jan.5/37, letter from Yarnell to Admiral Henry A. Wiley, Dec.23/37. Yarnell told the new head of the Maritime Commission that "In general, American trade and prestige in the Far East have suffered a very severe blow, and it will take some time for the companies to get back their previous trade when they start running again." Also, Yarnell MSS, Container 1, Folder-General, April 24 to April 30, 1937, letter from Yarnell to Rear-Admiral E.S. Land (who was a recent addition to the board of the Maritime Commission), April 28, 1937. Yarnell tells Land of the terrible shape he thinks the American merchant fleet was in, especially those lines trying to run in the Far East. Land showed the letter to Kennedy, who agreed completely with Yarnell's assessment: see, Ibid, Folder-General, June 4 to June 24, 1937, letter from Land to Yarnell, June 1, 1937. On the development of the tanker as a vital part of the USN force projection effort, see Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, (Annapolis, 1995), pp.1-90.

158.FDR-OF 1705, Box 2, Folder January to May 1938, letter from Kennedy to FDR, Feb.17, 1938. Some historians, such as D.C. Watt and Antony Best, see Kennedy as not being an effective Ambassador because of a belief that he was not 'close' to FDR or did not have his ear. Given the importance FDR gave to the task of creating a sustainable merchant fleet, and his choice of the Bostonian for the job, those assumptions must be re-evaluated.

159.Ibid.

160.FO 371/21491/A1469/1/45, report by the Industrial Intelligence Centre, 'USA: General Survey of Material Resources and Industry in Their Bearing upon National War Potential,' Jan.1, 1938.

161.The renewal of the subsidy for tramp shipping was put to the Cabinet by Runciman and approved with no objections in November, 1935, see CAB 24/257, C.P.213(35), "Memo by the President of the Board of Trade," Nov.22, 1935; and CAB 23/82, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting 49(35), Nov.27, 1935. It was put forward by Runciman for renewal again on October 30, 1936. At that time, the President of the BoT was asked by the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee that the subsidy be continued for another three years. Runciman and Neville Chamberlain, the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, both rejected that idea, with Chamberlain insisting that the industry be prepared to go without a subsidy after December 1937. Runciman was impressed by the advances the British shipping industry was making in terms of efficiency and number of people employed. It was his belief that the Government assistance given to the industry had saved it from bankruptcy. See CAB 23/86, Meeting 62(36), Nov.4, 1936; CAB 24/264, C.P.273(36), "Memo by the President of the Board of Trade on Tramp Shipping Subsidy", Oct.30, 1936.

On the British Government's increasing role in merchant marine affairs, see Martin Doughty, Merchant Shipping and War, pp.33-40. An overly deterministic but adequate conclusion of Anglo-American merchant marine competition is found in Kevin E. Smith, Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American logistics diplomacy in the Second World War, (Cambridge, 1996).

162.CAB 24/257, C.P.213(35).

163.Ibid. See also CAB 24/257, C.P.214(35), "Note by the President of the Board of Trade on Scrap and Build Scheme", Nov.22, 1935.

164.CAB 24/282, C.P.6(39), "Memo by the President of the Board of Trade on The Shipping Industry", Jan.13, 1939; CAB 24/284, C.P.67(39), "Memo by the President of the Board of Trade on Shipping and Shipbuilding", March 17, 1939.

165.CAB 24/264, C.P.273(36) (see note 161), shows the employment growth, as well as the efficiency increases that the British merchant marine was experiencing at this time, due largely to its 1935 Scrap and Build Scheme. A study of the monthly reports to Cabinet, which were made by the Board of Trade Advisory Council, "State of Trade-(for what ever month)," is most useful for a close plotting of the amount of British shipping building and what was happening to the freight rates. The overall picture, for 1936-1939 shows a painful, yet steady growth and improvement in the amount of British tonnage idle, a higher than pre-1936 freight rate, and a general improvement in the building programme. These reports are in CAB 24.

166.See E.H. Watts, "The Merchant Marine as a Factor in Imperial Defence, Brassey's Naval Annual, 1937, pp.125-132; Capt. H. Taprell Dorling, "Men of the Merchant Navy," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1938, pp.119-136; idem, "Merchant Seamen and Fishermen," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1939, pp.147-164; Sir Archibald Hurd, "The British Maritime Industries," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1939, pp.63-73; "Various Notes," USNIP, April, 1936, pp.594-595; "Professional Notes," USNIP, July 1936, pp.1064-1065; "Various Notes," USNIP, Sept. 1937, p.1352; "Various Notes," USNIP, Nov. 1937, p.1662; CAB 24/284, C.P.67(39).

167.CAB 24/264, C.P.273(36) (see note 161).

168.CAB 2/6, CID Minutes, 268 Meeting, Feb.25, 1935; CAB 4/23, CID Paper No.1165-B, "Memo by the President of the Oil Board", Feb.22, 1935; CAB 50/1, Minutes of Meetings of the Oil Board (hereafter Minutes of Oil Board), 23rd Meeting, Feb.18, 1935, provide useful discussions of changes in strategic planning that begin to make new evaluations regarding shipping, especially tankers, necessary. Up to that point the Oil Board was concerned only with a war in the Far East. The Far Eastern aspect remained the predominant theme of the Board, but, by 1939, the European situation began to rival it in terms of Committee workload.

169.CAB 4/24, CID Papers; Pro, Kew, London, Paper No.1196-B, "Tenth Annual Report of the Oil Board", Nov.26, 1935; CAB 50/1, Minutes of Oil Board, 25th Meeting, Nov.26, 1935.

170.Since a great deal of the British oil, especially aviation fuel, was supplied by areas vulnerable to Japanese attack, such as the Dutch East Indies and Borneo, the US was certainly seen as being a much more secure source for that vital fuel. See CAB 50/1, Minutes of Oil Board, Meeting 27, July 24, 1936.

171.Ibid.

172.Ibid.

173.Ibid.

174.CAB 4/24, CID Paper No.1196-B; CAB 50/1, Minutes of Oil Board, 24th Meeting, Sept.24, 1935; CAB 50/1, 25th Meeting, Nov.26, 1935; CAB 50/1, 28th Meeting, Oct.7, 1936.

175.CAB 50/2, Minutes of Oil Board, 32nd Meeting, June 13th, 1937.

176.CAB 50/2, Minutes of Oil Board, 33rd Meeting, July 23, 1937.

177.CAB 4/27, CID Paper No.1404-B, Feb.8, 1938.

178.Ibid. This outcome had been foreshadowed by the Petroleum Department in July, 1937, see FO 371/20666/A4719/448/45, confidential letter from Mr. Starling of the Petroleum Dept., and a copy of a secret report by the Oil Board Sub-Committee on US Neutrality Legislation, to J.M. Troutbeck, American Department, July 2, 1937.

179.CAB 2/7, Minutes of 322nd Meeting, May 12, 1938.

180.Ibid, Annex; For making good US tanker shortages in case of European war, see CAB 4/27, CID Paper No. 1427-B, May 9, 1938. Members of the Oil Board pointed out that no consideration was being taken in assumptions being made about the availability of tanker tonnage for the demands that would be put on British resources by allies such as France or Belgium. This criticism was certainly valid given the large amount of British shipping that was required to sustain allies during the First World War. See CAB 50/2, Minutes of Oil Board, 36th Meeting, April 11, 1938. On the tanker reserve question see CAB 50/2, Minutes of Oil Board, 45th Meeting, July 28, 1939.

181.CAB 4/29, CID Paper No.1514-B, Feb.22, 1939; CAB 4/29, CID Paper No.1529-B, Jan.24, 1939.

182.CAB 2/8, Minutes of 349th Meeting, March 3, 1939. It is clear from these minutes that it had been assumed from the Abyssinian Crisis onward that there would be no difficulty in buying US oil, indirectly if necessary, through other countries. US tankers could also have been used to haul the oil to a neutral and where British tankers would pick it up and move it once more. As well, worries about the Mediterranean being closed, and oil supplies from the Middle East not being able to transit the Suez Canal, were not as serious, given the US ability to compensate for those lost resources.

183.As the threat of war in Europe grew, Great Britain looked to the United States as a possible source of shipping in that emergency. In May, 1939, the Board of Trade began a process which saw the British embassy and the Maritime Commission coordinate a very secret and confidential investigation into whether or not the United States had enough spare shipbuilding capacity to allow it to build vessels for Great Britain. One suggestion made by Admiral Land was that the British consider buying up the excess tonnage held by the Maritime Commission. That collaboration took place to the disadvantage of Japan, who had also been looking to purchase those vessels, but had been refused access to them by the State Department. See FO 371/22833/A3188/3188/45, secret letter from W. Graham (Mercantile Marine Dept.) to J.V. Perowne (AD), May 2, 1939; ibid, /A4600/3188/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, July 3, 1939; ibid, /A4800/3188/45, confidential report and minutes of conversation between Sir O. Chalkley and Admiral Land, June 30, 1939; ibid, /A5356/3188/45, confidential minute by Chalkley, July 20, 1939.

CHAPTER THREE

COMMON VALUES: BRITISH AND AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE FAR EAST, 1933-39

Part one: The British

By 1933 diplomatic relations between the Great Powers relied on a balance of power to sustain the peace in the Far East. Thought long-dead and gone after the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, balance-of-power diplomacy and the shadowy uncertainty of old-style Great Power diplomacy were major elements of the day-to-day reality of American and British Far Eastern policy. Between 1933 and 1939, both the United States and Great Britain made certain assumptions about the usefulness of the Soviet Union in their strategies for dealing with Japan. British and American diplomacy utilized Japanese fears both of the Soviet bear and of diplomatic isolation, used to contain Japanese expansion.[1] Thus, it is important to understand what role the two Western nations thought the Soviet Union might play in the Far East.[2] Before this can be done, it is necessary to consider the situation prior to the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union in late 1933.

Britain's view of what this meant was an important issue for the Foreign Office. Earlier in the year, in April, 1933, Sir Robert Vansittart, the Foreign Office's permanent under secretary (PUS), had visited the United States. Through this fortunate circumstance, the chief civil servant in the Foreign Office was able to provide a first-hand assessment of the US attitude towards Russia.[3] Prior to the Metro-Vickers Affair, considerable pressure had been brought to bear on Roosevelt for recognition, and recognition was thought to be imminent. Vansittart reported that there had been a feeling in the US that recognition was imminent, but the Metro-Vickers Affair had, in the words of the Undersecretary of State William Phillips, "put the clock right back."[4] Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, and Vansittart agreed that the State Department had always been opposed to recognition of the Soviet Union and now its hand had been greatly strengthened. However, despite the Vickers affair, pressure on Roosevelt for recognition continued to come, particularly from American industrial interests that saw an opportunity to profit greatly from trade with the Soviet Union.[5] Lobbying on behalf of the Soviet cause also emanated from William C. Bullitt, a close personal advisor to the President and a future US Ambassador to Soviet Russia.[6]

On April 25, President Roosevelt had expressed his own views on the matter to Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald; "though recognition did not appear to be matter of immediate moment he hoped that we would not take it as an unfriendly action on his part if it eventually took place."[7] The American position towards the Soviet Union was obviously still unresolved, but it was attracting the attention of enough high-ranking policy-makers to indicate that it was of some importance.[8] Such continuous pressures worked away on the Roosevelt administration until November 17, when the White House finally announced that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were now a reality.[9]

One of the main British concerns about this new development was what would be the effect on Japan? The common view of the British diplomatic personnel at the embassy in Tokyo was that recognition would cause a setback in US-Japanese relations and that American diplomatic officials in Japan knew that this would be the case.[10] The British view was reinforced by statements attributed to Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar who had negotiated the final terms of recognition with President Roosevelt. The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, reported that "In private conversation on the ship which brought him he [Litvinov] spoke, I heax from a trustworthy source, with the greatest candour. Recognition of the USSR by the United States, he said, would be welcome to the former, chiefly because it would give Japan seriously to think."[11] Ironically enough, one of FDR's motives for recognition was the hope that such a move would act as a brake against Japanese aggression in the Far East, particularly against China and Russia.[12] Both the US and Soviet Union had reason to feel that better relations between them would have a positive influence on Japanese aggression. Neither power seemed to give consideration to theh outcome which the British Foreign Office thought the likely: that recognition would make Japan more suspicious of both and less likely to want to work towards any constructive agreements with either the US or the USSR.[13] The recognition of the USSR by the US marked the beginning of informal policies emanating from both London and Washington, not coordinated in any way, yet parallel in nature, which were directed at assessing and evaluating how the Soviet Empire in the Far East could be used as a counter-balance to Japanese aggression in the region.

In 1933 Great Britain viewed the Soviet Union as a large but militarily weak power in the Far East. While preparing their pivotal Annual Review of Imperial Defence for 1933, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) received the Foreign Office's view of the Soviet Union.[14] The FO held that, as far as Soviet relations with Japan were concerned,

> Towards Japan, indeed, their recent policy has been so forbearing, in the face of a clearly concerted effort by the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities to undermine their position in North Manchuria, as to give rise to a general (though perhaps ill founded) belief throughout the Far East that they will never face a war in that region.[15]

As to Chinese-Soviet relations and what effect that would have on Japanese policy, the accepted view at the FO was that "It is too early at present to estimate the possible results of China's resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR. It is not anticipated, however, that there will be any considerable swing over towards communism. As regards Manchuria, the USSR, though deeply resenting Japan's aggression is likely to continue to play a passive role."[16] As a result of this lack of appreciation for the Soviet bear's worth in any military considerations of the Far Eastern theatre, the COS made the defence of India against Soviet aggression its third and last priority in the Annual Review.[17] However, a change in perspective on the role of the Soviet Union in Far Eastern affairs was not long in coming.

By May, 1933, a division of opinion over the true nature of the Soviet regime existed in the Foreign Office between Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern Department (which dealt with Russia), and Sir Lancelot Oliphant, assistant under secretary of state. Both men expressed their views about the role the Soviet Union could be expected to play in the Far Eastern balance-of-power scheme in a FO discussion of the COS Annual Report and its ranking of the Empire's strategic concerns. While Collier questioned the COS's labelling of the Soviet Union as Britain's "avowed enemy", Oliphant held strongly to the anti-communist feeling that had for so long been a fixture of British foreign policy.[18] Collier's argument acknowledged that the Communist Party was Britain's avowed enemy in the Far East, but questioned the strategic placement the COS gave the USSR in Far Eastern matters. He saw the Soviet Union as a nation desperately seeking allies to aid it against an encircling group of traditional enemies. And, he thought that this traditional Russian fear of encirclement could be used to Britain's global strategic advantage:

> ... they are bitterly opposed to Japanese ambitions, and are likely to remain so, as long as Japanese policy remains what it is. We consequently seem more likely than not to find ourselves one day in the position where we and the Soviet Government will have a common enemy, though we are not perhaps likely both to be fighting him at the same time. This may seem strange to the CID; but after all, as Palmerston said: "We have no eternal friends nor eternal enemies. Our interests only are eternal."[19]

Collier also saw Japan as a power similar to the Germany of 1914, one ruled by militarists and seeking complete regional dominance. In order to protect its interests from the expansionist tendencies of such a power, Britain would once again have to operate in a balance-of-power environment that afforded her both formal and informal allies.[20] On the other hand, Oliphant believed that Soviet Russia had not been substantially affected by any recent developments, and therefore, believed the COS position to be sound. His view was unsupported by any other important FO members.[21]

Charles Orde, head of the Far Eastern Department, considered tension and antagonism to be the day-to-day norm for Russo-Japanese relations in the future. His department was undertaking a survey of the Far Eastern situation at that very moment, with the objective to create a document that could guide British foreign policy in the Far East.[22] Orde strongly supported the COS's rankings of defence problems and stressed the need for real military force in the Far East to counter the growing Japanese aggression. He felt that Great Britain could not depend on the United States to assist her in defending her imperial interests, but believed that Soviet Russia could be counted on to remain a constant counterbalance to any Japanese southern advances:

> ... an alliance between Japan and Russia is not a probable contingency; if and when Japan secures Vladivostok it might become one; but even then the outlook of the Soviets will have to change considerably before they abet the most imperialist country in the world in extending her power in China and give up their ambitions of spreading Communism, which is anathema to Japan, in the hopeful field, as the Soviets regard it, of China. Japan, for her part, not only detests Communism as a political force, but regards it as a hindrance to the development of the Chinese market which is all important to her.[23]

The Far Eastern Department's view of Japan was echoed by Sir Victor A.A.H. Wellesley, deputy under secretary of state and a close monitor of Far Eastern affairs. He, too, stressed the desire of Japan to establish a hegemony in the Far East and Pacific at China's expense.[24] This could lead only to continued confrontation with other powers, one of those powers being presumably the Soviet Union. Wellesley did not endorse the COS report's ranking of threats, as he saw the threat from Japan being primarily an economic and not a military one. His analogy between the Japan of 1933 and the Germany of 1914 stated that "It does not seem to me likely that she is going to make the mistake which Germany made of trying to accelerate the pace by resorting to arms in order to get what can equally be obtained by economic pressure unless we are to assume that we are dealing with a nation of madmen."[25] He wanted the CID to wait for the final findings of the review of the Far Eastern policy that was underway before implementing the COS's recommendations. The main reason he preferred the delay was his questioning of when the Japanese would choose to attack British interests in the Far East: "1. if she were attacked by us and 2. if we were engaged in war with another great Power and then only if she were convinced that we were going to be defeated".[26] This questioning of the timing of a Japanese attack against Britain allowed Vansittart an opportunity to try and turn the COS report from a 'Far East first' recommendation into a 'Germany first' declaration.

Vansittart objected to the report's putting Japan first, arguing that it pre-supposed that Japan would attack British interests in the Far East only after Britain became involved in difficulties elsewhere.[27] As he then argued: "It seems to be generally agreed that Japan is unlikely to attack us, unless we are engaged elsewhere. Very well then. That puts 'elsewhere' first. And elsewhere is Europe and Germany."[28] One of the main reasons why Vansittart argued that the threat from Japan could be relegated to second place behind European considerations was his perception of the state of Russo-Japanese relations. He believed that Japan had no desire to provoke a war with Britain, especially while the Japanese were not on better terms with the Soviet Union. As he read the situation, the available evidence pointed to no decrease in the tensions between the two Asian powers, and, therefore, no improvement in Russo-Japanese relations was likely.[29] Vansittart recommended that the Singapore base be completed as soon as possible, but concluded that "If therefore we cannot cover the whole ground, first things must come first, and we must begin "a day's march nearer home".... we must begin at the centre, and spread as we can afford it."[30] He also called for a speedy delivery of the FO's Far Eastern review, in order that a more accurate appreciate of the defence needs of Great Britain in that region could be made.

The need to establish Britain's defence priorities clearly resulted in the establishment of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) of the CID, on November 15, 1933. The immediate topic for the committee, and certainly the service chiefs, was the situation in the Far East. For Vansittart and Sir Warren Fisher, Secretary to the Treasury, other ideas about what the priority of British defence preparations were at play in their minds, but the resulting recommendations, apart from identifying Germany as the 'ultimate potential enemy', clearly were concentrated on Japan and the growing dangers in the Far East.[31]

The DRC was quick to place the Soviet Union in the strategic scheme of things. In fact, for those, like Fisher and Vanisttart, concerned primarily with European issues, the state of Russo-Japanese relations was a critical factor if the debate was to shift towards Germany. Expressed in a statement that was a cross between the arguments of Orde and those of Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was reluctant to identify any threat which would require money being spent and favoured the re-establishment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the DRC's opinion was

> In the meantime, Japan's relations with Russia in the Far East have deteriorated and should incline her to seek improved relations with other Powers generally and ourselves in particular. This inclination is at present confirmed both by letters and despatches from our Embassy at Tokyo and by outward and visible signs, among which may be quoted the successful issue of the Indo-Japanese cotton negotiations and the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Diet on the 23rd January, when he said that "the traditional friendship with Great Britain remains unshaken and the two island empires can by wholehearted collaboration effectively serve the cause of universal peace."[32]

This statement represented a compromise between the Treasury's desire for the re-establishment of some kind of relationship akin to an Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Foreign Office's belief that Anglo-Japanese relations were still in a steady state of decline, requiring security to be provided by a Far Eastern a balance of power. It also represented the influence Vansittart had on the formulation of the DRC report.

At the third meeting of the DRC, on December 4, 1933, Vansittart had brought his objection to the COS's annual report to the attention of the committee.[33] Repeating the arguments he had made in the FO discussion of the COS Annual Review, Vansittart argued for a greater concentration on the German problem. He again placed the strained Russo-Japanese relations in a prominent position in any evaluation of the Far Eastern situation

> ...for some time both Japan and Russia had been apprehensive that the next clash would be between those two countries, and Sir Francis Lindley, in Tokio, had often confirmed the existence of this apprehension. If the view was held that Japan came first in order

> of priority it pre-supposed that Japan would not expect any trouble with Russia, as she would be unlikely to embark on any offensive action vis a vis ourselves, if, at the same time, she was expecting or preparing any trouble with Russia. If it was believed that we were to have a settled period as between Russia and Japan, then a more serious view must be taken of the position as regards India....he felt that if our economic policy - and by that he had in mind such issues as the present cotton dispute - allowed the Foreign Office a reasonably free hand, the Foreign Office should be able to prevent our diplomatic relations with Japan from deteriorating into a rupture so long anyhow as accounts with Russia were unsettled....In his opinion the danger of being drawn into a European War provoked by Germany was a nearer menace than that from Japan, though the latter undoubtedly existed too, and would be brought nearer by the necessities of our economic policy, which must necessarily affect the internal situation here, and weight with our Government.[34]

Vansittart's attempt to use the Soviet bear as a guarantor of Britain's position in the Far East met with a cool response from his DRC colleagues. General Sir Archibald A. Montgomery-Massingberd, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS); Admiral Sir A. Ernle M. Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, and Sir Warren Fisher, all viewed the Japanese menacc as one which required a strengthening of Britain's military and naval strength in the Far East.[35] Unable to put forth a solid argument as to why Germany should be considered the greatest immediate threat, Vansittart's attempt to make the DRC report a 'Germany first' document failed, and preparations for improving Britain's defensive position in the Far East, particularly with regard to naval preparations, remained the first priority.[36]

By early 1934 it was not yet clear how far the Soviet Union could be included in any Far Eastern strategy. While militarily and politically not a formal ally, the impact of the Soviet "loose-cannon", in the Far East remained an important factor.[37] The Foreign Office, particularly the Far Eastern and Northern Departments, continued to monitor the USSR's relations with Japan closely. The departments' objectives with regard to protecting British interests in the Far East were to two-fold: first, to assess the Soviet Union's military and diplomatic capabilities obviously and, second, to keep an eye on the state of Russo-Japanese relations, in order that Britain's Far Eastern foreign policy could exploit any underlying fears, uncertainties, or tensions to its own benefit.[38] It was not long before the Russian bear took a greater place in the British diplomatic and defence plans concerning the Far East.[39] Much depended on Soviet strength.

Military assessments of the Soviet Union's forces in the Far East were positive, if reserved. The Northern Department noted a growing Russian military capability, especially in armored and aviation units, which it attributed to a direct fear of Japanese aggression in the Far East. In the 1933 Annual Report on Russia, the British embassy concluded that

> The increased concentration on armaments, possibly to the prejudice of other industrial developments, which was shown during the year, was certainly the direct result of the Japanese menace in Manchuria. Reliable evidence was obtained in the spring, ... that submarines were being assembled at Vladivostok and the defences of the port overhauled. According to information received from Harbin, twenty submarines had been commissioned by April. Meanwhile, during the spring and summer the strength of the Far Eastern Army ... was brought up to between 200,000 and 250,000 men. Evidence of troop movement to the Far East was obtained from widely separate parts of the country, and the withdrawal of forces from European Russia was reported to have been compensated for by the formation of five new infantry divisions.[40]

In January, 1934, the COS prepared a paper on Russian military efficiency and capability,[41] which was approved by the CID on May 31 without any comment. The report suggested that the Red Army was becoming a modern fighting force, although it still had a long way to go to reach the operational and mechanical efficiency of the British army. More encouraging was the evidence that a modern, productive and efficient industrial base was being set up to support a vast army and air force.[42]

British Army and Royal Navy intelligence sources also attempted to ascertain what the nature of the Russo-Japanese tension was and how it affected British interests. In early February, 1934, Rear-Admiral G.C. Dickens, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), received secret information from Captain J.P. Vivian, the Naval Attache in Tokyo.[43] Vivian was responding to Dickens' request for more information and views on the possibility of another Russo-Japanese war. In Vivian's opinion, there was little chance of Japan's declaring war on Russia in the next three to four years, although the attitude of younger, more aggressive, Japanese army and naval officers made such prophesy an uncertain science.[44] Dickens immediately forwarded a copy of Vivian's assessment to his good friend 'Dillo', Major General J.G. Dill, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.[45] Dill informed Dickens that the army agreed with Vivian's opinions on the unlikelihood of an immediate war and the influence of the 'Young Officers'.[46] A consensus of opinion between the army and navy intelligence community then existed, for Dicken's views were in accord with Dill's:

> My reading of the situation is: -- Japan knows exactly what she wants to get from Russia and she intends to have it -- one day. No one knows when that day will be. The Japs don't. They will watch the situation patiently and intently. The moment the best possible combination of circumstances shows itself -- it may be this year or in 2 or 3 -- they will act quickly and God help the Bolos![47]

The Northern Department agreed with the bulk of this assessment, pointing out that there were particular problems with supplies and food stuffs being made available to the Soviet forces in the Far East.[48] The British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Francis O. Lindley, added perspective with information garnered from influential Japanese sources. Commenting on discussions held between the British Military Attache in Tokyo, Colonel E.A.H. James, and Colonel M. Homma, former Japanese Military Attache in London and now close advisor to General Araki, the Japanese Minister of War, on the inevitability of a Russo-Japanese war, Lindley concluded

> It will be observed that the Colonel [Homma] regards a conflict with Russia as inevitable, and is preoccupied with the possibility of Japan being faced with hostility from some other quarter while such a conflict is in progress. It is generally recognised amongst responsible Japanese that Japan's success against Russia was due to the fact that Great Britain held the ring; and the General Staff are naturally concerned with the isolation of their country at the present time. Although it is doubtless to British interests that a second war between Japan and Russia should be avoided, I cannot help feeling that the conviction of its inevitability, prevailing at army headquarters, which are, at present, so influential in directing Japanese foreign policy, will be of not little assistance to our diplomacy so long as it persists.[49]

That threat of an increased Russian military capability, and, Japan's perception of her own isolation, was already felt to be having its effect on Japanese attitudes towards Great Britain, according to other FO assessments.

The Far Eastern Department and the British Embassy in Tokyo commented frequently on the state of Russo-Japanese relations in 1934, and the possible repercussions they might have on the British Empire. Lindley thought that the Soviet military build-up in the Far East was acting as an effective corrective to Japan's aggressive tendencies. The increase in Russian military might corresponded with a deterioration of the Japanese diplomatic position, said Lindley, creating a feeling of anxiety in the Japanese that made them careful to "avoid a breach with any great power at a time when American recognition of Soviet and universal outcry against Japanese trade competition have emphasised her isolation."[50] Orde agreed, crediting the increased fear of Russia for Japan's increased willingness to foster better relations with Britain in upcoming trade talks between the two.[51] The increasing flow of information on Soviet-Japanese tensions from such various sources had created a sense of opportunity and change within the higher circles of the Foreign Office. In early February an attempt to take a clearer view of the situation was made by A.W.G. Randall, a Far Eastern Department clerk. He produced a memo, at Vansittart's request, on what impact a Russo-Japanese war would have on British interests in the Far East.[52]

Randall's memo indicated that the probability of such a war was not great at the moment nor in the near future, but it was a distinct possibility for the remoter future. The reason the idea of such a war could not be easily submerged was that "...there is no reason to suppose that Japan has given up her ultimate aim of domination of the Asiatic continent, or that Soviet Russia has abandoned her fundamental policy of undermining all bourgeois States and using them to spread the Communist idea. Between these two imperialisms there seems little chance of permanent accommodation..."[53] He argued that, as far a British interests in the Far East were concerned, if such a war did occur, a Japanese victory would be less harmful than a Russian one. In Randall's opinion, in most circumstances, such a war would be won by the Japanese. As matters stood at the moment, the best the Russians could do was to win a defensive war. If such was the case, then all was well, as both Russia and Japan would be greatly weakened.[54] While Orde and the rest of the Far Eastern Department supported Randall's analysis, other FO departments were not so certain about many of the memo's conclusions.

Laurence Collier disagreed with the memo's insinuation that Soviet Russia was a greater threat to British interests than Japan. Using arguments similar to those he had expressed earlier his evaluation of the COS's Annual Report, Collier pointed out that the Soviets were interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East. Therefore, Russian interests coincided with the British desire to prevent Japan from dominating mainland China.[55] If this analysis was correct, Collier argued, then "... I feel that we must take the facts as we find them, and that, since we live among a number of Powers, few of whom really wish us well but some of whom have the same interests as ourselves, we should, whenever possible, encourage the latter to join with us in defending the status quo against those whose interests ... demand its overthrow." Citing past Japanese aggression and the probability of greater demands for expansion due to an increasing population, Collier considered the Japanese a far greater threat to British commercial interests than Russia could possibly be.[56]

Vansittart took favourable note of his friend Collier's difference of interpretation, and was very pleased with the viewpoint taken by the memo and used it to help guide Britain's relations with China. His own view of how the continued Russo-Japanese tensions played to the British benefit was

> I am, however, glad to see from this paper that no clash between Russia and Japan is anticipate anyhow for some years to come. Since tension produces good, or better, behaviour on both sides, it is in our interest that there should be tension but not blows for as long

> as possible. Were the latter to come about, it is clear of course, ... that a draw would be the best result. If that could not be, the choice would be difficult between the two evils.[57]

On May 31, Sir George Mounsey, Assistant Under Secretary of State, passed Vansittart's view along to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Head of the British Legation in Peking. The Chinese had been trying to pin down Cadogan on what he thought British and American attitudes would be towards a Russo-Japanese war.[58] Vansittart thought it would be useful for Cadogan to know his personal views on the matter, in case the matter came up again. Mounsey described those views as follows: "...that it would best suit our interests in the Far East that war between Russia and Japan should not occur; but that the reciprocal antipathies of the two races should restrain both of them from doing actual harm to our interests which depend upon peace and the absence of any one-sided predominance."[59]

Vansittart's approval of the memo and the approach which it advocated were echoed by the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon. But, while the Foreign Secretary approved of the general tone and direction of the memo, he was concerned about the timetable of events proposed by Randall. In Simon's view, as soon as Japan was finished digesting Manchukuo and Jehol, a task that would take some four to five years, Japan would be prepared to take on Soviet interests once more.[60] If that happened, Simon was of the opinion that Japan would win such a contest, causing Russia "... to try to regain cast by successes elsewhere...", most likely in the direction of Afghanistan and Persia.[61] The prospect of facing a Japan flushed with victory also did not sit well with the Foreign Secretary either.[62] His fears of what a frustrated Japan might do if it were denied the ability to expand on the mainland also were applicable to the perils that the southern regions in the Far East might someday face. The informal policy of trying to sail a course between Russo-Japanese tension was one fraught with great dangers for the British Empire in the Far East.

In these circumstances, the FO attempted to pursue what might be called a 'no bloc' policy. It was, however, one which was consistent with the 'no bloc' policy British diplomacy was trying to implement.[63] The 'no bloc' was a strategy to balance various Far Eastern powers against the other, with Great Britain making no formal committment that would endanger its interests. That opportunistic approach of the Far Eastern Department's strategy served three purposes: to protect British trade and commerce against Japanese and Chinese pressures; to exert diplomatic influence on both Japan and China in the balance-of-power environment, and to act as a shield, utilizing the balance-of-power in the region to buy time for the rearmament and reorganization of the defence forces of the empire. As long as this balance-of-power remained in the Far East, two elements of the traditional 'British way in warfare' had an opportunity to take effect: the creation of a dominant maritime force for use in Europe and the Far East, and, time, over which perhaps a new government or fiscal problems would temper Japan's aggressive attitude. Such insights and information on Russo-Japanese tensions became even more important to British policy-makers after the Japanese Amau declaration of April 1934.[64] This Japanese-style Monroe Doctrine created concerns about what Japan's attitude would be towards British interests in the Far East.

Sir Robert Henry Clive replaced Lindley as the British Ambassador to Japan in May, 1934. Clive's initial attitude towards the role of Russia in regard to British interests was the same of that of his predecessor. In his view, the Japanese had missed their chance to do anything about Russia, now that the Soviet forces had been increased and improved. But, while a war was not likely, tensions would remain high.[65] However, by September, Clive had reassessed the matter and concluded that possibility of a Russo-Japanese war was greater.[66] Out of his concern about the possible escalation of tensions, Clive recommended to London that he should approach the Japanese and warn them against going to war with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador's proposal was met by a solid negative reaction, primarily at the War Office (WO), the FO and the Treasury.[67]

The main problem with such action was felt to be the fear of antagonizing the Japanese General Staff, which was believed to be in favour of an early war with Russia.[68] Both the FED and the WO held this opinion. However, the WO's private view of what might happen if such a war took place was not shared by the FED or FO.[69] The WO's position reflected that department's view of the advantages accruing to Britain from a possible Russo-Japanese war. While agreeing that the risk of antagonising Japan was a possibility that had to be avoided, Colonel Ismay, MI2, GSO1, at the WO also held that

> It is of course a truism that, from the ethical and economic standpoint, peace throughout the world is to be desired. But viewed solely from the military aspect, we cannot altogether agree with Sir R. Clive. Soviet Russia and Japan are both potential enemies of the British Empire. The result of a war between them is problematical, but there seems a fair chance of a draw or a stalemate resulting. Such a result would remove the potential danger from both of them for many years and thus give us time to complete our own preparations. The defeat of one or other side would suit us less well, but the enormous strain of a modern war would impoverish both sides and again neutralize our danger for a long time even from the victor. Moreover, we should then only have one instead of two possible enemies to guard against.[70]

Some of those military advantages referred to by Ismay were already paying dividends for the British strategic planners. The Joint Planning Committee (JPC) and the COS, when considering the defence requirements for Hong Kong, factored in the Japanese pre-occupations with Russia.[71] It was their contention that, as far as air attack against Hong Kong was concerned,

> Japan does not normally maintain any air forces within effective striking range of Hong Kong and units required for attack would have to be drawn from those stationed in Japan, Manchukuo, Korea, Formosa, etc. In deciding the size of the forces which she could use for this purpose, Japan will be influenced by such factors as the Soviet Air Force and by a desire not to commit too large a proportion of her Air Force to operations at a distance from Japan.[72]

The Admiralty had similar views. The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) received information in late 1934 that supported the idea that the build-up of Russian naval and air forces in Vladivostok was holding the Imperial Japanese Navy somewhat in check. At a farewell party held by Captain Vivian, the British Naval Attache in Tokyo, for the Japanese naval officers going to London as part of a naval conference delegation, he was informed by Capt. Iwamura, ADC to the Japanese Minister of Marine:

> ...that the Russians are building submarines at Vladivostok and ... that he, Iwamura, fully realised that in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, Japan's international position would be a difficult one. Capt. Iwamura is a man who holds broadminded views and he probably reflects the opinions of the Minister of Marine. The Vice-Minister informed me that Iwamura is an exceptionally able officers.[73]

The Vice-Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa told Vivian at the same party that a Russo-Japanese war, "... 'is the last thing we want and the Army is not ready', he then hastily changed the subject."[74] Clearly, then, by the end of 1934, while no move was being made to warn the Japanese against going to war with Russia, British assessments of the Russo-Japanese relationship were undergoing continuous modification and the usefulness of continued Russo-Japanese tensions was being constantly monitored.

A large part of that modification was the result of the continued build-up of Soviet military and naval strength in the Far East. Ismay had alluded to this increase in strength in his discussions with the FO and it was a view also held the Tokyo Embassy and the COS. Completed in early January, 1935, the embassy's Annual Report on Japan opened the section on Japan's relations with Russia with the comment that "The world may congratulate itself that the year passed without a war between Japan and the USSR."[75] By 1935, and in comparison to 1933, the Russian Army was much larger, more technologically advanced and in a solid defensive position. The Russian navy and the large fleet of submarines in Vladivostok were a more serious threat to lines of communication between Japan and its armies on mainland China. Most important, however, was the Japanese fear of massive air attacks on their wooden cities.[76] As far as British interests were concerned, the military aspects of Russo-Japanese tensions were favourable in 1935.

The delicate diplomatic balance that was required between Japanese, British and Russian perceptions, tensions and positions was difficult to maintain. It almost collapsed under pressures brought on by Italian and German challenges to Britain's security in Europe.[77] Equally, that critical Far Eastern balance-of-power was threatened in 1935 by an incident of the FO's own making: the suggestion of creating closer relations with Russia through the granting of a loan, a suggestion followed by a mission of the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony Eden, to Moscow in March.[78] The Treasury stirred the pot as well, ruminating over the possibility of bilateral Anglo-Japanese action to rehabilitate China's struggling currency situation. There was also the possibility of Russia finding some terms of agreement with Germany, but the close ties between Germany and Japan cast many doubts upon such a likelihood. All of the above aside, because Russia was viewed as both a European and an Asian power, that country posed a unique problem for British strategic planning in 1935.

The usefulness of the Soviet Union to British interests in both Europe and the Far East had been clearly defined during discussions in early January 1935, surrounding the up-coming London naval talks. When the chief British naval negotiator and head of the American Department, Sir Robert L. Craigie indicated that he was not overly concerned whether or not Britain was particularly tender towards the Soviet Union's fears of an Anglo-Japanese entente arising out of the conversations, Collier quickly pointed out the strategic place the Soviet Union occupied in British global defence considerations.[79] Referring to a memo prepared by himself and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, an economic adviser in the FO, Collier pointed out that there was indeed some reasons "...for not letting Russia assume that we are particularly anxious to cooperate with the Japanese."[80] The two argued that the Soviet Union had what it considered to be two main enemies: Germany and Japan. It considered Japan the more dangerous of the two, and, therefore, any policy of British cooperation with Japan could not be considered in the Far Eastern context only. They pointed out that the Soviet Government was intensely nervous about any moves made by Great

Britain or Japan towards each other as a result of the legacy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; an alliance formed to resist possible Russian expansion in the Far East in 1902. Due to that history, the Soviet Union watched Anglo-Japanese relations very closely and was convinced that Japan would join others in actions designed to rehabilitate China only if Japan could use such actions to help further her aim of excluding Russia, Great Britain and all other Powers from China. On the grounds that British cooperation with Japan would signal to the Soviet Union that Great Britain was a willing partner in the ousting of all other Powers from China, Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin argued against any strict bilateral cooperation with Japan to aid China's currency problems.[81] As well, the memo argued that the Soviets were now definitely opposed to any change in the status quo in both Europe and the Far East. Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin concluded that the lesson to be remembered at all times was that

> ...Russia cannot afford to have an enemy East and West. The coming together of Russia and Germany is Europe's greatest danger, so long as there is possibility of war. The flirtation of Germany and Japan is obviously a lesser danger so long as Russia is hostile to both. The situation in Europe must once again dictate our policy in the Far East. It should forbid us from gratuitously antagonising Japan; but is also forbids us from approaching Japan beyond the limit where such an approach would alarm Russia and throw her into the arms of Germany. Joint action by the Consortium Powers to assist the Chinese currency situation would be on the right side of this limit; joint action with Japan alone for the same purpose would be getting dangerously near to it; and it might be actually crossed as the scope of the rehabilitation programme, the closeness of the cooperation, and the price of Japanese support became more clear. A good deal of the above argument applies equally to our relations with the United States in this matter....a policy of exclusive collaboration with Japan in China would make us Japan's supporter in the opinion of the rest of the world, and particularly of the Soviet Government; and that, in view of the paramount importance of maintaining and strengthening every factor in Europe which tends to the consolidation of the status quo and in particular to check the ambitions of Germany, we cannot afford to take any action in the Far East which would antagonise one of the most important of those factors and perhaps turn it in a direction opposed to our own.[82]

This view was supported by Victor Wellesley and Vansittart. They feared that the Treasury was indeed working towards just such a disastrous bilateral Anglo-Japanese solution. On the basis of the arguments put forth by Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin and others, Vansittart had informed Sir Warren Fisher, that the FO was "...irrevocably opposed to any deal a deux with Japan," and he hoped that the United States and France would also be asked to join with Great Britain and Japan in any such currency schemes.[83]

Collier put the situation clearly once again in late January, when he wrote:

> There is, however, a possibility that, if M. Litvinov who is already somewhat disgruntled at recent developments in Europe, makes up his mind that the French and ourselves are going to leave him without support in face of German "Drang nach Osten", he may throw in his hand altogether in the Far East in order to be able to turn his undivided attention to the West. This, of course, would not suit our book at all, any more than the reverse situation - which is also a possibility though a more remote one - in which a Soviet-German detente in Europe might be brought about through Soviet fear of isolation in the face of Japan in the Far East. The moral for us seems to be that we should handle M. Litvinov very carefully in the next few months.[84]

Both Vansittart and Eden agreed with Collier's analysis of how the Soviets worked into Britain's strategic scheme. Still, under pressure from what he perceived was a worsening European situation, Vansittart was determined to attempt to reach some sort of understanding with Russia over Germany.[85] Vansittart's Europe-first vision posed a serious threat to the very fabric of the 'no bloc' strategy that safeguarded Britain's Far Eastern interests.

Because Russia held such an important position as a deterrent to Japanese aggression in China, a continued threat from that flank was vital, if British diplomacy were to balance the one against the other. However, any British arrangement with Russia over any issue, no matter if it was economic, commercial, political or military, would also give Japan cause to fear the beginning of an anti-Japanese bloc being created by Britain. The result would in all likelihood be a Japanese move southward against British interests.[86] Vansittart's attempts at securing European security through an agreement with Russia cut across this 'no bloc' strategy of opportunism that the FED was trying to keep in play. His approach tended towards trying to create a sterile environment around the disease (Japan), rather than dealing directly with the problem, as was Simon's want to do through the multi-lateral approach.[87] Given the importance and vulnerability of the Far East in Imperial affairs, the perception of greater volatility from Japan, and the need to respect the coming of the critical year, 1936, such a disruption of the balance-of-power in the Far East could not be tolerated.[88] Just as an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement would have increased suspicions of Britain in Moscow, thereby perhaps eliminating a potential British ally in the containment of Germany, Vansittart's ambitions on this matter had little chance of success due to the absolute importance of a 'loose' Russia at this time in the Far Eastern balance-of-power. The Treasury and Board of Trade, who desired an improvement in relations with Japan, were also opposed to the risks inherent in such a venture with Russia.[89]

This reliance on an unaligned Russia coincided with the need to avoid any unnecessary action that might possibly provoke Japan. The solution was to avoid any bi-lateral agreements with Powers involved in the Far East so there could be no grounds for charges of collusion of one power or group of powers against another. In his discussion with Litvinov on March 28th, Eden explained the British position towards the situation in the Far East was "... that mutual relations should be as good as possible, as, amongst other reasons, freedom from anxiety in the Far East made a greater possibility of British influence being usefully exercised in Europe."[90] Eden assured the Soviets that the British Government's policy was that it had no intention of signing a bi-lateral non-aggression pact with Japan, nor did it intend to establish a special relationship with any single Power in the Far East at the expense of any other.[91] This attitude was reflected in the manner in which the British had dealt with the Chinese loan issue, said Eden, a clear indicator of the co-operative and joint approach policy Britain would like to see utilized in dealing with Far Eastern matters. Furthermore, he made it clear that Great Britain considered close communications with the Soviets and a clear understanding of Far Eastern matters to be very important to the British Government. Eden told Litvinov that if there ever was a time when the

Soviet Government required information on British policy towards Far Eastern matters, they had only to ask Lord Chilston or the Soviet Ambassador in London, Maiski, to inquire and the information would be provided because, "His Majesty's Government wished that there should be no cloud in the relations between the two countries on grounds of mere misunderstanding."[92] Finally, in a gesture meant to solidify Anglo-Soviet understandings about the situation in the Far East, Eden put Stalin and Litvinov at ease over their fears of Britain granting possible loans to Japan. According to Lord Chilston, Eden "...had given a formal promise to Litvinov and Stalin that no loans were now contemplated and that if any loans from Great Britain to Japan should be contemplated in the future the Soviet Government would be Fully informed in advance.[93] Litvinov expressed his gratitude for the offer and told Eden that he too considered the Japanese problem to be one that required collective, and not independent, action.[94]

That policy of not formally favouring one power over another in the Far East of course applied to the British treatment of Russia as well. However, while not taking an overt and active attitude towards the balance of power predicament in the Far East, the FO, through acts of omission, could attempt to create an atmosphere more conducive to British interests. Victor Wellesley's instructions to Ambassador Clive, in the spring of 1935, summed up the situation regarding the attitude of Britain towards Russia and her place in the Far Eastern strategy for defending the Empire. In the most diplomatic of terms, Wellesley, at Orde's and the Northern Department's request, instructed Clive to not promote the idea of better Russo-Japanese relations to the Japanese during this 'critical' period:

> War between Japan and Russia is of course far from our desire. Apart from the evils resulting by repercussion from any war a Russo-Japanese war would destroy for the time being a balancing factor against Germany, our greatest source of anxiety. Our desire to maintain good relations with Russia, both for their own sake and from the standpoint of her influence against Germany, has caused us to assure her in all sincerity, that we do not wish Japan to attack her. We also of course are most anxious to maintain good relations with Japan but she is a danger to our interests in the Far East and it is difficult at present to see how she is to be checked. We can

> place no reliance on American co-operation against her or, in spite of Litvinov's language to Eden, on concerted help from Russia. But nervousness in Japan about Russia may be useful as a check on Japanese aggression further South and the ideal state of things seems to us to be one in which such nervousness should continue but without any commitment of Russia's strength in the Far East which could not quickly be liquidated should the situation in Europe render this desirable. We think therefore that it will be best not to go out of our way unnecessarily to sooth Japan's fears of Russia, though naturally we must be careful to negative any impression that we want ill-feeling between them. Apart from special circumstances this is the general line we should like you to follow.[95]

Vansittart understood what Orde meant, writing later that, "They [Japan] will probably have to become more frightened of trouble with Russia before they really try to earn our friendship."[96] The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Hailsham, pointed out the same strategic realities to the Cabinet during the final discussions in early 1936, over whether the Soviet Union should receive a loan. He explained most clearly that such a disruption of the balance-of-power would involve not only Far Eastern questions, but also the links of the three countries to Germany, all with serious and unwelcome consequences for the defence of Britain's empire.[97] The Far Eastern Department's 'no bloc' strategy had survived another challenge, as the loan discussions floundered in the face of such forceful opposition to any bi-lateral actions throwing the delicate Far Eastern balance out of its natural rhythm. The need for Great Britain to keep all nations with Far Eastern interests 'in play' continued to be the central pillar of Imperial foreign policy.

The subtlety of the 'no bloc' balance-of-power approach was not to the liking of the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, and the Secretary of State for War, Duff Cooper. Working from incomplete information provided by the Military Attache in Tokyo and scraps of Foreign Office despatches from Clive, Montgomery-Massingberd argued to the Cabinet that the Japanese Foreign Office desired better relations with Britain.[98] Given that the stated desire of British foreign policy was to ensure that the British Empire never faced simultaneously a coalition of Germany, Italy and Japan, Massingberd advocated that the Foreign Office should attempt to take advantage of the Japanese offer and formally improve relations between the two countries.[99] The CIGS's attempt to dictate British foreign policy in the Far East was quickly rejected by the FO, although Chatfield supported the CIGS's position.[100] Starved of crucial defence monies, the service chiefs rallied around the idea of diplomacy keeping the strategic commitments to a minimum. Their linear thinking saw alliances as a natural choice. It was not the Foreign Offices's preference.

Charles Orde launched a scathing attack, placing the Russian factor as one of the most prominent reasons why such an event could not take place. He argued that, if Britain should now attempt a closer relationship with Japan, the United States and the League of Nations would view the British as selfish opportunists and "traitors to the cause of international morality," and, such action would encourage the Japanese to take aggressive action against Russia.[101] Of the utmost importance was the need to keep the larger strategic picture in view. Citing Clive's most recent reports, Collier emphasized that any Anglo-Japanese political agreement would "fall like a bombshell on Russia". Such a consequence needed to be very carefully considered, argued Collier, in order to avoid anything which might alienate the Soviet Government and weaken her as a counter-poise against Japan in the Far East or Germany in Europe. He acknowledged that uneasy relations between Japan and Russia were to Britain's advantage as a check on Japanese aggression, however, he did not think it wise to do anything to encourage hostilities between the two, as that could hardly fail to be the result of making Japan feel that she had made the initial step to closer Anglo-Japanese relations. His final analysis was that

Japanese action against Russia was likely unless Russia became so involved in the affairs of Europe and liquidated her position in the Far East by meeting all Japanese requirements. There was, he judged, no imminent danger of a conflict at the time. Japan would wait to rebuild and reorganize her army. Russia in the meantime would grow strong as well, and as Russia became stronger Japan would be more likely to wait until Germany was ready to strike at her end. As for an German-Japanese agreement, Collier thought

> The danger of an agreement between Japan and Germany, to which the CIGS draws attention, is only too real, but it is difficult to agree to the suggestion that Anglo-Japanese friendship will diminish the danger. Japan will pursue her primary aims, which must include any help she can obtain in a possible struggle with Russia, regardless of our wishes, and an agreement with us will in no way diminish the attraction of an agreement with Germany. The most that can be said is that it would diminish the risk of a Japanese attack on British possessions when we were at war with Germany. Obviously this would be an object worth securing, but the price to be paid for it indicated above would surely be excessive.... Good relations with both China and Japan should be our basic policy, and cooperation with both if the Sino-Japanese link in the circle can be brought into existence.[102]

Orde's memorandum was fully supported by the rest of the key members of the FO. Victor Wellesley contended that Orde had disposed of the CIGS's fallacies admirably.[103] This admiration was continued in Vansittart's commentary on the issue, as he exclaimed that he agreed with the whole of it, but added

> Perhaps the true situation can be summed up still more tersely. Germany wants to attack Russia. Japan wants to attack Russia and China, when Germany is ready. So long as these wholly immoral...ambitions are entertained, it is of no use to expect any permanent or real settlement with either. And if we tried, we should lose more...than we won.... These remarks apply equally to Germany and Japan, and will apply for some time yet to come. But they need not at all necessarily apply, when we have hastened to repair our strength.[104]

Vansittart was also aware, from information provided by Sir Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador in Rome, that Japan was indeed worried about Russia's relations with France and Great Britain making the Soviets unstoppable in the Far East.[105] Sir John Simon, now in charge of the Home Office, lent his support to the FO's cause. He commended Orde's report, and suggested that the case could be made even stronger against the army, because, in his view, the General Staff tended to paint the Japanese as supermen and ignored the changed strategic, domestic and commercial realities of Japan.[106] In the final analysis, he found the CIGS's assessment of the situation out-of-date, and warned "It is not difficult even for an ordinary civilian to see the advantages from a military point of view of an agreement between the UK and Japan, but it is not sound strategy to disregard, as I think our General Staff has, all other considerations."[107]

Anthony Eden, the newly-appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs concurred.[108] He pointed out to both the CIGS and First Sea Lord that, while he shared their desire to improve Britain's relations with Japan, "It was easier to desire them, however, than to find in current events a good opportunity for promoting them in the general interest."[109] In May, Eden expressed further his whole-hearted support of the 'no bloc' strategy for the Far East. In a private and confidential letter to Orde, Clive had reported repeated Japanese attempts to further better relations with Great Britain.[110] Clive held that this change in the Japanese military's attitude toward Britain was due to Japan's isolation and desire to confirm that the British Empire would, at worst, be a benevolent neutral in any Japanese war with Russia. Clive's opinion of the matter was that "So far as we are concerned it is not a bad thing that both the Japanese and the Russians should be feeling anxious as to where our sympathies lie and uncertain as to what line we should adopt..."[111] Orde replied to Clive's letter in June, informing him that Eden was in full agreement with his assessment and that "...the Secretary of State observed that the first few lines of the penultimate paragraph represent the right position for us to be in. In our present state of inadequate armament and vast commitments we haven't got the straw necessary for all the bricks we should like to make."[112]

Indeed, by mid-1936, conditions in Europe, and British pre-occupations with the continent, made the Russian bear an even more necessary part of the overall British strategic considerations for the Far East.[113] Japanese fears of a possible Anglo-Soviet rapprochement were having the desired effect of making that island nation anxious as to what actions to take next in China.[114] S.G. Harcourt-Smith, a clerk in the FED, provided a useful commentary on the issue when he observed that the

Japanese fears of an Anglo-Russian understanding, embracing Far Eastern matters, was "...almost the only adequate protection available for our Pacific interests," given the growing British concerns with European problems. He wished that that Japanese fear could be stimulated further, in order that Japan could be brought to heel.[115] Orde cautioned that while the desire to further stimulate Japan's apprehensions of Russia was an easy card to play, "It is satisfactory to see this preoccupation with Russia, which is the best brake on Japan. But it is too uncertain a field to interfere in with the object of increasing the application of the brake."[116] British opinions of Russia's worth as a military power, and her effectiveness as a brake, were upgraded in September, 1936, with the visit of Major-General Archibald Wavell's military mission to the Soviet Union. After careful observation of Red Army manoeuvres, Wavell's conclusion was that the Red Army was a formidable defensive force, but it was not an effective offensive instrument.[117] Wavell's evaluation of the Russian military machine was lent strong support by a report submitted by the Indian General Staff on Japanese aggression against India.[118] The report maintained that "Even if there were no formal alliance between Russia and the British Empire, Russian interests would remain diametrically opposed to those of Japan, and Japan would be compelled to take account of possible Russian action."[119] In an Anglo-Japanese war, Japan's fears of Russian opportunism would cause the Japanese to retain a large part of their air force in home regions for potential operations against Russia. This would allow Britain's military preparations to counter effectively the minor Japanese air attacks that could therefore be expected.[120] In a war which saw the Soviet Union and the British Empire allied against Japan, the report was positive that the results would be even more favourably inclined towards the protection of British interests in the Far East.

These evaluations suited the FO's plans for the Far East well enough; a strong Soviet Union that could act as a brake on Japanese aggression, yet was not strong enough to threat British interests was indeed a case of the bear's porridge being not too hot, nor too cold, but just right.[121] However, that Far Eastern balance-of-power was put into jeopardy by two important events in 1936 and 1937: the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Germany and Japan, on November 25, 1936; and the devastating Stalinist purges of the Soviet Red Army in June, 1937.

The Anti-Comintern Pact was viewed by some in the Foreign Office as a signal that Japan could now disregard the threat from the Soviet Union because the USSR would now have to concentrate more of its energies on Germany and the European front.[122] This analysis was quickly rejected by the FED, by Craigie, and the new deputy under secretary, Sir Alexander Cadogan, who all argued to the contrary: since Japan had declared herself openly as an antagonist of the Soviet Union, she would have to be even more wary of her adventures in the Far East.[123] In late October, Clive had warned the FO that now that the Japanese bluff in the Far East had been called by the Soviet military build-up, the Japanese realized they had missed the opportunity to deal the Russians a quick, decisive blow. This realization was making an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations possible.[124] Orde and Cadogan thought the chances of such an understanding occurring were slight. Both held to the belief that Japan was still most concerned with her interests in China and that any rumoured Russo-Japanese rapprochement was a temporary condition brought on by Japan's desire not to provoke the Soviets unnecessarily.[125] More important, as far as Britain's interests in the Far East were concerned, was the disquieting point brought up by Harcourt-Smith, who argued that if Japan was stymied by the Russians in the North, she would then most likely turn her attentions to the Southern regions.[126] Both Orde and Cadogan acknowledged the possible dangers that lay in having the Soviet Union present too formidable a position to the Japanese, and Vansittart summed it up well: "Very interesting...and potentially disquieting."[127]

In view of the creation of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the impact it might have on the normal tensions that had been the mainstay of Russo-Japanese relations the situation now seemed to warrant a formal reassessment.[128] In November, Vansittart asked Orde for a memorandum on the Japanese attitude towards other Powers and an evaluation of whether Japan was satisfied enough with its relations with Russia as to contemplate a strike southward. Orde repeated that he believed that the Japanese Army still had its eye firmly fixed on Russia.[129] He thought it unlikely that enough evidence of a pacific attitude would be forthcoming from Russia to make Japan move from that assessment. The Russian increases in their military strength had allowed them to meet Japanese border pin-pricks with great force, said Orde, causing Japan to have to re-evaluate its chances of success of any military adventure. As for the Anti-Comintern Pact, it had disposed of any chance of a rapprochement between the two. There was something to be said for the fear of Japan turning southward, Orde argued, but it was still a distant problem, although a growing concern that required careful attention.[130] Cadogan and Vansittart both thought the memo a wise summary, with Cadogan adding that the Japanese had a growing fear of the Soviet bomber forces in Vladivostok. Both appreciated that the Anti-Comintern Pact was perhaps not an entirely disadvantageous agreement from the British perspective.[131] The full spectrum of advantages and disadvantage of the Pact were analyzed at the end of the year.

In December, the Far Eastern Department, in consultation with the Central and Norther Departments, produced a definitive report on what the Japanese-German agreement meant to British interests in the Far East.[132] Their combined opinion was that the agreement was ill-advised on the Japanese side. The agreement did nothing to strengthen Japan's strategic position, while at the same time the psychological effect on Russia was tantamount to creating the same impression a German-Japanese military alliance would have. Because of that perception being created, Japan's strategic position was weakened rather than strengthened. The three FO

Departments believed that the Russians had been irritated rather than frightened. Soviet forces in the Far East were considered strong enough by that time to meet any Japanese threat and were rapidly approaching a state of organization when they would be entirely self-supporting and independent of European Russia. The agreement would give an extra boost to that Russian re-armament. The report also believed that with her agreement with Germany, Japan had confirmed existing Soviet suspicions. That meant the Russians would be unlikely to move any considerable forces from the Far East to the West. Moreover Japan's aim to create a curtain along the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier of Russia to prevent the penetration of "dangerous thoughts" of communism into Manchukuo, Korea or China was now threatened. If an accommodation with the Soviets had been reached, Japan might have been able to secure an undertaking that would have helped check that flow of subversive thought. However, by irritating Russia, Japan had made it necessary to reinforce that border area with more troops and resources. That situation made it all the more improbable that Japan will have the resources available for adventures outside Mongolia and Manchukuo.

> The agreement must moreover tend to bring Great Britain and the United States closer together in the Far East (Mr. Arita himself admitted this at this conversation with Sir R. Clive on the 2nd December), while China's fears and suspicions have received a new impetus prompting her to turn for help and friendship to precisely those countries which Japan has most irritated by entering into this agreement....We are, moreover, also effected in a more immediate way by this agreement. The Russian reply has been the announcement of a large naval building programme. This will inevitably react through its effect on Germany on our naval agreement with Germany and endanger the whole labouriously constructed system centering round the London Naval Treaty. Apart from this and the introduction of a fresh disturbing factor into world politics the consequences of the agreement for us would not appear to be serious. We might indeed derive some small advantage if Japan finds it more instead of less necessary to watch Russia, and if annoyance with the Germans on top of her fears of Japan leads China to divert some of her orders from Germany to the United Kingdom. And if Japanese fears expressed in their press have any foundation in fact we may arrive a closer and harmonious collaboration with the USA in the Far East.[133]

The memo received solid support from Cadogan, Vansittart and Eden, the latter deciding that the Anti-Comintern Pact was something he could not take too seriously.[134]

The Far Eastern Department's analysis of the Pact was also reinforced by secret intelligence gathered from broken Japanese diplomatic codes, which added to the FO's overall picture of the relations between Great Britain, Russia, Japan and Germany.[135] Evidence of the continual improvement in the Russian bear's military capability was also reflected in the Review of Imperial Defence, prepared by the COS and Joint Planning Committee for the 1937 Imperial Conference.[136] According to that review, Russia possessed the largest army and air force in the world, and a growing submarine fleet, much of force being directed at the Far East. In fact, the formal British military view of the usefulness of the Soviet Union in any Far Eastern conflict was that

> ...the Soviet military preparations are rapidly being completed, and include the location of a large force of long-distance bombing aircraft in the Maritime Province, which constitutes a serious threat to Japan. The Soviet submarine forces in the Far East, moreover, are a factor which cannot be disregarded. Consequently, in the event of war between the United Kingdom and Japan, the assistance of the USSR might be of considerable value.[137]

The Soviet Union remained, therefore, a strong semi-formal component of British diplomatic and military strategic planning for any conflict in the Far East, a role fostered by continuing favourable reports from the COS and CID about the increasing military strength and capability of the USSR.[138] But, that faith in the Soviet Union's strength was shaken in June 1937, by a series of purges in the officer corps of the Soviet military establishment.

The possible repercussions from the purges on British foreign policy and strategic planning were immediately recognised by members of the FO, as well as by military planners.[139] In the Far East, the impact was not so disasterous. The importance that the Soviets' placed on being prepared to meet any Japanese threat was underlined by the fact that Marshal Blucher, commander of the Far Eastern Army, was the only commander of a military district left untouched at his post.[140] However, some feared a Soviet withdrawal into isolationism. This was an especially worrisome prospect, as it would send a clear signal to the Japanese that they could act without fear of Soviet reprisals.[141] Fortunately, the Soviet purges coincided with the new Japanese campaign against China. The Soviet purges, combined with the reorganization and strain in the Japanese army, reduced the chances of the Japanese taking advantage of a weakened Russia.[142] Despite reassurances to this effect from Tokyo, the FED thought it best that the Japanese not be allowed to acquire any British views or information as to the possible damage done by the purges to the Soviet military presence in the Far East.

Therefore, the FED cautioned Collier not to not divulge any information on British assessments of the Soviet military capability to Japanese officials. In particular, the Northern Department was not to let Japanese military attaches or embassy staff in London get the impression that the purges had created a serious crisis in the Soviet military. It was feared that if the Japanese perceived the Russians to be severely weakened then Japan might adopt a more forward policy in the region.[143] The head of the Northern Department followed the FED's advice, as he, too, believed that the Japanese assessment of the situation should be kept as confused as possible for as long as possible. When the counsellor from the Japanese embassy called to enquire as to Collier's views on the consequences of the Soviet purges, Collier told him,

> ...that while it would seem as he suggested, that the immediate effects on the upper ranks of the Army must be unfavourable, we had no evidence of serious discontent in the Army as a whole or among the population in general and could only assume that Stalin's recent actions had been prompted by a desire to remove possible future dangers to his power, rather than by the discovery of any actual plot. Baron Tomi said he agreed generally with this diagnosis and certainly did not believe that the Generals had been actually plotting with the Germans. He himself thought Stalin's actions were the usual precautionary measures of a dictator who thought to strengthen his own position by the elimination of all possible opposition; and he supposed it was possible that in a country like Russia the regime might actually be strengthened by such measures in the long run. I hastened to agree with this view and to point out that if the regime were strengthened and the army became more reliable politically, the Soviet States and its power of resistance against foreign attack would be strengthened generally, although the technical efficiency of the Army might temporarily suffer. I then added, in accordance with Mr. Ronald's suggestion ... that these developments would at least ensure that Soviet policy in the Far East would be strictly defensive for the next few months at least, which should give the Japanese Government the opportunity to reduce

> their forces in Manchuria. This produced the expected burst of laughter, followed by remarks to the effect that a mutual reduction of forces might be considered....[144]

The WO approved of the measures taken by the FED and Collier, as the former also wished, for obvious reasons, to keep the Japanese guessing on the matter as long as possible.[145] While the impact of such a disinformation campaign on the Japanese intentions in the Far East is not clear, the escalation in border incidents between the Soviet and Japanese forces in 1938 and 1939, reflected the Japanese need to test the Russian military, since there was no clear consensus in Tokyo on the state of the USSR's defenses.[146]

Craigie, who took over as Ambassador to Japan on August 4, 1937, reported six months later that the Japanese military had lost some of their fear of the Soviet bear both because of the purges and as a result of the lack of any aggressive action being taken by the Russians while the Japanese were tied up in China.[147] That lack of fear of Russia had allowed an increase in the anti-British attitude of Japanese officials, both in the army and the navy, as well as in the government. Craigie also pointed out that it was only now, when Russia had reacted to various border tensions with obvious military strength and political determination that Japan was once more approaching Britain in a more conciliatory attitude.[148] In his view, Japan was still not strong enough, in 1938, to risk the simultaneous antagonism of any two of the three great powers - Russia, the United States and Great Britain - arrayed against her. Therefore, with an increase in anti-Japanese feeling on the rise in the US, and, with Russia still viewed with great anxiety, the only option available to the Japanese was to try and get on better terms with Britain.[149]

Russia's role as a 'loose-cannon' was modified to a large extent after the Japanese attack on China in 1937 to a position of the predominant military advisor to the Chinese.[150] The Soviets quickly became one of the main sources of military assistance and supplies to

China, a nation whose strategic position in the Far Eastern balance of power was also of great importance to the British position.[151] Britain's service chiefs were not able to reach a definite conclusion as to the extent that British assistance should be offered to China.[152] Air Chief Marshal, Sir Cyril L.N. Newall, Chief of Air Staff (CAS), saw the situation in the Far East as going from bad to worse. He advocated supporting Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese war effort against Japan in order to (a) secure China's goodwill; (b) keep China from turning to the USSR for more help, and (c) to prevent China seeking an accommodation with Japan.[153] The CIGS, General the Viscount Gort, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, both disagreed with Newall's vision, citing a lack of faith in China's ability to resist Japan, and a belief that Japan had already bitten off more than it could chew on the mainland. In the face of such a deadlock, the COS refused to interject their voice into the Cabinet's debate over how much aid was to be given to China.[154] No such reluctance over aid to China existed within the Soviet Union. Between September 1937 and June 1941, the USSR supplied 904 aircraft, 82 tanks, over 1,500 automobiles, over 600 tractors, 1,140 heavy guns, over 9,000 machine guns (both light and heavy), 50,000 rifles, over 31 thousand bombs, two million shells, 180 million cartridges, as well as over 3,600 military advisers and specialists.[155] That Soviet military support to China, along with lesser material aid provided by Great Britain and the financial aid of the United States, was seen as an integral part of the FO's 'stalemate' policy, which was aimed at containing any further Japanese aggression in the Far East through weakening it through attrition in a stalemated Chinese adventure. Seen by most Far Eastern experts as the great, unconquerable mass, China was thought to have the potential to be the Japanese equivalent of Napoleon's march on Moscow.[156] The enormous financial and military effort Japan was forced to make in China, combined with the traditional tensions and fears of the Soviet Union, created a real balance-of-power for the British Empire in the Far East.[157] The usefulness of a strong Soviet Union and a Soviet backed China providing a deterrent to Japanese aggressions against British Far Eastern interests continued to be a viable part of the British Far Eastern strategy well into 1939, as the clouds of war grew darker over Europe. There were divided opinions as to how best to achieve this goal.

In mid-1938, in response to continued misguided pleas from Craigie for Britain to strike a deal with Japan over the China issue and thus attempt to buy Japanese goodwill, the FED and FO outlined their views of how a long Japanese struggle in China, and continued fears of the Soviet Union, worked to Britain's advantage.[158] Sir John Brenan, a senior Far Eastern Department official, ringingly denounced Craigie's suggestions and painted a clear picture of the realities facing British policy-makers concerned with Far Eastern matters:

> The truth of the matter is that we acquired our dominant position in China as the result of our wars with that country in the nineteenth century and we can now only keep it by the same or similar methods. We must either use force, or otherwise bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Japanese authorities to compel them to relinquish in our favour what they regard as the spoils of victory. We may, without fighting ourselves, be able to apply that pressure if the Japanese are exhausted by a long war with the Chinese, but it is futile to expect that we shall get what we want for the mere asking, or by protests about the infringements of our "rights", or by a more friendly attitude....there is no prospect of obtaining anything of permanent value by abandoning China and cooperating with Japan - at least, not yet. The "stalemate" policy still offers the best hope for the survival of our influence in China.[159]

Cadogan, who took over as PUS from Vansittart on August 1, 1938, agreed entirely with Brenan's assessment. On September 15, in a letter to Craigie, Cadogan repeated Brenan's analysis as the instructions Craigie was to follow from that point on in any discussions with the Japanese.[160]

In April, 1939, as discussions took place in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy (FPC) over whether or not Great Britain should join France and the Soviet Union in another Grand Alliance, the question of the Far East and Britain's interests there were also taken into consideration.[161] The role, capabilities and intentions of the Soviet forces in the Far East held an important place in how the FPC viewed the situation in the Far East at this crucial juncture.[162]

The COS were tasked with providing the necessary appraisal of the Soviet Union's military capability and attitudes, primarily with the European situation in mind. The underlying question that was being asked and required answering was, could the Soviet Union help Britain in any way if Japan threatened to take advantage of a general European war to further her position in the Far East at Great Britain's expense? The COS's initial evaluation was to repeat to the FPC that "In the Far East Russian intervention on our side would quite possibly delay and might even deter Japan from entering the war against us. Japan's preoccupation in China and the possibility of Russian action in Manchukuo would almost certainly prevent Japan from carrying out large-scale seaborne expeditions against either Singapore or Australia and New Zealand."[163] The COS returned to the FPC six days later with a more complete position paper.[164] In their view, the Russian navy's two light cruisers, 2 large destroyers, 9 small destroyers and large number of submarines (estimated at close to 80) were an important deterrent against the Japanese attacking Australia, New Zealand or Singapore with any sizeable, large-scale military force, especially an expeditionary force. The Red Army in the Far East was estimated at 5 cavalry and 32 infantry divisions. It had enough reserves for the first six months of a war, although there were some fuel supply problems. The opinion was that such a force would "...at least exercise a containing influence on Japan in Manchukuo and China, particularly in support of the Chinese 8th Route Army." In the air, the Soviet air force east of Lake Baikal was composed of over 1,000 aircraft of various types. That force was economically independent of Western Russia, and it, too, had at least a six months' reserve of planes, parts, and aviation fuel. In the COS's opinion, the general level of efficiency of the force was "equal to, if not better than, the Japanese. A number of heavy type bombers in this force, although obsolete, can reach Tokyo, a threat which we understand the Japanese consider with some trepidation. The presence of this Russian air force in the Far East would have a restraining influence on the Japanese, would contain some Japanese air force, and might afford valuable assistance to China."[165] While the Russian 'steamroller' was plagued with traditional organisational, supply and transport problems in the Western theatre, the overall picture of the Soviet's capability in the Far East was much more promising and helpful.[166]

This deterrent value of the USSR against Japan was not lost on Sir Thomas Inskip, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. He and the rest of the FPC, did not dispute the fact that Russian forces would be able to exercise a restraining influence on Japan and were therefore a valuable element in ensuring that the strategic nightmare of Italy, Germany, and Japan simultaneously attacking the British Empire did not become a reality.[167] That was also the strategic view held by Chatfield, now the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, when he questioned the COS as to the need for an Anglo-Soviet agreement covering the Far East.[168] The COS did not respond to this request because of other, more pressing planning matters. The FO and FED did not support a hard-line against Japan in the negotiations with Russia, acknowledging the nervousness with which Tokyo was watching the process.[169] They were wary that the formalization of an alliance with Russia would cause Japan to panic and strike out against British interests. This view was also held by other high-ranking British officials, but there were other views as well.

Sir Horace Wilson, Chief Industrial Advisor to HMG and a confidant of Prime Minister Chamberlain, was willing to sell out the Soviets in order to get the Japanese to accept some sort of arrangement. In a conversation with the American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy, Wilson told him that the Soviet military was worthless and therefore there was nothing the Soviets had to offer. As well, "...he [Wilson] said the Japanese are beginning to indicate some willingness to play ball with Great Britain if no pact is concluded with Russia and have also indicated their willingness to break away from the Axis."[170] Reports from the American Ambassador in Warsaw also suggested Neville Chamberlain was indecisive as he tried to balance European needs with Far Eastern interests and patch together an Anglo-Russian agreement:

> Though for some time it had become clear that British public opinion desired an alliance with Russia Chamberlain has been seeking a formula to circumvent the Far Eastern implications of a three-cornered full military alliance (reportedly desired by Moscow) for Chamberlain wished to minimize the risk of throwing Japan into military alliance with the Axis. Accordingly Beck [Jozef, Polish Foreign Minister] was now under the impression that Chamberlain was suggesting formula entailing: (a) mutual Anglo-Russian assistance (somewhat along the lines of the French-Soviet alliance) in the event of a European conflict; and (b) British assistance for Russia in the Far East in the Event Russia were attacked there by a third party while engaged in honoring her pledge in Europe. Beck felt moreover there was room for hope that arrangements along these lines might not throw Japan into an Axis alliance.[171]

Such reports reveal clearly the serious indecision resulting from fears of the potentially major dislocation of the balance of power that would occur if the Soviet Union sided with the Axis powers. The references to Britain's making a deal with the Japanese could certainly not have done much to strengthen the American view of London's determination to stand firm against the Japanese, and such rumours most certainly must have created great suspicions of Great Britain's real intentions toward the Far East.

The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on August 23, 1939, quickly ended any further speculation about the role the Soviet Union would play in conjunction with Great Britain in the Far East. At that point, the entire strategic position of the British Empire in the Far East required a serious re-evaluation.[172] However, even after the signing of the Pact[173], the Japanese did not feel secure in their ability to turn southward against British and American interests. This was because of Tokyo's Chinese entanglements and its fear of the Soviet Union.[174] The FED and FO continued to believe correctly that the innate qualities that had long characterised Russo-Japanese tensions remained beneficial to Britain's long-term interests. When Craigie informed the FO that he had information that Japan and the Soviet Union were working towards a non-aggression pact, his views were characteristically dismissed by Brenan and other FED members.[175] Brenan quickly dismantled Craigie's argument that Russia would throw over the Chinese for better relations with Japan:

> I suggest that it would not suit her purpose because of the difference, from the Russian point of view, between the European situation and that in the Far East. It is not unlikely that the Kremlin looks at things somewhat as follows. The non-aggression pact with Germany will encourage the latter to embark on a war which will involve the Western European Powers and possibly the United States. From this war Russia can remain aloof, but whatever the outcome it will leave Germany exhausted and eliminate the German menace to Russia for a long time to come. It may also produce revolution in Germany, and other countries, and prepare the ground for the spread of communism. There is quite another outlook on the other side of the world. Russia's chief enemy in the Far East is Japan. But Japan is already at war with China and, if assured of a free hand by a non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese may well consolidate their position on the mainland and become a much graver menace to Soviet Russia than they were before. Whether or not, therefore, the Soviet Government are encouraged by their German pact to embark on a direct war with Japan, or, shall we say, enlarge the hostilities already in progress on the Mongolian border, it must be to Russia's interest to assist the Chinese in prolonging their own campaign against Japan. The longer China continues the war with Russian help, the greater the Soviet hold over the Chinese Government; and the more exhausted Japan becomes the less of a danger she is to Russia and the more chance of internal trouble and the emergence of a Japanese socialist regime.[176]

Collier supported Brenan's argument that Russia was not likely to agree to a non-aggression pact with Japan, as did R.A. Butler, the parliamentary under secretary of state.[177]

Further enquiries of Craigie by the FED and FO, as to the possibility of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact, were answered initially that such an occurence was indeed likely and that, therefore, a greater effort was needed to create better Anglo-Japanese relations.[178] The British Ambassador's stance on the matter soon crumbled under a devastating barrage of information and argument put forth from the FED experts, old Far Eastern hands, such as Brenan and Sir George Sansom, and the Political Intelligence Department.[179] Craigie's credibility, already damaged by his lack of Far Eastern knowledge, languages and heavy reliance on the Japanophile Military Attache, Major-General F.S.G. Piggott, had suffered one more devastating blow. He attempted to backtrack on his previous position and to repair the damage done to his credibility, but as far as his views on a Russo-Japanese entente were concerned, it was too late.[190]

As 1939 came to a close, the Soviet bear held a vital position in the strategic and diplomatic manoeuverings of British Far Eastern policy-makers. Japan's insecurity concerning its isolated political position and economic instability brought on by the prolonged campaign in China, made her even more susceptible to the usual Japanese fears of the USSR and communism. Those fears would not be put to rest until Nazi Germany commenced operation Barbarossa, in June 1941. Then, and only then, was the Russian 'loose-cannon' in the Far East firmly lashed down in Eastern Europe. But, in December, 1939, British interests could still be protected by a Far Eastern balance of power that used the Russian bear and the Chinese panda as powerful levers against Japan. A reliance on Russo-Japanese tensions was a vital factor used by British strategic policy-makers to ensure that Germany, Italy and Japan did not all declare war on the British Empire simultaneously. Fascinatingly, the Japanese fear of Russia also benefited the United States in its attempts to protect American interests in the Far East.

ENDNOTES

1. Studies of the attitudes towards and perceptions of Soviet Russia, as a major player in Far Eastern affairs in the 1930s are almost non-existent. A few works that touch on the subject are Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39, (London, 1984); idem., The Soviet Union and the Threat From the Far East, 1933-1941, (London, 1992); Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, (Stanford, 1985); Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, (London, 1977); James W. Morley ed., Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940, (New York, 1976); Roy H. Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, reprinted edition, (Washington, D.C., 1979); Keith Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear": British Estimates of Soviet Military Strength and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1922-1939," Canadian Journal of History, vol.28, 1993, pp.189-222; R.J. Pritchard, Far Eastern Influences upon British Strategy towards the Great Powers, (New York, 1987).

2. For the British case, Bradford A. Lee acknowledges that such a formal relationship between Great Britain and the Soviet Union would have been helpful. Lee's need for a formal policy, and his idea that the Chamberlain government saw the Soviet Union as a big a problem in the Far East as the Japanese, reveals a lack of comprehension of the subtle nature and global nature of Britain's strategic problems; see his, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939, (London, 1973).

For evidence that the American Far Eastern Division requested the American Embassy in London to keep a close eye on British announcements and discussions of the Soviet Union in the Far East, see Confidential US State Department Central File, Great Britain - Foreign Affairs, 1930-39, (hereafter CSDCF), on microfilm, National Archive, Washington, D.C., 741.61/403, letter from Pierrepoint Moffat, Chief, Division of Western European Affairs to Ray Atherton, American embassy, London, January 13, 1934. In the letter Moffat told Atherton that, with regard to a Dec.1/33 despatch that contained a record of a debate in the House of Lords on the British Government's policy in China, the Far Eastern Division appreciated the record and its information on British views of the Far East and Russia. They also wanted more information on the speakers recorded in future despatches so that weight could be given to specific comments. For the despatch, see Ibid, despatch and enclosure from Raymond Cox, First Secretary of Embassy to Hull, Dec.1, 1933.

3. FO 371/17263/N3090/1149/38, telegram from Sir R. Lindsay, April 25, 1933. See also, Simon Bourette-Knowles, "The Global Micawber: Sir Robert Vansittart, the Treasury and the Global Balance of Power, 1933-35," Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.6, March 1995, pp.91-121, p.99.

4. See G.L. Owen, "The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934," Slavonic and East European Review, vol.114 , 1971, pp.92-112; Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear," p.207; FO 371/17263/N3090/1149/38, telegram from Vansittart, April 25, 1933.

5. FO 371/17263/N3231/1149/38, telegram from Vansittart to FO, April 28, 1933, and minutes of Lawrence Collier (Head of the FO Northern Dept.) and Robert L. Craigie, (Head of FO American Dept.), both April 29, 1933. See also James K. Libbey, "The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce," Diplomatic History, vol.9, 1985, pp.233-249, pp.243-245; and Edward M. Bennett, Recognition of Russia, (Waltham, 1970).

6. Ibid. See also, Andrew J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks: The Politics of East-West Trade, 1920-39, (Manchester, 1992), pp.169-170.

7.FO 371/17263/N3231/1149/38, Vansittart telegram; see also Robert Dallek, *Franklin Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, (New York, 1979), pp.39-40.

8.Karl A. Bickel, President of the United Press Association, confided to his friend Nelson T. Johnson, US Minister in China, on Sept.30, 1932, that his sources caused him to believe that if FDR were elected, he would probably do something to regularize relations with Russia soon after his election because of the role Russia could play in the Far East due to the Russian-Manchurian situation. Nelson T. Johnson MSS (hereafter NTJ papers), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 17, letter Bickel to Johnson, Sept.30, 1932.

9.Dallek, pp.78-81.

10.FO 371/17263/N7829/1149/38, telegram from T.M. Snow to FO, Oct.26, 1933; FO 371/17263/F6784/614/23, telegram from Snow to FO, Oct.26, 1933. See also, Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy, *The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-35*, (Manchester, 1969), pp.270-271.

11.FO 371/17263/N8492/1149/38, despatch from Lindsay to Simon, Nov.16, 1933.

12.Dallek, p.78.

13.FO 371/17263/N7726/1149/38, telegram from Snow to FO, Oct.26, 1933. Snow reported that the Japanese Foreign Office feared that such recognition would add fuel to the fire of hot-headed anti-Soviet and anti-Western/US groups in general, because the perception was that recognition would strengthen the Soviets' position in the Far East against Japan.

14.CAB 4/22, Committee of Imperial Defence Papers (hereafter CAB 4/), Paper 1112-B, June 30, 1933, "Imperial Defence Policy", Foreign Office memo.

15.*Ibid*.

16.CAB 53/23, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes of Meetings and Papers (hereafter COS), Paper No.307, "Imperial Defence Policy", May 20, 1933.

17.CAB 53/23, COS Paper, No.310, "Imperial Defence Policy", Oct.12, 1933.

18.FO 371/17388/W11987/11987/80, Collier and Oliphant minutes, Nov.2 and Nov.8, 1933. For the anti-Communist tradition in British politics, see Michael Jabara Carley, " 'A Fearful Concatenation of Circumstances': the Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement, 1934-1936," forthcoming in *Journal of Contemporary European History*.

19.FO 371/17338/W11987/11987/50, Collier minute, Nov.22, 1933.

20.*Ibid*.

21.*Ibid*, Oliphant minutes, Nov.8, 1933.

22.*Ibid*, Orde minute, Oct.27, 1933.

23.*Ibid*.

24.*Ibid*, Wellesley minute, Nov.8, 1933.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid, Vansittart minutes, Nov.30, 1933.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. CAB 16/109, Defence Requirements Committee Minutes and Papers, (hereafter CAB 16/), DRC Report 14, Feb.28, 1934. Donald Cameron Watt, "Work Completed and Work as Yet Unborn: Some Reflections on the Conference from the British Side," in Ian Nish ed., Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952, (London, 1979), pp.291-292.

32. CAB 16/109, DRC Paper 14, Feb 28, 1934.

33. CAB 16/109, Minutes of the 3rd DRC Meeting, Dec.4, 1933.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart, (London, 1958), p.443.

37. For a look at the Soviet's equivalent of the DRC, see Lennart Samuelson, "Mikhail Tukhachevsky and War-Economic Planning: Reconsiderations on the Pre-war Soviet Military Build-Up," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.9, 1996, pp.804-847.

38. Evidence of the need to consider Russo-Japanese tensions in the formulation of British Far Eastern strategic policy at the highest level is available in CAB 23/78, Minutes of Cabinet Meetings (hereafter CAB 23/), Cabinet 9(34), March 14th, 1934, when the viability of making closer relations with Japan a formal policy were discussed.

39. Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear", pp.207-209.

40. FO 371/17256/N8770/3632/38, "Annual Report on Russia", Dec. 5, 1933.

41. CAB 53/23, COS Paper No.316, and also, CAB 4/22, Paper No.1127-B, "Russian Preparations for War"; CAB 2/6, CID Minutes of meetings (hereafter CAB 2/), Meeting No.264, May 31, 1934. See also Neilson, note 83.

42. CAB 4/22, Paper No.1127-B, "Russian Preparations for War".

43. War Office, PRO, Kew, London (hereafter WO) 106/5499, secret letter from Vivian to Dickens, Jan. 19, 1934.

44. Ibid.

45. WO 106/5499, note from Dickens to Dill, Feb. 20, 1934.

46. WO 106/5499, secret letter from Dill to Dickens, Feb. 28, 1934.

47.WO 106/5499, holograph from Dickens to Dill, Mar. 1, 1934.

48.FO 371/18301/N489/4/38, T.A. Shone and R.G.Howe minutes, commenting on CID paper 1127-B, Jan.17, 1934.

49.FO 371/18176/F639/316/23, despatch from Lindley to FO, Dec.26, 1933.

50.FO 371/18166/F27/24/23, telegram from Lindley to FO, Jan.1, 1934.

51.FO 371/18166/F731/24/23, Orde minute, Jan.11, 1934.

52.FO 371/18176/F823/316/23, Foreign Office Memo by A.W.G. Randall, Feb.9, 1934.

53.Ibid.

54.Ibid.

55.Ibid, Collier minute, Feb.16, 1934.

56.Ibid.

57.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Feb.22, 1934.

58.FO 800/293, Cadogan MSS, PRO, Kew, London, China file 1934-36, private and confidential letter from Mounsey to Cadogan, May 31, 1934.

59.Ibid.

60.FO 371/18176/F823/316/23, Simon minute, Feb. 26, 1934.

61.Ibid.

62.Ibid.

63.For the full description of this 'no bloc' policy see, Greg Kennedy, "1935: A Snapshot of British Imperial Defence in the Far East," in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy eds., Far Flung Lines: Essays in Honour of Donald M. Schurman, (London, 1997), pp.190-216.

64.William Roger Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939, (Oxford, 1971), p.222; Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-37, (Cambridge, 1975), p.58.

65.FO 371/18169/F5943/57/23, very confidential letter from Clive to Wellesley, Aug.23, 1934.

66.FO 371/18177/F5371/316/23, telegram from Clive to FO, Sept.4, 1934.

67.Ibid, Orde minutes, Sept.5; S. Harcourt-Smith minute, Sept.5; Sir George A. Mounsey minute, Sept.5; Vansittart minute, Sept.5; Simon minute, Sept.7; and letter from Neville Chamberlain (acting PM) to Simon, Sept.10, all 1934.

68.Ibid, personal letter from Simon to Chamberlain, Sept.7, 1934.

69.Ibid, Harcourt-Smith minute, Sept.5, 1934, on conversation that he had with Col. Ismay and a Col. Grimsdale on the matter. Ismay requested the meeting. Ismay revealed that the WO felt Russia was improving her military position in the Far East faster than Japan could, and that this fear of being out-matched was causing some groups in Japan's military to call for a pre-emptive strike. The WO did not think that the Japanese General Staff was so inclined at the moment.

70.WO 106/5499, telegram Clive to FO, Sept.4, 1934; Ismay minutes, Sept.7.

71.CAB 53/24, COS Paper 344 (JP), "Hong Kong - Plans for Defence, Relief or Recapture", July 11, 1934.

72.Ibid.

73.FO 371/17600/F6006/537/23, Secret Report from DNI to FO, Oct.6, 1934; ibid, Naval Attache's Report, Sept.5, 1934.

74.Ibid. Hasegawa had been naval attache at Washington from 1923-1926 and Chief of Staff in 1932 to the Naval delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. He was appointed Vice-Minister of Marine in early 1934. The British assessment of him was that he spoke good English, was very friendly and fond of the sake bottle. It was expected that he would go far in the service because of his political capabilities. See FO 371/19361/F1104/1104/23, despatch from Tokyo to FO, on leading personalities in Japan, Jan.18, 1935.

75.FO 371/19360/F1086/1086/23, Annual Report on Japan for 1934, Jan.1, 1935.

76.Ibid, and Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear," p.210.

77.On the European crisis see, Lawrence R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, (Cambridge, 1975), pp.8-21; R.J.Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39, (London, 1993); M.I. Roi, "From the Stresa Front to the Triple Entent: Sir Robert Vansittart, the Abyssinian Crisis and the Containment of Germany, " Diplomatic History, vol.6, 1995, pp.61-90; R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1993); Gaines Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937, (Ithaca, 1993).

78.Robert Manne, "The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.16, 1981, pp.725-755; R. Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart, (London, 1958), pp.454-55; FO 371/18826/N1339/55/38, Vansittart to Chilston (British Ambassador to Moscow), Feb.21, 1935; FO 371/19447/N281/1/38, Vansittart minute, Jan.21, 1935, Greg Kennedy, "1935,", pp.285-291; Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear," p.209; Roi, "From the Stresa Front to the Triple Entent," pp.82-83; Bourette-Knowles, "The Global Micawber," pp.114-117; Carley, "A Fearful Concatenation of Circumstances," pp.29-36.

79.FO 371/18731/A127/22/45, despatch from Chilston to FO, Jan.5; Craigie minute, Jan.9; Collier minute, Jan.9, all 1935.

80.Ibid, Collier minute; Collier/Ashton-Gwatkin memo, Jan.7, 1935.

81.ibid, Collier/Ashton-Gwatkin memo, Jan.7, 1935. On the British attempts to help rehabilitate China's currency see Trotter, pp.132-146; Peter Lowe, Britain in the Far East, (London, 1981), pp.150-151; Stephen Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937, (Vancouver, 1975), pp.82-100.

82.FO 371/18731/A127/22/45, Collier/Ashton-Gwatkin memo, Jan.7, 1935.

83.FO 371/18731/A127/22/45, Wellesley minute, Jan.10, 1935; Vansittart minute, Jan.11, 1935.

84.FO 371/19347/F632/13/23, Collier minute, Jan.29, 1935.

85.FO 371/19460/N927/135/38, Minute by Vansittart and memo from Collier, Wigram and Orde, Feb.12, 1935; Roi, pp.84-85; Bourette-Knowles, pp.105-116; David Carlton, Anthony Eden, (London, 1981), pp.62-64; R. Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, (London, 1986), pp.140-145.

86.FO 371/19347/F4366/13/23, despatch, Clive to Simon, "Soviet-Japanese relations," July 6, 1935; FO 371/19349/F4646/29/23, despatch, "Political Situation in Japan," June 20, 1935; FO 371/19349/F2908/55/23, "Press Summary," Apr.3, 1935.

87.Kennedy, "1935", pp.266-269.

88.1936 was considered a critical year in terms of British defence planning for it was the year in which the Japanese obtained a number of naval aircraft squadrons and new vessels into the Japanese fleet; it was the year that the Japanese were likely to withdraw from the Washington and London naval treaty system; it was a year before the base at Singapore could be completed; and, it marked the beginning of British naval rearmament programmes, all of which combined to present a very unfavourable position for the Royal Navy in the Far East as a guarantor of Imperial interests. See Kennedy, "1935", pp.283-284.

89.Kennedy, "1935,", pp.259-261; Roi, "From the Stresa Front to the Triple Entent", pp.82-83.

90.FO 371/18733/A3755/22/45, copy of record of conversation from Central Dept. file, C2726/55/18 dated Apr.1, Apr.5, 1935.

91.CSDCF, 741.61/456, telegram from Bullitt to Hull, Apr.1, 1935.

92.FO 371/18733/A3755/22/45, record of conversation, Apr.5, 1935.

93.CSDCF, 741.61/476, confidential letter from Bullitt to Hull, April 22, 1935, underline in the original.

94.FO 371/18733/A3755/22/45, record of conversation, Apr.5, 1935.

95.FO 371/19347/F4837/13/23, memo on "Soviet-Japanese relations," Orde and Dodds minutes, June 6, 1935.

96.FO 371/19357/F8065/376/23, Vansittart minute, Dec.12, 1935. See Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, 2 vols., (Stanford, 1985).

97.CAB 23/83, Cabinet meeting 6(36), Feb.12, 1936.

98.CAB 24/259, Cabinet Papers (hereafter CP), CP12(36), "Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff", Jan. 17, 1936.

99.Ibid.

100.FO 371/20279/F607/89/23, "Cabinet Conclusion Extract", Jan.29, 1936.

101.FO 371/20279/F701/89/23, "Orde Memo", Jan.22, 1936.

102.Ibid.

103.Ibid, Wellesley minute, Jan.22, 1936.

104.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Jan.25, 1936..

105.Anthony Eden MSS, FO 954/6, PRO, Kew, London, folder - The Far East, letter from Drummond to Vansittart, Feb.21, 1936.

106.FO 371/20279/F701/89/23, Simon minute, Jan.23, 1936.

107.Ibid.

108.Ibid, Eden minute, Jan.23, 1936.

109.FO 371/20279/F607/89/23, "Cabinet Conclusion Extract", Jan.29, 1936.

110.FO 371/20279/F2872/89/23, private and confidential letter from Clive to Orde, Apr.22, 1936.

111.Ibid.

112.Ibid.

113.Eden MSS, FO 954/7, note and memo by Secretary of the CID (Hankey) to Eden, August 11, 1936 (the memo is dated June 8.) In this memo, Hankey sees the role of Russia as being critical to Britain's Far Eastern strategy given the militarily weakness of the Empire in that region: "...it is difficult to make a helpful suggestion, except that we should do all we can to avert war between China and Japan (which would probably precipitate the situation in which Japan will be free to pursue her "Drang nach Suden") and to maintain as satisfactory relations with her as we can. Our best hope for the present lies in the balance power between China's neighbors - Japan and Russia. The longer it can be maintained without war the better."

114.FO 371/20279/F3900/89/23, despatch from Clive to FO, July 3, 1936.

115.Ibid, S.G. Harcourt-Smith minute, July 15, 1936.

116.Ibid, Orde minute, July 16.

117.Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear", pp.212-213.

118.CAB 53/29, COS Paper No. 523, "The Vulnerability of Burma in a Far Eastern War,", Oct.27, 1936.

119.Ibid.

120.Ibid.

121.The Cabinet desired an appreciation of where Great Britain's military preparedness stood so that the Dominions could be appraised of the Imperial Defence situation at the 1937 Imperial Conference. The COS produced a number of reports, one of which revealed how the Royal Navy was fearful of Russian involvement in a European war against Germany lest such action would bring Japan into the fray. This would cause the RN to have to send a large portion of the fleet to the Far East, a delicate point in Britain's strategic planning. The navy preferred Russian neutrality to intervention in the case of a European war. CAB 53/29, COS Paper No.539(JP), "Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with that of Certain Other Nations as at May 1937," Dec.22, 1936; CAB 53/30, COS Paper No.551, Feb.9, 1937, (also CAB 4/26, CID paper no.1311-B, February 25, 1937.

122.Neilson, p.214.

123.FO 371/20348/N5886/287/38, minutes, Nov.19, 1936.

124.FO 371/20286/F6478/539/23, despatch from Clive to FO, Oct.26, 1936.

125.*Ibid*, Orde minute, Nov.1; Cadogan minute, Nov.5, both 1936.

126.This point was brought up in the CID and at the Imperial Conference of 1937, when, in outlining the Review of Imperial Defence the COS stated that as far as the situation in the Far East was concerned Sino-Japanese tensions continued to create risks for the British interests in that region, but "On the other hand, the increase of Soviet strength in the Far East may act as a check on Japanese activities, though it may deflect them further southward, when they would come into more direct conflict with our interests." CAB 53/30, COS Papers No.561 and 562, both, "Review of Imperial Defence," Feb.11, 1937 for both.

127.FO 371/20348/N5886/287/38, Vansittart minute, Nov.5, 1936.

128.On the impact of the Anti-Comintern Pact on Japan and its thinking see, Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935-1939," in Morley ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy*, pp.20-21.

129.FO 371/20287/F7146/553/23, Orde memo, Nov.19, 1936.

130.*Ibid*.

131.*Ibid*, Cadogan minute, Nov.19, 1936.

132.FO 371/20286/F7504/303/23, Secret FO Memorandum, Dec.4, 1936.

133.*Ibid*.

134.*Ibid*, Eden minute, Dec.8, 1936.

135.John R. Ferris, "Indulged in All Too Little?: Vansittart, Intelligence and Appeasement," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol.6, 1995, pp.122-175, pp.134-136; David Dilks, "Appeasement and 'Intelligence'," in David Dilks ed., *Retreat From Power*, (London, 1981), pp.139-169, p.142. The standard work on British intelligence does not take the inter-war Far East and intelligence work into account in any relevant way, preferring to write it off as "The Japanese intercepts thus merely helped Britain keep track of a menace to which she was in no real position to respond." See Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*, (London, 1986), p.353. For a more thoughtful accounting of the role of intelligence in the formulation of Britain's Far Eastern policy in this period see Antony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-41*, (London, 1995), pp.27-29; idem., "Constructing and Image: British Intelligence and Whitehall's Perception of Japan, 1931-1939," *Intelligence and National Security*, vol.11, 1996, pp.403-423.

136.CAB 53/30, COS Papers 561 and 562, Feb.11, 1937.

137.*Ibid*.

138.CAB 4/25, CID Paper 1305-B, "Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee", Feb.22, 1937. Also, FO 371/22190/F2286/2286/23, "Annual Report on Japan for 1937", Jan.1, 1938; and FO 371/22299/N961/961/38, "Annual Report on Russia for 1937", Feb.9, 1938.

139.Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear", pp.215-216.

140.FO 371/22299/N961/961/38, "Annual Report on Russia", Feb.9, 1938. The Soviet Navy also was beginning to play a more important role in British considerations of the Far East at this time, "... it is difficult to say where Russian naval policy is leading; but, in view of the insistence with which the Soviet Union maintained that her Far Eastern forces should not be governed by the Anglo-Soviet Naval Treaty, it is conceivable that all her "large navy" talk is directed towards Japan, and that it is in the Far East that her primary naval strength is now most urgently required."

141.FO 371/22288/N97/97/38, letter Collier to Col. Hayes, DMI, War Office, Jan.14, 1938; FO 371/22288/N748/97/38, letter from Chilston (British ambassador in Moscow) to Collier, Feb.1, 1938.

142.FO 371/21041/F8128/609/23, Orde minute, Oct.20, 1937; FO 371/21041/F10924/609/23, "Confidential, Military Attache's despatch", Nov.17, 1937.

143.FO 371/21104/N3447/461/38, A. Walker minute, July 3, 1937.

144.Ibid, Collier minute, July 3, 1937.

145.Ibid, WO minute, July 3, 1937.

146.Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation," in Morley ed., Deterrent Diplomacy, pp.115-179.

147.FO 371/22185/F2844/152/23, despatch from Craigie to FO, Feb.12, 1938.

148.Ibid.

149.Ibid.

150.Aron Shai, Origins of the War in the East: Britain, China and Japan, 1937-39, (London, 1976), p.120, p.163.

151.Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet Aid to China and Japan's Place in Moscow's Foreign Policy, 1937-1939," in Ian Nish ed., Some Aspects of Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1930s, (London 1982), pp.35-58; Nish, Some Aspects of Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1930s, pp.35-58; Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat From the East, 1933-41, pp.88-135.

152.CAB 53/10, COS Minutes, 263rd meeting, Nov.23, 1938.

153.Ibid.

154.Ibid.

155.Haslam, "Soviet Aid to China and Japan's Place in Moscow's Foreign Policy," pp.38-39; idem, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the Far East, pp.88-111.

156.FO 371/22183/F6419/103/23, "Annual economic report on Japan", May 20, 1938; FO 371/22183/F6424/103/23, "Visit of Mr. Hall Patch to Tokyo", May 20, 1938; Greg Kennedy, "1935".

157.Here the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, and the resulting anti-German, anti-Russian fears it created in Japan worked in Britain's favour. See Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, (London, 1977), pp.230-233.

158.FO 371/22181/F8961/71/23, letter from Craigie to Cadogan, July 27, 1938; ibid, Sir John Brenan minute, August 25.

159.Ibid, Brenan minute.

160.Ibid, secret letter from Cadogan to Craigie, Sept.15, 1938.

161.CAB 27/624, Committee on Foreign Policy, Proceedings, 43rd and 44th meetings, April 19th and 25th, 1939.

162.Neilson, "Pursued by a Bear", pp.217-218.

163.CAB 27/624, FPC, 43rd meeting.

164.CAB 24/285, CP 95(39), "Military Value of Russia, Report by the COS," Apr.25, 1939; also CAB 53/48, COS Paper 887, "Military Value of Russia," Apr.24, 1939.

165.CAB 24/285, CP 95(39), "Military Value of Russia".

166.For a contrary view of British assessments of the Russian military in the Far East, see Paul W. Doerr, "The Changkufeng/Lake Khasan Incident of 1938: British Intelligence on Soviet and Japanese Military Performance," Intelligence and National Security, vol.5, 1990, pp.184-199.

167.CAB 27/624, FPC, 43rd and 44th meetings.

168.CAB 53/11, COS minutes, 305 meeting, June 28, 1939. The question had been raised in an indirect way at the May 17th Cabinet Meeting, when in response to questions on how Japan would react to an Anglo-Soviet agreement aimed at Germany, Lord Halifax had replied "...he thought the effect would be bad, but not catastrophic. Japan would, no doubt, be annoyed; but he doubted whether Japan's actual course of action would be greatly affected provided that our agreement with Russia did not extend to the Far East. When the time came the Japanese Government would do what suited them, whatever their commitments." CAB 23/99, Cabinet meeting, May 17th, 1939.

169.FO 371/23555/F4419/176/23, "Record of conversation," Ashley Clarke minutes, May 10; E. Dening minutes, May 11; Sansom minutes, May 12; R.G. Howe minutes, May 13; Cadogan minutes, May 15; Halifax has read this as well on May 15 with no comment; all 1939

170.CSDCF, 741/61/629, strictly confidential telegram from Kennedy to Hull, May 19, 1939.

171.CSDCF, 741.61/645, strictly confidential telegram from Biddle (Ambassador to Poland) to Hull, May 25, 1939.

172.CAB 53/11, COS Minutes, 312 meeting, August 24, 1939. See also, Brock Millman, "Toward War with Russia: British Naval and Air Planning for Conflict in the Near East, 1939-1940," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.29, 1994, pp.261-183.

173.Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," in Morley ed., Deterrent Diplomacy, pp.191-258; Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, pp.231-245; David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, Vol.II, (New York, 1971), pp.861-920; Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet Aid to China and Japan's Place in Moscow's Foreign Policy, 1937-1939".

174.FO 371/23555/F11481/23/23, Simon note on letter from Peir Groves, Oct.11, 1939;ibid, Brenan minute, Nov.2, 1939; FO 371/23556/F11063/176/23, "Record of Conversation between R. Butler and Japanese Ambassador, Shigemitsu", Oct.13, 1939, and minutes of Ashley Clarke and George Sansom, both Oct.19, and R.G. Howe (now head of the FED), October 21, all 1939.

175.FO 371/23558/F9456/347/23, telegram from Craigie to FO, Aug.25, 1939.

176.Ibid, Brenan minute, Aug.29, 1939.

177.Ibid, Collier minute, Aug.30; Butler minute, Sept.1, both 1939.

178.FO 371/23559/F11426/347/23, telegram from FO to Craigie, Nov.23, 1939; FO 371/23559/F12088/347/23, telegram from Craigie to FO, Nov.23, 1939.

179.FO 371/23559/F12088/347/23, Dening minutes, Nov.23; R.G. Howe minute, Nov.27; Cadogan minute, Nov.28.(This particular telegram was also read by George Sansom, Vansittart and Halifax, who all seemed to accept the above minutes and offered no support to Craigie's views), all 1939. FO371/23559/F12129/347/23, telegram from Sir W. Seeds (Moscow) to FO, Nov.25, 1939; Brenan minutes, Dec.2; and FO 371/23559/F13004/347/23, "Political Intelligence Report: The Foundations for a Japanese-Russian Entente", Dec.21, 1939. The conclusion of the lengthy report was that

> The liquidation of outstanding disputes between Japan and Russia for the sake of their mutual convenience, is possible and not improbable. On the other hand, the conclusion of a fundamental agreement, such as could radically affect the position of the Western Democracies in the Far Eastern areas and influence the issues of the European war, opens up very great difficulties.
>
> History and geography combine to make Japan regard Russia as her permanent rival for the hegemony of East Asia, which is the goal of Japanese ambitions. That rivalry is, at the present time, chiefly active in China, where Russia is thwarting Japan's efforts to acquire political and economic control in the face of Chinese resistance. The need for Japan to end the China campaign has become so urgent - so much so that a section of the Japanese military are ready to barter their hopes for the future in exchange for the immediate prospect of being enabled to achieve an early victory in China; this, they hope, would result if Russia could be persuaded to withdraw assistance from Chiang Kai-shek and to reduce the tension on the Russo-Japanese frontiers. They, therefore, favour a comprehensive agreement with Moscow.
>
> This would imply a policy of friendliness to Russia, combined with faith in the value of Russian undertakings. Such a policy is in direct conflict with the engrained Japanese feeling of detestation and distrust of Communism; it presupposes a reliance on Russia's pledges which events in Europe are proving unjustified; it is based on the questionable assumption that a rapprochement with Russia would enable Japan to settle affairs in China; finally, its adoption would involve the abandonment of hope of improving relations with the United States, whose power of economic reprisal is an ever-present menace for Japan.
>
> The principal advocates of a "pro-Russian" policy for Japan are an extremist minority group. It is only if this group succeeds - as is possible but not, on the whole likely, - in wresting the

governing power in Japan from the hands of the relatively moderate element who are at present in office that there would be imminent danger of Japan turning decisively in the direction of Russia. Drastic action against Japan by the US might drive Japan further in that direction, but at the present time the Government in Washington, although taking a firmer line with Japan, show no intention of proceeding to extremes.

As for Russia, one can see no adequate inducement for her to enter into a non-aggression pact with Japan which would crystallise the position in East Asia and fetter Russia's freedom of action in that region. Any motives which Moscow might have for binding herself to Japan would be motives of pure opportunism arising out fo her attitude towards the world situation as a whole. If such motives exist, there is no evidence that they are of sufficient strength to induce Russia to reverse her established policy of friendship with China and opposition to Japan.

180.FO 371/23559/12287/347/23, telegram from Craigie to FO, Nov.30, 1939; Dening minute, Nov.5; Howe minute, Dec.6, all 1939.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMMON VALUES: BRITISH AND AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE FAR EAST, 1933-39

Part two: The Americans

The Roosevelt Administration's attitude towards the usefulness of the USSR in Far Eastern strategic matters underwent some modification from 1933 to September 1939, primarily on issues related to the actual worthiness of Russia's military forces in that region. Yet, overall, the basic goal of using the Japanese fear of a joint Russo-American, and possibly British, front to keep Japanese aggression in check remained a constant factor in American Far Eastern policy, closely monitored and exploited by the American Far Eastern Division of the State Department, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and FDR.[1] There were various channels through which information on the Soviet Union and how it affected American interests in the Far East reached these decision-makers.

One of the early, important commentators on the increasing importance of the Soviet Union in Far Eastern affairs was the talented American ambassador to China, Nelson T. Johnson. An academic, professional diplomatist and recognised expert on Chinese language, government and culture, Johnson was a valuable 'old China hand'.[2] He was also the type of diplomatic official least likely to make an impression on President Roosevelt, who fancied the informal style of a William C. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union. In fact, in Roosevelt's view, too many career men lost their common touch and became snobs. His belief that they would benefit from consular or business experience eventually led to a shake-up within the State Department ranks in 1935, which resulted in the likes of J. Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, being assigned to head the legation in Australia for two years. In Roosevelt's view, Bill Bullitt was a refreshing contrast to such correct diplomats. The recognition of Russia was an example of what could be done if the diplomat's code of endless talking and sparring was ignored.[3] An experienced veteran of the diplomatic game, Johnson, on the other hand, had the consular advantage, but, by force of personality, or the lack thereof, would by and large have to be content to let his expertise support his views and ideas as they percolated through the State Department apparatus.

The specialized requirements of the Far Eastern Division and the close relations of its staff, allowed Johnson and the American Ambassador to Japan, Jospeh Grew, the chance to have their ideas drift through the policy-making process, finding allies to support and advance them to the next highest level. This was in contrast to Bullitt's style, which attempted to bludgeon his ideas into actual policy.[4] This difference in style and procedure was a reflection of the uniqueness of the Far Eastern Division, a situation resulting from the language skills, cultural knowledge and specialized training that was required by the majority of its staff.[5] As was the case for Great Britain's policy-making elite, the strangeness and foreignness of the Far East made policy-makers in America very dependent on those few individuals who had the necessary skills, contacts and training that enabled them to give an accurate picture of Far Eastern affairs.

Johnson's view of the role of the Soviet bear in the Far East fluctuated in 1932. In the early months of that year he thought that Russia was very weak militarily in the East, and that Japan could have taken Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces at any time.[6] However, although militarily weak, there were certain historical pressures that continued to make the Soviet Union a key element in any American policy aimed at securing peace in the Far East. In a January letter to the former Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, Johnson gave a clear expression of the relationship between Japan and the USSR:

> The more I think about the situation in Manchuria and Japan's recent activities there, the more convinced I am that the whole matter must be interpreted in the light of Japan's traditions with Soviet Russia....The interest of Russia in Manchuria is strategic. Manchuria is stretched directly across Russia's highway to Asia and Pacific waters. The vast and fertile steppes of Siberia, destined

> some day to be the bread basket of European Russia, need access to the Pacific. The only power that challenges this need is Japan, which Fate has placed directly in front of Siberia's front door, Vladivostok. Japan's interest in Manchuria is both strategic and economic. It is strategic because a powerful and growing Russia threatens Japan; it threatens Japan because Japan is completely dependent upon the mainland for her supplies of iron and coal, resources so necessary to the successful life of a modern nation in this age of steel ships. Japan is crowded in her islands; she is forced, by her position, her teeming population, and her ambitions as a nation, to develop her industries and to live by becoming one of the world's great factories for the production of finished goods. This requires uninterrupted access to the resources of China and of China's markets. A strong and growing Russia threatens this freedom of access so necessary to Japan's existence. Therefore, it seems to me that there can be no final settlement, not settlement calculated to ensure peace in the Far East, that does not take into consideration the vital interests of these three nations: China, Russia, and Japan.[7]

According to Johnson, American foreign policy would have to take into account this three-sided structure in any policy it made for the Far East. He advocated strongly the idea that it was indeed in America's self-interest to stay involved in Far Eastern matters, even though America would have to play the loathsome 'balance of power' game in order to keep the peace in the Far East.[8] His argument was that the US, China and Japan were jointly responsible for the future of the Pacific area, but the growing power of Russia was something that none of the other powers could afford to ignore. Any solution to the struggle taking place in the Far East was bound to fail if it did not recognize the need to consider the Soviet Union.[9]

Stanley Hornbeck, the Chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, also recognized the changing face of relations in the Far East and his views coincided exactly with Johnson's. Writing in February, 1932, Hornbeck pointed out that Great Britain needed to reestablish the balance of power in Northern China using the Soviet Union and suggested what this meant for the American Far Eastern policy:

> The balance of power has again been destroyed, this time by Japan, and Great Britain is becoming conscious of her need for diplomatic reinsurance in the Far East....But in Northern China, there is only on Power which could counter-balance the rising power of Japan: the Soviet Union; and it is in Northern China that the balance of power has been destroyed....So long as the United States is dealing with the defense of international rights and interests in Central China, it may be assumed that the British Government will cooperate. It is

> not certain that they will follow us with any conviction so far as concerns Manchuria, where their inclination will be to accept a special Japanese position as a fait accompli of which they can say that they regret the fact but that they can do nothing to undo it. It should, therefore, be the objective of our Far Eastern policy, so to link the situation in the Yangtze with our policy in Manchuria as to bring basic Russian and British interests simultaneously into the balance against such features of Japanese policy as are subversive of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact and the international policy relative to China which is commonly know as the open door policy.[10]

Hornbeck's analysis of the world situation, plus his special interest in the Far East required him to see how the Soviet bear played into the wider aspects of US interests. Here, Hornbeck believed firmly that only a combined front of Russia, Great Britain and the United States could force the Japanese from Manchuria.[11] If such a harmonization of interests could not be achieved, then he believed that only a general Far Eastern war would stop Japan.[12] Clearly, by the time the new Roosevelt administration took over the reigns of power in Washington, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department recognized the pivotal role that the Soviet Union played in Far Eastern affairs.

The Division did not take long getting those views into the hands of the key foreign policy-makers of the new administration. Johnson's consideration on the Far Eastern situation in general were put before Cordell Hull in June, 1933 in a memo prepared specifically for the Secretary of State, entitled "Japanese Activities on Asiatic Mainland. Probable Effect on American Interests in the Pacific Area."[13] Johnson's critique of possible problems facing American interests in the Far East started with an assessment of Russo-Japanese relations. Citing the Soviet Union as the Power most immediately concerned with Japan's expansion in Asia, Johnson proposed that the Russians would seek to avoid antagonizing the Japanese but that continual tensions and conflict were indeed possible as the Japanese threatened Russian interests in Inner and Outer Mongolia.[14] Grew's assessments of Soviet-Japanese relations in early 1933 agreed with this view of the strategic situation, and confirmed that the Japanese could indeed be influenced through their fear of a possible

Soviet-American alliance.[15] By late-1933, because of growing rumors and fears that the two Asian rivals would perhaps be going to war in the near future, the assessments from China and Japan of Russo-Japanese relations became even more important. It was Grew's belief that the Soviets had built up a large and powerful military force in the Far East, and that they were becoming much more resistant to Japanese attempts to bully them.[16] His conclusion and forecast for the future was that

> While the situation between the two countries does not at the present moment appear to be critical, foreign observers in Tokyo are very nearly unanimous that, with a continuance of present political conditions, eventual war between Japan and Soviet Russia is inevitable, such differences of opinion as arise being concerned more with the probable time of the eventual clash than with the inevitability of its occurrence. The majority of observers see the spring of 1935 or the spring of 1936 as the most likely dates, basing their opinion on the fact that Japan will then be fully prepared to strike, but it is obviously recognized that unforeseen developments may alter these predictions. The foregoing opinions are based to some extent on the following factor: (1) The Chinese Eastern Railway controversy. (2) The continuance of petty but irritating incidents. (3) Japanese ambitions in Kamchatka and Mongolia. (4) Soviet military preparations and increasing indications of Russian intransigence....In conclusion therefore, it appears reasonable to believe that for the present Japan will devote her energies to the exploitation of Manchuria, to the North China situation, to the modernization of her army and the building of her navy, and to her manifold trade problems, although, it may be said, the possibility certainly exists that a crisis may result from the Chinese Eastern Railway situation. For the future only time will tell whether a war will fulfill the logic of the evidence or whether unforeseen forces will obviate a struggle generally predicted for two years hence.[17]

For US interests in southern China and in the south Pacific, this continual Japanese pre-occupation with her Northern flank was a strategic asset, at least until 1935 or 1936, at which time many believed the inevitable Russo-Japanese war would take place.[18]

The Division of Far Eastern Affairs' views on the Far Eastern balance of power and the Soviet Union's place in it were passed along to the Roosevelt administration by Hornbeck in October, 1933. Writing in reply to Japanese overtures for an anti-war pact, the Far Eastern Division Chief painted a clear picture of where American interests fit into the overall Far Eastern situation. He established that geographical location dictated the linkage between the interests of the United States, China, Russia and Japan in the Far Eastern problem and stated that

> The Far Eastern problem of course revolves around China. What happens in China is of concern not only to China but to Russia and to the United States. Japan wishes to deal with China in her own way and without restrictions....To any definite proposal from Japan for the conclusion between Japan and the United States of such an agreement, an expedient rejoinder might be the suggestion that there be concluded such a pact not on a bilateral but on a quadrilateral basis, the four parties to be the United States, Japan, Russia and China. Such a counter-proposal would, of course, be rejected by Japan.[19]

This balance of power approach advocated by Hornbeck and the rest of the Far Eastern Division was certainly part of the reason for the American recognition of Russia in November, 1933. A need both for closer relations with this powerful Far Eastern power and more information about Russian designs and capabilities in the Far East, was part of the reason for recognition.[20] That act signaled that the Roosevelt Administration saw the connection between the Soviet Union and the protection of US interests in the Far East. Further, it signalled that the US was willing to follow a balance of power policy to contain Japanese aggression in the Far East.

Confirmation of the usefulness of the American recognition to US strategic planners did not take long. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, congratulated Robert W. Bingham, the American Ambassador in London, on the United State's vision in the matter. Maisky confided to Bingham that the Soviet Union was sure that it was going to have to fight a war with Japan in the spring of 1934. However, now that the US had recognized Russia, the Japanese were having a change of heart in their attitude towards the Soviet Union, for fear that they might be caught between the Russians and the Americans.[21] American reports from the Far East and the Soviet Union confirmed that the US recognition of the USSR had indeed created a stir in the Far Eastern balance of power and that these shifting currents would have to be watched closely.

Various groups within the US policy-making elite watched events in the Far East unfold in early 1934, and all, including President Roosevelt, did so with the Soviet Union in mind. In January, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) prepared a memo for the Chief of Naval Operation (CNO), Admiral W.H. Standley as to what were the pertinent factors in the Soviet-Japanese situation.[22] The ONI believed that the militaristic leadership of Japan required a foreign threat to hold steady their domestic support among various Japanese groups. To that end, a successful campaign against the Soviet Union seemed the logical choice, given the Japanese fear of communism; their desire to seize rich Soviet fishing grounds; the high probability that Japan would win such a war; and the need to preempt growing military power of the USSR in the Far East.[23] Admiral Standley relayed this information to William Bullitt, telling him that Japan would fight a limited war in Asia.[24] As for the effect of this rivalry on the USN, Standley believed that

> Japanese naval preparations are without doubt for the purpose of making any intervention in a Russo-Japanese war by the United States or Great Britain an unattractive proposition. If the Japanese Government estimates that the United States or Great Britain might intervene in such a war, then Japan will not take any measures that will lessen the advantage of Japanese naval preparedness. Japan will retain its naval force concentrated in a manner best calculated to deter intervention on the part of the United States or Great Britain. Control of the sea in the Western Pacific, as against Russia, is essential to Japan to guard her commerce and to move troops overseas without interference from Russia. The naval force of Japan will undoubtedly remain concentrated in Japanese home waters, with observation and patrol forces in the Marshalls, the Bonins, the Pescadores Islands and off the eastern coast of Honshu.[25]

Hornbeck's views on the escalating tension between Japan and Russia were not as pessimistic, when he lay out what America's response to a Russo-Japanese war should be. Stating that he thought the trend in Russo-Japanese relations was away from rather than toward armed conflict, Hornbeck repeated his views on the balance of power in the Far East between Japan, China, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. He also pointed out that the US did not have any vital interests at stake in the region, except a general desire for world peace.[26] The possibility which worried Hornbeck would occur if Japan fought Russia and won. Then, Japan could potentially emerge from the conflict stronger than ever and be even more capable of disrupting the balance of power in the Far East. The solution, argued Hornbeck, was for America to safeguard her interests through ensuring a perpetuation of the rough balance between China, Russia and Japan. To that end, he suggested that

> This is likely to be achieved only if China grows stronger, Russia remains at peace, and the military spirit and power of Japan are kept in check. It should therefore be the intent and effort of the United States: 1. To help China toward internal improvement; 2. To help the Soviet Union likewise; 3. To discourage the militarism of Japan; 4. To work toward preventing war; 5. In the event of there beginning a war to which Japan is one of the parties, to see to it that Japan does not emerge the victor.[27]

Also incorporated into this grand strategy were the twin features of a strong, rebuilt American navy that would be able to stand up to the Japanese fleet and some form of cooperation with Great Britain. However, that nation would have to take the lead in any initiatives, as American public opinion was still not ready to acknowledge the realities of global balance of power diplomacy.[28]

In China, Johnson's view continued to correspond with Hornbeck's, and vice versa. The Ambassador saw Russia as being an inward-looking nation, one bent on completing the great "ten year plan" as soon as possible and thus not willing to jeopardize the gains made over the last few years in a war with Japan.[29] Similarly, Japan was also taxing its population severely with efforts to modernize and expand its army and navy for the coming year of crisis, 1936.[30] Time, Johnson predicted, was on Russia's side. The longer the Japanese waited, the stronger would be the Russian air, army and naval forces in Vladivostok and other regions. These forces, along with the uncertainty created by the Japanese perception of increasing Russo-American friendship resulting from the American recognition of Soviet Russia, would play havoc with Japanese strategic considerations.[31]

These views were supported by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. In February, Grew reported to Hull that he considered a war between Russia and Japan to be very unlikely in the next six months, although there were always likely to be tensions between the two rivals.[32] Militarily, he believed that the Japanese Army was still confident that it could take Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces, but the Soviet Defences had grown much stronger in the last six months. The Japanese Army would reach its peak in 1935 said Grew, citing the views of the military attaches in Tokyo, and after that "...time will tell in favor of Soviet Russia in point of lines of communication, organized man power, fortification and equipment."[33] Those military experts also believed that Manchuria, the Maritime Provinces and Eastern Siberia were the main strategic goals of Japan, as far as its empire was concerned. Because the Soviet Union stood in the way of that expansion, the Japanese would be forced to deal with the Soviets at the first favorable moment.[34] Grew's own opinion differed from that of the military observers, whom he considered too pessimistic. Unlike them, while he thought the situation between the two nations fraught with tension, he did not believe that a Russo-Japanese war was inevitable.[35] His own opinion was that

> ...their [Russia's] defenses in the East have been materially strengthened, and their air forces in Vladivostok and elsewhere along the frontier constitute a serious threat to Tokyo and other important Japanese cities. Furthermore, American recognition of Soviet Russia has injected an important psychological element into the situation and gives pause to those in authority in Japan, for regardless of the pacific policy of the United States, American action in the event of a Japanese-Soviet conflict would be to the Japanese an unknown and disturbing factor, necessarily to be taken into consideration. Military plans may be regarded as infallible; but the attitude and possible action of the United States constitutes an element of uncertainty and therefore an unknown hazard. American recognition has increased self-confidence and bluster in Moscow, but no one believes that the Soviet Union will commence hostilities. I therefore believe that our recognition of the Soviet Union has injected into the situation a restraining influence, probably of greater effect than any other single integral.[36]

This new Soviet military strength, now bolstered by the American recognition of the Soviet Union, was sure to confuse, and therefore slow down, Japanese aggression without the United States' having to risk a direct confrontation with Japan.

By the summer of 1934, even American policy studies groups and academic gatherings were considering how the United States could or should utilize the Russian bear in the Far East. At a round table conference on "Currents of Conflict in the Far East," held at the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, the group recommended three possible methods for providing peace in the Far East.[37] Those recommendations were to retreat gradually from the field and let Japan do as it wished; to establish a balance of power in the Far East between Japan and Russia; and to establish a Far Eastern regional organization.[38] All demonstrated the central importance of the Soviet Union in Far Eastern matters. This was especially the case for the second solution:

> Assuming that there is a general desire for peace, stability and economic development in the Far East, how can peace machinery best operate to achieve these results?...A second possibility is the establishment of a far Eastern balance of power, with Japan and Russia as the principle protagonists. Such a balance was doubtless a major factor in maintaining the stability of the Far East from 1894 to the World War, and the ambitious policy of Japan may be attributed to the serious weakening of Russia as the result of the Bolshevist revolution. It seems not improbable, however, that this weakening is temporary, and that the balance will eventually be restored. The re-entry of Russia into the somity of nations, her recognition by the United States, and a possible strengthening of her position through alliance with France would contribute to this result. The danger of such balance, however, is that it could only be maintained through periodic wars, in the course of which Manchuria and China would undoubtedly suffer. The balance, however, might eventually be made more stable through the development of greater internal strength in China itself, thus establishing a balance of the three powers surrounding Manchuria, a consummation which could easily be further stabilized through a Far Eastern Locarno.[39]

This view that the Soviet Union was able to balance or control Japanese aggression was confirmed and supported by both Hornbeck and Johnson. Their assessment was that time was on Russia's side and Japan was developing a healthy respect for Russia's air and naval forces in Vladivostok.[40]

Ambassador Bullitt added his voice to chorus of experts on the Soviets' importance. He wrote to the State Department about a possible Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, arguing "... that the British no less than the Russians now regard the establishment of close relations between the British Empire and the Soviet Union is a primary object of foreign policy."[41] According to Bullitt, who was receiving his information directly from the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, Simon had assured the Russians that the British would under no circumstances aid Japan in an attack on the Soviet Union. Litvinov's response to Simon's declaration was to tell Bullitt that, for the first time since Great Britain had recognized the Soviet Union there were now actual diplomatic relations between the two countries. The apparent reversal in British policy, said Litvinov, was a response to the threat posed by German aviation and the Japanese threat to British interests in Northern China, which combined with Japanese dumping in British markets, had made British cooperation with Japan impossible.[42] Bullitt also commented on the effect that this change of policy would have for British Far Eastern policy. In a conversation with the British charge d'Affaires, Bullitt was told that Britain desired Japan to be "...firmly planted between the Soviet Union and China as a bar to Soviet advance and to have the eyes of the Japanese directed toward the continent of Asia rather than toward the Southern Pacific." Bullitt took this statement to be authoritative, given that the Charge had just returned from a long visit to London where Bullitt assumed that he had been made privy to official policy.[43] Copies of Bullitt's conversation were immediately sent to the American offices in Japan and China for their information.[44] The idea of the possibility of a Russo-Japanese war, and the effect such a war would have on American interests in the Far East, created a clear picture for President Roosevelt of what Anglo-Soviet relations meant to American interests in that region. There were, however, many subtle interpretations of that image

In a September interview with a Mr. Streit, a reporter for the New York Times, Roosevelt was asked what he would do if a Russo-Japanese war broke out. The President replied "Nothing. We shall provide material etc. to both sides and we shall strengthen our naval bases, but beyond that nothing."[45] Roosevelt was more than willing to utilize the Japanese fear of Russia as a indirect method of guaranteeing continued good behaviour from the Japanese. The British Foreign Office and Admiralty certainly accepted that Roosevelt's most likely response to any Russo-Japanese troubles would be to sell war material to both parties and let them bludgeon one another into a weaker state, a situation that was advantageous for American interests in the region.[46] William Bullitt's reports to the State Department (which eventually found their way through a circuitous route from Assistant Secretary of State, Judge Walton Moore, to Roosevelt's Secretary Miss Le Hand, and finally to FDR) confirmed that even the Russians did not think that the Americans would intervene in a Russo-Japanese conflict.[47] Bullitt explained, however, that the Soviets expected that, if such a war occurred, the US would inevitably be drawn to the Russian side no matter "...whether our relations with the Soviet Union prior to such an event were warm, tepid or cold."[48] But, these Soviet beliefs were not shared by Roosevelt. Instead, he followed the balance of power argument put forth by Hornbeck and Hull about the correct approach the US Government should take towards the Soviet Union and what the latter's role was in US Far Eastern interests.[49] This view - that the Soviets were a useful and relatively cheap foil to the Japanese - was refined throughout 1935.

In early January, 1935, Hornbeck produced a seminal memo for the State Department entitled "Relations between the United States and Countries of the Far East - Especially Japan - in 1935".[50] At the same time, Grew had submitted his own lengthy analysis of the situation, "The Importance of American Naval Preparedness in connection with the Situation in the Far East", which also contained a section on the role of the Soviet Union in the Far East.[51] The Secretary of State agreed entirely with the contents of both documents, thinking so much of their analysis that he sent them directly to the President. Hull had also given copies to Norman Davis, Roosevelt's adviser and roving negotiator, and Bullitt for their appraisal. Both men agreed with the contents of the memos, and Roosevelt was so informed by Hull.[52] A clear consensus of opinion on Far Eastern issues and possible policy options had emerged from the two papers.

Grew's principal point about the Soviets was that in their approach to dealing with the Japanese was a useful model that the US Government would be wise to consider. Citing discussions with the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo and the results that the latter had achieved over the last two years, Grew's opinion was that the hardline and rearmament strategy adopted by the USSR had proved very effective in making the Japanese respect the Soviet position. The Soviet method could be applied to the USN, said Grew, thereby creating the military force required for duplicating the Russians' success.[53] Hornbeck's attitude towards the USN was identical to Grew's, but his main focus was to outline what possible favourable diplomatic avenues were open for the American policy-makers in their future dealings with Japan.

The Hornbeck memo established foreign relations with Japan as the most important problem facing the United States in 1935. The paper was divided into eleven sections that discussed both what possible unilateral actions the US could take in the Far East and, the various multilateral American options in that region.[54] The idea of close cooperation with the Soviet Union was explored, with Hornbeck stating clearly that the best course would be a cautious economic cooperation with the Soviets rather than any closer political rapprochement between the US and USSR.[55] Such economic and commercial cooperation would keep the Japanese guessing as to the true nature of the Russo-American relationship.[56] Such cooperation would also help the Soviets continue their military program in the Far East: "Increments of economic strength by the Soviet Union will tend to divert the attention of Japan and to discourage reckless adventuring on Japan's part."[57] On the diplomatic front, however, caution had to be employed in order to avoid causing a panic in Japan, a panic brought on by the perception of a united Russo-American front:

> We should be cautious, however, about any movement toward the developing of political bonds or appearance of diplomatic rapprochement between ourselves and the Soviet Government. Developments of those types would give us nothing upon which we could definitely rely and would, on the other hand, increase suspicion among the Japanese of our intentions with regard to the Far East, thereby injecting a new cause of irritation into our relations with Japan...[58]

In April, this line of argument was repeated by Hornbeck to Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore, at which point Hornbeck summed up his attitude towards the Soviet Union: "We should therefore be friendly with but not unduly cordial toward the Soviet Union."[59] Hornbeck's need for caution, tinged with hopefulness for continued Russo-Japanese tension, was a sentiment shared by the War Department, who also considered a war between Japan and Russia to be inevitable and set to possibly begin some time in 1935.[60]

In February 1935, Ambassador Grew submitted a lengthy report to the State Department on the Soviet Union's military forces in the Far East and what the potential impact of that military build-up could be for the US.[61] His' opinion was that the Soviets had little to fear from the Japanese at present. Indeed, Grew believed that Russo-Japanese relations would "crystallize" along the lines established during the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1934, a sale which saw the Japanese buy the railway from the Russians in order that both countries could consolidate their strategic positions in Manchuria.[62] It was Grew's fear that the sale might inaugurate a cooperative, or at least less tumultuous, relationship between Russia and Japan could bode only ill for American interests. He believed that the Japanese fear of Russia was forcing Tokyo to consider expanding in central and southern China, an act that would be distinctly detrimental to US and British interests.[63] Grew also acknowledged that the Soviet-US honeymoon was over, leaving Japan willing either to oppose the Soviet Union or to try coming to terms with her on conflicting items.[64] Still, no matter how much some of the external issues surrounding Russo-Japanese relations changed, no matter what changes were made in the Japanese Government, Grew believed that the Japanese Army would continue to see the Soviets as their greatest menace and would take the first opportunity afforded to them to strike decisively against the Russians.[65] The Soviet presence in the Far East was certainly a twin-edged sword for the United States. Needing to protect their interests in China, trying to contain any further Japanese aggression, and, attempting to avoid the unattractive possibility of having a communist nation dominant in the region, American Far Eastern policy was indeed a delicate balancing act. That act involved playing on the Japanese fears of their traditional enemy, Russia, while at the same time trying to establish better relations with Japan itself.

Many of the American military and diplomatic appreciations of Russo-Japanese relations in the first half of 1936 commented on two themes: (1) the feeling in both Japan and Russia that Russian military forces were superior to the Japanese forces immediately facing them (meaning that if there was to be a war it would be a long and costly one, an action that Japan was loath to begin unless absolutely certain of victory), and (2) the assumption that Japan was perhaps going to have to try and come to an understanding with the Soviet Union, if for only a short time, because of Tokyo's military inferiority.[66] Johnson's position in China gave him a particularly good position from which to comment on the situation. Replying to queries from newspaper editor Roy Howard as to whether or not Russia was washed up in the Far East,[67] Johnson stated that

> There is no doubt in my mind that at the moment the Japanese are more afraid of Russia than they are of anyone else. It is the Russian situation which is moving Terauchi and his colleagues to recommend the placing of an increased financial burden upon the Japanese for the purpose of permitting them to buy a new defensive outfit. It has seemed to me that a clash between Russia and Japan is almost inevitable because not only do the material interests of the two countries clash but also the political ideas entertained in either country are at variance. I believe that Japan will precipitate such a clash because Japanese leadership is actively interested in Japan's expansion on to the continent. For the moment Russian leadership is not interested in Russian expansion anywhere, but Japanese leadership at present does not feel itself prepared for the clash. Russia is the only country in a position to strike Japan, but Russia is held back by the situation in Europe which has not been improved by the revolution now going on in Spain.[68]

Johnson believed that fear of the Russian bear was still potent, even though there had been some sign of improved relations between the two.

Corroborating evidence of Japan's new-found respect for Russia was provided by Norman H. Davis, after he had talks with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Shigeru Yoshida. Davis reported to Hornbeck that Yoshida had confirmed that the Japanese army had been taken by surprise by how well prepared Russia was militarily. The Ambassador intimated to Davis that the Japanese army's leadership were having to rethink their approach to the Soviets: should they make greater military preparations to combat the Soviets or should they try diplomacy? Above all, the Japanese hoped that the Russians would not join with anyone and, if it was at all possible, the Japanese desired to get an alignment with some other Power against Russia.[69] In talks with British Officials, Ray Atherton, the charge d'Affaires at the American Embassy in London, confirmed that the Soviets were more and more becoming an important part of Britain's balance of power policy in the Far East. He reported to the State Department that British foreign policy was now based on the idea of temporization while rearmament went on. The British had created a policy which "...circumstances have rendered appealing to Eden who is anxious to belie tory criticism of [his] youthful impetuousness and impractical idealism."[70] Atherton explained that Eden's attitude toward Japan was

> Since Japan's position and attitude renders Great Britain very vulnerable in the Far East, England will, through temporization, strive to prevent any issue from arising with Japan so long as the German situation remains unsolved. Indeed, there are influential elements here which continue to advocate the consideration of a policy of rapprochement with Japan. In answer to a question it was stated to me that the present surface friendliness between London and Moscow, born of mutual support for the League is viewed merely as a feature in the present British policy of temporization, since it tends to ease France's position in pursuit of her Danubian policy, where England has no commitments of her own outside the League, and also it has a restraining influence in Berlin and Tokyo.[71]

Any fears that the Americans might have had that the Japanese and Soviets were moving closer to each other were not confirmed by such insights. The final evidence that such an Soviet-Japanese rapprochement was unlikely came in November, when the German and Japanese Governments signed the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The Pact was an immediate source of tension in Russo-Japanese relations, a point not lost on the Americans. The Tokyo embassy reported back to the State Department that the signing of the pact was a severe set-back to the efforts of the Japanese Prime Minister, Koki Hirota, to improve Russo-Japanese relations. It had been the embassy's opinion that until then Hirota had indeed been having some success in creating an atmosphere favourable to better Russo-Japanese relations.[72] Now, however, the falling out of the two signalled a renewed effort on the part of Japan to create better Japanese-American relations. Grew's analysis was that "...there is very good reason to feel that the Japanese Government values American friendship, especially in view of Japan's increasing difficulties with other nations, and will not purposely alienate the United States unless situations arise where Japan considers her own national interests to be acutely involved."[73] In addition, Grew pointed out the increased pressure that was being brought to bear on the Japanese by their fear of a combined Anglo-Soviet front in the Far East.[74] The shift in Russo-Japanese relations, according to Grew, ensured that

> At any rate, the die is now cast and it is obvious that Japan's relations with Soviet Russia have suffered a rude setback which is not likely to be overcome in the near future. Moreover we may be sure that the Soviet Government will continue to act on the principle that the only language understood by the Japanese is force, and that when struck whether by a minor frontier incursion or by some broader form of aggression, the wisest policy to follow is promptly to strike back with double the force.[75]

Nelson Johnson agreed with Grew's assessment of the situation, believed that the Japanese military had acted stupidly, and, felt that Japan had now ensured continued animosity from the Soviets.[76] That animosity was intensified by the start of the undeclared war between China and Japan in the summer of 1937. Faced with a lack of military resources in the region and having limited diplomatic leverage to employ against the Japanese, the United States scrambled to establish a strategy for dealing with the emergency in the Far East. One avenue of approach was to attempt to manipulate the Japanese fear of Russia, and in particular the fear that there might be grounds for a combined Soviet-American front. This diplomatic foray required the assistance of the USN.

Members of the American naval and maritime communities had observed the development of the Soviet naval forces in the Far East closely after 1933. In a well-publicized essay on America's naval policy in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling Jr. reflected on how navies, including the Soviet navy, might fight Japan in any Far Eastern conflict. His conclusion was that American naval weakness in the region meant that:

> The situation thus becomes one that our statesmen must solve. Reciprocal trade treaties and carefully fuiged friendly relations between Japan, Russia, and the United States under the circumstances will give us more lasting and better results than any amount of saber rattling and for the present it is along that line that our Far Eastern policy should lie.[77]

Captain Dudley Knox, noted American naval publicist and Navy Department booster, also called for the USN and the American public to recognize the worth of Russia for the protection of American interests in the Far East, particularly the Philippines. Knox made the connection between the Japanese fear of Russia and her reluctance to challenge the United States: for Japan to do so, he argued, would be to commit strategic suicide by courting a two-front conflict.[78] This slight, yet informed, interest shown by American navalists in the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet increased in 1936.

The signing of that Anglo-German naval agreement and the after-glow of the London Naval conference generated enough interest in the United States about naval matters that leading American newspapers, along with those groups which had a traditional interest in American naval affairs, began to consider some of the maritime strategic questions facing American Far Eastern policy, . The Baltimore Sun reported that the Soviet Union was determined to create an impenetrable wall of submarines to the North and South of Vladivostok. The aim of this deployment was to deter the Japanese from making an attack on the Soviet Pacific port and thusly occupy the Japanese fleet far from any important strategic areas.[79] In November the Washington Star reported that the Soviet Navy had made their Pacific bastion impregnable to Japanese attack through an extensive naval building program.[80] Soviet naval preparations hit closer to home in the United States in the spring of 1937, when reports emerged that the Soviet Union had approached the State Department with a request that the USSR be permitted to ask American shipbuilding companies to construct a 16-inch battleship for the Soviets.[81] In attempting to gain support for the project, the Soviet Ambassador, M. Alexander Antonovitch Troyanovsky, assured the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, that American support for the Soviets building a strong Pacific fleet would go a long way towards ensuring peace between Russia and Japan.[82] While the battleships and super-destroyers requested were never completed, the debate that surrounded the building of the "X" ships for the Soviets illustrated clearly the desire of the State Department and President Roosevelt to exploit the Russo-Japanese tensions.[83]

The Japanese attack on China in July 1937, created another situation where American reaction to Japanese aggression utilized the traditional Russo-Japanese friction. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral H.E. Yarnell, was scheduled to make a visit to Vladivostok in the flagship AUGUSTA during the summer of 1937.[84] The original plans for the visit had been designed to send the same force that went to Vladivostok on to Japan, in order not to raise any unnecessary Japanese suspicions.[85] Yarnell reported that the Japanese seemed overly interested in this trip, and wrote that "They feel no doubt that his visit which is the first that a U.S. Naval vessel has made for many years is a sure sign of more friendly relations between the United States and Soviet Russia."[86] Reports by American naval attache in Tokyo, Captain Harold Bemis, on Russo-Japanese relations confirmed Yarnell's latter observation. The Tokyo reports to the Office of Naval Intelligence revealed that

> There is no doubt that the adjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations is the most urgent issue facing Japanese diplomacy. That negotiations are resumed after being virtually abandoned with the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, shows a more conciliatory attitude. Japan is suspicious that the USSR has some underlying motive in its peaceful proposals to nullify the efficacy of the German-Japanese pact, Russia realizes that Japan has waited to long to be able to successfully attack the maritime provinces and having practically consolidated her position in the Far East is maneuvering to break the encircling ring of the anti-comintern signatories. If Russia proposes a non-aggression pact, Japan will have to show her hand in refusing.[87]

With the outbreak of the July crisis thinking on the proposed naval visit was reversed completely, and it was decided to exploit the tensions expressed in the naval attache's reports. Yarnell immediately informed

Johnson that he was willing to cancel the trip to Vladivostok and had informed the State and Navy Departments to that effect. Instead, at the direction of both the State and Navy departments, the Asiatic Fleet was ordered to visit the Soviet Union, but not Japan, in a deliberate attempt to stall further Japanese aggression by preying on their fears of a Russo-American front.[88] As a valuable strategic aside, Yarnell arrived in Vladivostok on July 28 and was able to get a first hand feel for the Soviet navy in the Far East. He was impressed by the Soviet forces in Vladivostok, reporting that

> ...the Russian Army in Siberia is undoubtedly well provided with tanks, artillery, and war munitions. The Russians place great reliance in their air force, and this is probable well justified. We saw a number of submarines in Vladivostok and they appeared to be well trained. The Russian seamen on these ships were a fine looking body of men. Just how many submarines the Russians have in the Far East is not known. They have at least thirty and may have many more. If they have any ability at all, and I think they have, it will render the problem of the Japanese far more difficult than at present were they have prefect freedom of the seas.[89]

Throughout the crisis, as they monitored and assessed the situation, both Yarnell and Johnson were constantly aware of the Soviet factor in the developing China crisis and the impact Soviet factors had on Japanese actions. Their observations were passed along all the way up to Roosevelt himself when warranted.

Johnson reported his views on Russia and its continuing role in the Far Eastern situation directly to the Secretary of State in February, 1938. He told Hull that he considered Russia the "Brer Fox" of the Far East:

> Japan is driving China into a chaos, which may be called communism, through the same door of misery through which Russia entered into that land of promise. Of course Communist Russia is interested in seeing China prolong this conflict. You know Uncle Remus' story of the "Tar Baby". China is the "Tar Baby", Japan is "Brer Rabbit", and Russia is "Brer Fox". And "Brer Fox ain't saying' nothin'" in this quarrel between "Brer Rabbit" and the "Tar Baby". Communist Russia is not going to assist China by coming in on China's side. Communist Russia expects to profit by the chaos that Japan is creating, and sees safety for itself in a Japan that is exhausting itself in China. Three or four years ago I had a talk with the Russian Ambassador which satisfied me that Russia expected sooner or later to fight Japan on the old battlefields of Manchuria, that she expected to win, and that she would not hand back to China any territory that she might occupy in the course of such a fight....If

> Japan does attack Russia, and there are plenty of people out here who believe that the Japanese military leaders are just crazy enough to try this, the first two weeks of the war will be the bloodiest and most terrible that the world has seen. Japan's bombing of Chinese cities far behind the lines has set the tune, and the Russians know that they must get there first or have the Japanese bombers all about them. There is little for Japan to destroy in Siberia, but Russian bombers can get at the very heart of Japan in no time, and Tokyo and Osaka will not be nice places to live in."[90]

Such a view was welcome in Washington. Hull was fearful of the effect in the Far East if Japan faced a Soviet Union that was only inward-looking.[91] That fear of an isolationist Soviet Union was shared by Hornbeck, Herbert Feis (the State Department's Economic Adviser), and Jay Pierrepont Moffat (Chief of the Division of European Affairs), all of whom hoped that the Russians would continue to act as the proverbial fly in the Japanese-Chinese soup.[92] The reports of American officials in Shanghai, in other Chinese centres and in Europe, noting the large amount of Soviet material that was flowing into China from the Soviet Union, supported Johnson's analysis and allayed any fears that the Soviets would withdraw from China.[93] Such reports were known not only to the Secretary of State, but also to President Roosevelt himself, who monitored closely the Far Eastern situation and the strategic position the of the Soviets in that region.[94] By early 1938, both the USN and State Department were informing the White House that expert opinion felt that Japan was not going to be able to consume China; that Russia was pleased with the weakening of Japan due to her operations in China; that, even though the purges had led to some doubts as to the effectiveness of the Soviet forces, Russia was still Japan's biggest fear and most formidable military foe: and that the danger of a possible conflict between them was still high, if not higher than before.[95] Clearly, the idea that American interests could be protected by continued Russo-Japanese tensions was now commonplace in the Roosevelt Administration. The monitoring of those tensions and the calculation of how they affected American Far Eastern policy would continue right up until the outbreak of war in Europe, in September 1939. Of course, what impact the USSR would have in the Far East depended on Soviet strength.

The US Army produced detailed American military estimates of the Soviet Union's military worth were produced in mid-1938.[96] Their findings noted that, while the Soviet military establishment was the largest in the world, it also had the largest geographic area to protect.[97] As for the Far Eastern forces

> In 1935 the Transbaikal Military district was formed from the eastern part of the Siberian Military District and the western part of the Special Far Eastern Army Region apparently another countermove to check the Japanese advance into Mongolia. The combined strength of the two districts is believed to be about: 4 corps headquarters, 15 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 7 air brigades, 2 seaplane brigades, 10 separate air groups, 3 medium field artillery regiments, coast and AA artillery units, and numerous engineer, technical, combat vehicle, OGPU and irregular units. Approximate strength: 200,000 infantry and cavalry, 150,000 other troops, 1,000 airplanes, 1,000 combat vehicles, 1,250 field guns.[98]

That land force was supported by the Pacific Fleet, which was composed of 12 obsolete STALIN class destroyers, 50 new submarines (of between 800 to 200 surface tons), and approximately 20 patrol and river vessels.[99] The intelligence report concluded that Soviet Russia was the strongest military power in the world, with some logistical, training and equipment problems, but, like the British assessments, the Americans doubted whether the Soviets could produce an effective offensive effort. The purges were not thought to have been very detrimental to that defensive power.[100] Strategically, and despite the fact that it was now faced with the possibility of a two-front war, the Soviet Union was now in a better position in the Far East than it had been in 1937 because Japan was in a weaker state after its Chinese adventure.[101]

The US Army was not the only American military institution that had made this type of strategic appreciation of the Russians in the Far East. American Far Eastern observers in the State Department and elsewhere concurred with much of what the intelligence report had to say, continuing to rank the Soviet Union as Japan's number one enemy in 1939.[102] By early in that year, Admiral Yarnell was one of the most informed sources of information on Soviet military and diplomatic capabilities for the American policy-makers. Tied into Nelson Johnson's organization in China, and with access to information provided by the other Powers' naval commanders in China, Yarnell had a very clear insight into how the Russian bear fit into the Far Eastern crisis. His views often percolated through the Navy Department and Leahy right to the President himself.[103] By February, it was Yarnell's opinion that, if there were a general war in Europe, the Japanese would make short work of American and European interests in the Far East. The only thing that would control them or give them pause was the Soviet Union and fears of how it would react to such Japanese actions.[104] Yarnell's belief was that the Soviet Union could not be conquered in the Far East, nor bought off, by the Japanese.[105] Similar observations and beliefs prevailed within the State Department's core of Far Eastern analysts.[106]

Joseph Grew counseled the State Department that now, perhaps more than ever, under Prime Minister Hiranuma, the Japanese were more likely to go to war with Russia.[107] The Ambassador's reasoning was that Hiranuma would have a difficult time from keeping the military hard-liners from launching a pre-emptive strike against Russia. The military leadership thought the Soviets had been weakened by the purges, said Grew, and thus were more likely to favour a quick strike. As well, the Japanese military were anxious to settle the Chinese matter and to do that they needed to eliminate Russian support to the Chinese. These factors had the potential to create a crisis in Russo-Japanese relations.[108] Further, talks between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were making the Japanese anxious lest they be faced by a Soviet-British combination.[109] While Eugene Dooman, the charges d'Affaries at the American embassy in Tokyo, ventured to suggest that such anxiety was good for US-Japanese relations, the destabilizing influences were judged to be greater as such Japanese fears could result in a general Far Eastern war breaking-out.[110] Working closely together, Dooman and the British Ambassador, Sir R. Craigie, came to the conclusion that the Japanese fear of the Soviet Union's military presence in the Far East, combined with the possibility that the Russians might be allied with the British and French, was forcing the Japanese closer to the German-Italian Axis.[111] While it was not clear whether a war in the Far East was imminent, or even who the main characters in such a conflict would be, both the British and American views held that the Soviets would continued to be at the center of things for some time to come.[112] However, with the possibility of a European war looming, the American Far Eastern policy-makers had to evaluate whether the Japanese would ever be able to work with the Soviets, or whether the Soviets would be a perpetual loose-cannon in the Japanese strategic plans for the Far East.[113]

On September 12, 1939, Dooman addressed the problem fully in a concise memo for Hull. Dooman advocated that

> The considerations which force on me the belief that Japan would not entertain in the present circumstances a proposal for a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union prevail over the reasons which might be brought forward to support a contrary view. There will immediately occur to mind the basic conflict between the interests of Japan and Russia in the Far EAst, especially in China, the irreconcilability of militant bolshevism with Japanese imperialism, the paradox in the Japanese insistence on the one hand on maintaining troops in Manchuria in violation of the Portsmouth Treaty and claiming on the other hand fishing rights in Soviet waters and so on. But a more important consideration than all these is the fact that the Soviet Union has, like Germany, given evidence of the ephemeral character of any undertaking given by a nation which is ruled by a dictator. The one great advantage which a non-aggression pact with Russia could be expected to bring would be the relaxation of Russian pressure along the Manchurian border, thus enabling Japan to give greater attention than hitherto to her conflict with China. It is I think unlikely that, if the suggested treaty were concluded, Japan would have sufficient confidence in Soviet good faith to divert to China the substantial forces now being maintained in Manchuria to offset Soviet pressure.[114]

Two months later, as FDR pondered the strategic balance of a world now at war, Grew used Dooman's report as his official appreciation of the situation in the Far East and asked President Roosevelt to keep it in mind during his strategic deliberations.[115] The State Department concurred with both Grew and Dooman, also arguing that the differences between Japan and the Soviet Union were too fundamental to ever permit a comprehensive rapprochement.[116] Furthermore, the State Department was convinced that the Japanese Government recognized the strategic role the Russians played in the British and American attempts to isolate Japan. The Department contended, therefore, that the Japanese were attempting to obtain concessions from the Western powers by threatening to effect a rapprochement with Russia and thereby putting American and British Far Eastern interests in jeopardy. The State Department recommendation to Great Britain and its own Government was

> ... we should not compromise in our principles or surrender any of our material interests in an attempt to dissuade Japan from reaching an accord with the Soviet Union. Japan is employing the idea of such an accord as a threat to wrest from the democracies concessions such as those outlined above. The fact that Japan is giving so much publicity to the question of the accord indicates that she is seriously feeling the effects of her present situation and is seriously perturbed. A yielding to Japan at the present time would render illusory the hope that the course of events would lead to a result which we have striven to bring about, namely, a realization on the part of Japan that she cannot with impunity disregard treaties and international law. Futhermore, if Japan is actually intending to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it means that control of the Government is in the hands of extremists. In such circumstance it could reasonably be expected that an accord effected by the Government of the Soviet Union on the one hand and Japanese extremists on the other could endure only for a short period of time.[117]

This attitude of wringing as much respect from the Japanese using her fear of encirclement and Soviet Russia was also the one being proposed by the Naval Attache in Tokyo to the USN.[118] By the end of 1939, the Soviet loose-cannon clearly still was a vital factor in any American Far Eastern policy attempting to check further Japanese aggression. The United States believed that as long as the Japanese feared the Soviet bear, and feared that the bear might someday find allies, the Japanese would have to move cautiously in their attempts to expand in the Far East.

* * * * *

Neither the United States nor Great Britain wished to see Japan crushed in a war with the Soviet Union. The desire of these countries to see the military strength of the Russian bear control, drain and deter Japanese aggression was derived from their imperative to see the Far East, and particularly China, remain free of Communist control.[119] And therein lay the dilemma for American and British foreign policy-makers. How could the Japanese be utilized in the fight against the spread of Communism and at the same time be deterred from dominating China? Which was the greater threat: Communism or Japanese militarism and aggression? Such complex questions could not be answered by the State Department or Foreign Office with great confidence or surety. Indeed, while both American and British policy-makers recognized the similarities and variances of each other's views of the Soviet Union in the Far East, there was no conscious attempt on the part of those nations to coordinate their efforts towards the Soviets. The problem was made even more difficult by the dual position the Soviet Union held in the global balance of power: for Moscow was a counter-weight to both Germany and Japan. This particularly affected the British, who often could find a useful role for Russia in the Far East, only to realize that it would serve to complicate or endanger the strategic situation in the other. Russo-Japanese tensions and problems were merely something US and British strategic policy-makers could exploit whenever events allowed them to do so.

Furthermore, for both western nations their policy towards the Soviet Union had to be a clandestine one, for neither government could act openly towards the Soviets. In the United States and Britain both, there was a likelihood of a public backlash from the electorates if there was a thought that either was practicing old-fashioned, pre-World War One balance of power diplomacy. Equally, there would be a strong reaction in these countries against open cooperation with the Communists. Therefore, the Americans and British instead utilized the Soviets in their relations with Japan like a bogey-man; waiting until the Japanese were isolated, needful or vulnerable and then preying on the historic Japanese fear of finding themselves alone, facing a strong Soviet Russia accompanied by a strong naval ally. This approach was an informal, shadowy and uncertain policy, but one which offered some hope of success, in a period when both the United States and Great Britain were militarily weak in the Far East. This common approach to dealing with the Japanese lent itself well to the informal, parallel style of Anglo-American Far Eastern relations in the period from 1933 to 1939.

Such an approach had a strong strategic advantage for both Britain and the United States. As long as China and Russia were strategic threats to Japan, the latter would spend valuable military resources and money preparing to meet those circumstances, instead of using them to build a bigger navy or to prepare for a southern advance. The efficacy of this approach was underlined by the fact that it lasted even past the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of war in Europe. Indeed, it was not until the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941 that Japan believed herself secure enough to initiate its southern advance. With the Soviet forces finally having to move from the East to meet the German advance in the West, the greatest threat to Japan's strategic position was eliminated. With China now subdued, France out of the war in Europe and Britain battling for her very existence, the opportunity to move south beckoned to Japan like a Siren's song. That need for the Japanese to await the moment when the Soviet Union's attention was distracted from the Far East confirmed how correct British and American interwar strategic foreign policy-makers were in their assessments of the worth of the bear in the Far Eastern balance of power.

ENDNOTES

1.Edward M. Bennett, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939, (Wilmington, 1990), p.xxii.

2.Johnson was the head of the State Department's Far Eastern Division from 1925 to 1929 He was then made US minister to Peiping. A close friend of Stanley Hornbeck (Johnson was in fact responsible for Hornbeck getting a job with the Far Eastern Division) and on very good terms with Joseph C. Grew, the US ambassador to Tokyo, Johnson's wise council and advice on Far Eastern matters, especially those related to China and Japan's intentions towards China, often filtered from his desk to that of the Secretary of State and even the President, through Hornbeck and later Maxwell Hamilton, who took over the Far Eastern Division when Hornbeck left that spot to become special advisor. See Dorthy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, (Cambridge, Mass, 1964), p.30; and Russell D Buhite, "The Open Door in Perspective: Stanley K. Hornbeck and American Far Eastern Policy," in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson eds., Makers of American Diplomacy, (New York, 1974), pp.431-458.

3.Wilson Brown Papers, Nimitz Library, USNA, Annapolis, Box 5, Diary entry, July 23, 1934.

4.Grew certainly was not impressed with the idea that Roosevelt's new political appointee to the Secretary of State's job might interfer with Far Eastern matters, commenting to Johnson that, "I hope very much, however, that we are going to be let alone because your work and mine are not the kind of jobs that can be handled by inexperienced "statesmen", no matter how deserving they may be." Nelson T. Johnson Papers, (hereafter NTJ papers) Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 19, folder A-G, letter from Grew to Johnson, Jan.4, 1933

5.NTJ papers, container 17, folder A-L, letter from Hornbeck to Grew, June 2, 1932. In the letter, Hornbeck told Grew how happy he was with the team he had in the Far East, namely Grew and Johnson. He discussed the nature of the Far Eastern division and its workings, and told Grew, "...in the Far Eastern field, we are exceptionally well circumstanced by virtue of the fact that at all of the most important points or offices are men in charge who have had special experience and a lot of it, together with the additional fact that the members of this group, by and large, are to an unusual degree personally acquainted and familiar with each other's psychology, political outlook and thought and methods."

6.NTJ papers, container 17, folder A-L, letter from Johnson to Dr. G.H. Blakeslee (Clark University), Feb.8, 1932.

7.NTJ papers, container 17, folder A-L, letter from Johnson to Kellogg, Jan.12, 1932.

8.NTJ papers, container 17, folder A-L, confidential letter from Johnson to Hornbeck, Sept.13, 1932.

9.Ibid.

10.Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, (hereafter SKH Papers) Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Box 453, memo "Conflict of British Interests and Policies in the Far East. Russia, India and Communism. The Empire and the United States in the Pacific", Feb.17, 1932.

11.On the centrality of Hornbeck in the formulation of American Far Eastern policy, see Richard D. Burns, "Stanley K. Hornbeck: The Diplomacy of the Open Door", in Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennett eds., *Diplomats in Crisis*, (Santa Barbara, 1974), pp.90-117; Russell D. Buhite, "The Open Door in Perspective: Stanley K. Hornbeck and American Far Eastern Policy", in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson eds., *Makers of American Diplomacy*, (New York, 1974), pp.431-458; James C. Thomson Jr., "The Role of the Department of State", in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., *Pearl Harbor as History*, (New York, 1973), pp.81-106; Kenneth G. McCarty, "Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Far East, 1931-1941", Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1970; Shizhang Hu, *Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 1919-1937*, (Westport, 1995).

12.SKH Papers, Box 453, memo "Europe and the Far East. Europe, Russia, Great Britain and the United States. Germany, Italy and France. The League of Nations in Europe and in the Far East", Feb.19, 1932.

13.NTJ Papers, container 21, folder O-Z, memo from Johnson to Hull, June 12, 1933; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (hereafter FRUS), vol.III, "The Far East", 1933, pp.360-362.

14.*Ibid*.

15.*FRUS*, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Secretary of State, Mar. 9, 1933, p.228.

16.*FRUS*, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Sept.29, 1933, pp.412-416.

17.*Ibid*.

18.*FRUS*, vol.III, letter from Grew to Under-Secretary of State, William Phillips,Oct.6, 1933 p.421-424; *Ibid*, letter from Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Maxwell Hamilton, to Hornbeck, Oct.6, 1933, pp.424-427. Hamilton had just returned from being on special assignment in the Far East.

19.Hull MSS (hereafter Hull Papers), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 35, memo from Hornbeck to Hull, Oct.9, 1933.

20.Hu, *Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy*, p.175.

21.Bingham Diary, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., entry for Dec.11, 1933.

22.Franklin D. Roosevelt, President's Secretary's File (hereafter FDR-PSF), Franklin E. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, Japan, 1933-34, "Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations Pertinent Factors in Soviet-Japanese Situation", Jan.31, 1934.

23.*Ibid*.

24.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1933-34, Secret letter and memo from Standley to Bullitt, Feb.3, 1934.

25.*Ibid*.

26.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1933-34, memo "Russo-Japanese Conflict, Problem: What Should be the Attitude and Course of Action of the United States", Feb.2, 1934.

27.*Ibid*.

28.Ibid. See also, FRUS, vol.III, "Far East", memo by Hornbeck, "Our Diplomatic Position, as of Today, in the Far East, with Special Reference to Naval Conference and Need for Naval Construction", May 24, 1934, pp.189-193.

29.NTJ Papers, container 23, folder G-M, letter from Johnson to Roy Howard of Scripps-Howard Newspapers, Jan.13, 1934.

30.Ibid.

31.NTJ Papers, container 23, folder G-M, letter from Johnson to Hornbeck, Aug.23, 1934.

32.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Feb.8, 1934, p.32-36.

33.Ibid.

34.Ibid.

35.Ibid. This Feb.8 despatch was sent by the State Department to Ambassador Bullitt for his opinion. He agreed with Grew's assessment of the situation, both militarily and politically. Bullitt thought that while the honeymoon with the United States and the Soviet Union was over, the Soviets were mindful of the restraining influence of US recognition on Japan, and believed that until their military preparations in the Far East were complete, they would not wantonly strain US-USSR relations for fear of provoking a Japanese attack. FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Bullitt to Grew, April 16, 1934, pp.109-112.

36.Ibid. FRUS, vol.III, despatch and enclosure from Grew to Hull, March 8, 1934, p.66-72. The Soviet Ambassador, Youreneff, had accused the British of trying to instigate a war between the Soviet Union and Japan, in order to protect their own interests in the Far East. The Ambassador also tried frequently to influence Grew into believing that the British were extremely pro-Japanese and willing to sell-out anyone else in order to protect their own interests.

37.Hull Papers, Container 37, paper "The Far East and the World Peace Machinery", sent to Hull by Dr. Quincy Wright, University of Chicago, Illinois, July 14, 1934.

38.Ibid.

39.Ibid.

40.NTJ Papers, container 23, folder G-M, letter from Johnson to Hornbeck, Aug.23, 1934 and container 26, folder -K, letter from Hornbeck to Johnson, Jan.17, 1935.

41.CSDCF, 741.61/427, telegram from Bullitt to Hull, July 27, 1934.

42.CSDCF, 741.61/428, telegram from Bullitt to Hull, July 30, 1934.

43.CSDCF, 741.61/432, telegram from Bullitt to Hull, Sept.24, 1934.

44.CSDCF, 741.61/432, note and enclosure from William Phillips to Edwin L. Neville, (Charge d'Affaires, Tokyo), Willys Peck (American Consul General, Nanking), and Nelson T. Johnson, all Oct.8, 1934.

45.FO 371/18177/F6853/316/23, letter from Drummond (British Ambassador in Rome) to Sir Victor Wellesley, Nov.8, 1934.

46.FO 371/18177/F5809/316/23, FO memo entitled, "Attitude of United States to an eventual Soviet-Japanese war", Sept.17, 1934; FO 371/18177/F7517/316/23, letter from Rear Admiral G.C. Dickens, Head of Department of Naval Intelligence, to Orde, Dec.20, 1934. See also, George A. Lensen, The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises, 1924-1935, (Tallahassee, 1974), p.444.

47.R. Walton Moore Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, Box 3, letter from Bullitt to Moore, April 23/34. At the same time Bullitt was reporting directly to FDR that the honeymoon with Russia was over due to the Russian belief that Japan was becoming less of a threat: "The Russians are convinced that Japan will not attack this spring or summer and, as they no longer feel that they need our immediate help, their underlying hostility to all capitalist countries now shows through the veneer of the intimate friendship. We shall have to deal with them according to Claudel's formula of the donkey, the carrot, and the club." FDR-PSF, Confidential Files, Box 50, Folder- Russia, William C. Bullitt, 1933-36, personal and confidential letter from Bullitt to FDR, April 13, 1934.

48.Ibid. See also, FDR-PSF files, Confidential Files, Box 49, Folder - Diplomatic Correspondence, Russia, 1934, despatch from Bullitt to Hull, "Personal Observations of Ambassador William C. Bullitt on Conditions in the Soviet Union", Oct.2, 1934.

49.The Soviets were not above trying to get the United States to provide them with information about possible British or Japanese intentions. In a private luncheon at the Soviet Embassy in Nanking, on August 31, 1934, the Soviet Ambassador, Bogomoloff, pumped the American Consul General from Shanghai, Clarence E. Gauss, for information as to why the Japanese had not accepted Soviet terms for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Bogomoloff blamed the British for this, telling Gauss that John Simon and other Conservatives were desirous of the Japanese expanding in Northern China at Russia's expense. This fondness for Japan, coupled with such encouraging gestures to the Japanese as the British Industrial Mission, all served to encourage the Japanese into thinking some agreement could be reached with the British and therefore into believing that a harder line could be taken with the Soviets. Gauss was asked if he knew of any secret agreement between the Japanese and British. Clearly the Soviets thought highly of the Americans' access to information from the British and Japanese and hoped that in light of the new spirit of cooperation that existed between the US and USSR, they could gain some insights from Washington. CSDCF, 741.61/41, memorandum of conversation from Johnson to Hull, Sept.7, 1934.

50.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1935, Jan.3, 1935; FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", Hornbeck memo, Jan.3, 1935, pp.829-837.

51.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1935, note from Hull with memo enclosed, Jan.22 1935,; FRUS, vol.III, "Far East", despatch from Grew to Hull, Dec.27, 1934, pp.821-829.

52.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1935, note from Hull to FDR with memo enclosed, Jan.22 1935; FRUS, vol.III, 1935, pp.842-43.

53.FRUS, vol III, Grew memo, Dec.27, 1934, pp.821-829.

54.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1935, Jan.3, 1935; FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", Jan.3, 1935, pp.829-837.

55.Ibid, FRUS, p.836.

56.For a very able and more specific look at US-USSR trade relations from 1933 to 1939, see Andrew J. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks: The politics of East-West trade, 1920-39, (Manchester, 1992), pp.151-184.

57.FRUS, vol.III, Hornbeck memo, Jan.3, 1935, pp.829-837.

58.Ibid.

59.Moore Papers, memo from Hornbeck to Moore, "Foreign Policy of the United States and Analysis, with Suggestions for Procedure," Apr.17, 1935. This was part of a massive comprehensive assessment of America's foreign policy and how it might eventually evolve. Only the Far Eastern section was present, although there were to be sections from the Latin American, Western Europe, Near East, Mexico, Eastern Europe, Economic and Treaty departments. It is unclear if any of these other sections were ever completed.

60.FRUS, vol.III, memo from War Dept. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 to Hornbeck, Jan.7, 1935, p.2-4.

61.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Feb.8, 1935, p.49-54.

62.Ibid. On the sale of the CER see Lensen, The Damned Inheritance, pp.330-333.

63.FRUS, p.49-54.

64.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Apr.5, 1935, p.106-111.

65.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, May 31, 1935, p.193-196.

66.FRUS, vol.IV, "The Far East", memo by Under Secretary of State, William Phillips, of meeting with Russian Ambassador to Washington, A.A. Troyanovsky, Feb.7, 1936, pp.40-41; ibid, telegram from Charge in Moscow, (Henderson) to Hull, Feb.13, 1936, pp.56-57; ibid, despatch from Bullitt to Hull, March 18, 1936, pp.78-79; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, March 18, 1936, pp.80-83; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, May 29, 1936, pp.177-180.

67.NTJ Papers, container 29, folder F-L, letter from Howard to Johnson, July 17, 1936.

68.Ibid, letter from Johnson to Howard, Aug.15, 1936.

69.Norman Davis Papers, (hereafter Davis Papers), Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Container 27, letter from Davis to Hornbeck, June 17, 1936.

70.CSDCF, 741.65/210, telegram from Atherton to Hull, Feb.13, 1936.

71.Ibid.

72.FRUS, vol.IV, "The Far East", despatch from Erle R. Dickover (First secretary in Tokyo) to Hull, Nov.26, 1936, p.394-396; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, Dec.16, 1936, p.426-429; NTJ Papers, container 31, folder A-K, letter from Grew to Johnson, May 17, 1937.

73.FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", despatch from Grew to Hull, Jan.1, 1937, p.1-11.

74.Ibid.

75.Ibid.

76.NTJ Papers, container 31, folder A-K, letter from Johnson to Grew, June 4, 1937.

77.Rear Admiral Yates Stirling Jr., "Naval Preparedness in the Pacific Area," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP), May, 1934, pp.601-608, p.608. On Russo-Japanese tensions see Stirling, "Sea Power", USNIP, June, 1935, pp.767-780, p.779.

78.Captain Dudley W. Knox, "The Japanese Situation", USNIP, September, 1935, pp.1277-1280, p.1278. For more on Knox, see Greg Kennedy, "Depression and Security: Aspects Influencing the United States Navy during the Hoover Administration", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.6, 1995, pp.342-372.

79.Reprinted in USNIP, April, 1936, p.593.

80.Reprinted in USNIP, Jan., 1937, p.130. See also, USNIP, Sept., 1937, p.1350.

81.USNIP, June, 1937, p.898. For the full story of this Russo-American adventure, see Malcolm Muir Jr., "American Warship Construction for Stalin's Navy Prior to World War II: A Study in Paralysis of Policy", Diplomatic History, vol.5, 1981, pp.337-351.

82.William D. Leahy Diary, (hereafter Leahy Diary), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., entry for May 3, 1937.

83.Muir, pp.348-349. See also, Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board of the U.S. navy, 1900-1950, (Hereafter Proceedings and Hearings), National Archives, Washington, D.C., Hearing of the General Board vols. 1-2, 1939, "Battleship "X" ", Dec.5, 1939; and ibid, "Destroyer to Accompany Ship "X" ", Dec.11, 1939; Official Files of President Roosevelt (hereafter FDR-OF) FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York, Navy Dept., letter from Gibbs and Cox INC. to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Charles Edison, Sept.7, 1937; Ibid, letter from Charles W. Yost, Office of Arms and Munitions Control, State Dept. to Carp Export and Import Corporation, Feb.27, 1937.

Anglo-American naval discussions surrounding how to respond to Japanese escalations in its capital ship building program in May and June of 1938 were affected by the American agreement to build such vessels. In August, 1938, a Mr. Pell, who had been part of the US State Department's naval affairs team, told A. Holman, a senior official in the FO's American Department, that the reason the American Government had hesitated in giving its support to Britain for new upper limits for capital ship construction was related to the US Government agreeing to build these ships for the Soviet Union. Pell revealed that the USN had agreed to build a 62,000 ton aircraft-carrying ship for the Soviets. The plans had been prepared, but the President had not been aware of the obligations of the United States under the 1935-36 London Naval Treaty. This embarrassing situation had created a delay while the State Department squared away an explanation for the Soviets. While not a serious matter, the incident revealed how the Soviet naval question was interwoven into the fabric of Anglo-American Far Eastern policy. See FO 371/21523/A6523/55/45, record of conversation, Aug.18, 1938.

84.Record Group (RG) 38, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Division of Naval Intelligence, General Correspondence, 1929-1942 (hereafter CNO-DNI General Corr. 1929-42), National Archives, Washington D.C., Box 117, Folder A4-5/FF6, restricted report from Yarnell to CNO, July 1, 1937.

85.Admiral Harry E. Yarnell Papers (hereafter Yarnell MSS), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 3, Folder - Leahy 17-26, letter from Leahy to Yarnell, June 30, 1937; NTJ Papers, Container 32, folder L-Y, letter from Yarnell to Johnson, July 7, 1937.

86.Ibid.

87.Selected Naval Attache Reports Relating to the World Crisis, 1937-1943, "Probability of an Outbreak of War", (hereafter US Naval Attache, Outbreak), on microfilm, National Archive, Washington D.C., Tokyo Naval Attache report no.125, May 1, 1937.

88.NTJ Papers, container 33, folder U-Z, letter from Yarnell to Johnson, July 21, 1937. Yarnell's observations of the Russians and his trip to Vladivostok were sent along by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Leahy, to President Roosevelt for his information. See FDR-OF, Navy Dept., letter from Leahy to FDR, August 23, 1937, and enclosure, private letter from Yarnell to Leahy, August 1, 1937. In that August 1 letter, Yarnell revealed that he respected the Soviet naval capability, but, as far as the Communist system itself went, "It is, of course, not possible to generalize about Russia from what is seen of this one city. However, I can not but believe that while general conditions here are worse than they are in other sections of Russia the general appearance of the people and the attitude of the officials is perhaps typical, and if it is, God save us from communism. In order to make a success of this form of government the following requisites seem to be necessary: first, kill off all the intelligentsia of the country; second, destroy all churches and deny all religion; third, discourage family life; fourth, have one half the people watch the other half."

89.NTJ Papers, container 35, folder U-Y, letter from Yarnell to Johnson, Feb.13, 1938. For a study of the Russian Navy's attitude and capability in the Far East during the 1930s see, Jurgen Rohwer and Mikhail Monakov, "The Soviet Union's Ocean-Going Fleet, 1935-1956," The International History Review, vol.18, 1996, pp.837-868.

90.Hull Papers, Container 42, letter from Nelson T. Johnson to Hull, Feb.17, 1938.

91.Henry L. Stimson Diary, (hereafter Stimson Diary), Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, entry for March 24/38.

92.Ibid.

93.FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", telegram from Bullitt (Ambassador to France) to Hull, Jan.13, 1938, p.19; telegram from charge d'Affaires in France (Wilson) to Hull, Apr.5, 1938, p.135; Bullitt was given information on Russian supplies to China from Sun Yat-Sen's son Sun Fo, as well as intelligence on Soviet Far Eastern policy and attitudes toward Japan, telegram from Bullitt to Hull, May 9, 1938, p.164; see also the entire section on "Developments with respect to Border Hostilities between Japanese and Soviet Troops", much of which shows the military superiority of the Russians in the defence and the amount of worry, tension and uncertainty, as well as a drain on military manpower and resources, that the Soviet Union caused for the Japanese plans for the Far East; memo prepared by Department of Far Eastern Affairs, April 20, 1938, p.595.

94.Hull Papers, Container 42, Report from A. Bland Calder, Assistant commercial attache at Shanghai, "The Flow of Arms into China", March 2, 1938. This report was sent along by Hull to FDR for his personal information. The report discussed the flow of arms to China from French Indo-China and Hong Kong, with the last part of the report dealing with the vast bulk of war material, especially aircraft, that were coming into China from Russia: "At Hankow Mr. Calder was informed that 250 Soviet bombing and pursuit planes, together with the necessary personnel, had recently arrived from Russia. It was also reported that 400 Soviet Ford trucks were engaged in bringing military supplies over the route between the Turk-Sib Railway and Sian. The Nanchang Airplane Factory, from which the Italian personnel has been withdrawn, is now to be operated by Russians."

95.RG 38, CNO-DNI General Corr., Box 117, Folder A4-5/FF6, restricted report from Yarnell to CNO, Jan.16, 1938; ibid, restricted report from Yarnell to CNO, March 16, 1938; NTJ Papers, container 34, folder H-I, letter from Johnson to Hull, May 27, 1938; ibid, container 35, folder U-Y, letter from Yarnell to Johnson, Jan.3, 1938; ibid, container 35, folder U-Y, letter from Yarnell to Johnson, Feb.13, 1938; Morley, Deterrent Diplomacy, p.133.

96.Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Predecessor Organizations, Series III: Miscellaneous Subject File, 1917-1947, (hereafter Strategic Plans Div.) on microfilm, National Archive, Washington D.C., Military Intelligence Division (Army) Studies, OP-12-War Plans, confidential G-2, "Russian Combat Estimate", July 1, 1938.

97.Ibid.

98.Ibid.

99.Ibid.

100.The effect of the purges on the Soviet Navy in the Far East was debated in articles reprinted from foreign sources in the USNIP; See sections on the USSR in the November 1938, March 1939 and July 1939 volumes of USNIP.

101.Ibid.

102.See note 66.

103.Yarnell Papers, Container 2, Folder, General June 5 - July 1, 1938, letter from retired Admiral A. St. Clair Smith to Yarnell, May 26, 1938; ibid, Container 3, Folder, General June 25 - July 12, 1939, letter from Leahy to Yarnell, May 31, 1939; RG 38, CNO-DNI General Corr., Box 117, Folder A4-5/FF6, Restricted Report, from C-in-C, Asiatic Fleet to CNO, Jan.2, 1939; Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals, (New York, 1963), pp.151-177; John Major, "The Navy Plans for War, 1937-1941," in Kenneth J. Hagan ed., In Peace and War, (Westport 1984), pp.237-262, p.238; Robert G. Albion (edited by Rowena Reed) Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947, (Annapolis, 1980), pp.344-346.

104.Yarnell Papers, Container 3, Folder, General, letter from Yarnell to Admiral Marquart (at the Naval Examining Board), Feb.189, 1939.

105.Yarnell's views on the matter were relayed to the CNO and other USN policy-making bodies and were supported by the Naval Attache in Tokyo, see, Naval Attache, Tokyo, "Outbreak", Report no.11, Jan.17, 1939.

106.Observations by Yarnell and Nelson Johnson had convinced the USN to accept the Russian factor as being a vital element of the Far Eastern balance of power to such an extent that, during a lecture on "The Present Naval Policy and its support of our National Policy", given to 35 US Naval Reserve and Army Officers in Baltimore, Commander Leland P. Lovetter, the USN officer in charge of the public relations branch of the Navy Department in Washington, told his audience that "Russia was also a sealed book. The Japanese were evidently apprehensive of a move by Russia as they had moved 350,000 of their best troops to the Russian Manchuko border. As far as the American Administration was concerned the rule was to keep on as good terms as possible with the Russian Government and its representatives." The American Navy's attitude towards the Russians and their usefulness in the Far East was also carefully monitored by the British. See FO 371/22829/A2122/1292/45, confidential report from Hoyer Millar (HM Consul in Baltimore) to J. Balfour (Head of American Department), Mar.3, 1939.

107.FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", despatch from Grew to Hull, Jan.13, 1939, p.1.

108.Ibid.

109.FRUS, vol.III, extract from despatch from Dooman (Charge in Tokyo) to Hull, June 7, 1939, p.43.

110.Ibid; FRUS vol.III, telegram from Dooman to Hull, Aug.8, 1939, p.48. For American advances to the Soviets about possible combination of Powers in the Far East see Bennett, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory, p.3.

111.For aspects of that relationship see: Jacob Kavalio, "Japan's Perception of Stalinist Foreign Policy in the Early 1930s", Journal of Contemporary History, vol.19, 1984, pp.315-335; Brian Bridges, "Yoshizawa Kenkichi and the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression Pact Proposal", Modern Asian Studies, vol.14, 1980, pp.111-127.

112.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Dooman to Hull, Aug.8, 1939, p.48. See also Naval Attache Tokyo, "Outbreak", Report no.163, July 19, 1939; David Dilks ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945, (London, 1971), pp.150-155, 180-189.

113.See Naval Attache Tokyo, "Outbreak", Report no.81, April 12, 1939.

114.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Dooman to Hull, Sept.12, 1939, p.64. For the Japanese fear of a Anglo-Soviet alliance see CSDCF, 741.61/655, confidential telegram from Dooman to Hull, May 31, 1939.

115.FDR-PSF, Japan, 1939-40, letter from Grew to FDR, Nov.6, 1939, in which he told FDR that as far as he was concerned, the Soviet position in the Far East was that "The USSR still appears to be helping Chiang Kai-Shek with supplies but it may be significant that Molotov in his recent speech did not mention China at all and made a point of flattering Japan....There is much speculation as to whether the USSR and Japan are going to get together with a view to dividing up China between them. The German Embassy is working hard to bring the two countries together. But I can't for the life of me see any possibility of a real Soviet-Japanese rapprochement because far too many fundamental differences exist...."

116.FRUS, vol.III, undated (sometime late November, 1939) memo by the State Department, p.92.

117.Ibid.

118.Naval Attache Tokyo, "Outbreak", Report no.184, August 24, 1939.

119.CAB 23/96, Cabinet 57(38), Nov.30, 1938.

CHAPTER FIVE

CREATING TIES THAT BIND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN TRUST AND THE 1935 LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

Part one

> "Personal contact between the leading statesmen of different countries enables friendships to be formed, more intimate relations and better understandings to be established. These in turn create confidence and confidence makes for co-operation." Victor Wellesley[1]

Nations that do not trust one another are not likely to be able to cooperate effectively. Continued failures to find common ground or mutually satisfactory solutions to international issues affecting Anglo-American relations threatened to create an attitude of suspicion and hostility early in Roosevelt's first term. Such was the attitude of policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic in 1934 regarding the strategically linked issues of naval arms limitation and security in the Far East. The fear and uncertainty over each other's foreign policy and maritime position regarding the Far East required elimination if Anglo-American relations were to continue to be amicable.[2] By the end of 1936, that suspicion and distrust would be replaced by a concerted effort on behalf of both parties to work more closely together on Far Eastern matters. This new-found sense of trust between the United States and Great Britain was forged in the discussions which surrounded the 1935 Naval Conference, which proved to be the final phase of the Washington Treaty system of 1921-22.

Prior to the 1935 Conference, American sensibilities towards the British in the Far East and the naval issue were tinged with a sense of irritation, reflecting the Administration's belief that Sir John Simon, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, had betrayed the Far Eastern policy of American secretary of state, Henry L. Stimson, during the Manchurian Crisis of 1932.[3] Rubbing salt in that old scar was the failure to achieve Anglo-American economic cooperation at the World Economic Conference in 1933, and, a continued suspicion that slippery John Simon and the British Government would try and put one over on America at the naval conference.[4] How the State Department regarded Simon in May 1933, is revealed in the diary of the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Jay Pierrepont Moffat:

> Anglo-American relations are growing visibly worse. Simon has been up to his old tricks of undoing all the progress that has been made blocking the Tariff Truce Agreement as well as conniving at the Government's attitude in (1) rushing through their trade agreements with the Argentine, Germany, etc., which are at utter variance with the spirit of the MacDonald talks, (2) increasing the British equalization fund, which is a transparent device to gamble with our currency for the greater advantage of English trade..., and (3) listening complacently to the British outcry against our payment in dollars of our internally issued Liberty Bonds when Great Britain did exactly the same thing and the British courts (not our own) had issued a decision that the gold clause did not mean payment in bullion. There is great discouragement in certain quarters here despite a stiff upper lip.[5]

There were other irritations. On the British side, the failed Economic Conference and the branding of Great Britain as a debtor nation over the war debts issue in the Johnson Act of January 11, 1934, had soured many in the policy-making elite who dealt with America.[6] Also, there were the mutual feelings of frustration in the Foreign Office, the State Department, and the Royal and United States Navies, over the failed attempt of the MacDonald Mission to the United States, in April 1933, to bring the two nations closer together on world security issues through the disarmament talks being held in Geneva.[7] Finally, the Admiralty and Foreign Office were unimpressed by the Roosevelt administration's designs for building a treaty-strength navy. John Simon in particular saw the American action as guaranteeing that Japan would not settle for anything less than naval parity with the United States and Great Britain. If this were the case, then the conference was sure to end in failure.[8] He and Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary (PUS), were anxious to start a public campaign in England denouncing the American naval increases as the first step in ensuring that it would not be the British Government that was blamed for any failure. Temporarily warned off such action by the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Ronald Lindsay, both men grudgingly agreed to await further developments before taking any further steps.[9]

Anti-American sentiment ran strongest in the British Treasury largely because of the many economic tensions between the two nations.[10] The Treasury mentality was best expressed by Sir Warren Fisher, the secretary to the Treasury, in the defence debates taking place in England in late 1933 and early 1934.[11] During the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) meetings, he opined that Britain's defence planning had to reflect that it was not a 'backboneless nation' required to bow down to the United States. Fisher also thought that the worst aspect of British defence deficiencies was Great Britain's entanglement with the Americans.[12] He believed that entanglement had prevented British diplomacy being able to make better Anglo-Japanese relations. In a paper prepared for the DRC, Fisher put forth the Treasury view as to how Great Britain should deal with the Americans in the naval talks scheduled for 1935:

> ...it is essential in my view to get clear of our "entangling" agreement with the USA who should be left to circle the globe with ships if they want, to gratify their vanity by singing "Rule Columbia, Columbia rules the waves," and to wait and see for how many years the politically all-powerful Middle West will continue to acquiesce in paying a fantastic bill related to not real requirement but primarily to indulge the braggadocio of Yahoodom.[13]

The Treasury's pro-Japanese attitude towards imperial defence questions in the Far East was also reflected in Fisher's strategic vision of the worth of the Anglo-American relationship in the Far East and his fear of German rearmament:

> The American interest in these naval pacts is, in my belief, to keep us on bad terms with the Japanese (and therefore potentially weaker and less able to take an independent line vis a vis the USA), and to limit their own expenditure against the bogy which their imaginings make of Japan. As the USA thinks of a first-class war in terms of Japan, she would of course like us involved on her side. (To get us in the meantime to pick the Asiatic chestnuts of the USA out of the fire is a useful preliminary)....If then we emancipate ourselves from thraldom to the USA (who as an institution - and indeed from Colonial days - never has been friendly to us and never will be) and thus free ourselves to establish durable relations with Japan, we can concentrate on the paramount danger at our very threshold. This of course is in the future; but its likelihood will in my opinion become a certainty unless the Germans have every reason to believe that, if and when it might suit them to force a war, they will come up against our maximum strength, undivided and undistracted by Far Eastern complications.[14]

This attitude towards the United States was unhelpful and meddlesome, and reflected the narrow continentalist views of a Treasury that had no grasp of the Imperial nature of the troubles facing British foreign and defence policy. It also served to complicate Foreign Office and State Department attempts to reach a mutual understanding on maritime and foreign policy questions concerning the Far East. It would, however, be overridden and discarded as British policy by the end of the naval talks, a process in which the Treasury played no significant role.[15]

Both the Royal Navy, under the leadership of Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, and the FO took a view opposite to Fisher's. Chatfield many times, stated clearly in the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and during DRC meetings of the need for the Royal Navy to maintain good relations with the United States, and, in particular with the United States Navy. Pushed by Japan in the Far East, with Singapore unfinished and Hong Kong largely undefended, the Royal Navy hoped ultimately for American maritime assistance in a war with Japan. Even if such assistance was not in the form of a formal naval alliance, there was the need for America to help enforce a blockade on Japan by being at least a neutral favourable to the British position. The DRC process could reach no solid conclusion, however, regarding Britain's future maritime power because it was the outcome of the 1935 Naval Conference (would Japan be given the same ratios as the United States and Great Britain?) that would decide ultimately the course of the Admiralty's rearmament programme.[16]

Until that disarmament process was either extended or eliminated, Chatfield and the RN could not safely plan the future development of Britain's fleet.[17] Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald lent his reduced but still-significant weight to the pro-American side. The secretary of the CID, Sir Maurice Hankey, warned Fisher that this was the case. Hankey told the Treasury official that the Foreign Office position was to continue to attempt to promote friendly relations with the United States and MacDonald had 'a very warm spot of the Americans generally' and for President Roosevelt in particular.[18] The FO's official view of how America fit into Great Britain's strategic balance of power in mid-1933 was that

> It must be the aim of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to continue the policy they have consistently followed with beneficial results during the last decade of promoting friendly relations with the United States of America. This policy has not entailed, and does not call for the sacrifice of any essential British interest. It does, however, demand the exercise of much patience, for progress must inevitably be slow. But if the United States Government and people can be persuaded that Great Britain is pursing a sane, constructive and progressive world policy, that, in a word, her attitude contrasts favourably with the mutual antagonisms, fears and suspicions of the continental Powers, it will be possible for this country virtually to ensure that the political and economic influence of the United States is utilised to the best effect, and incidentally to our advantage.[19]

Even Vansittart, who was often very skeptical of the strategic worth of the Americans, still preferred their strategic company to that of the Japanese, as evidenced in his statement during the DRC meetings that, "...no one realised more than he did the paramount necessity for better relations with Japan, especially during our period of weakness. We had, however, made much progress in Anglo-American relations of recent years and, while Anglo-American relations would always be disappointing, he hoped that the benefits of betterment would not all be thrown away in order to run after the Japanese."[20] But, Fisher's arguments had presented the issue clearly to the British foreign and defence policy-makers: because of strategic and maritime pressures in the Far East, Britain would have to choose between the United States and Japan at the upcoming naval conference.

Underlying the mutual feelings of distrust and frustration that existed between the US and Great Britain was a real desire to cooperate on naval limitation issues, as long as each nation could ensure its security and find favourable applause from their watchful publics and presses. It was during the preliminary talks and resulting negotiation of the Naval Conference that a lasting sense of trust regarding each nation's attitude towards Japan and the Far Eastern situation was established between the

British Foreign Office and the American State Department, as well their respective navies.[21] This confidence-building process was successful -- despite painful suspicions -- because of predominantly open and honest communication on both sides of the Atlantic, a mutual need to appear to be trying to limit naval arms (this for domestic consumption), and the desire to find some security against Japanese actions in the Far East.

The FO's early sensitivity to any perceived affronts by the United States was especially apparent in the actions and statements of Vansittart. The PUS was darkly skeptical of American actions in the period from 1933 to early 1936.[22] His attitude was one of severe reaction to any American slight against Great Britain, and, while he had not supported Fisher's anti-American sentiments during the DRC procedures with regard to defence matters, he had pointed out that, when preparations for the 1935 naval conference began, Fisher's points would then be appropriate.[23] Often he was filled with a distrust of, and a blinding, mean-spiritedness, combined with a sense of superiority towards those who held office, both politically and professionally, in the United States.[24] This belligerent, biased, at times irrational, and unprofessional attitude was the culmination of many years of experience, as head of the FO's American Department and as PUS, in attempting to create better Anglo-American relations in trying times.[25] While naturally loyal and devoted to the protection of Britain's imperial interests and the preservation of the Empire's position as a great world power, Vansittart's petulant attitude toward the United States often needed to be overridden or ignored by other members of the Foreign Office or such politicians as Prime Minister MacDonald during the naval conversations that took place between 1934 and 1935. Indeed, from the beginning of the process that would culminate in the 1936 London Naval Treaty being signed by Great Britain and the United States, Vansittart found himself at odds with many powerful and influential British policy-makers over how to deal with the Americans on the issue of naval disarmament.

In early January, 1934, shortly after the United States passed the Johnson Act, which prevented nations who had defaulted on World War I debts to America from borrowing in the United States, Vansittart vented his rage against what he saw as American duplicity. In discussions surrounding the advisability of allowing an American naval squadron to visit the Home Fleet, Vansittart revealed fully just how punitive he wished to be. Pent-up frustration with the Americans boiled forth, as he proposed to throw overboard attempts to come to some sort of understanding with the Americans on naval disarmament and instead begin the preparations for the 1935 naval conference by seeking an agreement with the Japanese:[26]

> The visit is definitely off, so far as I am concerned. In the last week alone the US have given an offensively hostile reception to our disarmament plan, and have ranked us as defaulters (according to the Times of yesterday). And this despite the President's assurance. The administration has switched and is now behind the Johnson Bill.... I will not here dilate on the recent record of the US toward the outside world, in which we are included, because I am too busy with other matters. I will only repeat my strengthened conviction that we have been too tender, not to say too subservient, with the US for a long time past. It is we who have made all the advances, and received nothing in return. It is still necessary, and I still desire as much as ever, that we should get on well with this untrustworthy race; we shall never get very far; they will always let us down; but I think our methods will obviously have to change, and we shall do no good until they realise that they must make at least some of the running. That will be particularly true of courtesies such as that here discussed. But I am now considering whether we should not go further. Mr.Craigie's idea of preparation for the Naval Conference of 1935 has been first to approach the USA. There was much to be said for this, but by no means everything....Lord Stanhope evidently considers that we should approach Japan independently. I wonder if he considers that we should approach Japan first. I should like to see him and Mr. Craigie at once about this. A change of tactics towards America is evidently desirable. This may conceivably be the moment for stimulating her by the change. It is also conceivable at least that to approach Japan first may, in this instance, be the right tactics anyhow. Japan is rather anxious to stand well with us just at present. It may be right to take advantage of this moment, and certainly by ourselves. The universally unpopular US would be a deadweight.... The Prime Minister was speaking to us a few days ago about the necessity of an early start of preparations for the Naval Conference. He evidently considered that the opening, indeed I think the opening stages, should be conducted with the USA. I do not feel so sure of that.[27]

On February 6, Vansittart met with the head of the Far Eastern Department, Charles Orde; the head of the American Department, Robert Craigie; and the parliamentary under secretary of state, Earl Stanhope, to consolidate his position before presenting it to the Admiralty and the Prime Minister as the first steps to take towards the 1935 conference.[28] Under Vansittart's guidance, the Foreign Office conclusions that emanated from this meeting were that: (1) it was best not to go to the Americans first and instead wait for them to come to the British; (2) no common front was to be established with the Americans against the Japanese, at least not one which the Japanese could detect. Such action would make the Japanese quite intractable and create the worst impression before the conference even got going. No joint Anglo-American approach to Japan would be made, but it was decided it would be useful to know the American position on quantitative limitation before the British approached the Japanese; (3) Great Britain should define her position and objectives for the conference, inform the US of them, note that they were going to talk to the Japanese Government in preparation for the Conference and enquire whether the US had anything to tell His Majesty's Government; (4) if the US made no response in a reasonable time then talks with Japan were to go ahead and; (5) this procedure was to be used if quantitative limitations were to be discussed first. If qualitative issues were to be raised before the quantitative, then it was thought to be desirable to contact the United States first.[29] This plan of attack reflected the influence of the FO official who would truly run the diplomatic side of the naval talks for the next two years: Robert Leslie Craigie.[30] Craigie was opposed to chasing too far after the Japanese at the expense of relations with America. The five initial steps were his way of creating a mechanism for thwarting Vansittart's desire to pursue the Japanese in order to punish the Americans. While no formal approach would be made to the Americans, the offer of inviting talks with His Majesty's Government (HMG) about the naval conference would be opening enough to ensure that discussions would take place with the Americans first. As well, the Prime Minster and the Admiralty, the institution that would have the last word on any formulae, timings or proposals concerning the final outcome of the naval talks, had something to say about the idea of not moving towards the US first.

Before Vansittart had promised Fisher the Foreign Office's closest cooperation in preparation for the naval talks, the FO and Admiralty had been in close contact on preparatory tactics and procedures. On January 19, Vansittart had written Chatfield telling him that the FO and Admiralty should cooperate in their historic manner and control the process. Most importantly, the PUS wanted to know how the First Sea Lord felt about the usefulness of early private and unofficial conversations with representatives of other naval powers.[31]

Accompanying Vansittart's questions to Chatfield was a Foreign Office memo, prepared by Craigie. It dealt with five main topics: the need for early preparatory work; the need to distinguish between the naval problems of the Disarmament Conference and those of the 1935 Conference; questions of policy development; procedure; and the position of the Dominions.[32] Craigie emphasised the difficult nature of the upcoming talks and the need for thorough, early preparatory planning and a decision as to the policy and strategy which would be used. He acknowledged the Admiralty's right to make definite proposals regarding that policy, but pointed out the need for the Admiralty to keep other questions in mind: how long should the treaty last; what were the minimum requirements in categories during that period; what reductions would be asked for in unit sizes; what are the relative strengths of the naval powers to be; and most importantly, what was the likely attitude of the principal naval powers to be in light of some of the answers to the above.[33]

On the key issue of the American attitude towards the talks, Craigie felt that the US could be brought into an agreement on the basis of a 'live and let live' approach. He did not want to pressure the Americans into decreasing the size of their ships to the point of challenging the tactical and strategic considerations that underpinned the American position with regard to the size of their ships. Similarly, then, he thought, the US would not press Britain to reduce the number of units below that considered essential for its absolute needs. This belief was especially important for the Royal Navy in its quest to increase its cruiser numbers to an overall strength of seventy.[34] As to capital ships, Craigie felt the British Government could not agree to a further ship building holiday because of the age of their ships.

> Once agreement has been reached with the United States on some such plan and assuming that it is not the intention of the United States Government to resume construction of 8" gun cruisers, we should have reached practically complete agreement with that Power and our hands would be greatly strengthened for negotiating with other Powers. An Anglo-American agreement in regard to the maximum displacements in the various categories would, in the nature of things, have to be accepted eventually by the other naval Powers, however reluctantly, because they would not wish to build larger ships than those favoured by the United States and could not risk building smaller ones.[35]

Craigie acknowledged the care that would need to be taken in handling the Japanese during the process to ensure that their nationalistic sensibilities were not aroused. There was even a chance that tripartite conversations with the Japanese Government might eventually be held in Tokyo, but the success of any such talks would be less problematical if the British had managed to exchange views with the Americans and arrive at a confidential working agreement in the mean time. He felt, however, that in the end Japan would accept a total tonnage averaging around seventy percent of that of the US and Britain, but might balk at the idea of 12-inch guns for capital ships instead of the 14-inch that they desired. As to procedures, the order of who was to be met first, and what early deals were to be struck, he suggested that the United States and France be approached first, as they "...are the key Powers in this business and also, incidentally the Powers with whom it should be the least difficult for us to reach agreement."[36] Craigie also desired close cooperation between the FO and Admiralty in preparing a position paper that could be sent along to MacDonald as soon as possible.[37]

John Simon thought the resulting memorandum first-rate, commenting that "I am hopeful of USA agreeing to a reduction in the size of capital ships - not of cruisers - as she too has now experienced financial difficulties. The approach to Japan will be difficult. If we go hand in hand with USA we shall, I believe, have far less chance than if we take the matter up independently."[38] The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was also worried about the press and other groups in Britain that did not support the Admiralty's desire to build capital ships larger than 20,000 tons.[39] This latter reflecting the influence of Sir Herbert Richmond, a noted naval thinker and educator, and caused Simon to argue that an attempt should be made to strength the Admiralty's hand through the setting up of a Cabinet Committee. This committee would act as an official sanctioning agent, supporting the Admiralty and their policy during the upcoming naval debates.[40] Simon, not knowing of the Admiralty's complete victory in the DRC discussions on this issue, was not dogmatic in his desire for such a committee, as long as the British position going into the talks was prepared thoroughly.[41]

Chatfield and the Admiralty quickly replied to the Foreign Office initiative. The First Sea Lord informed Vansittart that the Admiralty had nearly completed their own proposal as to how to approach the upcoming naval talks. He agreed that the two departments should work closely together. A joint memorandum could be produced, he thought, which could then be sent to the PM.[42] The Prime Minister could then strike a Cabinet Committee that would use the joint memorandum as the basis for creating a national policy for the 1935 conference. Chatfield was not enthusiastic about the usefulness or safety of any private or unofficial conversations taking place on such important issues such as ratios, numerical strength, total tonnages, and so on, until that national policy was determined. Qualitative limitation could be discussed. As for approaching the United States, Chatfield thought they could be induced into discussing qualitative matters, but he wanted to do so only after talking to the other signatory Powers.[43]

This hesitant attitude towards approaching the United States first in any discussions did not sit well with Craigie. He disagreed with Chatfield's desire to create a coalition of powers to present a united front against the United States with regard to qualitative limitation instead of dealing with the quantitative limitations first. Craigie felt that such an approach was a bad tactical decision that "...would end by pushing into the forefront of the picture the well worn controversy arising out of the American need for size and our need for numbers."[44] His preference was naturally for the Admiralty to consider the course of action that he had recommended in the memorandum prepared for Vansittart. These views were taken up by the PUS with Chatfield. Replying to the Admiralty proposal, Vansittart declared how happy he was that the two departments were agreed that they should work together closely and that a British policy for the conference should be devised as quickly as possible. Howver, he pointed out to the First Sea Lord that

> The only point on which we feel a little doubtful is whether it would be wise at this stage to attempt to separate the subject of qualitative limitation from that of quantitative limitation and to press ahead with the former subject as being the more urgent. I quite see there are certain advantages in this course, but feel on the other hand great doubt whether the U.S. Government would be likely to agree to it, every indication we have pointing to their determination to reserve any concession as regards qualitative limitation until they know with what they will be faced in the matter of total tonnage. Furthermore, there is a risk that, even if we did succeed in getting a prior agreement as regards qualitative limitation, the prospects of securing a subsequent quantitative agreement on line acceptable to us might be diminished.[45]

The views of both Craigie and the Admiralty reflected the fact that neither knew exactly what the United States Navy's position on the matter really was, nor did they know any details of the Roosevelt Administration's attitude towards the 1935 conference. This uncertainty, combined with a more certain belief that the Japanese were going to demand parity with the United States and Great Britain, created a momentum towards Anglo-American preliminary talks.

The State Department and the United States Navy were in fact becoming both more flexible in their attitude towards Britain's naval needs and more willing to work together with the British to contain the growing Japanese threat. In September, 1933, the British government send an aide memoire to the State Department that made certain suggestions about how the Americans could modify their naval building program. Such an act of interference in a traditionally sensitive topic had the potential to embarrass the British government severely, as well as to rekindle Anglo-American antagonisms. However, instead of using the gaffe against the British, the State Department defused the situation by sharing the information with the press, who were thirsting and speculating wildly about a confrontational story, and then instructed the press that they could not use this information. The result was a series of negative editorials that were resentful of the British action but not inflammatory.[46] The State Department in general also resented the British act of interference, but still preferred cooperation with the British.[47] Norman Davis, naval disarmament expert and special ambassador-at-large for President Roosevelt, was sure that the British Admiralty, knowing full well what type of reaction the American press would have to the suggested modifications, had put the Foreign Office up to the task. Davis believed that the Admiralty would then use that reaction to try to gain more funding for a bigger building program of their own. The naval negotiator trusted the Foreign Office officials, such men as Simon and Alexander Cadogan (at that point the FO's Adviser on League of Nations Affairs) more so than the Admiralty to deal openly and honestly on the naval disarmament issue. Still, he was surprised that the FO had gone along with such a scheme, given the advantages he saw for the British in Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Far East.[48]

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral William V. Pratt, also advocated a more accommodating attitude towards Great Britain in March of 1933.[49] Both he and Norman Davis agreed that "...the dictates of higher policy made it essential for us to come to a naval understanding with Great Britain before the 1935 Conference; that only in this way could we prevent the Japanese from succeeding in getting the increase of ratio which they desire; that to attain this, some concessions toward the British view must be made, though this could not be accepted in toto."[50] Even though such a stand was in direct opposition to the policy of the United States Navy's General Board, Pratt was willing to challenge that advisory body on the matter.[51] With support for his views coming from other well-respected and senior Admirals as William H. Standley (Pratt's successor as CNO) and Arthur J. Hepburn, Pratt's willingness to consider cooperating with the Royal Navy signaled a coming test of strength over who would formulate American naval policy at the 1935 London Naval talks: the President, the State Department and the CNO, or, the General Board and isolationist big navy supporters.

Roosevelt, Davis, and Standley were all agreed that some sort of arrangement had to be found with Great Britain on the naval arms question. Reports from the American Ambassador in Japan, Joseph Grew, confirmed suspicions that the Japanese navy would not be willing to accept any new treaty terms that offered anything less than parity with the United States and Great Britain.[52] Even Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Grew's son-in-law and a man not normally given to great expressions of warmth for things British, fell in with the opinion that, given the realities of the situation in the Far East, some sort of naval agreement with Great Britain was necessary. In preparing instructions for the American embassy in London on how to handle the British in questions concerning the Far East and naval limitations, Roosevelt had approved Moffat's suggestion that "Our whole energy should be centered on reaching a meeting of minds with the British on the specific question of the Far Eastern and naval situation in 1935."[53] Roosevelt, at a private lunch with the American Ambassador to Great Britain, Robert W. Bingham, confided that he did not believe that the Japanese had any right to parity. He instructed the Ambassador to take the issue up with the British and try to work out an understanding on naval disarmament which the two nations could support together against Japan's demands. FDR acknowledged that such a unified approach would in all likelihood drive that Japanese from the conference, but "...then the British and ourselves could absolutely control the situation by giving the Japanese to understand that every time they built one ship, we would build two."[54] The President believe that it was very important to feel out the British attitude towards cooperation with the United States, in case a war broke out in the Far East or Europe. His idea was that, if the British showed a willingness to consider cooperation, then the two nations could engage in confidential contacts in order to explore the further possibilities of united action in order to try to prevent war, or, failing that, to localize it. That was the strategic vision held by the American President when he ordered Bingham to arrange a meeting between Prime Minister MacDonald and Norman Davis as soon as possible.[55]

Of all the important advisors to the President on this matter, the only major dessenting voice was that of the soon-to-be US Ambassador to the Soviet Union (and close confidant of the President), William C. Bullitt. Bullitt agreed that the only long-term solution to America's problems in the realm of naval arms limitation and with respect to Great Britain in general, was for the US to improve and tighten its bonds with England. He did not think, however, that now was the proper time to try and advance this idea of creating closer relations. His reasons for this hesitation were based on the belief that most of the major officials in the British Government - Stanley Baldwin, former Conservative Prime Minister and now Lord President of the Council; Prime Minister MacDonald; Simon; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain; and the President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runicman - were hostile to the United States. However, Bullitt's point of view did not carry the day in the debate over how to go about preparing for the 1935 conference.[56] Neither the United States nor Britain knew how compatible would be the other's views to their own naval disarmament positions. Instead, each would have to decide how best to approach the coming conference during an initial preliminary stage designed to allow a feeling out of the other's position to occur.

In preparation for those initial talks, the Admiralty returned to the argument with the Foreign Office as to whether qualitative matters could be divorced from quantitative in discussions with the United States. In February 1934, the Admiralty informed the Foreign Office that it was vital to get American cooperation on the matter of agreeing to qualitative limitation questions, especially those pertaining to capital ships, before anything else was discussed. The American reluctance to move on such matters as gun size and tonnage restrictions were acknowledged, but the Admiralty argued that, by pointing out to the Americans the European aspect of the problem, and how ships and gun size increases by those powers would force Great Britain and eventually Japan and the US to follow suit, cooperation could possibly be achieved. Then, if such headway was produced, the Japanese could be approached and brought into the mix to face the British and American agreement.[57] Craigie was skeptical of the Admiralty's assumption that it would prove relatively easy under such conditions to obtain a Japanese agreement to qualitative limitation, especially with respect to gun size. More importantly, while he agreed on the need to approach the Americans first, he outlined their reluctance to separate qualitative issues from quantitative or to do so before a building holiday was assured. His acceptance of the need to approach the Americans first on the matter underlined his rejection of Vansittart's call to begin preliminary discussions with the Japanese and not the Americans. Craigie's arguments reflected his superior knowledge - as opposed to Vansittart's entrenched 1930 vision - of the delicate nature of Anglo-American naval negotiations in 1934. He proposed that

> On thinking the matter over carefully I doubt whether this procedure [Vansittart's view on approaching Japan first] would work in regard to the particular matter now under discussion since, if we approach Japan first in regard to qualitative limitation, this would destroy such slender chances as may at present exist of our being able to induce the US Government to discuss this matter independently of quantitative limitation. Perhaps, therefore, it would be better...to confine the procedure outlined in ... A785 [Vansittart's

> minute] to a subsequent approach in regard to quantitative limitation.[58]

Finally, Craigie described the American Government's, especially the State and Navy Departments', perpetual fears of being "trapped" into a bad deal by perfidious Albion.[59] Still suffering from Anglo-American tensions caused by cruiser matters the previous summer, Craigie blamed official channels of communication for much of problem. He now recommended that the best British approach to the Americans on the qualitative position question would be through unofficial methods. A memorandum could be given to the American charge d'Affaires and then supplemented with oral explanations.

Vansittart was willing to be overruled by the Admiralty and Craigie on the matter of which nation to approach first on condition that such action was approved by the parliamentary under secretary of state, Lord Stanhope. It was time, said Vansittart, for the Foreign Office and the Admiralty to go to the Prime Minister, who was very interested in the matter, and establish a clear plan of action.[60] This traditional method of power-brokering on naval matters by the FO and the Admiralty was interrupted at this point, however, by Vansittart's earlier promise to Fisher in the DRC to keep the Treasury informed of naval disarmament matters. With that promise, Vansittart had brought the Treasury's virulent anti-American attitude into the negotiation and policy formulation process. Now, with the Treasury involved, the normal lines of communication between the Prime Minister, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office would no longer suffice. Thus, a meeting planned with MacDonald, Simon, and Sir Bolton M. Eyres Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to discuss the approach to be taken towards the 1935 conference was cancelled because now it would have to include Neville Chamberlain. Trapped by his promise to Fisher, Vansittart was now forced to have to allow a Cabinet Committee to be set up to formulate British strategy for the conference.[61] Before that strategy could be finalized, however, MacDonald met with an American delegation in early March to begin the preliminary feeling-out process.[62]

On March 2 the Prime Minister had a two-hour lunch at the American embassy. During his visit, he met with President Roosevelt's emissary-at-large, Norman Davis; Ambassador Bingham; and the American charge d'Affaires, Ray Atherton, and discussed the upcoming naval talks. During the luncheon meeting, both sides agreed that there was little or no hope that the Japanese would accept any formulae other than parity with the two western nations. Both also agreed that such an outcome was unacceptable and Japan should be so informed, although independently through separate channels. There was to be no hint of a united front or collusion on the part of Great Britain and the US.[63] Clearly, Japanese actions would determine which way Anglo-American naval cooperation would proceed. If the Japanese demanded parity, then the US and Great Britain would be forced to work together against such a program. If Japan chose a new ratio system that did not create parity, then she would find the two western nations eager to accommodate her with a new treaty.

The British anxieties over incurring Japan's wrath over the naval talks was obvious to the Americans, but that did not deter them from thinking that the first steps towards Anglo-American naval cooperation had been taken in the talks with MacDonald. Davis reported to Roosevelt that the British were desirous of having an Anglo-American agreement in order to check Japanese activities:

> The British are unquestionably disturbed as to the far-reaching effect which the present Japanese activities may have, and they are most desirous of reaching an agreement with us, if possible, because of the salutary effect which it might have on Japan. I am informed that they are pushing the work at Singapore as rapidly as possible but that this will not be completed until 1937. In the meantime their policy will, in my judgment, be to iron out their differences with us with regard to the maintenance of naval parity, to reach a common understanding as to the Japanese demands for an increased ration and even to go further, if we are disposed to do so, for the maintenance of peace and the protection of our respective rights and interests.[64]

Davis also had some idea as to who within the British Cabinet favoured cooperation with America on the matter and who did not. He believed that

> while they all want an agreement with us, Baldwin and some of them

> are fearful that the Senate might upset any agreement that might be made. For that reason they want to be careful in doing nothing to arouse Japan's susceptibilities until they know definitely where they stand. That, I think, is MacDonald's chief reason for insisting that any preliminary negotiations should be most secret.[65]

Bingham reported that he, too, had no doubt that the Prime Minister wanted to cooperate with the US in dealing with the Japanese on the naval question. The Ambassador's only reservation after the conversation was that he and Davis both felt that there could be some difficulty in the Americans and British coming to an agreement over qualitative matters concerning capital ships.[66]

Bingham attempted to follow up the successful talks with MacDonald by going to Sir John Simon to obtain further information on the British position.[67] The foreign secretary had earlier had discussions on the golf course with Norman Davis, pertaining as to what steps needed to be taken in these early stages to ensure a succesful naval conference. Simon succeeded only in diminishing his already low reputation with the Americans in his subsequent meeting with the Ambassador. The foreign secretary attempted to make the American Ambassador wait unnecessarily for the appointment to start and was caught out in his petty contrivance, thereby unnecessarily reinforcing the belief that he was rude and insensitive to American officials. When Bingham threatened to leave at once, the "busy" Simon rushed out of his office and summoned Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal and an expert on British disarmament policy, to attend the meeting.[68] Simon tried to explain how he believed the Far Eastern interests of the US to be greater than those the British empire in the Pacific. As well, it was his view that the Japanese presented a greater problem for America than they did for Great Britain. Bingham curtly replied that there was not a man, woman or child in the United States that would agree with that kind of analysis.

Simon's obvious attempt to distort the facts simply succeeded in reinforcing the image of perfidious Albion in Bingham's mind. The Ambassador went away from the meeting believing that

> They [British] are undoubtedly gravely concerned over the situation and want to cooperate with us in holding the Japanese naval program down, but they want to avoid offending the Japanese until they can finish their great naval base at Singapore, on which we understand they are pushing the work with all possible speed. My impression is that they want to cooperate with us, but, as usual, they want us to urge it upon them as a favor to ourselves.[69]

He reported the incident with Simon to the American under secretary of state, William Phillips, who relayed it to the President. It was Phillips' view that this encounter confirmed the State Department's guess that the British were disturbed over the naval situation and eager to cooperate with the Americans, but that their desire to cooperate was cautious and somewhat reluctant. He apprised FDR as follows: "However that may be, I am confident that the British are slowly moving towards the realization of the need of a change of front."[70]

Having been approached by a person of such high rank as the Prime Minister and been told that the strategic visions of both Great Britain and the United States were similar, American policy-makers expected a cooperative attitude from the British in any preparatory talks. However, the problem was that British policy-makers did not yet have a firm plan of action and had not decided whom to side with -- the Americans or the Japanese -- should push come to shove. The struggle between the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury, over the final British position during the naval talks now began in ernest.[71]

The Treasury, under the guidance of Chamberlain and Fisher, tried to push British foreign policy towards trying to re-establish an Anglo-Japanese alliance, through the formation of an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact. Their position resulted from both the failure of the Treasury to move the DRC to a formal denunciation of any cooperation with America and a commitment to maintain limits on defence spending. Now the Treasury, consumed with anti-American bitterness brought on by failed war debt and trade negotiations, hoped to influence the British position regarding the 1935 naval conference. Through that process, it wished to avoid closer relations with the United States, consolidate better relations with Japan, and keep naval spending on new construction and modernization to a bare minimum. In both the Cabinet and the CID, the Treasury pushed for creating better relations with Japan as the first and most critical of the steps required to achieve its goals.[72] Chamberlain laid out his strategic vision to the Cabinet on March 14, stating that he desired an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact because it would help trade relations between the two nations and thereby create better relations, especially if the agreement contained assurances from Japan about its attitude towards China. Then, argued Chamberlain, Britain could concentrate on the serious situation that was developing in Europe. As for the 1935 naval talks, he was opposed to any alliance with the Americans, for he could think of nothing more guaranteed to give offence to the Japanese, and he refused to "...pull the chestnuts out of the fire..." for the Americans.[73] His final analysis was

> While recognising that this question was affected by all sorts of technical considerations he put as a basis for discussion the opposite point of view: we should decline to align ourselves with Washington; indicate that we were not prepared to submit ourselves to the limitations of a Treaty, and say that we did not mind what America chose to build. This would free us from the hampering restriction of the Treaty in matters of design and so forth and perhaps enable us to carry out more effectively our obligations for defence at home. At the same time we might go to Japan and say that we had not linked ourselves with America. If this were done Japan would be free from the fear that we might be united with America against her....A hostile Japan meant a risk to our Possessions in the Far East, a menace to India and Australasia. What we risked by good relations with Japan was (1) trade, (2) deterioration of our relations with America. As to trade, he thought the difficulties were not insurmountable. As to America, what were we going to lose? He doubted if the pursuit of friendly relations with Japan was inconsistent with good relations with the United States.[74]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's views were supported by the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare; Monsell; W. Ormsby-Gore, First Minister of Works; and J.H. Thomas, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. For the opposition, while agreeing that better relations with Japan were of course desirable, MacDonald, the Secretary of State for War, Viscount Hailsham and Walter Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries were not enthusiastic about re-embracing Japan with such a formal act. Simon waffled. Knowing the FO's desire to form no alliance with any nation in the Far East in order to play one off against the other, but at the same time personally leaning towards distancing Britain from the United States in Far Eastern matters, the foreign secretary did not commit himself. MacDonald summed up the debate by acknowledging that all agreed that something should be done to improve relations with Japan, but how to do so would require very careful consideration, as "There was first the question of parity, which raised the whole question of naval power in the Pacific. If Japan was not given some idea of our intentions before the Conference a very serious situation would arise. The more quietly we could improve our relations with Japan the better for present."[75] Chamberlain felt the issue slipping away from his control, and insisted that the naval matters should not be left exclusively in the hands of the Admiralty. For the moment, MacDonald ignored Chamberlain's request for a small committee to deal with preparing the British position for the naval talks and instructed Monsell and Simon, in consultation with any other ministers they desired, to prepare a definite recommendation on the issue for Cabinet's consideration. Time was of the essence, and the Prime Minister wanted the issue of whether to appease the Japanese to be decided before any further serious talks took place with the Americans.

The centre of activity was the Foreign Office. Two days prior to the Cabinet meeting, Vansittart had summarized the numerous memoranda that had been collected and constructed at the Foreign Office by Sir Victor Wellesley, the deputy under secretary of state, Far Eastern expert, and superintending under secretary for the Far Eastern Department.[76] Wellesley played an important role. He was an important link and filter between the Far Eastern Department of the FO, Vansittart, and Simon, and the other government departments. It would be Wellesley who would be looked to give the lead on Far Eastern issues during the formulation of the British strategy for the naval conference. Vansittart used Wellesley's memoranda and collection of material to inform the Admiralty of the Foreign Office view of the situation in the Far East. The six main points of the FO's assessment were: (1) it was inadvisable to tie British foreign policy in the FE to either Japan or the United States. Japan had aims in Asia which Britain could not support, and America, while an important potential ally, was an uncertain factor in the Far East. (2) It was very important for Britain to not antagonise Japan or be made the point-man in any opposition to Japanese aims. The FO recommended that a liberal economic and trading attitude towards Japan would be useful. (3) All this did not mean that the Japanese were to be given a free-hand in trade matters, and, indeed, Britain must defend her trade interests in the Far East vigorously, but always should maintain a moderate and calm manner. (4) Preparations for strengthening the empire's military strength in the Far East, especially the completion of Singapore, were to proceed in an ostentatious fashion. (5) British foreign policy towards China was to continue as it had, promoting goodwill and avoiding antagonizing the Chinese through cultivating Japanese goodwill at China's expense. (6) British foreign policy in the Far East would have to be opportunist, given the variety of nations involved and the intertwining of European, American and Far Eastern interests. Above all, Wellesley's recommendation was "...that we should leave our hands free to act as impelled by our international obligations and special interests in all such separate problems...."[77] Citing the collection as the definitive work on the matter, Vansittart suggested broadly that no other department stray far from these overall strategic considerations without first closely consulting with the FO.

The Foreign Office was also busy preparing a reply to the suggestion put forward by Chamberlain for an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact. Simon composed a memorandum listing the pros and cons of such a pact, and, then, on March 15, asked Orde and Vansittart for their views. The FO believed that the positive attributes of a non-aggression pact were few. First, Japan might, but this was not at all certain, moderate her naval demands if it were clearly shown that Britain would not ally with the US in any war against Japan. Second, the pact would give Japan a freer hand against Russia, and, it would demonstrate Britain's friendly feeling towards Japan and signal that there was an intention for them to become more so. The cons of the pact were much more complex, and presented a daunting picture for British interests in the Far East. The most important drawback was the negative effect on Anglo-American relations. It was pointed out that such a pact would come as a severe shock to the Americans. There was the chance that the opportunity to take such action and investigate a pact might present itself during the naval talks, but to broach the idea before such talks was definitely not good timing. Overall, even though Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East was not seen as an immediate reality, the damage to even that tenuous relationship was not desired. A second problem would be that China would be antagonized and the League of Nations was likely to see the pact as Britain's condonation of Japanese actions in Manchukuo. Finally, Russia would resent any Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, and Britain's previously-stated desire to avoid forming pacts that added nothing to the Kellogg Pact would also be shown to be hollow, damaging Britain's credibility. The FO's overall recommendation was that the Admiralty's strategic considerations would have to carry the day on the matter. The cons were more important to the Empire's overall position than the pros, which were of little worth, especially in the face of the impending naval talks:

> As things stand, Japan is demanding naval parity with the British Commonwealth of Nations. The view of our Admiralty is that Japan, far from hoping to increase her relative strength, must be content with a ratio in cruiser strength slightly inferior to that accorded by the London Naval Treaty. So complete a deadlock cannot be overcome by means of a non-aggression pact - particularly if we pay our price before the bargaining begins. In fact, the conclusion of such a pact without reference to the impending naval negotiations would probably prove to be merely a "flash in the pan." If the policy of the non-aggression pact is considered otherwise desirable, the best course would probably be to keep it in reserve pending the progress of the naval negotiations. If at a later stage it were found that Japan might be induced to accept a lower ratio of naval strength in return for a non-aggression pact with this country - and possibly also with the United States - the proposal might then serve a useful and practical purpose.[78]

Simon gave his memorandum, along with the Foreign Office's collection of memoranda on the Far Eastern situation, to the Cabinet on March 19. That body decided that continued study of the question was appropriate.

The RN opened its part of the debate with the drafting of a memorandum designed to explain Britain's imperial position regarding naval commitments and the upcoming conference. In that memorandum, the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) outlined the strategic requirements for a Two Power Standard.[79] That standard was to provide a fleet capable of having sufficient strength to be able to send elements to the Far East to counter any Japanese encroachment on Britain's imperial interests there. There would also need to be naval forces adequate to protect merchant ships on all sea routes and still leave sufficient forces in European and Atlantic waters to give security against the strongest European naval Powers.[80] Chatfield's argument pointed out that the Royal Navy did not measure up to that standard and would not for at least five more years. His message to the Government was very clear: if the government were unwilling to contemplate spending money on rearming the RN, then a different foreign policy would need to be considered; one which eliminated imperial commitments. The CNS recognized that France and the United States were not to be considered as possible threats to the empire's security. However, the growth of Japanese aggression in the Far East, coupled with the fear of German rearmament jeopardized Great Britain's naval security seriously. The time had come either to spend more money expanding and modernizing the RN or to consider withdrawing all naval forces to European waters and trust to a naval combination with some other power to provide security for the rest of the empire. If this was to be the case, then diplomatic measures, such as the upcoming naval talks, had to ensure that countries such as Japan and Germany agreed to a formula that would guarantee Britain's security for a long time (at least ten years). The memorandum argued that negotiations for the 1935 conference should allow the RN to expand to a "safer naval strength." Japan and her reaction to the naval talks was the key to any future Royal Navy planning. If Japan proved to be unwilling to compromise on her demands for parity, then American approval had to be obtained during the negotiations to allow for the necessary expansion of the RN.[81]

Sir John Simon hesitated to agree with the CNS's view of the matter. The foreign secretary felt that the Admiralty had always had a "bee in its bonnet" about Japan, but realized that Japan, unlike the United States, could not be disregarded as a potential foe, if for no other reason than the pressures that would be brought to bear by Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As well, Simon acknowledged that domestic political pressures were in favour of naval rearmament and that both the government and the man in the street would be loathe to sign another 1930 London Naval Treaty limiting Britain's freedom to build, no matter what the financial cost.[82] Where cooperation with other nations to protect Britain's Far Eastern interests were concerned, his belief was that Great Britain could expect no help from the Kellogg Pact or other Pacts if the situation became tense. As for the United States and Japan, and the maintenance of the existing treaty ratios, Simon thought that if Japan was contacted first then perhaps the ratios could be kept as they were, but, if the British went into the conference allied with the USA then there was no hope that such would be the case. The foreign secretary was sympathetic to the Admiralty's needs for rapid and immediate construction and modernization of capital ships, but was of the opinion that the replacement could be spread over one ship every two years, or at the most, two in two years.[83] Despite his less than full support of the Admiralty's position, Simon respected Chatfield's skills, fearing that the new First Lord would be much firmer in driving home the Navy's message and position than was his predecessor.

That respect was repaid on March 20, when Chatfield held a meeting at the Admiralty with Vansittart and Craigie. The CNS told the Foreign Office members that it was his belief that Japan would demand a parity or an increased ratio in capital ships at the naval conference.[84] It was his hope that the United States would refuse to accept that parity. Chatfield argued that there was no benefit to agreeing to give Japan a higher ratio, as Britain's slender strategic advantage in that region would then be destroyed. If that occurred, Great Britain could meet the threat only "...by weakening our European position and rectifying it in some political manner. In the long run it would be better to let Japan build her capital ships and keep a free hand as to how Britain would strengthen its own naval forces.[85] When pressed by Vansittart that HMG might be reluctant to fund a massive capital ship replacement programme and would want a continuation of the building 'holiday' which had been in effect since 1922, the First Sea Lord stressed the fact that such an attitude was unacceptable to the Admiralty. Craigie explained that he thought the Americans would also in favour of a continuation of the building holiday, although naval and political advisors were known to oppose any reduction. He told Chatfield that it was the FO's intention to feel out the US position on parity, qualitative and quantitative limitation, but not to obtain any definite agreement until discussions had taken place with the Japanese. Both the FO and Admiralty representatives agreed that a joint presentation to the Prime Minister would be required to begin the process of arriving at some solid policy before negotiations began. They also agreed that no government could fail to send a Fleet to the Far East if necessary. Both felt that if the government did not accept sending a full Fleet to the Far East, then the government must state what their policy was. Lastly, it was decided that the Foreign Office and Admiralty would submit the CNS's memorandum on Imperial security and defend it against all comers to try to get as much as possible accepted by Cabinet or any committee that was struck.[86]

On March 27 the CNS's views on the Empire's strategic position, along with a Foreign Office critique of the Admiralty's analysis and proposals, were sent to MacDonald and Hankey by Vansittart. The Foreign Office acknowledged that it believed measures should be taken to get on better with the Japanese, but, unless Cabinet ruled that no Fleet was to be sent to the Far East in a time of crisis, then the Foreign Office supported the Naval Staff and their basis for their proposals.[87] Craigie was somewhat concerned about the overall cost of the programme, which would be L7,000,000 a year for replacement, over a period of 12 years, and L2,000,000 a year for modernization over a five-year period, but felt that the navy could justify its case.[88] As for the procedure that was to be followed in preparing for the naval talks, Vansittart and Chatfield reported that

> ...we think that until the proposals set forth in this memorandum have been considered by a Cabinet Committee, and decisions reached in regard to our future naval policy, little purpose would be served by entering upon exploratory conversations with representatives of foreign Powers. Once such decisions have been reached, it is suggested that an invitation should be sent simultaneously to the United States and Japanese Governments to exchange views on our respective desiderata for the 1935 Conference. As the United States Government have already made the first approach, it will probably be preferable that the first exchange of views should take place with representatives of that Government. To this the Japanese could not legitimately object, provided that the invitation to open discussions had been sent simultaneously to both Governments.[89]

The ball had now been tossed squarely into the Cabinet's lap. Now it would have to decide how to proceed.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans also were consolidating their position. Much of the information as to how they were going to proceed issued from the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs (DFEA) and the American embassy in London, and Norman Davis. The goal of those groups was to ascertain the true motives behind the British naval position and what the British attitude towards Japan would be.

Maxwell Hamilton, a senior member of the DFEA reported in early March that the British interests in the Far East were based on trade, and primarily trade with China. After talks with Charles Orde, Hamilton reported that relations with Japan were important for Britain's ability to protect its trade in China. However, Orde had confirmed that there did not appear to be any truth to the idea that there would be any sort of

Anglo-Japanese agreement to that end and, in fact, "... aside from the considerations of trade and of the Open door, opportunism was the keynote of British action in reference to situations in and problems presented by the Far East."[90] William Phillips, along with Norman Davis and Ambassador Bingham, were still impressed with the face the British had presented so far.[91] Their sentiment was not held unanimously. Moffat was becoming suspicious that the British were trying to get the United States to take the lead in the talks while at the same time trying to get some sort of agreement with the Japanese. His suspicions were based on the anti-American sentiments and distrust of key American figures that he saw emanating from British leaders.[92] Such concerns were secondary, however, to the key element in American preparations: to ensure that America's strategic interests were safeguarded.

Stanley Hornbeck, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and chief constructor of America's Far Eastern policy, made that point clear to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in late March.[93] Hornbeck was a disciple of the school of power diplomacy and the protection of national self-interests. His view of the British and American positions in the Far East was critical, yet fair, and had been built up over a long period of time in China and as head of the DFEA since 1928. Hornbeck was naturally suspicious that the British would, if American diplomacy was not alert, at times attempt both to get the Americans to take the lead against Japanese actions in the region and to diminsh the Americans in the eyes of the Chinese authorities.[94] However, he also recognized that, given the balance of power in Far Eastern diplomacy, cooperation with Great Britain on major issues was absolutely necessary.[95] For Hornbeck, such cooperation was not a blank cheque or a policy that would be automatically activated in every circumstance. Just as the Foreign Office officials described British policy as being one of opportunism, designed to prevent the Japanese from leveling charges of cooperation or complicity against Great Britain, Hornbeck subscribed to the principle of cooperation between the British and American Governments only when major interests of both nations were the issue. It was his view that, in the past where British interests had been attacked and America had no parallel or any interest at all, the US had naturally not rushed in to Britain's aid: "A 'joint policy' or a 'policy of cooperation' do not call for any such thing," he declared, "We do not expect them to pull our chestnuts out of the fire and they should not expect us to pull theirs."[96] Analyzing the Far Eastern situation, the upcoming naval conference, and how American interests needed to be protected from further Japanese aggression, Hornbeck argued a line of policy similar to that advanced by the Admiralty and the USN, declaring that America needed to maintain naval strength sufficient to protect its national interests in the region.[97] For Hornbeck that meant that while the adjustment in details within the ratios was possible, the United States had to adhere to the Washington and London Treaty ratios:

> The naval ratios as they now stand were designed, it is believed, on the principle of making it possible, on the one hand, for each of the powers concerned adequately to safeguard its own interests, on a defensive basis, and of making it impossible, on the other hand, for any one of the powers provided that each and all built up to and maintained its allotment of naval equipment, to indulge in aggression against one or more of the others....The situation has not changed, as regards the rightful interests of the various powers concerned, separately and collectively, from the point of view of problems of self-defense,...since these rations were worked out and agreed upon. It would therefore seem that any alteration of the ratios in favor, upward, of any one power, would tend toward an upset of the equilibrium and would impair the principle on which the powers have proceeded in the formulating and concluding of naval limitation agreements....There is perceived no reason why we should discuss or enter into any agreement by and under the provisions of which Japan would, with our assent, become relatively stronger and we become relatively weaker in naval armament. It is believed that no step that we might take would contribute more effectively toward rendering real in the long run likelihood of war between Japan and this country than would such a step.[98]

There were, therefore, similar strategic views of the situation in the Far East held in the two Western navies, foreign offices, and executive offices. These views revolved around the untrustworthiness of Japan's word not to interfere with American and British interests in the region, suspicions of the real intentions of American and British Far Eastern policies, and the need for strong navies to protect those interests from further Japanese encroachments. Now, these first indicators of common views and interests would have to be refined and explored.

Craigie; Vice-Admiral C.J.C. Little, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS); Norman Davis and Ambassador Bingham met on April 12 to follow up the discussions began by MacDonald on March 2. The technical and ratio sides of the issue were not that far apart, reported Little. Both groups were agreed that Japan should not have parity, aircraft carriers would not be abolished so the status quo on that class was acceptable, there was agreement on destroyer and submarine matters and, according to Davis, a movement was taking place in the USN and State Department, as well as in the Executive, towards an understanding on the question of cruiser strength.[99] Only in the area of capital ship qualities did the two sides deviate substantially. Davis explained that Roosevelt and the American Government wanted a reduction in the number of capital ships from fifteen to twelve, but, also wanted those battleships to be larger and carry sixteen- or fourteen-inch guns.[100] British strategic needs dictated a need for at least fifteen capital ships, but they desired smaller vessels (around 25,000 tons as opposed to the 35,000 tons suggested by the Americans) with twelve-inch guns.[101]

On the diplomatic side, both parties were still trying to get to grips with the other's position. Craigie noted the continued appeal by the Americans for cooperation in a united front against Japan. Bingham assured the FO representative that the United States was no longer the same nation which had rejected the League Covenant and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Ambassador argued that Roosevelt and the executive were in the ascendant over Congress and things were now quite different, "...and co-operation in all fields should be attended by fruitful results for both countries."[102] Craigie summed up the discussion and its meaning nicely in his reporting of the talks to Ambassador Lindsay:

> There is a tendency on the part of the Americans to try to get us to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them in connection with this

> question of the Japanese ratio. This our people are not in the least disposed to do, and believe in fact that the more solidaire we and the Americans appear to be on this question at the present juncture the more stiff we are likely to find the Japanese when the time arrives to talk to them. As you will see however, the Americans are most anxious to establish very close co-operation with us at the earliest possible moment so that the situation may at any moment become a little delicate.[103]

On the American side, Davis reported to the President that he now did not believe there was going to be any difficulty with the British over the technical naval questions in any discussions. He also mentioned that it had been agreed that while invitations for talks would be issued to Japan and the United States at the same time, the American delegation was to arrive at least a week before the Japanese so that the former could work out the details and have a prepared position ready before the Japanese arrived.[104] Ambassador Bingham's assessment of the talks supported Davis' views. The Ambassador informed Roosevelt that the recent Japanese declaration warning all foreign nations to not interfere with affairs in China -- the so-called Amau declaration -- had made many British policy-makers more receptive to the idea of some sort of Anglo-American naval cooperation at the conference.[105] Simon had warned him that British financial interests would try and bring great pressure to bear on the government to find some agreement with the Japanese, if the Japanese carried out their plan. The foreign secretary had expressed his deep desire for cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in handling the whole situation, including the naval aspect. That sentiment for cooperation had been reinforced by talks with the First Lord of the Admiralty and the retired Admiral of the Fleet, and now Member of Parliament, Sir Roger Keyes. In fact, the Ambassador was scheduled to have lunch with Vansittart that Sunday to discuss these new developments and British attitudes toward the upcoming naval talks.[106]

The intricacies of the situation were increasing, as Chamberlain attempted to keep the British government from favouring any Anglo-American cooperative spirit. In response to the discussions held on the April 12, Chamberlain used the pulpit of the Ministerial Committee on the London

Naval Conference [NCM(35)], to continue to preach the safer road of appeasing the Japanese. If the conference failed, he argued, then some sort of pact with Japan would protect British interests in China, the only region where Japanese and British interests were in danger of conflict. The British people, said Chamberlain, would be greatly upset at the failure of the naval conference as it would signal the beginning of a new naval race. If, however, an agreement with the Japanese could be substituted for a treaty on quotas, then the public discontent would be assuaged. In his view, some sort of division of China could take place. Worries about how such British involvement in carving up China to suit Japanese and British needs would be viewed by the Americans never entered his mind. Simon and the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out the problems such actions would cause with regard to the Nine Power Treaty and the Americans' desire to protect the Open Door policy as based pm the Nine Power Treaty. However, Chamberlain was willing to cast the Americans adrift over the matter and let them stay out in the cold.[107] The meeting ended with MacDonald, Simon, Chatfield and Monsell stressing both that no approach along Chamberlain's lines was to be made before the conference and that further study on the matter needed to be done. As well, the FO and Admiralty had agreed that, given the state of British capital ships, and if the nation were willing to face the expense, that the British position regarding capital ships should be to call for at least the maintenance of the fifteen already allowed. A new battlefleet was to be achieved through construction, not reconditioning.[108]

The battle between the Foreign Office and the Treasury as to whether the Americans would be the focus of the naval talks or a Japanese deal the primary aim, was taken up in earnest on April 19. Sensing that support for a Japan-first strategy was not making as much progress in the NCM as was desired, the Treasury drafted its position more carefully. Fisher prepared a memorandum for the NCM on the effect of the London Naval Treaty on Britain's naval strength, and argued that the Washington and London

Treaties should be abandoned. He believed that the treaties had subordinated British interests to those of the USA and had obliged Britain to build classes of ships and a fleet that it did not want. The Foreign Office received a copy of Fisher's views before the memo was circulated to the NCM.[109] Craigie and Vansittart both agreed that Fisher's arguments contained many misconceptions and ill-informed ideas about what the strategic reality of British policy towards the Far Eastern balance-of-power was, especially concerning how cavalierly Britain could treat American sensitivities. They headed off Fisher's misguided presentation by preparing their own evaluation, which was sent to the Prime Minister and Fisher in late May.[110]

The FO counter-attack began by agreeing with Fisher that Britain's predominant defensive concern was to ensure that the Empire did not become engaged with Germany and Japan at the same time.[111] That did not mean, however, that there was an opportunity to construct a thorough and lasting accommodation with Japan. Vansittart emphasized the opportunism that was at the heart of Britain's Far Eastern foreign policy and discredited Fisher's allegations about the impact of the Washington and London Naval Treaties. The legacy of those treaties was not onerous, he argued, and they had prevented the Americans from building a navy larger than Great Britain's. The size of the American fleet was of special importance for the RN because the size of the American fleet dictated what the Japanese could build: the bigger the American fleet the bigger the Japanese. That was the reason why the Admiralty, with FO support, was unwilling to let the US build whatever they wanted.[112] As for Fisher's espousal of the idea that the RN had been forced to build a fleet that it did not want, Vansittart laid the blame for any short-comings in the RN's numbers squarely where it belonged: in the lap of the Treasury. Further, it was the FO view that Britain would have had to match the Americans in building 10,000 ton, 8-inch gun cruisers in any case. It was now unlikely, given Japan's continued aggression in the Far East, that the Americans would reduce the size and gunpower of their ships. Furthermore, Britain had never shaped its policy out of any sense of subservience to the US, but, "If our navy has been reduced during the post-war period to relatively smaller proportions this has notoriously been due far more to motives of economy than to any other vice or virtue."[113]

Vansittart pointed out that the Foreign Office and Admiralty agreed with Fisher that there could be no question of sacrificing Britain's minimum naval requirements merely to acquire an agreement with the United States. He also emphasized that no stone should be left unturned in order to try and make better relations with Japan, and he agreed with Fisher that an eye had to be kept on the far more important developments that were occurring in Europe. The PUS was clear that it was not his view that Japan should be abandoned in favour of a complete reliance upon the US. But, the strategic reality and overall usefulness of Japan and America in the overall scheme of Britain's imperial policy was clear. It was important to "...maintain the present level of relations with the United States if possible and not forfeit the useful and marked advance in this respect achieved with much difficulty during the last decade. We have paid for what we have got, and neither you nor I would want to waste what we have already bought, such as it is, particularly having regard to all our other present and impending difficulties."[114]

Vansittart's past experiences had shown how quickly Anglo-American relations could deteriorate into a series of mutual recriminations and hostile press propaganda, and this caused him to caution Fisher against turning a cold shoulder to the Americans, particularly at this delicate time. His final word on the matter was that, while presenting a united front at the naval conference with the Americans against Japan would certainly cause bad relations with the latter, it was more important to realize that the Japanese were more likely to behave themselves if there was no sign of any open deterioration in Anglo-American relations. He ended the memorandum to Fisher succinctly, telling the Secretary of the

Treasury that

> If we wish to improve our relations with Japan, it may well be sound policy simultaneously to keep on good terms with the United States, provided that these terms are neither too obtrusive nor of a kind to wound Japanese sensibilities.... But while fully recognising how little reliance can safely be placed on the United States in present circumstances it is well to remember that there are certain fundamental reasons why, in point of fact, no government here will really be allowed, or allow itself to treat Anglo-American relations with anything but considerable respect when it comes to a show-down. I will only mention two here: (1) Public opinion and the press here have invariably been critical of any British Government which has allowed a marked deterioration in Anglo-American relations to occur, almost irrespective of the merits of the case. The same is true of public opinion in the Dominions....(2) Bad relations with the United States would greatly increase the difficulty of this country giving any form of security guarantee to France and so relieving the present tension in Europe, since the adequacy of any such guarantee and the safety with which it could be given are admittedly dependent on some degree of American co-operation - or at least benevolent neutrality. Hence the extent of the influence we exercise in Europe is to some extent dependent on the quality of the relations we maintain with the United States.[115]

Other strategic considerations were also present in Vansittart's thinking, but he declined the opportunity to lecture Fisher on the intricacies of Britain's imperial foreign policy and so removed them from the final version of the document. Those critical considerations were, that, except for trade issue, the fundamental interests and objectives of Great Britain and the United States were more nearly identical than those of any two other Powers. Also, the obvious need to have access to American resources if a major war broke out was a key to the Foreign Office's demand for friendly relations with the Americans.[116] Ultimately, in the question of who would come first, the Foreign Office view would be that, "The best hope for peace in the Pacific lies in the promotion of a steady improvement in the relations between the three Great Powers, Japan, the United States, and ourselves, and not in one country seeking to fish in the troubled waters lying between the other two."[117] The Foreign Office's intention was to allow the Japanese to worry about American and British interests and actions coinciding, but never to admit to or act as if such an arrangement was the real desire of British policy.

The Americans were also in the midst of trying to work out their tactical position regarding the naval talks. State Department officials were keen on the idea of coming to some sort of understanding with the British, but were concerned about whether the US Navy was going to play ball. Far Eastern considerations were so intimately bound up with the naval talks that it appeared to Hull and Davis that the two could not be discussed entirely separately.[118] Davis was given the go-ahead by the President, however, to have talks with the USN with a view to meeting bilaterally with the British some time in the summer or early fall. As of the end of April it was still not clear to the State Department what the exact response from the Navy would be, nor who would be the USN's voice at any talks.[119]

By May 1 various pressures had created a need for the British to issue an invitation to the Americans and Japanese to come to England and hold preliminary talks.[120] The Japanese Amau Declaration, the Manchukuo Oil Monopoly issue and other trade disputes between Japan and Great Britain had not allowed an atmosphere conducive to exploring the matter of Japan's attitude towards naval ratios to develop.[121] This instability in the Far East had created some doubt and concern on the part of the British. These feelings were not lost on the American observers. The time had come to see whether Japanese actions would cause Britain either to appease the Asian power or to cooperate with United States and oppose Japanese naval expansion.

Ambassador Bingham met with King George in late April and they discussed Anglo-American relations in the Pacific. His Majesty informed Bingham that Britain had given up her treaty with Japan as an act of good faith towards America. He also believed that the two Anglo-Saxon nations had similar, if not identical interests in the Pacific, and it was his hope that the two nations would be able to cooperate in the maintenance of trade and peace in that region.[122] Bingham reported back to Roosevelt that, after talking to the King and having lunch with Vansittart (whom the Ambassador thought most able), it was now clear to him that the British had changed their mind as to how much they would cooperate with the

Americans during the naval talks. Bingham ddid not suspect prior bad faith. He was satisfied that, until the Amau Declaration, MacDonald and Craigie had dealt honestly with the United States representatives and that British policy had been to go along with the Americans as far as possible, so long as no offence was given to the Japanese. That position had changed. It was now the British policy, he felt, ultimately to cooperate with the Americans, but there would be no willingness to adopt any Anglo-American policy that could either be interpreted in Japan as any form of coercion, or would help solidify the control of the militaristic element in that country.[123] Bingham emphasised Vansittart's preoccupation with Germany, and his fears of a growing threat in Europe. The PUS had made it clear that Britain now relied on the Russian, Chinese and American attitudes in the Far East to keep the Japanese deterred from taking any immediate action. While understanding that the Japanese had never really abandoned their twenty-one points of 1915, Vansittart felt that there was no immediate threat to the Empire from the Far Eastern situation and believed that there would be no such disturbance unless the Japanese were given the opportunity by a British preoccupation with Germany in a European war. [124] Bingham concluded that "The only deduction, in my opinion, to be drawn from his [Vansittart's] statement was that the British Government has made up its mind to run no risk, so far as the Far Eastern question is concerned, at this time, and to concentrate all of its efforts upon trying to keep peace in Europe."[125] He recommended that the US leave the British alone now to sort out their situation and arrive at some sort of more exact policy position.

That recommendation was ignored by the State Department, and overridden by the action of the British Cabinet, who issued an invitation to the Americans and Japanese to send delegations to London for preliminary talks.[126] The State Department accepted the invitation on May 24 and would send a delegation headed by both Davis and Bingham, and consisting of such technical experts as Rear Admiral Richard A.H. Leigh

(Chairman of the General Board), Commander Theodore S. Wilkinson, (Secretary of the General Board), and Noel H. Field of the State Department. The delegation would assemble in London at some time around mid-June.[127] Concerns about Simon's real attitude towards the conference, and the United States in general, still plagued the American delegation, but a feeling that some sort of Anglo-American cooperation could be achieved prevailed. During disarmament talks in Geneva in late May, Simon told Davis that such cooperation was his desire. The foreign secretary expected the American and British delegations to clear up any questions between themselves before the Japanese arrived. As to the question of the Japanese demand for parity, when Davis pressed Simon to confirm that the statements of Sir Roger Keyes and other British naval officers advocating a closer cooperation between Great Britain and Japan were not the Government's position, Simon told the American that the British Government could not control the comments made by Keyes. However "...he could not believe that any naval officer on the active list could take such a position because it was positively not the attitude of either the Government or the Admiralty: that Great Britain has more seas to cover than Japan and that parity with Japan would be absurd."[128] Davis was guardedly optimistic that the British would not bow to Japanese pressures, but was also concerned that the British would try and maneuver the talks so that it appeared that they were the 'honest brokers' trying to bring the Americans and Japanese together, when all along it was in Britain's interest not to support Japanese parity. Davis feared the British would attempt to make it appear that it was American reluctance to accept parity that would be the reason for any failure.[129]

President Roosevelt was also growing weary of Sir John Simon and his slippery ways. The President told Henry Stimson at a long lunch the two shared on May 17 that he was very irritated by Simon's action in turning down Bingham's unofficial initiatives to cooperate against Japanese advances and the foreign secretary's obvious shying away from the first, promising position of cooperation put forward by Craigie in March. FDR was now of the opinion that the only hope for generous cooperation with the British would come after a change of government in London, an event that he looked forward to.[130] Roosevelt also shared his personal views of the Far Eastern situation with the former Secretary of State; views which coincided closely with those held by Stimson himself.

Stimson told FDR that he approved of the American recognition of Russia, the intention to increase the American fleet to its treaty strength, and the recent note to Japan disapproving its Amau declaration. All were important steps in a policy aimed at taking a firm line in the Pacific against Japan, but he regretted the movement of the fleet from the Pacific back to the Atlantic. Roosevelt then informed him of his future plans to strengthen greatly the fleet in the Pacific and his desire to take an even stronger tone with the Japanese, but sais that the State Department, Mrs. Roosevelt and the newspapers' strong negative reaction to a watered-down version of his reply to Japan had caused him to rethink how strongly he should push the Japanese.[131] Roosevelt and Stimson both agreed that the American policies towards the Far East and Europe had to be different and were different, as the former was an area where America had interests and faced a real threat, while the later was not as yet an important American arena.[132] In the Far East, however, Roosevelt was convinced that America's best bet for staying out of war in that region was "... to adopt a policy of firm statements as to our rights and of full preparedness for war. A policy of drift or timidity would be the surest way of getting into war."[133] The pressure to find some sort of security in the Far East, and, at the same time, achieve a naval reduction for the American taxpayer were clearly at odds as the Americans prepared for naval talks.

In London, the Foreign Office began to prepare for the meetings with the Japanese and Americans. Position papers on cruisers, ratios and agendas were prepared by Craigie and the Admiralty, in conjunction with guidance from the NCM, in order that the British position could be put to both nations in a vigorous and comprehensive manner.[134] Still, the key point was what would the Japanese position towards parity be. The latest reports from Japan and the Japanese Ambassador in London all pointed to the fact that the Japanese government would indeed demand parity at all costs. Similar unproductive communications by the Americans to the Japanese embassy in Washington, and Ambassador Joseph Grew in Japan, told them the same thing.[135] Such a position was still unacceptable to both the Americans and British.[136] Adding to the uncertainty, was the Foreign Office's lack of a clear understanding of what America's long-term commitment in the Far East really was. Lindsay informed the FO, just before talks began with the American delegates, that if Japan obstinately refused to come to an agreement in 1935, then a naval understanding between the US and Great Britain became the obvious solution. There was growing public awareness in America of the fact that Washington lagged behind the Japanese and British in terms of naval strength. As well, the Japanese arguments as to why they needed a larger navy were unintelligible to Americans, who saw the request as a simple mask for further aggression in Asia. While there was some concern that the Americans might be prepared to "scuttle" out of the Far East by coming to some agreement with the Japanese at the naval talks, Lindsay did not share it.[137] Orde, Wellesley and Simon thought it would be typically American however, if such concessions as Lindsay had outlined were made in order to get a naval agreement. Still, the attitude remained that recommended by Craigie, one of wait-and-see.[138]

The American delegation had internal troubles of its own. Davis was not happy that he had to share the limelight of leadership for the mission with Ambassador Bingham and petitioned Washington to be given supreme command.[139] Roosevelt and Hull rejected Davis' arguments on the grounds that those preliminary talks had to appear not really to be preliminary talks. If the discussions appeared to be directed by the Embassy, then they could be linked to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The State Department had stressed the informal nature of the upcoming naval conversations with the American press, and were most careful to give the impression that they were in no way a preliminary conference in themselves. Neither the President or Hull expected much success in coming to grips on technical problems, and so wanted the exercise to have the appearance of being nothing more than a sounding-out process. A separate delegation at London, outside normal diplomatic channels, would ruin that psychological effect.[140] Davis, forever the professional negotiator, thought they were being too pessimistic and that some understanding, especially with the British, could be reached. Hull explained to Davis that Japanese pressure had put the Americans in a difficult position. Japanese suspicions of an Anglo-American united front had caused them to indicate they would not discuss even technical matters and were not in favor of any preliminary conference, only informal conversation. In order to make sure that the Japanese did not continue to suspect that the Americans were organizing any systematic opposition, and to keep the American press from suspecting any Anglo-American collusion, the informal route was proposed. In the end, Roosevelt personally assured Davis that he, too, thought that success was possible with the British and that Davis would be the lead man when naval negotiations reached a critical stage. For now, however, Bingham and the embassy would be required as a cover for the talks.[141]

Hull himself was not hopeful that the talks would result in any joint or concerted naval action on the part of the two western powers, but he was worried that the talks would turn into an attempt to find some sort of cooperative solution for Far Eastern problems in general.[142] The Secretary of State had kept Japanese advances to the United States about a non-aggression pact or some other sort of public utterance of understanding at arms length that spring. Unwilling to incite the wrath of Great Britain or the American public, and continually warned of the pitfalls of such action by Hornbeck, Hull refused to entertain any idea of an agreement with Japan.[143] Those sentiments were reinforced by Phillips' view that there was enough anti-American sentiment in British circles to make the attempt at cooperation impossible.[144] Hull's concerns about Japan's attitude at the talks and the British being ill-disposed to the Americans caused him much concern, but Phillips and Moffat convinced him to commit to the idea of the talks; otherwise the Americans would be exposed to "... incurring a charge of sharp practice...". Moffat and Phillips soothed the worried brows in Washington with the suggestion that Davis be limited to discussion of procedural questions and technical naval aspects of the problem, and not political matters.[145] Hull and Roosevelt expected Davis certainly to be able to iron out any differences between the two views on technical matters so that a common viewpoint could be created before the Japanese delegation arrived. Davis' final orders gave him tactical control over how he went about achieving that goal, so long as he did not "... run any risk of losing control of the talks you are guiding and that what we envisaged was a system of informal talks some what analogous to that you and Bingham had worked out last spring."[146]

Talks with the British were enjoined on June 18th, at Number 10 Downing Street, with the British being represented by MacDonald, Monsell, Admiral Little and Craigie; the Americans by Bingham, Davis, Admiral Leigh, and Atherton. The American attitude was to wait and see what the British proposal and opening position were to be. When they were given, Davis found them penetrating, frank and sympathetic, even more so than the American position. MacDonald laid out the problems that had arisen in the Far East and Europe since the London Conference in 1930. Both groups agreed that the Washington Treaty system was worth saving and that they would work to discourage any denunciation of it. Officially, both sides also agreed that they did not understand Japan's request for parity, and if the Japanese demanded such parity, then a written explanation as to why Japan felt it needed such a naval presence would be asked for. The two parties also agreed that their "... joint policy should be respectively to refuse to accept even a minor modification in the Japanese ratio without previous Anglo-American consultation."[147] This item was left out of the official minutes due to its sensitive nature. MacDonald had reacted to Davis' suggestion that the two nations should agree "... that in no circumstances would either country agree to any increase in the Japanese ratio of naval strength" with some trepidation.[148] MacDonald had proposed that neither side would end its opposition to the Japanese demands without first consulting the other. This system, he recalled, had been the basis for success in the 1930 London Naval Conference, where American and British delegates had conferred, consulted and cooperated without any written agreements being required.[149] Davis was reassured that both parties would work to keep Japan from gaining parity and that both also wished to avoid a naval race amongst the principal naval powers. Both the American and British delegations agreed that the substance of the meeting had to be kept utterly secret.[150]

Those initial agreements were followed up by a second series of conversations on June 20. Davis asked for and received confirmation of Roosevelt's desire for an agreement among the principal naval powers "... for a percentage reduction of possible up to 20 per cent, in the total treaty tonnages of all categories (except we should keep the present tonnage in aircraft carriers) without modification of the treaty rations, or failing such reduction, a prolongation of the Washington and London Treaty limitations for as long a period as possible, say from 10 to 15 years."[151] Certain technical issues concerning capital ship displacement and gun size were areas that had the potential to create problems, but, in Davis' opinion it was the question of the Japanese ratio that needed to be agreed on. As it appeared there was agreement with the British on that matter, he was most confident that, even if no other nations wished to join, the Americans and British could arrive at a treaty between themselves.[152]

A second meeting between the two delegations took place two days later, on June 20, at which time Davis put the question of what would happen if only the United States and Great Britain could agree on a program of future naval construction.[153] MacDonald replied that it would be most unfortunate if a race in naval construction ensued between the two countries, and, therefore, their objective should be to reach a naval agreement that would "...regulate their respective naval construction, it being understood that the levels agreed upon would be liable to modification, either upwards or downwards, in accordance with the rate of building actually undertaken by other Powers."[154] Once again, this admission was to be left out of the official record.

The Admiralty's technical and building plans did not sit well with the Americans. Proposals for 25,000 ton battleships with twelve-inch guns were unacceptable to the General Board and the British requirements concerning cruisers was also 'shocking' to Davis and his fellow representatives. However, Davis was willing to accept that British requirements were grounded in some strategic realities.[155] MacDonald was pleased with the result of the talks, believing that

> The US may refuse to build to our parity as it would be a waste of their money but we might get an agreement that we should on full understanding of each other's needs agree upon a naval attitude to each other eliminating competition. Unless we get a well signed Treaty I should deliberately work for this, as it would have more promise for the future than a bargained and uneasy agreement on limitation.[156]

MacDonald believed that the US could indeed be brought into some type of coalition. He explained to Simon the idea that the British and Americans could have agreement on general naval policy as follows: "With America rather nervous about Japan we might secure an agreement as regards the Pacific which would be of great benefit to the maintenance of peace."[157] Craigie agreed with that assessment, but cautioned that he believed it was the American plan to let the talks break down because of the uncompromising attitude of some other Power, probably Japan or France, and then "... to work for an Anglo-American naval understanding under which both countries would adhere to the principle of parity but the United States would probably only build up to the level of parity in so far as she is forced by Japan to do so."[158]

The American delegates were disappointed, however, in the British position. Davis himself had hoped for a solid anti-Japanese front and had not gotten it, although there was agreement that both Britain and the United States would oppose Japan's quest for parity.[159] Davis told Craigie that he felt a sense of betrayal, because it had been the Americans' understanding that the British had merely wanted to maintain the London Naval Treaty figures, not make increases in them. Those increases were in direct contrast to President Roosevelt's desire to see a reduction in numbers and tonnage. Craigie tried to sooth the delegates' sense of failure by expressing his belief that what had occurred was a beneficial and frank airing of each other's requirements in the light of the present world situation: "It would now be for the two missions to endeavour to find some way by which, without endangering our security, any unnecessary building by the United States and Japan could be avoided. This I did not believe to be by any means a hopeless problem if there were good will on both sides."[160] Davis agreed generally with Craigie's view, but told him confidentially and personally that Washington had been very upset by reports that Britain was going to curry favour with the Japanese at all costs and would sacrifice Anglo-American friendship if necessary in the process. That suspicion of British intentions, now coupled with this 'change of attitude' towards the naval building program would make it very difficult to induce the American government to take a generous view of Britain's naval proposals. Craigie pointed out that it was the British government's intention to arrive at some tripartite entente, rather than a bilateral understanding, that would improve relations with both the United States and Japan. He also highlighted some of the frustration that the British administration felt concerning such issues as America's true intentions in the Far East and the war debt matter, when it seemed that the Executive's alleged desire for cooperative solutions were checkmated by the Senate. Davis assured Craigie that "... in all matters relating to the Pacific we could be quite sure that the President and Congress saw absolutely eye to eye and that any policy approved by the President would be warmly endorsed by Congress."[161]

A good deal of discussion ensued on the British side after the talk between Craigie and Davis as to whether the Americans were really surprised or only feigning disappointment in order to help their position. After the talk with Davis, Craigie reported to the Prime Minister and the Admiralty that it was his opinion that the Americans were sincerely hurt by the Admiralty's demand for more cruisers and that this was not some sort of bargaining tactic.[162] Vansittart was not so sure, however, suspecting that the Americans had been fully aware of the British position but were now using this sense of betrayal as a manoeuvre to try and cast the blame for failure on Britain.[163] Admiral Little agreed with Craigie that the Americans had expressed surprise and alarm at British cruiser demands, but noted that the Americans did not criticise Britain's desire for the maintenance of an increased Fleet. In fact, it was his view that Davis had not only quite explicitly agreed with the proposed increases, but also had expressed his government's desire to see a twenty per cent reduction on the London Naval Treaty tonnages.[164] The mixed signals being put forward by the chief American negotiator were not lost on Little, who had also been told by Davis that the American navy had no figures of their own and planned to mold their Fleet after the British.[165] Little's advice, which was accepted by Chatfield, was that

> There can be no doubt that the great surprise which the American representatives have shown at our increased cruiser requirements must be artificial. In the first place, a close study of the problem which undoubtedly must be made in the Navy Department at Washington shows that with the increased qualitative limit of cruisers there is an automatic and unavoidable increase in the London Naval Treaty tonnages from this reason alone. Secondly, our minimum requirements were explained to the Americans in 1927 and subsequent to the 1930 Conference the Prime Minister and First Lord of the Admiralty stated in the House of Commons that these were still our requirements although we had agreed in the London Naval Treaty to reduce tonnages for a short period on account of the

> political situation. Since then the number of 70 cruisers has been frequently mentioned in this country and the American press and Mr. Davis himself admitted that he had heard of this number....We have been very frank with the Americans but in view of Mr. Norman Davis's suggestion that we may be able to reduce our requirements after discussion with the other Powers it seems that he has not understood that the figures we have put forward for cruisers are a minimum based on an absolute requirement, in spite of the very full explanation of this problem given at the meeting with the technical experts.[166]

Little ended his analysis by wondering if it wouldn not be best if he had a private, strictly unofficial, talk with Davis to try and to explain the British cruiser position more clearly. This idea was not accepted. Monsell did not want to push the Americans on the matter as yet, and was in favour of waiting to see what kinds of options could be produced by discussions with the Japanese.[167] Both MacDonald and Simon agreed with the Admiralty's assessment of the situation, in particular Monsell's proposal to let the Americans be for a while to sort themselves out. MacDonald's only suggestion was to try to get the USN to come up with some solid figures and numbers, especially on what their minimum requirements for capital ships would be.[168]

The American delegation was split on what options to follow, now that it looked as if the technical discussions with Britain had stalled. Bingham and Davis argued over when and what message to deliver to the President. The Ambassador recommended leaving the British alone, for it was his belief that in the light of the new strategic realities of the world, the British would eventually have to come to the Americans for assistance. Davis, on the other hand, was reluctant to acknowledge that perhaps these preliminary talks had been a failure, or that he had misread British intentions regarding cruiser limits.[169] He argued that the Admiralty's attitude, supported by the Foreign Office, confirmed his view that the proper American strategy was to take a strong stand at the outset against any increases and face down the British demands. By threatening such an early break-down of the conference over British demands, Davis was sure the American position could weather any public relations storm in the press, as well as leave the British with no choice but to come back to negotiate, after they had reconsidered their 'extreme' position.[170]

The President and the State Department agreed with Davis' point of view. Hull instructed him to take a strong stand against the British cruiser and capital ship proposals and to inform them that the President considered any increases to the existing tonnages to be absolutely unacceptable.[171] There was a tone of disappointment in Washington's reply, but the level of malice towards the British was negligible. Hull's telegram to Davis confirmed the American desire to see some agreement reached, for he instructed his key negotiator not to let the press create any ill-will or poisonous conditions around the talks:

> It is difficult to understand the subtle distinction made by MacDonald and Craigie between a "statement of position" and a "proposal" but this may well offer them a golden bridge for retreat and we for our part will facilitate it by indicating to the press, if necessary, that whatever increases the British technical experts may have indicate as their preference the British delegates have not committed themselves in any way, and that the conversations are still in an exploratory stage.[172]

Roosevelt lent his own eight to the effort to make sure relations with Great Britain did not rupture at this critical point by a personal appeal to MacDonald.[173] He emphasised the need to control the desires of Admirals and Navy Departments and hoped that technical issues could be put aside and some 'big basic principles' arrived at. Desiring to keep as much of these naval conversations as quiet as possible, FDR told MacDonald that the Prime Minister could let the Cabinet know what he had written but did not want the press to get hold of the news.[174] Indeed, the President refused to let himself admit that the conversations might fail and no limitation treaty would be produced.[175]

FDR and the State Department were also making certain that USN objections and reactions were not allowed to put an end to the talks. The General Board was most annoyed with the British proposal and demanded that Leigh and Wilkinson be brought back to the US immediately. Admiral Standley disagreed, and countered the Board's demand with a promise to issue instructions to the naval representatives putting limits on the conversations they could have with the British delegates. The CNO's actions did not correspond with the political aspects of the issue. Moffat and other State Department officials lobbied Standley to not put any restrictions on the naval representatives.[176] The primary purpose of the talks was to see if an accord could be reached in 1935, argued Moffat, and, if technical discussions were not allowed at this stage, then the Americans would go into the actual conference itself next year blind. He also pointed out that Standley's suggested actions could effectively end the talks before the Japanese arrived, thereby shifting the blame to the American delegation. Finally, he believed that the British were already showing signs of making some accommodations. Standley and Admirals Taussig and Clark were swayed by Moffat's points, and refrained from limiting the powers of the naval personnel in London.[177]

MacDonald replied that he, too, certainly wished for a reduction in the size and numbers of naval vessels, but that the strategic realities facing the British Empire made such concessions impossible to contemplate. Dangers in the Far East and Europe mitigated against any such action until the risk of conflict was reduced. He told Roosevelt that the British delegation had made the British position as clear and open as possible. It was MacDonald's hope "... that mutual examination and understanding will lead to an agreement on how to face the situation, remembering that a thorough understanding between us will enable us within bounds of our separate possibilities to maintain complete co-operation, because I firmly believe that that is an essential condition of the maintenance of sanity and peace in the world."[178] Craigie and Vansittart were less charitable about the President and his motivation for writing to MacDonald. Both condemned his views as being reflective of a need to assist domestic congressional elections and desire to shut his eyes to international problems.[179]

Davis and Bingham were both now convinced that Britain was determined to build a two-ocean navy; one which would allow it to deal with the Japanese in the Far East while at the same time providing the forces necessary for protecting European waters. The only thing that could arrest such a construction programme, Davis wrote, was a contractual agreement, passed by the US Senate, that gave Britain assurance in advance that it would not stand alone against Japan.[180] Both men also agreed that Japan was the main threat for both the Admiralty and the Cabinet. The movement to cooperate with the Americans and not to appease the Japanese was in the ascendant, said Davis, but the factional nature of the British policy-makers could not be ignored. Both the British and American delegations agreed that talks had reached a point where it was best to not go on to certain failure, but instead, talks with the Japanese and French should be explored, in the hope that some solution might thereby materialize for the Americans and British.[181] With no clear cooperative atmosphere created, the two sides agreed to disagree and to suspend any further official talks between themselves until the October, when a Japanese delegation (which had been delayed) was expected to arrive.[182] Both parties cooperated in putting a positive face on the stalled talks to the press. Each side claimed that a recess was natural and did not indicate any unsolvable problems or unbridgeable positions, nor did it mean that the talks had broken down.[183] Neither the side was willing to accuse the other in public, for each camp had too much to lose from a failed conference, and, there was a strong sense that some agreement between the two nations could still be arrived at.[184]

Craigie was very worried that a disgruntled and disappointed Davis would return to the United States after July 19th in a foul mood, spreading anti-British sentiment in a Stimson-like fashion. Such actions could damage forever any hopes of Anglo-American cooperation at the naval conference. He was most concerned that the realities of Britain's strategic position, particularly in the Far East, had to be spelt out most carefully and fully for the President, whom Davis was scheduled to see and brief immediately after his return from England.[185] Vansittart doubted that the Americans could ever be expected to see such realities. He did not want Craigie to lead the Americans on to expect that the British would be willing to compromise their security needs and was reluctant to approach them at all.[186] However, with the Admiralty's approval and assistance, Craigie composed a seminal summary of the British naval and foreign policy position that was approved by both the Admiralty and Foreign Office for transmittal to the President.[187]

Craigie enlisted the assistance of Ray Atherton to help ensure that the British message was received by the right people and not discounted by Davis or any other State Department officials with anti-British sentiments.[188] Both Craigie and Atherton were aware of the Congressional elections in November and the problems that these were creating for the President and his foreign and defence policies. However, the two also were confident that after those fall elections much more progress would then be made.[189]

The head of the American department knew that he could count on Atherton, because the two had worked very closely together to ensure that Foreign Office and State Department attitudes proceeded along closely parallel paths, especially in the stage-managing of the press's commentary surrounding the conference.[190] When Davis had announced his decision to return to the United States, Craigie had approached Atherton about what could be done to make certain that the two sides did not leave the discussions under a dark cloud of negative public comment. Davis and his delegation could no longer take the initiative on the matter, so Atherton told Craigie that, for the sake of American public opinion, the next step had to "appear" to come from the British, and should best be in the form of some declaration to the press that the American and British objectives remained identical. Such a step would remove any impression that unresolvable differences had arisen. An offer could then be made to the American delegation to join the British in issuing the statement to the press.[191] Craigie, privately and entirely off the record, took the unusual step of asking Atherton to draft just such a press release.

Atherton obliged, asking that his actions in the matter be kept absolutely anonymous, and submitted a draft which was then altered by Vansittart and Chatfield. Simon presented the statement to Norman Davis and his delegation, who much appreciated the document, and, after a brief re-drafting, wished to make the joint announcement.[192] They believed it would give them the leverage required to keep relations on a friendly footing while they presented the British case to the USN and State Department.[193] However, when Davis asked Hull if the statement could be issued as a joint communique his request was denied on the grounds that it would create an impression of differences of opinion between the two nations, make the Japanese suspicious that a common front against them was being formed, lead the press to ask embarrassing questions because it contained glaring ommissions, and, commit the US to continued negotiations regardless of future developments.[194] Nevertheless, the Secretary of State did use the statement as a general basis for his conversations with the American press. Hull told them he was not worried about the recess, that the talks would begin again in the fall and that any lack of progress to that point was the fault of the Japanese, who had not yet managed to get an authoritative delegation to London. Craigie liked the Secretary's handling of the matter and thought the British could take the same line, except for the part about the Japanese being at fault.[195]

Even though the joint communique itself was never issued, the process of cooperation in trying to construct a positive atmosphere around why the talks were recessed had done much to improve the general tone of Anglo-American relations towards the talks. Atherton informed Craigie that such was the case, especially from the point of view of the State Department:

> In the last few days the atmosphere had been greatly improved by the following ... events: (1) the issue of the Anglo-American-Japanese communique stating that further discussions would be postponed until October, pending the arrival of Japanese representatives; (2) Mr. Hull's statement to the press on the 16th instant which was to the effect that "the suspension of the London discussions did not mean that there had been a breakdown in the talk; the conversations had gone as far as possible for the time being and Mr. Davis would be

> prepared to return to London whenever the Japanese were ready to send delegates for the preliminary talks"; a report which the American journalists here had cabled over to Washington newspapers stating that Mr. Bingham and Mr. Norman Davis had had a very friendly final talk with the Secretary of State yesterday. The United States Government felt that the discussions had now been adjourned on such a "friendly and harmonious note" that it would be a pity to take any step which might conceivably provoke a discord.[196]

Craigie was also assured that Davis and his delegation had gone home in a happy frame of mind, with each nation's position clarified. Stanley Baldwin, former Prime Minster and now the Lord President of the Council, who had often taken the place of the less well-liked Simon in critical talks with the Americans, rejoiced at the news.[197] Simon himself thought it had been Davis' intention to leave in a good atmosphere all along and thought that the rescue effort was very good for all parties.[198] A rescue had indeed been performed, as both sides now regrouped on their respective sides of the Atlantic and prepared to take up the negotiations in the fall.

ENDNOTES

1.Sir Victor Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters, (London, 1944), p.33.

2.On pre-Roosevelt relations and a sense of trust in Anglo-American relations over Far Eastern and naval matters see: D.C. Watt, "The Nature of the Foreign-Policy Making Elite in Britain," in D.C. Watt ed., Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1965), pp.1-15; idem., Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975, (Cambridge, 1984); P.A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Years, (London, 1954), pp.35-47 and 69-80; Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente, (Columbia, 1978); F.C. Costigliola, "Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s," Journal of Economic History, Vol.37, 1977, pp.911-934; L.E. Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929, (New Brunswick, 1961); R.J. Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy, (Baton Rouge, 1969); R.L. Rapson, Britons View America: Travel Commentary, 1860-1935, (Seattle, 1971); David Carlton, "Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Conference of 1927," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.83, 1968, pp.573-98; Richard Fanning, "The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray," in B.J.C, McKercher ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament, pp.105-128; Roberta A. Dayer, "Anglo-American Monetary Policy and Rivalry in Europe and the Far East, 1919-1931," pp.158-186, Benjamin D. Rhodes, "The Image of Britain in the United States, 1919-1929: A Contentious Relative and Rival," pp.187-207, B.J.C. McKercher, "'The Deep and Latent Distrust': The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919-1929," all in B.J.C. McKercher ed., Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, (London, 1991); B.J.C. McKercher, "From Enmity to Cooperation: The Second Baldwin Government and the Improvement of Anglo-American Relations, November 1928-June 1929," Albion, vol.24, 1992, pp.64-87; idem, "The British Diplomatic Service in the United States and the Chamberlain Foreign Office's Perceptions of Domestic America, 1924-1927: Images, Reality, and Diplomacy," in B.J.C. McKercher and David J. Moss eds., Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939, (Edmonton, 1984), pp.221-248; idem, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States: Attitudes and Diplomacy, (Cambridge, 1984); Greg C. Kennedy, "The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927-1930, in McKercher Arms Limitation and Disarmament, pp.149-172; idem, "Depression and Security: Aspects Influencing the United States Navy during the Hoover Adminstration," Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.6, 1995, pp.342-372.

3.For various views of the crisis and what it meant to the United States, Great Britain and Japan, see: J.B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy. National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1939, (Princeton, 1966), pp.82-180; I.C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (New York, 1975), pp.656-63; I.H. Nish, Japan's Struggle With Internationalism. Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931-1933, (London, 1993), pp.23-43. For the American side of the falling out between the United States and Great Britain over the Manchurian Crisis, see Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy. The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933, (New York, 1973), pp.135-162; idem., "The Shanghai Crisis: The Basis of British Policy," The American Historical Review, Vol.75, 1970, pp.1616-1639, pp.1634-1639; James C. Thomson Jr., "The Role of the State Department," in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, pp.92-94; Dorthy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, (Harvard, 1964), pp.1-45; Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, (Cambridge, 1952), pp.929-930; H.L.Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, (New York, 1936); A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, (Yale, 1938), pp.410-436; and R.A. Hecht, "Great Britain and the Stimson Note of January 7, 1932," Pacific Historical Review, vol.38, 1969, pp.177-91; James Weland, "Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931", The Journal of Military History, vol.58, 1994, pp.445-460; Sandra Wilson, "The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations", Modern Asian Studies, vol.26, 1992, pp.507-544; idem., "Containing the Crisis: Japan's Diplomatic Offensive in the West, 1931-1933", Modern Asian Studies, vol.29, 1995, pp.337-372.

Stimson's anger at Sir John Simon and the British Cabinet, and his ability to transfer that anger (which in many cases was shared by the listener) into suspicion in other members of the Roosevelt Administration, especially those in the State Department, is evident in many instances. See Stimson Diary, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, Diary entry, May 17, 1934, talk with FDR; Ibid, Diary entry, July 24, 1934, talk with Stanley Baldwin. Also, Norman H. Davis MSS, (hereafter Davis MSS), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 54, Foreign Office memo on Stimson-Simon debate, April 30, 1935. See also, Confidential US State Dept. Central Files (hereafter CSDCF),on microfilm at the National Archive, Washington, D.C., 711.41/275, memo by Pierrepont Moffat (Division of Western European Affairs), July 14, 1934; Jay Pierrepont Moffat Diary, (hereafter Moffat Diary) Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Vol.35 (Jan.1 to July 1, 1934), entry for April 4, 1934. Also, William R. Castle Papers (hereafter Castle Papers or Castle Diary), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, Box 4, Folder England 1931-33, Private, Personal and Confidential letter from Ray Atherton (member of American embassy in London) to Castle, Feb.23, 1933; Ibid, Private, Personal and Confidential letter from Atherton to Castle, March 7, 1933; William R. Castle Diary, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa, Diary entry for Dec.5, 1934.

4.For some of the literature on the failed World Economic Conference of 1933, see A.P.N Erdmann, "Mining for the Corporate Synthesis: Gold in American Foreign Economic Policy, 1931-1936, Diplomatic History, 17, 1993, pp.171-200; A.M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, (Boston, 1939), pp.200-210; R. Moley, After Seven Years, (New York, 1939), pp.260-270; A. Booth, "Britain in the 1930s: A Managed Economy?", Economic History Review, 40, 1987, pp.499-521; idem., British Economic Policy, 1931-49, (London, 1989), pp.1-43; R. Middleton, Towards a Managed Economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the Fiscal Debate of the 1930s, (London, 1985); D. Kunz, The Battle for Britain's Gold Standard in 1931, (London, 1987), pp.160-163; idem., "When Money Counts and Doesn't: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives," Diplomatic History, vol.18, 1994, pp.451-462; J. Nichols, "Roosevelt's Monetary Diplomacy in 1933," American Historical Review, vol.56, pp.295-317; I. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 1931-39, (Cambridge, 1981); R.S. Sayers, The Bank of England, 1891-1944, (Cambridge, 1986), pp.455-460; P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy, and Empire, 1926-1932, (Cambridge, 1992), pp.500-504; K.A. Oye, "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Triangle: Monetary Diplomacy, 1929-1937," World Politics, vol.38, 1985, pp.173-99. The most useful contextual works on this topic are Patricia Clavin, "'The Fetishes of So-Called International Bankers': Central Bank Co-operation for the World Economic Conference, 1932-3," Contemporary European History, vol.3, 1992, pp.281-311; idem., "The World Economic Conference 1933: The Failure of British Internationalism," Journal of European Economic History, vol.20, 1991, pp.489-527; idem., The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, Germany, France and the United States, 1931-36, (London, 1996); Kenneth Moure, "The Limits to Central Bank Co-operation, 1916-36," Contemporary European History, vol.3, 1992, pp.259-279; Gyorgy Peter, "Central Bank Diplomacy: Montagu Norman and Central Europe's Monetary Reconstruction after World War I, Contemporary European History, 3, 1992, pp.233-258.

5.Moffat Diary, Vol.33, entry May 4, 1933.

6.Davis MSS, Container 51, letter from Davis to Roosevelt, April 7, 1933; Moffat Diary, Vol.35, entry April 4, 1934; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p.74.

7.For insights into those Anglo-American discussions on disarmament and their negative legacy, see: Moffat Diary, Vol.33, Jan.1 to June 30, 1933, diary entries for April 22, 23, 24, 25; Phillips memo, April 24, 1933, Vol.1, pp.68-69, in Edgar B. Nixon, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, 3 vols., Cambridge, Mass, 1969 (hereafter known as *FDR&FA*); *FDR&FA*, "Roosevelt to Heads of nations Represented at the London and Geneva Conferences," May 16, 1933, Vol.1, pp.126-128; FO 800/291, Simon MSS (hereafter Simon Papers), Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London, letter from Vansittart to Simon, May 23, 1933; CSDCF 711.41/261, despatch from Atherton to Hull, March 9, 1933; B.J.C. McKercher, "Of Horns and Teeth: the Preparatory commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926-1934," in B.J.C. McKercher ed., *Arms Limitation and Disarmament, 1899-1939*, pp.173-201; D. Richardson, *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s*, (London, 1989), pp.119-140; Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, Vol.2, (London, 1976), pp.134-163.

8.FO 371/17581/A961/198/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, telegram dated Jan.1, 1934; *ibid*, Simon minute, Feb.8, 1934.

9.FO 371/17581/A2700/198/45, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Mar. 22, 1934, and minutes by Vansittart, Craigie, Wellesley and Simon. In a pattern soon to become familiar, Anthony Eden stood out from these FO officials in his total support of Lindsay's warnings not to incite anti-British feeling in America through any propaganda war, Eden minute, April 13.

10.For the pro-Japanese views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, see CAB 2/6, Committee of Imperial Defence Minutes (hereafter CID minutes), PRO, Kew, London, 261st meeting, Nov.9, 1933.

11.Despite the claims made in such works as D.C. Watt, "Sir Warren Fisher and British Rearmament against Germany", in D.C. Watt *Personalities and Policies*, pp.100-116; Eunan O'Halpin, *Head of the Civil Service: A Study of Sir Warren Fisher*, (London, 1989), pp.227-265; Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy*, (Ithaca, 1985), pp.27-32; Charles Morrisey and M.A. Ramsay, "'Giving the Lead in the Right Direction': Sir Robert Vansittart and the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol.6, 1995, pp.39-60; David K. Varey, "'Fraught with the Gravest Difficulties': Sir Robert Vansittart, the Foreign Office and the Global Balance of Power, 1931-1934," an M.A. thesis in War Studies, the Royal Military College of Canada, 1995; and B.J.C. McKercher, "Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939," in Michael Dockrill and B.J.C. McKercher eds., *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp.79-115, that Sir Robert Vansittart was the catalyst and main constructor of British defense strategy from 1934 onwards, the evidence available clearly shows that Sir Warren Fisher and Vansittart did not control the DRC and the formulation of its eventual report. They were submerged and manipulated by Hankey and the Service Chiefs, and the resulting report was really about rearming to meet imperial defence needs in the Far East. Germany was for the future, not the immediate, which was what the DRC was all about. See Keith Neilson, "'Russia Herself is the Great Enigma': The Soviet Union in British Foreign and Defence Policy, 1930-1940," a paper given at the Canadian Historical Association meeting at Brock University, June 2, 1996. Also, Chapters 3 and 4 above.

12.See, CAB 16/109, Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Defence Requirements Committee (hereafter DRC), Dec.4, 1933; CAB 16/109, Minutes of 19th Meeting of DRC, 'Note by Sir Warren Fisher', Feb.17, 1934; CAB 21/434, Cabinet Registered Files, letter from Fisher to Hankey, Feb.17, 1934.

13.CAB 16/109, DRC 12 "Note by Sir Warren Fisher", Jan.30, 1934.

14.*Ibid*.

15.Fisher and the Treasury feared being left out of the 1935 naval talks. Fisher tried hard to get the anti-American sentiments he had presented to the DRC incorporated into the final report. His fears were, understandably, that the Foreign Office and Admiralty had traditionally treated such negotiations as their exclusive territory. If the Treasury's concerns about relations with America and their effect on Anglo-Japanese relations were not formally included in the DRC's report then they could be ignored during the naval negotiations because they would have no documentary basis. Fisher's fears were well founded. Vansittart and Chatfield both agreed with Fisher to some extent about the usefulness of America coming to Britain's aid in the Far East, but neither was willing to go as far as the Treasury and Fisher wished in alienating America. See CAB 16/109, minutes of 11th DRC meeting, Feb.19, 1934.

16.See Greg C. Kennedy, "1935: A Snapshot of British Imperial Defence in the Far East," in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson eds., Far Flung Lines: Essays in Honour of Donald M. Schurman, (London, 1997), pp.190-217; Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol.II, pp.164-193; idem., Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vol.III, (London, 1974), pp.67-120; CAB 53/5, Chiefs of Staff Committee, minutes of meeting (hereafter COS), meeting 132, July 24, 1934; CAB 16/109, minutes of 5th and 6th DRC meetings, Jan.19 and Jan.23, 1934.

17.Despite the claims by Morrisey and Ramsay, "'Giving the Lead in the Right Direction'"; Wark, Ultimate Enemy; Varey, "'Fraught with the Gravest Difficulties"; and McKercher, "Old Diplomacy and New", which support the narrow continentalist views of Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, (Oxford, 1980); and Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, (London, 1972), that the service chiefs were timid in their demands for defence funds during the DRC process, evidence shows that this hesitation was a realistic desire to not alienate reluctant government officials by demanding unrealistic sums of money for defence. One of the most powerful of those political figures who was wary of excessive defence spending was Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald himself, who held the view that "The military are getting too much on top, but up till now defence is so neglected that the time for pulling in has not come. They are, however, getting up pace and may not be easy to pull up." It was that sort of attitude which the service chiefs' cautious approach was designed to circumvent. MacDonald MSS PRO [Public Record Office, Kew] 30/69/1753, MacDonald Diary (Large), (hereafter MacDonald Diary), diary entry, Nov.27, 1934.

18.CAB 21/434, Hankey letter to Fisher, Feb.17, 1934.

19.CAB 53/23, Chiefs of Staff Papers (hereafter COS Papers), Paper No.307, May 20, 1933; CAB 4/2, Committee of Imperial Defence Papers (hereafter CID Papers), Paper No.1112-B. June 6, 1933.

20. CAB 16/109, minutes of the 3rd meeting of DRC, Dec.4, 1933.

21.Various other views of the usefulness or lack thereof of the Second London Naval Conference are found in: Meredith W. Berg, "Protecting National Interests by Treaty: the Second London Naval Conference, 1934-1936," in McKercher ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament, pp.203-229; Robert G. Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, (New York, 1990), pp.165-193; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, (Cambridge, 1974); Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937, (Cambridge, 1975), pp.88-114.

22.For the background to Vansittart's short-tempered attitude towards the United States, see Ch.2.

23.CAB 16/109, minutes of 11th DRC meeting, Feb.19, 1934

24.One example (the FO 371s for America and Japan are full of similar examples) that serves as an instructive insight into Vansittart's over-zealous desire to teach the Americans a lesson and protect British amour propre is found in an incident concerning Sir H.G. Armstrong, an ex-Consul General to New York. Armstrong wrote a letter to the New York Times arguing that the Americans subsidize their shipping in order to keep it competitive with the British. Vansittart was so outraged by and apoplectic over the incident that he began a campaign to see if Armstrong's government pension could be intercepted, reduced or cut off. After being informed that the ex-Consul General was independently wealthy, and that his pension could not be interfered with in any case, Vansittart still insisted in bringing Armstrong in to his office for a thorough going-over, despite assurances from his friend, Ambassador Lindsay, that Armstrong's mistake had been one of excitement, rather than any attempt to subvert the British merchant shipping position vis a vis the United States. It was not until after the successful conclusion of the 1935 London Naval talks that Vansittart began to see the Americans in a better light. FO 371/18747/A297/282/45, despatch and article from Lindsay to FO, minutes by Craigie, Wellesley and Vansittart, Dec.31, 1934; FO 371/18747/A636/282/45, despatch and letters, from Lindsay to FO, Jan.8, 1934; FO 371/18747/A1206/282/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, and minutes by Gore-Booth, Broad and Craigie, Feb.7, 1934.

25.While Vansittart may have been unfairly cast in the past as a man obsessed by the German threat to Great Britain and Anglo-French relations, recent attempts to paint him as a more Imperially-minded have neither been overly convincing with regard to Vansittart's role in the formulation of British foreign policy towards the United States, the Far East and the Soviet Union, nor accurate about his impact on British defence planning in the 1930s. The older works that are critical of Vansittart's performance include: Norman Rose, Vansittart. Portrait of a Diplomat, (London, 1977); A.R. Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1938, (New York, 1986); Aaron L. Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart's Search for Italian Cooperation Against Hitler, 1933-36," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.9, 1974, pp.93-130; Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office. An historical survey of the origins of the second world war based on the papers of Sir Robert Vansittart, (London, 1965). The restoration view is provided in a sympathetic and compassionate manner by a set of articles discussing Vansittart's role in the formulation of British foreign policy: B.J.C. McKercher, "The Last Old Diplomat: Sir Robert Vansittart and British Foreign Policy,"; Charles Morrisey and M.A. Ramsay, "Sir Robert Vansittart and the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee,"; M.L. Roi, "From the Stresa Front to the Triple Entente: Sir Robert Vansittart, The Abyssinian Crisis and the Containment of Germany,"; Simon Bourette-Knowles, "The Global Macawber: Sir Robert Vansittart, the Treasury and the Global Balance of Power, 1933-35; John R. Ferris, "Indulged in All Too Little?: Vansittart, Intelligence and Appeasement," all in Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.6, 1995. In the same vein, see D.C. Watt, How War Came, London, 1989; idem., "Chamberlain's Ambassadors," in Dockrill and McKercher eds., Diplomacy and World Power, pp.136-170; B.J.C. McKercher, "Old Diplomacy and New: the Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939," in Dockrill and McKercher eds., Diplomacy and World Power, pp.79-114.

26.FO 371/17593/A785/785/45, confidential letter from Admiralty to under secretary of state, Jan.24, 1934; Vansittart minutes, Feb.5.

27.Ibid, Vansittart minute.

28.FO 371/17596/A2060/1938/45, FO minute, Feb.9, 1934.

29.Ibid.

30.Craigie was not only the technical expert for the Foreign Office on naval matters, but during the course of the preliminary talks for the 1935 London Naval Conference he met with Prime Minister MacDonald in the mornings on a regular basis to inform the PM of events and to receive MacDonald's personal instructions on how to proceed on matters. See MacDonald Diary, entry Nov.29, 1934

31.FO 371/17596/A1977/1938/45, letter from Vansittart to Chatfield, Jan.19, 1934.

32.Ibid, FO memo by Craigie, Jan.9, 1934.

33.Ibid.

34.Ibid.

35.Ibid.

36.Ibid.

37.Ibid, Craigie minute, Jan.9, 1934.

38.FO 371/17596/A1977/1938/45, Simon minute, Feb.1, 1934.

39.These critics reflected the theorizing of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and his calls for smaller capital ships. See Hunt, Sailor-Scholar. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871-1946, (Waterloo, 1982), pp.189-208; Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, Vol.II, (London, 1947), p.60. For views on importance of Craigie and events leading up to the conference, see Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, Vol.II, pp.64-76.

40.FO 371/17596/A1977/1938/45, Simon minute, Feb.1, 1934.

41.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Feb.5 and Simon minute, Feb.5, 1934.

42.For a useful look at Admiralty and Foreign Office relations and British naval planning see, Orest Babij, "The Royal Navy and the defence of the British Empire, 1928-1934," in Kennedy and Neilson, eds., Far Flung Lines, pp.171-189.

43.FO 371/17596/A1978/1938/45, letter from Chatfield to Vansittart, Jan.23, 1934.

44.Ibid, Craigie minute, Jan.26, 1934.

45.Ibid, draft letter from Vansittart to Chatfield, Jan.27, 1934.

46.Davis Papers, Container 41, letter from Pierrepont Moffat to Davis, Sept.25, 1933.

47.Ibid; Davis Papers, Container 41, letter from Moffat to Davis, Oct.3, 1933.

48.Davis Papers, Container 41, letter from Davis to Moffat, Oct.10, 1933.

49.For earlier evidence of Pratt and Hepburn's desire for closer Anglo-American cooperation on naval matters, see Davis Papers, Container 17, Secret Memo on USN naval disarmament plans, Sept.21, 1932.

50.Moffat Diary, Vol.33, entry for Mar.16, 1933.

51.Ibid, entry for Mar.18, 1933; RG 80, General Board, 1900-1947, GB 420-2, (hereafter GB 420-2), National Archives, Washington, D.C., memo from CNO Pratt "The Navy's Needs", July 20, 1933. See also Gerald H. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy, (Washington, 1974), pp.359-375.

52.Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Vol.1, "General and British Commonwealth", telegram from Grew to Hull, Jan.22, 1934, p.217.

53.Moffat Diary, Vol.35, entry for Jan.31, 1934.

54.Robert W. Bingham Diary (hereafter Bingham Diary), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., entry Feb.20, 1934.

55.Ibid.

56.Ibid, entry for Feb.1, 1934.

57.FO 371/17596/A1979/1938/45, Official letter from the Admiralty to Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, Feb.10. 1934.

58.Ibid.

59.Ibid, Craigie minute, Feb.15.

60.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Feb.16.

61.Ibid, Craigie minute, Feb.21.

62.For some insights into MacDonald's handling of foreign affairs and his mental state at the time, see David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, (London, 1977), pp.704-705, 715, 736-737, 757-759.

63.Bingham Diary, entry for Mar.1, 1934; MacDonald Diary, entry for Mar.4, 1934; FO 371/17596/A1938/1938/45, record of a conversation, Mar.5, 1934; FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Bingham to Hull, Mar.5, 1934, p.222.

64.FRUS, vol.1, memo from Davis to FDR, Mar.6, 1934, pp.222-230. See also CSDCF, 741.94/32 despatch from Atherton to Hull, Mar.16, 1934.

65.FRUS, vol.1, memo from Davis to FDR, Mar.6, 1934, pp.222-230.

66.Bingham Diary, Mar.1. 1934; FRUS, vol.1, telegram Bingham to Hull, Mar.5, 1934, p.222.

67.For views on Simon's role in armament and disarmament talks at this time, see David Dutton Simon: A Political Biography of Sir John Simon, (London, 1992), pp.181-210.

68.Bingham Diary, entry for Mar.2, 1934.

69.Ibid. Bingham's beliefs on the desire of the British for cooperation was reinforced by Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, who told the Ambassador that the Americans and British should prepare themselves militarily to be able to "...take care of these nigger[s]", referring to the Japanese. See Bingham Diary, entry for Mar.21, 1934 The personal relationship between Simon and Bingham only got worse as the year went on. Sniping by Mrs. Simon about southerners lynching blacks provoked a strong reply from Bingham at a dinner party. This was followed up by remarks made by Simon at a luncheon at No.10 Downing St., which the Ambassador heard, about how Mrs. Simon was being forced to use antiseptics to ward off disease ever since attending a luncheon given at the Bingham's residence. The result of these incidents was a very negative view of Simon and his handling of British foreign policy. Bingham's assessments of such things were incorporated into how the State Department and the President formulated their view of British policy. See Bingham Diary, entry for Oct.30 and Nov.1, 1934.

70.President's Private Secretary's Files (hereafter FDR-PSF), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, Confidential Files, Box 142, Folder, London Naval Conference 1934, note by Phillips to FDR, Mar.21, 1934.

71.For the particulars of that struggle and the final success of the Foreign Office in directing a policy which kept Britain from maintaining a formal alliance with any one nation against Japan, - the 'No-Bloc' policy - see Kennedy, "1935."

72.See CAB 2/6, CID Minutes, 261 Meeting, Nov.9, 1933; CAB 4/22, CID Paper No. 1112-B, "Imperial Defence Policy", June 6, 1933 and CID Paper No. 1113-B, "Imperial Defence Policy, Annual Review of the Chief of Staff," Oct.12, 1933; CAB 53/23, COS Paper No.304 (Joint Planning Committee, hereafter JP), 'The Situation in the Far East, Plans for Singapore and Hong-Kong,' April 7, 1933, COS Paper No.305, 'Situation in the Far East,' March 31, 1933, COS Paper No.306, 'Imperial Defence Policy,' April 8, 1933, COS Paper No.307, 'Imperial Defence Policy and Memo by the Foreign Office,', May 20, 1933, COS Paper No.310, 'Imperial Defence Policy, Annual Review of the COS,' Oct.12, 1933; CAB 16/109, DRC 19, 'Memo by Sir Warren Fisher', Feb.17. 1934; DRC 20, 'The Far Eastern Situation, letter and set of memorandum from Sir Robert Vansittart and the Foreign Office', Feb.24, 1934.

73.CAB 23/78, Cabinet Minutes, PRO, Kew, London, minutes of meeting 9(34), Mar. 14, 1934.

74.*Ibid*.

75.*Ibid*.

76.See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (hereafter DBFP), London, 1984, Second Series, Vol.XX, Far Eastern Affairs, May 20, 1933 - Nov.5, 1936, No.77, "Summary by Sir V. Wellesley of memorandum on the situation in the Far East," [F295/295/61], January 18, 1934.

77.*DBFP*, Vol.XX, letter from Vansittart to the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, [F295/295/61], Mar.12, 1934. This letter was also sent to the War Office, Air Ministry, Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Board of Trade, and India Office, with copies also going to Hankey and Cabinet Ministers.

78.CAB 24/248, Cabinet Papers (hereafter CP), PRO, Kew, London, CP 80(34), 'Memo by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,' Mar.16, 1934.

79.FO 371/17596/A2176/1938/45, memorandum by the Chief of the Naval Staff in preparation for the 1935 London Naval Conference, Mar.14, 1934.

80.*Ibid*. See also, Kennedy, "1935", pp.204-206.

81.FO 371/17596/A2176/1938/45, memo by CNS, Mar.14, 1934.

82.*Ibid*, Simon minute, Mar.19, 1934.

83.*Ibid*.

84.FO 371/17596/A2416/1938/45, record of meeting held at Admiralty on March 20, Mar.23, 1934.

85.Ibid. For Chatfield's view on Britain's naval position during these talks see, Roskill, Naval Policy, vol.2, pp.72-75; Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, Vol.II, pp.64-73; Eric J. Grove, "Admiral Sir (later Baron) Ernle Chatfield (1933-1938), in Malcolm H. Murfett ed., The First Sea Lords, (Westport, 1995), pp.157-173. For Chatfield's earlier career see his autobiography, The Navy and Defence, (London, 1942).

86.FO 371/17596/A2416/1938/45, record of meeting on March 20, Mar.23, 1934.

87.FO 371/17596/A2417/1938/45, memo from Director of Plans on 1935 Naval Conference, Mar.23, 1934.

88.Ibid, Craigie minute, Mar.28, 1934.

89.Ibid, covering note signed by Vansittart and Chatfield, Mar.23, 1934.

90.CSDCF, 741.93/71, confidential memo of conversation, Mar.10, 1934.

91.Moffat Diary, entry for Mar.16, 1934; Bingham Diary, entry for Apr.12, 1934.

92.Moffat Diary, entry for Mar.16 and Apr.1, 1934.

93.On the centrality of Hornbeck in the formulation of American Far Eastern policy, see: Castle Diary, diary entries for May 26, 1933; Nov.7, 1933, and May 29, 1934; Oral History of Eugene Dooman, (hereafter Dooman interview) on Occupation of Japan, by Columbia University, May, 1962, on microform at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, p.98; Richard D. Burns, "Stanley K. Hornbeck: The Diplomacy of the Open Door", in Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennett eds., Diplomats in Crisis, (Santa Barbara, 1974), pp.90-117; Russell D. Buhite, "The Open Door in Perspective: Stanley K. Hornbeck and American Far Eastern Policy", in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson eds., Makers of American Diplomacy, (New York, 1974), pp.431-458; James C. Thomson Jr., "The Role of the Department of State", in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, pp.81-106; Kenneth G. McCarty, "Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Far East, 1931-1941", Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1970; Shizhang Hu, Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Open Door Policy, 1919-1937, (Westport, 1995).

94.Nelson T. Johnson MSS (hereafter NTJ papers), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 23, folder G-M, personal and confidential letter from Stanley K. Hornbeck (hereafter Hornbeck) to Johnson, Feb.14, 1934.

95.NTJ papers, strictly confidential letter from Hornbeck to Johnson, July 9, 1934.

96.NTJ papers, copy of a letter dated June 5 send from Hornbeck to Ray Atherton in London, copy sent by Hornbeck to Johnson on July 9, 1934.

97.FRUS, vol.1, memo from Hornbeck to Hull, Mar.31, 1934, pp.230-231.

98.Ibid.

99.FO 371/17597/A2966/1938/45, Admiralty and Foreign Office Memorandum, "Report by Admiral Little to NCM(35) (Ministerial Committee on London Naval Conference for 1935-36) on preparations for the 1935 Naval Conference," Apr.12, 1934. The cruiser question was an old song for the two nation. See Roskill, Naval Policy, Vol.II, pp.286-289, 290-295, 300-317; Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp.119-122;

Berg, "Second London Naval Conference", p.213.

100.The General Board of the USN was not in favour of smaller battleships carrying guns of less than sixteen inches because of the lack of American bases in the Pacific and the lack of destructive power in the fourteen-inch guns. The General Board's view was that, if and when war broke out, and given the limited bases for repairs available to the Americans, the maximum damage had to be inflicted on the enemy whenever the opportunity to inflict damage occurred, thus the need for the sixteen inch guns. See RG 80, Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board of the U.S. Navy, 1900-1950 (hereafter Proceedings and Hearings), National Archives, Washington, D.C. "Reduction in Displacement and Armament of Capital Ships," March 31, 1931, Reel 21; "Capital Ships," Oct.8, 1935, Reel 22; "Capital Ships," Oct.14, 1935, Reel 22; "Capital Ships," Oct.22, 1935, Reel 22; and "Capital Ships," Dec.13, 1935, Reel 22.

101.FO 371/17597/A2966/1938/45, report by Little, Apr.12, 1934.

102.FO 371/17597/A2966/1938/45, report by Craigie, Apr.12, 1934.

103.FO 371/17597/A2966/1938/45, private and secret letter from Craigie to Lindsay, Apr.17, 1934.

104.FDR-PSF, Confidential Files, Box 142, Folder, London Naval Conference 1934, letter from Davis to FDR, Apr.23, 1934.

105.For details on the Amau Declaration see Dutton, Simon, pp.191-193; James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938, (Princeton, 1966), pp.195-198; Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the Inter-war Years, p.92; S. Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy 1933-1937, (Manchester, 1975), pp.45-50, p.66; Roy H. Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542-1936, (Tokyo, 1936), pp.138-139; Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's View, 1919-37," in Ian Nish ed., Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952, pp.42-43; idem, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, pp.210-213, p.216; Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp.46-99.

106.FDR-PSF, Box 142, Folder - London Naval Conference, 1934, letter from Bingham to FDR, Apr.23, 1934.

107.CAB 29/147, Minutes of NCM(35), First Meeting, Apr.16, 1934.

108.Ibid.

109.FO 371/17597/A4114/1938/45, memo from Sir Warren Fisher, May 16, 1934.

110.Ibid, Craigie minutes, May 18 and 25, 1934.

111.Ibid, draft memo from Vansittart to Fisher, undated for May, 1934.

112.Ibid.

113.Ibid.

114.Ibid.

115.Ibid. The Foreign Office view of not being able to ignore America in order to favour Japan in the naval conference was supported by the Admiralty. See CAB 29/148, NCM(35)10, Memo by Chief of the Naval Staff, May 18, 1934.

116.FO 371/17597/A4114/1938/45, draft memo, undated for May, 1934. Vansittart appears to have not wanted to aggravate the Treasury's sensitivities to the reality of needing American support in the event of another major war, especially one that might include Germany and Japan attacking the empire simultaneously.

117.*Ibid*. That sentence was omitted from the final copy sent off to Fisher.

118.Moffat Diary, entry for Apr.26, 1934.

119.Moffat Diary, entry for Apr.27, 1934.

120.Throughout the month of May, mutual suspicions concerning leaks to the press about the nature of these secret and very preliminary discussions threatened to poison the whole process. Both the State Department and the Foreign Office, as well as the USN and RN, put the need to establish a cooperative spirit ahead of the issue of who was to blame for the leak. See FO 371/17597/A4132/1938/45, record of conversation between Craigie and Atherton, May 25, 1934; FO 371/17597/A4136/1938/45, report from Director of Naval Intelligence, Vice-Admiral Dickens, May 26, 1934; FO 371/17597/A4538/1938/45, record of conversation between Atherton and Craigie, June 1, 1934; Moffat Diary, entry for May 2, 1934.

121.FO 371/17597/A4517/1938/45, FO memo on "Preparations for the 1935 Naval Conference,", written by Craigie, May 1, 1934. On the context for the situation, the Amau Declaration and Oil Monopoly problem, see Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East*, p.222-223; Trotter, *Britain and East Asia*, pp.115-131; Peter Lowe, *Britain in the Far East*, p.148; Kennedy, "1935", pp.193-196.

122.FDR-PSF, Britain 1933-36, letter from Bingham to FDR, May 1, 1934.

123.FDR-PSF, Great Britain 1933-36, letter from Bingham to FDR, May 8, 1934; Hull Papers, Container 37, letter from Bingham to Hull, July 23, 1934.

124.FDR-PSF, Great Britain 1933-36, letter from Bingham to FDR, May 8, 1934.

147.*FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 18, 1934, pp.259-261.

148.FO 371/17598/A5183/1938/45, FO minute on present position of naval conversations, by Craigie, June 21, 1934.

149.*Ibid*.

150.*FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 19, 1934, pp.261-261. Davis was also worried about the British being able to read the delegation's confidential cables back to Washington.

151.*FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull and FDR, June 19, 1934, pp.262-264.

152.*Ibid*. Davis' cautious optimism about a succesful technical agreement with the British was shared by Admiral Standley and Hull, see *FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, June 19, 1934, p.266.

153.FO 371/17598/A5183/1938/45, FO minute by Craigie, June 21, 9134; *FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 21, 1934, pp.266-267.

154.*Ibid*.

155.Ibid; FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Bingham to Hull, June 22, 1934, pp.267-268; MacDonald Diary, entry for June 20, 1934.

156.MacDonald Diary, entry for June 20, 1934.

157.FO 37117598/A5384/1938/45, letter from MacDonald to Simon, June 28, 1934.

158.Ibid, minute by Craigie, July 2, 1934.

159.Bingham Diary, entry for June 22, 1934; FO371/17598/A5184/1938/45, FO minute, record of conversation between Craigie and Davis, June 23, 1934; FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 25, 1934, pp.272-274.

160.FO 371/17598/A5184/1938/45, FO minute, record of conversation between Craigie and Davis, June 23, 1934.

161.Ibid.

162.Ibid, letter from Craigie to Little, and Craigie minute, both June 25, 1934.

163.Ibid, Vansittart minute, June 26, 1934.

164.FO 371/17598/A5314/1938/45, Most Secret memo by Admiral Little, June 28, 1934.

165.Ibid.

166.Ibid.

167.Ibid, Most Secret covering note from C.B. Coxwell, First Lord's secretary, to Craigie, June 28, 1934. Copies of this memo were also sent to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, but not to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. On talks with the Japanese, see Berg, "Second London Naval Conference", pp.214-217; Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Age, pp.166-172; Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 118-151.

168.FO 371/17598/A5314/1938/45, letters from Neville Butler (MacDonald's private secretary) to Coxwell, June 29, and from H.F. Seymour (Simon's private secretary) to Coxwell, July 3, 1934.

169.Bingham Diary, entry for June 29, 1934; Ibid, entry for July 16, 1934; Hull Papers, Container 37, letter from Bingham to Hull, July 23, 1934.

170.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 25, 1934, pp.272-274; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 25, 1934, pp.274-275.

171.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, June 26, 1934, pp.276-277.

172.Ibid. The State Department had learned its lesson on how to handle the press during the World Economic Conference and over war debt debates. During the entire naval conference process, the State Department and the Foreign Office manipulated and starved the press until they were certain of a favourable outcome.

173.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from FDR to Davis, June 26, 1934, pp.277-278; FO 371/17598/A5315/1938/45, secret note and copy of message from Butler to Seymour, June 29, 1934.

174.Ibid.

175.Moffat Diary, entry for June 26, 1934.

176.Moffat Diary, entry for June 25, 1934. On earlier discussion by the General Board as to whether the USN had a place for a light cruiser or not, see comments by Standley and Taussig in Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board, "Light cruisers", March 16, 1934.

177.Moffat Diary, entry for June 26, 1934.

178.FO 371/17598/A5315/1938/45, secret telegram from MacDonald to FDR, June 28, 1934; FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 27, 1934, pp.281-282.

179.FO 371/17598/A5315/1938/45, Craigie and Vansittart minutes, both July 6, 1934.

180.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to FDR and Hull, June 28, 1934, pp.282-284.

181.FO 371/17598/A5428/1938/45, record of conversation and minutes between Craigie and Matsudaira, June 28, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5430/1938/45, FO minute, July 2, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5511/1938/45, FO minute by Craigie on talks with French delegation, July 5, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5556/1938/45, FO minute, July 4, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5564/1938/45, NC(F) minutes of 1st-5th meetings with French naval delegation, July 9, 1934.

182.Moffat diary, entries for June 27 and 28, 1934.

183.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, June 29, 1934, p.284; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, July 3, 1934, pp.285-286; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, June 3, 1934, pp.286-287; Ibid, telegram from Acting Secretary of State (Carr) to Davis, July 3, 1934, p.287; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, July 5, 1934, pp.287-289; Ibid, telegram from Hull to Davis, July 6, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5167/1938/45, NCM(35) 14, private and secret memo by Craigie on direction of naval conversations to date, July 20, 1934; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, July 17, 1934, pp.295-296; Ibid, telegram from Hull to Davis, July 17, 1934, pp.296-297; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, July 18, 1934, pp.297-298.

184.Suspicions on both sides ran high about leaks to the press. These suspicions threatened to create a strained atmosphere for further negotiation, but, eventually, the State Department was shown that the British were not responsible for certain leaks to the American press. The end result was an improvement in Anglo-American relations during the remainder of the talks because the Americans now believed in the honesty of the British in their dealings with the Americans. Atherton and Craigie worked closely together on this incident at well, helping to ensure that the matter did not become a major stumbling block to Anglo-American relations. See FO 371/17599/A5850/1938/45, record of conversation between Norman Davis and Sir John Simon, July 4, 1934; FO 371/17599/A5851/1938/45, FO memo by Sir V. Wellesley, July 7, 1934; FO 371/17599/A5852/1938/45, secret letter from Commander Clarke (CID) to Craigie, July 9, 1934; FO 371/17599/A5853/1938/45, FO memo by Craigie, July 9, 1934.

185.FO 371/17598/A5606/1938/45, FO memo by Craigie, July 10, minute by Craigie, July 11, 1934.

186.Ibid, Vansittart minute, July 12, 1934; FO 371/17598/A5607/1938/45, Vansittart minute, July 13, 1934. Simon had read and approved of the final copy of the memo as well, see Ibid, Seymour minute, July 13, 1934.

187.FO 371/17598/A5606/1938/45, letter from Craigie to Admiral Little, July 10, and letter from Little to Craigie, July 13, 1934; FO 371/17599/A6144/1938/45, FO memo by Craigie, July 25, 1934. Vansittart thought the final draft an excellent statement of the British position, as did Sir John Simon, who wanted a copy for his own files. See FO 371/17599/A6144/1938/45, Vansittart and Simon minutes, both July 25, 1934. The final copy sent to the Americans is also in FRUS, vol.1, enclosure in despatch from Atherton to Hull (and was sent on to White House), July 27, 1934, pp.299-303.

188.FO 371/17598/A5606/1938/45, record of conversation between Atherton and Craigie, July 10, 1934.

189.Ibid.

190.See notes 172 and 184 above.

191.FO 371/17598/A5606/1938/45, record of conversation, July 11, 1934.

192.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, July 17, 1934, pp.295-296; FO 371/17599/A5854/1938/45, draft communique and Craigie minute, July 16, 1934; FO 371/17599/A5855/1938/45, drafts from Capt. Danckwerts (Plans Division, Admiralty) to Craigie, July 17, 1934; FO 371/17599/A5856/1938/45, letter from Norman Davis to Sir John Simon, July 17, 1934.

193.FO 371/17598/A5607/1938/45, record of conversation, July 13, 1934.

194.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, July 17, 1934, pp.296-297; Davis Papers, letter from Moffat to Davis, July 20, 1934.

195.FO 371/17598/A5740/1938/45, despatch from Osborne (Washington embassy), July 17, 1934; Ibid, Craigie and Wellesley minutes, both July 18, 1934. According to Capt. A.R. Dewar, the RN Naval Attache in Washington, the stage-managing of the press-releases in London and declaration of support were keeping the talks from becoming an issue which the American press could savage at home. See FO 371/17599/A5915/1938/45, despatch from Naval Attache, July 23, 1934.

196.FO 371/17599/A5966/1938/45, record of conversation between Atherton and Craigie, July 18, 1934.

197.Ibid, Baldwin minute, July 19, 1934. Baldwin was much more well-liked than Simon, and the British delegation and NCM knew this. They strove to use Baldwin during the naval talks with the Americans as much as possible in order to avoid having to overcome the Americans' distrust of Simon on such occasions. Stimson had told Baldwin very frankly in July that the Roosevelt Administration was sour on Simon and blamed him for the lack of progress in creating Anglo-American cooperation. See Stimson Diary, entries for July 24, 25, and 26, 1934.

198.FO 371/17599/A5966/1938/45, Simon minute, July 18, 1934.

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UMI

CHAPTER SIX

CREATING THE TIES THAT BIND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN TRUST AND THE 1935 LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

Part two

The return of the American delegation to the United States signaled the beginning of the final clash between the Admiralty and Foreign Office against the Treasury in preparation for the renewed naval talks scheduled for October. A position had to be taken, once and for all, as to whether Japan's demand for parity would either be accepted or refused; a refusal which would mean having to work much closer with the Americans.

On the very day that Davis and his colleagues left for home, Hugh Wilson, the American representative to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, called on Anthony Eden. Wilson told Eden that Americans had information from Geneva that showed clearly that the Japanese would not participate in any technical committee at the Disarmament Conference, which led the Americans to believe that Tokyo would not agree to a new naval treaty in 1935.[1] Wilson relayed to Eden a message from Davis, repeating Davis' belief that the Japanese, if they demanded parity, would have to be the ones blamed for the failure of the conference. In order to ensure that this was the case, America and Britain needed to take a similar position during the conference talks. The message ended with Wilson repeating that the British were faced with two choices: either to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance and suffer the consequences, or, to try to establish an Anglo-American alliance. Wilson did not think the latter likely, in a formal, public sense, but he re-emphasised the need to make a joint effort that maintained as far as possible a full measure of Anglo-American cooperation. It was the cruiser tonnage issue (a sixty per cent increase) which was the fly in the ointment for the Americans, said Wilson.[2]

This message, along with public announcement by the American Secretary of the Navy, Claude L. Swanson, for cuts in the treaty tonnages of between ten and thirty per cent, provoked an angry and hostile reaction from the Foreign Office. Craigie called the American arguments disingenuous at best. His view was that, "So far the main result of these tactics has been to make agreement more difficult not only with Japan but also with this country. Unfortunately Mr. Norman Davis fancies himself as a diplomatic tactician while Mr. Swanson fancies himself as a naval die-hard and this is the difficult combination with which we have to deal."[3] Vansittart, who had been informed by Atherton that such a message from Davis was simply an American tactic to try to get the British to move closer to the US position, was, as usual, even more scathing in his assessment of events.

> Unfortunately the American idea of tactics, which is one always inspired by their own internal politics, is not one which could conceivably be adopted by our Admiralty. And even if it were, it would be completely disengenuous - and very dangerous - for us to be talking of reduction, in view of the Admiralty minima. As to Mr. Wilson's panacea, no sane person dreams of renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As to America there is no question of closer relations. These may become possible when American realises that she must have a policy. Hitherto she has thought it possible to dispense with the inconvenience - indeed with the inconvenience of all but the most nebulous and smug thinking. Events will force her out of that already waning illusion, - events, not we. We meanwhile can only wait and try to steer a middle course, as regards America and Japan. Personally I do not think that the American politician's idea of tactics is going to be very helpful to "a full measure of Anglo-American agreement".[4]

The foreign secretary did not object to these views. There were, however, other voices still to be heard from.

Neville Chamberlain and Warren Fisher were attempting to bring the Treasury point of view into play once more. On August 3, Fisher rang-up Commander Clark of the Cabinet Office to inform him that the Treasury took a dim view of the naval talks to date. It appeared that there had been no approved policy for the British delegation to follow during the preliminary discussions, said Fisher, who then proceeded to launch into another tirade on the need not to work with the Americans. Fisher then suggested that talks with the other Powers in the fall be delayed until after the recess, so that Ministers would have time to consider Britain's naval policy.[5] Clark responded by, first, pointing out the fallacies underlying Fisher's assumptions concerning the British delegation's instructions. He then informed the Treasury official that

> ...in expression of my own opinion, that I anticipated opposition by both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty to any suggestion to postpone the arrival of the Japanese for two reasons: Firstly, the embarrassment of having to give, at this stage, reasons for such a postponement, and secondly, that I knew it was desired to complete these preliminary talks as soon as possible in order that there might be time for consideration of the policy to be followed at the Naval Conference.[6]

Sir Warren Fisher, however, was clearly determined to pursue his line. It was obvious to Clark that the Treasury would make attempts to force a ministerial meeting or meetings after the recess in the hope that they may adopt a policy more in accord with Chamberlain and Fisher's ideas. Clark passed the Treasury view on to the Admiralty and Foreign Office so that Monsell and Simon were informed of Fisher's attitude. Both ministers refused to contemplate a postponement.[7]

Craigie and the Admiralty were at that moment discussing the possibility of sending a emissary to Washington to speak to FDR personally about the naval talks. Both were desperately anxious to keep the Americans happy and working toward some sort of agreement, but their views on how to go about doing so were at odds.[8] Craigie wanted to go to Washington himself, for he feared that without someone actually present to explain the British position, there was a chance that no understanding would be reached that autumn. His reasons for such fears were

> Mr. Swanson seems determined to bluster and to use the capital ships displacement question as a lever to force a reduction of our demands for new cruiser construction. The recent Anglo-American conversations proved unsatisfactory for four principal reasons: 1. Mr. Roosevelt, having only the haziest knowledge of the question, has hitherto looked upon it largely in terms of domestic politics and has consequently laid it down that he will be content with nothing less than an all-round percentage reduction. 2. His principal adviser on naval matters, Mr. Swanson, is a type of die-hard big-navalist who believes in bluster and the big stick, and who has had the misfortune to sit for a generation in the United States Senate. 3. Mr. Norman Davis is a politician who draws his main support from peace societies and goodwill organisations in the United States, and, as he said to me in a moment of candour, he could not afford to sign an agreement which provided for increases over existing Treaty figures; thus our case for cruiser increases will certainly not have gained in its presentation by Mr. Norman Davis and his influence will have tended to emphasise rather than to moderate Mr. Roosevelt's natural inclination to look at this question through domestic spectacles. 4. Mr. Hull is what Americans call a "poor fish", and there is no reason to believe he is friendly

> to this country. Mr. Roosevelt personally would like good relations with this country, but he is surrounded by men who try to narrow what would normally be a broad vision in foreign affairs. In his hands is the key to this naval problem and, unless he can be won over first, the resumed conversations in the autumn are likely to fare no better than the last....It is held in some quarters here that if the United States continues to be uncompromising we might reach some kind of naval understanding with the Japanese. This hope is in my humble opinion quite illusory and, in any case, such a course would be politically dangerous. If matters cannot be improved between the United States and ourselves Japan will have an unrivalled opportunity to fish in troubled waters - a pastime in which she has always shown herself most proficient.[9]

Vansittart thought that the personal touch would be useful, but was reluctant to let that touch be Craigie's, given that the American press would immediately suspect some sort of deal on naval issues was being struck.[10] However, the whole matter was abandoned after Chatfield protested against such an approach. He and other Admiralty planners feared that such tactics would antagonize and infuriate the United States Navy, and in particular the General Board. If the USN were provoked in such a fashion, this could only lessen the chances of persuading American naval officials of any merit in the British position. Chatfield was particularly concerned that, if the USN was pushed to that point, it would then try to manipulate the Japanese into an even more anti-British position.[11] In the face of such Admiralty opposition, Craigie and Vansittart were agreeable to letting the matter die on the vine. The Admiralty and Foreign Office were working well together in their traditional roles as chief constructors and negotiators of British naval policy. Now, once and for all, before the October talks began, the Treasury demands for some sort of agreement with Japan had to be discredited.

The Japanese suggestion that they would be interested in a non-aggression pact with the British was seen as a hollow promise by both the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. Both departments saw the United States as a more important participant in terms of possible future strategic problems involving Britain in the Far East, if Britain was to retain any of her imperial position in that region. Japan was seen as being clearly an aggressive and dangerous power, and one that was not expected to compromise during the naval talks in 1935. It would welcome some sort of arrangement with the British, but, any such agreement would not protect Britain's Far Eastern interests from eventually falling to Japan. So, even though there was much doubt about the Americans formally cooperating with the British against the Japanese during a crisis, there was no doubt that cooperation with the Japanese over Far Eastern matters was not an acceptable option.[12] Still, the Treasury remained to be convinced.

The matter was brought to a head in August and September when Chamberlain pushed forward his idea of a non-aggression pact with Japan to Vansittart and Simon. The Foreign Office, while understanding the need to keep the Japanese calm, would not accept any proposal that required cutting the Americans out of the agreement. Vansittart pointed out to Sir John that there was no use expecting the Japanese to agree to anything less than parity with the British and the Americans. Reports from Sir Robert Clive, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, persuaded the PUS that no Japanese delegation, nor government, would risk their very lives by agreeing to anything less. It was Vansittart's belief that, because of those great pressures being put on the Japanese government by militarists, the probability of Japan's signing an extension of the 1930 London Naval agreement in 1935 was "...black in the extreme."[13] Simon agreed. But, he hoped to find some sort of multi-party solution, or at least to estract a voluntary declaration by the Japanese not to build above the London Treaty limits. The foreign secretary asked Vansittart and Craigie what they thought of such a gentleman's agreement.[14] As for the non-aggression pact, Simon asked the Foreign Office to provide reasons for its rejection. If the recognition of Manchukuo or giving Japan a free hand in China was the price, then what were the consequences? Sir John wanted the Department's recommendations on paper quickly in order that a position could be taken, for he was sure that the pressures to revive some vestiges of the old Anglo-Japanese alliance would be great.[15]

Vansittart sought out the views of the American and Far Eastern Departments. His own opinion was that the Admiralty and the Americans would not be satisfied with any voluntary declaration by Japan. Neither was willing to see any increase in Japan's ratio, and any Japanese minister who failed to get a significant increase would be assassinated. Therefore, a vicious circle was sure to ensue and it was unlikely that a voluntary declaration could really mean anything.[16] As for the non-aggression pact, Vansittart pointed out that a similar offer had already been made to the Americans, who had unhesitatingly rejected it to a chorus of hostile press commentary as to whether the Japanese thought the Americans were fools. His own feeling was that

> It would surely be rather difficult for us (quite apart from the merits of the case) to accept what the United States have refused without a very serious breach with the United States, who, moreover, I should say were entirely justified in their scepticism, for I do not see what kind of pact of non-aggression the Japanese Government could offer to us which would not be open to all the criticism directed at the idea from America. Surely a pact of non-aggression concluded merely between us and the Dominions on the one side, and the Japanese on the other, or even if it were so stretched as to make it tripartite, bringing in the United States as well, would merely give Japan a free hand for aggression in China, unless the case of China were very carefully and specifically covered; and would any Japanese Government allow us or the Americans so to cover the case of China? The Americans have clearly thought that the Japanese Government would not, and I should say that on the face of things they were clearly right....All that I have said about China applies with equal force, perhaps even from the naval point of view with added force, to the case of the Netherlands East Indies. It would really be necessary to cover them too."[17]

Craigie sided with Simon on the idea of a voluntary declaration. The former believed that such a declaration would allow the moderate elements in Japan to save face, thereby gaining the momentum necessary to overcome the military extremists who wanted no treaty at all. In his view, from the point of view of Anglo-Japanese relations, some agreement, even if it had no basis in reality, was better than no agreement. However, he doubted if such camouflage was likely to deter Japan in her quest to attain parity with the USA. Craigie floated the idea of a naval agreement with the Japan and France, leaving the Americans to build what they wished. He did not think that the Admiralty would support such a motion, and the risks to future Anglo-American relations were obvious. As for the non-aggression pact, Craigie considered any imaginable agreement to be nothing more than political camouflage, although he was unwilling to condemn the idea forecefully.[18]

The Far Eastern Department had no such qualms about pointing out the formidable price that would have to be paid to obtain an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact. Nor did Charles Orde shy away from commenting directly against the likelihood of Japan's honouring such an understanding in any fashion that would safeguard Britain's Far Eastern empire in the long-term.[19] He directed readers to refer to the complete estimate of the situation in the Far East that had been presented to Cabinet the previous March and how the objections to any bi-lateral agreement with Japan had outweighed the factors in its favour.[20] Orde emphasised that he now felt these views to be correct more strongly than ever. He agreed with Vansittart that America and its attitude towards such a pact were a most important consideration, and, given that the Americans had rejected the Japanese offer, any British acceptance would be a great shock to Anglo-American relations. There was no evidence of Japan's being willing to keep out of Chinese affairs. Any agreement with Japan would create resentment in China against the British, who were looked on as the primary brake against Japanese aggression. Russia would not approve of such a pact, for it would see the pact as being an encouragement to Japan to turn against Moscow. The Netherlands East Indies and their protection was a serious issue, said Orde, as was the opposition that was certain to arise in some Dominions. Overall, he considered that a tripartite pact between Japan, Britain and the United States might be something to consider, but even then, Britain's Imperial and European security concerns would make such an agreement almost impossible. It was an idea not even worth considering if the Americans were not willing to participate. As for the voluntary declaration by Japan, the Far Eastern Department had the greatest doubts as to whether the Japanese civilians in government could sell such a plan to the navy and army.[21] Neither department was overly confident of either option. Both also recognized that the American attitude towards such proposals was a key as to how they should respond.

Vansittart objected to Craigie's 'soft' analysis of the problem, arguing that the American Department did not have a full sense of the security issues at stake. Further, it was his own belief that no Japanese statesman could afford to tie his hands to the naval status quo, no matter how camouflaged.[22] Orde's views, and their recognition of the multi-faceted danger involved, were fully supported by Vansittart and an assistant under secretary of state, Sir George A. Mounsey, a key advisor on Far Eastern issues.[23] Orde's position and arguments were those which Vansittart presented to Simon. The PUS petitioned the foreign secretary to acknowledge the logical superiority of avoiding either a pact or a voluntary declaration and to reaffirm his conclusion that "...a bilateral pact is out of the question; that a tripartite one is nt only superflurous but dangerous." The PUS strongly recommended that Simon modify the memorandum he was developing for presentation to the Cabinet on Anglo-Japanese relations, and to express the FO's views to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had been lobbying Vansittart vigorously the whole time to adopt a pro-Japan stance. It was also time, he ventured, for the Admiralty to put forward their views on what they thought a voluntary declaration from Japan was worth.[24]

The Far Eastern Department's position gained momentum steadily throughout September. The Marquess of Lothian, Philip Kerr, an independent Liberal MP, planned to go to the United States in the near future. An avid supporter of closer Anglo-American relations, Lothian passed a memorandum that he had produced on that topic through the Foreign Office for their opinion, as it was his intention to bring these matters up with the US Government, indeed the President himself, when he was in the USA. Lothian argued that there were three choices open to the British as far as their Far Eastern policy and the upcoming naval talks were concerned. At the 1935 conference, Britain could decide to either to go it alone and build a navy to take on all comers, to rekindle the Anglo-Japanese alliance by acknowledging Japan's right to naval parity with the United States, or to present a common front against Japan's demands with the Americans and move towards better cooperation and an understanding with them. Lothian left no doubt that it was his view that a common policy or closer relations with the Americans was the way to go.[25] His views on the need for closer Anglo-American relations against Japan at the next set of naval talks also sparked the Foreign Office into demanding that a solid policy towards those talks and Britain's attitude towards Japan and the United States be found.

Vansittart was skeptical of the ease with which Lothian thought the Americans could be brought into an agreement satisfactory to both the Admiralty and the USN and which also acknowledged each nation's over-all security needs.[26] His suspicions of Roosevelt and the Americans in general did not allow the PUS to expect much success in reaching a compromise with them. It was his view that Britain would have to go it alone in the Far East. Nevertheless, Vansittart approved of Lothian's talking to the Roosevelt and doing some "very plain speaking" to the Americans about what Britain's global strategic concerns were.[27]

Craigie was impressed by the clarity which Lothian's memorandum brought to the policy-making process at such a critical time. He agreed that it was absolutely essential that the government formulate some definite policy at once, before the American and Japanese delegations arrived.[28] To him, the choices were quite clear: was Britain going to attempt to achieve some form of Anglo-American cooperation, or was it going to align with Japan and "throw up the sponge" in the Far East? He saw the political issues surrounding the upcoming talks as being

> (a) even assuming that we shall not be prepared in the future to fight Japan either for the integrity of China or for the protection of our special rights there (a large assumption), will it not encourage Japan to embark on further aggression in China if she detects a readiness in this country to compromise on the relative sizes of the British and Japanese navies? (b) since l'appetit vient

> en mangeant, is it not reasonable to suppose that Japan, if thus encouraged to feed on China, would eventually turn hungry eyes upon British possessions in the Pacific? If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, then the forthcoming naval discussions are likely to be the turning point in our future policy in the Pacific; and immense difficulties in the future may be avoided by the adoption now - in cooperation with the United States - of a firm attitude towards a Japanese claim to change the existing relationship of the naval forces of the British Empire, the United States and Japan. If we fail to face firmly this beginning of overt naval aggression, Japan will be quick to read the omen.[29]

Craigie steadfastly demanded that the Treasury policy of aiding and abetting Japan against the United States be dealt with in Cabinet before the delegates arrived and the issue was brought to a head. If such a position could be taken, then the Admiralty would also have to decide as to whether it could reach some accommodation with the USN on quantitative and qualitative issues related to the cruiser and capital ships debates. To muddle between those two choices was unacceptable to the chief negotiator, as such a course held perils of its own.[30] A decision had to be made: either go with the United States or go against it.

Orde and the Far Eastern Department supported Craigie's demand for a decision, pointing out that Japan's word on protecting and maintaining the Open Door in China and Chinese integrity was worthless in the light of Japanese actions that had unashamedly torn up the Nine Power Treaty.[31] To bow to the Japanese meant not only having to deal with Japan a few years down the road again, but

> If we show fear we shall have not only Japan but China attacking our interests and we shall be driven out of the Far East. It would be a mistake to look on Japan as irresistible. She is full of self-confidence at present, but she still has to settle with Russia, and he resources are not great. I feel sure that weakness toward her will lead to worse things than firmness, though provocation must be avoided, as there is always the chance of her running amok.[32]

Mounsey and Vansittart agreed with Craigie, believing that a solid and definite policy was required.[33] Vansittart was determined, however, to get the Americans to allow the British a naval increase "...before we begin bearding the Japanese for or with them [Americans]."[34]

The PUS was deeply disillusioned by what he saw as a steady and rapid decline in Anglo-American relations. Information from Washington told Vansittart that many in the State Department, including William Phillips, thought Anglo-American relations were declining and that it was Britain which was to blame for this lack of a cooperative spirit. Vansittart blamed a lack of plain speaking on the part of the British government for this turn of events. However, although he professed to being as friendly as ever towards America, he also believed that the American public and Congress on the whole were too stupid and self-righteous to take direct criticism and objections well.[35] Vansittart's views were in reponse to the reported attitude of Phillips, who was said to have lamented the fact that "... there was no longer that automatic consultation and co-operation between the two governments which had existed in the past..." and went on to describe the ideal situation as one in which the USA and Great Britain kept "... the peace hand in hand and so firmly and formidably that there would be none to say them nay And it was a lack of that cooperation that allowed chaos."[36] Vansittart agreed with Phillips' sentiment, but firmly rejected any responsibility for the lack of that cooperative spirit. Consideration of past Anglo-American difficulties - during the First World War; over the formation and abandonment of the League of Nations; Britain's abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for the Americans; the war debt; the Irish issue; naval disarmament; the failed Economic Conference; liquor smuggling -resulted in Vansittart's mind, to a net debt owe by the Americans, who had consistently been treated with lenience and tolerance by the British. Now, wrote Vansittart, was the time for the Americans "... to undertake initiatives and gestures..." if any progress was to be made. Worried about the worsening situation in Europe and the gloomy conditions facing the Empire in the Far East, Vansittart told Lindsay that he was most concerned about the feeling of disillusionment with the United States that was permeating the world. This sense of disillusionment was brought on by the American tendency to cut and run from their responsibilities in the world: Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, and most important, the Far East.[37]

The PUS drew the analogy that "... the United States would not be a safe companion for 'tiger-shooting'; and I for one should like a higher howdah if not a 'bigger and better elephant'."[38] Returning to his favourite obsession (Germany), Vansittart felt that this was a most unfortunate condition for Britain to find herself in. Unable to face a war with Germany and Japan at the same time, it was this American reluctance to assume a larger world role that was causing a cry for a return to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If America stepped forward at the naval talks, then something could be done, but Vansittart doubted whether that was likely to occur:

> I see little prospect of a Naval Agreement in 1935. If that be so, I for one should wish to quarrel with neither the United States nor Japan: and the worse the European situation is by 1936 (it will certainly be worse) the fewer will be the people who will wish to quarrel with Japan when there is nothing to be got out of America.[39]

Sharing the darkest fears of the strategic situation facing the British empire, Vansittart told Lindsay that Britain was not nearly as strong as it had been in 1914, largely due to the possibility of having to fight a two-front war separated by such great distances. He then asked Lindsay for his help and guidance to deal with to the pressures being brought to bear on the FO by the Treasury:

> Many influential people here are beginning to ask insistently whether, in circumstances which America does not share, we can afford to neglect any opportunity of reinsuring in the Far East till the muttering German storm has burst or blown over. (We *can* make it blow over if we are wise and determined enough.) Can we, they ask and are difficult to answer, run this great risk for the American will o'the wisp that has given, and is giving, equally plain intimations of leaving us in the lurch in case of need. But the difficulty, as I see it, will be that if the answer is to be that we cannot run the risk, then this answer however translated must involve some damage, unreasonably perhaps but none the less certainly, to Anglo-American relations. Of course there would be another answer in a different world; namely that we could afford the risk if we could count on the United States. But we must take the world as we find it, and that answer just does not seem to be practical politics. What do you say? Is it for nothing that the Endeavour is on our side and the Rainbow on the other? I fear that there *is* a place where the Rainbow ends.[40]

While Vansittart waited for Lindsay's help, Sir John Simon took up the battle with the Treasury in Cabinet. Afraid to challenge the powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer too forcefully, Simon agreed that looking into the matter of finding some sort of non-aggression agreement with the Japanese was useful. He cautioned repeatedly, however, that the likelihood of being able to find the political and strategic grounds for making such a bi-lateral agreement was not promising.[41] Thus, a compromise was struck between the Foreign Office and Treasury in the form of a joint position paper being prepared for Cabinet by both Chamberlain and Simon on relations with Japan. The final victory of FO's opposition to the Treasury desire for closer Anglo-Japanese relations over naval matters was reflected in that joint memorandum, which clearly stated the long-term need for better relations with the United States, rather than with Japan, if Britain's Far Eastern position was to have any hope of being maintained.[42] The net result of the deadlock between the two departments was two-fold. First there was the eventual formation of a Cabinet Committee on Political and Economic Relations with Japan (on February 13, 1935), a body then used to explore the validity of the Treasury and industrialists' views of creating closer economic ties with Japan.[43] Second, no absolute recommendation for or against moving closer to either the Japanese or Americans was issued from Cabinet or the Ministerial Committee on the London Naval Conference (NCM) before the fall session began. The Foreign Office had acquired more time to fend off any further serious Treasury interference and to allow the Foreign Office and Admiralty to continue to make naval policy for the upcoming talks.[44]

By the first week of October, just before the naval talks were to resume, Vansittart received Lindsay's views on the state of Anglo-American relations and where his reading of the tea leaves indicated they were heading. First, the Ambassador told his friend that William Phillips' comments were not petulant, but lachrymose. Phillips and others in the State Department were saddened by the deterioration of relations between the two countries. It was a regrettable circumstance that most in the department wished to remedy. But, it was a delicate situation, balancing public opinion and executive desires. Phillips was concerned not so much with the formal idea of cooperation, reported Lindsay, but more with a desire to ensure that an intimacy of relations, an informal understanding of each nation's needs and points of view, remained a viable part of the Anglo-American diplomatic relationship. He recognized, as did Lindsay, that cooperation could not exist between England and America as it did between England and France, but that some sort of relationship was possible.[45]

Lindsay then moved to his assessment of Anglo-American relations. In that analysis he revealed a masterful understanding of the American nation and its government, giving a rousing slap in the face to Vansittart's near- hysterical plea for help:

> ...it is over sanguine to expect the United States ever to commit itself to any engagement with another Power, and perhaps even to cooperate in any important field, until its vital interests are affected; and that moment will never come till the eleventh hour has struck. For this there are a whole series of inexorable reasons - first geographical and political remoteness. Even in the Far East she can truly point out that our interests are greater than hers; in Europe she is normally not directly interested at all, and only becomes interested, indirectly, when war breaks out, i.e. in the fact of war rather than in its causes. Next, she is a vast county that moves only with almost incredible slowness....And finally, of course her policy is selfish, narrowly selfish, perhaps even more so than ours. And yet we must not reproach her too much for her stand-off attitude and her refusal to commit herself. Don't we do the same by Europe? Is it not freely said that if we had been able before 1914 to take a definite line, the last war would never have come about? And are not the statesmen of Europe at this very moment saying that by a definite commitment England may yet prevent the next war? Of course we can't do it, even if we didn't think it inadvisable; nor can America, a fortiori. Lay this maxim to heart; that in any war, in which America is destined not to remain neutral, she will be the last to come in; and the cause which she espouses will win the victory. The above maxim is almost susceptible of definite proof - let me lay down another which is more based on faith; 50 per cent of the population and 90 per cent of the governing class of America are of British stock, and are proud of it, and this fact, if ever America ceases to be neutral in a war, will ensure that, though she may postpone her decision till the eleventh hour and the fifty-fifth minute, she will in the end flop down on the English side. Is it not also a historic fact that owing to some deep immanent compulsion of public opinion, England has never been able long to pursue a policy antagonistic to America? Therefore I say, foam at the mouth and furiously rage (as I myself frequently do) as much as you like, but you will be wiser to pull yourself together and be patient once again. This Japanese flirtation, or reassurance, which you are about to embark on, I find it difficult to believe that you or anyone in the Foreign Office can really desire it, but I suppose it must come, because there is so much mere rotten logic to support it. I'm afraid it's too much to hope that the Japanese in their arrogance will decline the overture.

> Rather we must expect that they will respond, but mainly to split us off from America. This is not basis for a pleasant flirtation and it must inevitably come to grief. We shall have a very stormy time with America, possibly amounting to great danger; and we shall finally try to crawl back. It will be up to you to see that we don't go too far with Japan, and that we don't postpone our crawl back till it is too late.[46]

Lindsay's message was clear: siding with the Japanese at the naval talks would imperil the future of the British Empire.

American policy-makers also used the summer respite to assess the overall strategic situation facing them in the Far East and tried to decide whether they could trust the British to side with them against the Japanese. Davis reassured Roosevelt that, in spite of rumors circulating that there was the possibility of the British making a deal with the Japanese, such was not the case.[47] Faith in the British was also being pronounced in the State Department, where there was a growing sense of confidence that the British were most unlikely to return to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If such a deal were struck, then Britain would be seen in American eyes as having performed an act of double-dealing "....unequalled for a very long time."[48] Reports from Atherton in London confirmed those beliefs. Atherton, citing a number of well-connected sources in the government and British society, reported that the British government was not happy with the way it had handled the talks with the Americans that spring. The British were coming to the realization that it would not be practical to do a deal with the Japanese and thus would be more willing to work with the Americans later in the fall.[49]

Bingham gave a similar view to Cordell Hull:

> The present British attitude is the result of several factors: Lack of real leadership in the government itself; pressure from the Admiralty; narrow-mindedness among some of the old Conservatives; determination by some of the younger Conservatives to run the show themselves in their own way. In addition (1) they base their calculations on the assurance that they are in no danger of armed aggression from us, and (2) that they do not want to irritate Japan until their Singapore base is finished; and there is a better outlook in Europe; and (3) that their chief danger is in Europe itself....They would, of course, jump at an armed alliance with us, but, knowing that is wholly impracticable, they have concluded that they must have a military establishment large enough to enable them to handle the situation alone, either in Europe or in the Far East....In the end they will need us worse than we shall [illegible]er need

> them. In the end they will come to us in a frame of mind that will enable us to deal with them on a basis safe and satisfactory to ourselves, and which will make for peace. Yet, in the meanwhile, I think we shall only defer a satisfactory solution with them by making overtures of any sort. I do not think now that we should participate in any way in conversations to be held between them and the Japanese in October, As you said in your message, I am absolutely convinced we should make no commitments whatever either as to further preliminary conversations with the, or even to participating in a general naval conference, and I hope before commitments of any sort are made that you will communicate with me and give me the opportunity to express by views for your consideration. Your refusal to accept the statement prepared by Simon and Craigie is the strongest and longest step so far taken towards arriving ultimately at an agreement with the British which will be reasonable and fair, and which will make for peace.[50]

As well, talks between Lindsay and members of the State Department all pointed towards the British moving towards the American camp.[51] Expectations that Great Britain would agree to form a united front against Japan at the talks were increasing as State Department and USN officials met to make final preparations for the American delegation's move back across the Atlantic. The personalities on that mission would be critical for the outcome of the talks.

Davis' petitioning for Admiral Standley to go to London in October had been rewarded. The CNO would be the chief naval advisor to the American team, able to speak with great authority on building programs and questions concerning the strategic vision and direction of the USN.[52] His lack of anti-British sentiment was also sure to be a helpful factor in negotiations over capital ship qualities and cruiser quantities.[53] At a high-level meeting of Hull, Phillips, Hornbeck, Standley, Moffat and others, called to decide the American position going into the next round of naval talks, the CNO and Stanley Hornbeck led the others in a tour of America's strategic realities in the Far East. Standley, in response to questions about how America's proposed withdrawal from the Philippines was weakening its Far Eastern position in the eyes of other Powers, such as Britain, told the gathering that

> ...our Philippine policy had greater effects diplomatically than strategically. Diplomatically, it was causing Powers in the Far East to realign their policies and re-examine their situations. Strategically, however, he felt that the force of our fleet would not be affected. In the last analysis, the strength of our fleet

> depended on our policy in the Orient. If we desire to give adequate support to the policies which we have been following in the past, such as the Open Door, the 9-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, et cetera, then we must possess adequate naval force. If we were going to back down, throw over the rights of trade, et cetera, then we might as well do so now when we were not challenged than at some later date when we might be challenged.[54]

He reminded the meeting that talks with the British had been kept at a general level and thus there was still the hope of having some sort of compromise struck. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Henry L. Roosevelt, reminded everyone that the President's instructions were clear: no agreement that did not involve an actual reduction in armaments could be agreed to, and that all the British proposals to date meant an increase. The naval officers, however, countered by arguing that it was their position that an agreement with the British could be found that would not involve an actual increase in tonnage. As no one at the table was willing to give the Japanese a higher ratio, Standley pushed home the USN argument that the it could not allow Japan to catch up in size: "The utmost that we could do would be to make it difficult for the average man to compute but the present difference of strength between our fleet and the Japanese fleet must be maintained at all cost."[55] Without such strength, the US would not be able to exercise any influence in the Far East.

Hornbeck supported Standley fully, repeating his calls for a tough stance against Japan, backed up by naval expansion. He also acknowledged the political realities that faced the British in the Far East and the fact that such a circumstance could lead them to have to make a deal with the Japanese over the recognition of Manchuria in exchange for promises from Japan not to advance any further into the Southern Pacific. He did not believe, however, that the British would do so. This was based on broad strategic analysis. An Anglo-Japanese agreement might allow a Russo-Japanese collision to occur, the result of which, if there were a Japanese victory, would be an even more powerful Japan that could then turn on Britain without having to worry about any Anglo-Soviet alignment.

On the other hand, a Soviet victory would allow Moscow to have an even greater influence in China, another risk the British were unwilling to take.[56] Overall, the consensus of opinion that emerged from the meeting was that the US, and particularly its navy,

> ... could in no sense give up such policies and that a definite indication that we had abandoned any intention of using force for their maintenance would be viewed by all Oriental countries as the removal of an obstacle to further aggression in the Far East on the part of those so disposed. It was further the consensus that Japan's policy was definitely to continue its aims at dominating Eastern Asia. In these plans she is being held up at present by the United States and similarly by Great Britain. It was not felt, however, that she would give up her long term ambitions and would seek every occasion to press them further.[57]

Clearly, American naval policy needed a helping hand from the outside, to allow it solve the dilemma it found itself in. On the one side were the President's demands for a reduction; on the other, the desires of the Navy and State Department for a strong navy to block Japanese expansion. Only if the British presented some sort of face-saving compromise, or, if the full weight of any new construction could be blamed squarely on the Japanese, could a solution be found that satisfied both groups.

Lothian arrived in Washington in early October, just as the American and Japanese delegations were leaving for London.[58] He discussed the British Far Eastern situation with President Roosevelt and members of the State Department. In his meeting with the President on October 10, Lothian outlined the strategic options available to the British in the Far East. He pointed out the changed circumstances that now existed because of an imperialistic Japan, a resurgent Germany and a possibly hostile Italy, and told FDR that Britain could not now denude her home oceans to send a fleet to the Far East. That strategic reality meant that Britain had a limited number of options concerning how to safeguard the Far Eastern regions of its empire. Those alternatives (Lothian's "frontline views") were to build a Far Eastern fleet and base it in Singapore; to have a definite understanding with the United States on a common approach to the region; or, to come to terms with the Japanese in a replay of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[59]

Roosevelt responded, telling Lothian that anything in the nature of a definite commitment on the part of the United States was impossible. He added that, "...even if an individual President like himself entered into an informal understanding which might be effective during his tenure of power, no one could guarantee that the successor would take the same view. The cooperation between the United States and Great Britain would have to rest on the fundamental identity of their interests and ideals."[60] As for Lothian's points about the uncertainty of the situation in the Far East and Britain's fear that it might find the Empire alone and at war in that region, FDR stated that

> ... in no circumstances would he agree to Japanese parity; that if Japan insisted on parity and denounced the Treaties he would ask Congress for 500 million dollars for naval purposes, and he added that he would have no difficulty in getting it. He said that Norman Davis had instructions not to use threats but to make this clear to the British Government in London. The President spent some time in setting forth his view of Japanese policy. He had no illusions about it. They were pursuing a very long distance programme of imperialist expansion in Asia and would use with vigour but discretion the ordinary tactics of power diplomacy. He agreed with me that the immediate object of their diplomacy was to attain such a strategic position in the Pacific, either by means of parity or by means of new bases in the islands or China, or both, as to make it impossible for the United States or Great Britain to interfere with their Asiatic designs. He said that much the best way of dealing with the situation would be for Great Britain and the United States to take firmly the same line. If this were so the Japanese would face the facts and agreement might be possible, possibly under a formula which was based on "security" rather than ratios.... He went on the say that he understood the British position but that he did not believe that Great Britain or the Dominions could face the possibility of Japan having a larger Navy than their own and that if Japan forced the building contest they would have to follow suit. He evidently did not think that in practice it would be possible for Great Britain to come to terms with Japan in her present temper.[61]

When questioned as to whether the US would abandon the Philippines and the naval bases there, Roosevelt told Lothian that

> He said not for ten years but that at the end of ten years it was possible and even probable. So far as the relations between the United States and Great Britain were concerned he did not see why each side should not build the types of ships which suited themselves in friendly consultation. The essence of Anglo-American cooperation was agreement on political objectives rather than on technical questions. He ended the interview by saying emphatically that we ought to stand by the principle of sanctity of treaties, that the war of 1914 had been largely fought on that issue, and seemed to imply that in no circumstances would he agree to the recognition of Manchukuo.[62]

The President's message appeared to give a lead in the direction of allowing Britain to build the navy it felt necessary to fulfill its security commitments. And, while it did not give a formal promise of alliance with Britain over Far Eastern matters, FDR was committed to keeping American interests in the region and not scuttling immediately.

While on his tour of the United States, Lothian also met and talked to important State Department people, such as Henry Stimson, who had returned from his European excursion, and William Phillips. Stimson agreed that it was vital for the US and Great Britain to work together on Far Eastern matters and especially on naval issues. Talks with Lothian had convinced Stimson and Davis that many in the British Cabinet, particularly Standley Baldwin and Anthony Eden, were behind the idea of a firm commitment from Britain to cooperate with America in Far Eastern matters and that that school of thought was winning ascendancy within Cabinet.[63] With Phillips, Lothian also was direct. He told the under secretary that the British needed American help in the Far East because Britain could not exert any effective military power against Japan. America could take on that area with her navy and allow Britain to continue to carry the bulk of the responsibility for European and Middle Eastern security. As for the ability and foreign policy vision of Neville Chamberlain, Lothian classified the Chancellor of the Exchequer as representing "...a purely local point of view; he was not internationally minded and, although a brilliant man, could not be counted upon to favor cooperation with the United States."[64]

The net result of Lothian's mission was to obtain a clearer statement by the President of America's Far Eastern policy, a signal from Roosevelt that Britain's naval expansion would not be fought with any great conviction so long as Britain did not make a deal with Japan; and, to give a reassurance to the State Department that the move towards an Anglo Japanese agreement was not gaining support in the British policy-making elite. The timing of the visit was fortunate, for now, with these new insights and information, the British and American camps could engage in the final stages of deciding whether a naval agreement between the two would be possible. A naval agreement in 1935 would signal the beginning of an informal program of cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in trying to limit Japan's expansion.

Prepartions for such talks were at full speed in London. Craigie was not hopeful that the Japanese delegation to the talks would prove able to provide the material necessary to create a tripartite agreement. The appointment of Admiral Yamamoto as the Head of the delegation was seen as "...a very remarkable choice", given the Admiral's personality and attitude towards Great Britain. However, to Craigie's mind there had probably been very little competition for such an unattractive appointment.[65] Still, the British and Japanese representatives, often Simon and Matsudaira, went through the motions of civilized discourse, meeting in mid-October to see if a common-ground could be found.[66] British concerns centered around the question of whether the Americans would be willing to co-operate in the setting up of a tripartite or a simultaneous bilateral agreement between the two western powers and Japan, possibly also with China involved. Craigie saw the possibility of getting American assent for such action as being a formidable task, but a tripartite arrangement was the only one which could satisfy all of Britain's strategic needs.[67] The Far Eastern Department's experts on China, Sir John Pratt, Orde and Victor Wellesley, all voiced their doubts as to the practicability of expecting the Americans to go so far. To do so, would be an act which would signal the end of the Open Door policy in China, as well as amount to the recognition of Manchukuo.[68] Neither was thought acceptable to the United States, or to China. Pratt further argued that making any deal with Japan would weaken Britain in the Far East, and emphasized the disastrous effect such a pact would have on Sino-British relations:

> As regards our prestige we should to some extent be covered if America joined us in accepting this undertaking from Japan, but if,

> as seems more likely, America were to refuse and we alone accepted it, the shock to our prestige and to our whole position in the Far East would be more immediate and greater. The Chinese would not look for any real help from America, whose stake in China is comparatively small and they would still think that their only course was to placate Japan. They would however feel with great bitterness that it was we who had delivered them into the hands of the enemy; and they would believe that any necessary placating of Japan might justly and with impunity be effected at our expense....The difficult is that in view of what has happened to the Nine Power Treaty any formula we may employ is so obviously useless as a guarantee that the mere fact of our employing it will lead the Chinese - and others - to infer that we have in fact surrendered to Japanese pretensions. I do not myself see any way out of this difficulty.[69]

So, while the British policy-makers struggled over their choice, Norman Davis and the American delegation waited and watched in the wings to see if the British would indeed try and reach some agreement with the Japanese.

Simon summoned Davis to his office on October 18th to discuss the Japanese position. The Secretary of State reported that there was still no sign that the Japanese were willing to compromise on the ratio question. Davis told Simon that it was his hope that trilateral, rather than bilateral, talks could begin soon. Davis' request for three-way discussions was a reflection of his suspicion that the British would try to further their position with the Japanese by painting the Americans as the reason why approval for a change in ratios could not be obtained.[70] By the 25th of that month, the two western powers were once again sharing information on Japanese proposals and attempting to coordinate their response to their demands. When MacDonald and Simon met with Davis and Atherton that morning, both parties agreed that neither could accept the Japanese position. The Prime Minister would not allow Japan to hold Britain by the throat while it increased its forces.[71] Simon hoped that, when the Japanese ran into a solid opposition of American and British disapproval, they would soften their stand and try to find some 'gentleman's agreement' or agree to some meaningless general statement. MacDonald suggested that the Japanese delegation be questioned closely on technical proposals and allowed to try to develop their ideas further before Britain and America made a formal refusal. In the meantime, while the Japanese were kept talking in committees, Simon inquired whether, after another meeting with the Japanese, the Americans would be willing to have a meeting of the full British and American delegations, at which time the two would resume the discussions begun in the summer. Davis agreed, and was supported in his action by the State Department. Both he and the Department were anxious to ensure a solid opposition to the Japanese. However, both were also aware that such a cooperative gesture would have to be made carefully, so as to not evoke a return to discussions over the technical differences existing between the two navies' positions.[72] Davis planned to deal with that potential stumbling block by telling MacDonald that the US still favored a net reduction in total tonnage and would not agree willingly to an increase in total tonnage, but

> Recognizing, ..., the importance of keeping the British in line and at the same time avoiding a dangerous technical discussion I told MacDonald, in agreement with Standley, that if we could agree upon a common position with regards to the issues raised by Japan there was a possibility of reaching an agreement, within the limits imposed upon us, for an increase in cruiser tonnage provided any such increase could be offset by an equal if not greater decrease in other categories.[73]

The need for America and the British Empire to find common ground was becoming increasingly important, as Japan grew less and less concerned with observing the Washington Treaty system.

On the 29th, the American delegation met with MacDonald, Simon, Monsell and Chatfield to begin working out an acceptable understanding regarding Anglo-American naval relations and the Far East. Davis told MacDonald that there now seemed very little to gain worrying over the technical details of a treaty which the Japanese were not going to sign. Both sides then shared the information gained from their experiences with the Japanese delegation, in an attempt to ensure that both parties were working from the same page.[74] Both MacDonald and Davis desired the exploration of all possible alternatives with the Japanese, within reason. Davis was sure of the anxiety the British felt over the Japanese position. MacDonald told him that he had come to the conclusion, however, that

Britain had only two options: to build a fleet of a size sufficient to defend the Empire's far-flung responsibilities and the home islands, or to seek some political agreement covering the Pacific that would give England the security it needed.[75] The Prime Minister was not hopeful, however, that any such agreement could be reached with the Japanese and that they would also refuse to retreat from their demand for parity. Therefore, he felt it was necessary for the Americans and British to "...sit down together and discuss how we should deal with the resultant situation, particularly with regard to our own navies. He thought it, however, inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to attempt to do this until all hope of a tripartite agreement is exhausted."[76] Davis reassured the Prime Minister that the United States had no desire to impose a treaty on Britain incompatible with its national security. If Japan left the treaty system, then the onus for that failure would have to rest with her and Britain and America would have to work out a new arrangement.[77] Agreement between the two Anglo-Saxon powers seemed imminent. However, British efforts to make a last-ditch appeal to Japan not to denounce the treaty system almost cost them their renewed ties with the Americans.

On November 13th, Simon sent Clive a secret telegram outlining the result of British and American talks with Japan. As well, instructions were provided for the Ambassador about the idea of Japan's agreeing to a 'gentleman's agreement' not to build a navy larger than the RN. The difficulty, wrote Simon, was how to try to get the Japanese to agree to such a plan while at the same time keeping the Americans from finding out and thinking that Britain was attempting to betray their interests in exchange for Japanese assistance. Fear of making a repeat of the Manchurian fiasco was uppermost in the Foreign Office's mind.[78] Sir John, therefore, informed Clive that

> Mr. Norman Davis was duly informed before we put forward the tentative suggestion outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 and we have throughout kept in the closest ['closest' is put in place of 'quite abnormally close' in the original] touch with the United States representatives. Several American newspapers on the other hand (particularly the "New York Times") have been at pains to give the

> opposite impression and we have so far been unable to ascertain the actual origin of these mischievous press reports from London. This becomes the more objectionable if, as reported by the "Times" correspondent in Washington on November 11th, President Roosevelt is basing his opinions not only on official reports but on despatches from American newspaper correspondents, some of whom have shown themselves the reverse of helpful or truthful. It is obviously undesirable that you should appear to be going behind the backs of the American representatives here but at the same time it would be unfortunate if the United States Government were really to gain the impression from American press reports that: (i) we has made our suggestion to the Japanese without the courtesy of first informing the United States representatives; (ii) that the suggestion involved any change in our views on the question of the relative defensive needs of the British and Japanese navies; or (iii) that we were seeking to make a deal with Japan in the matter of our respective naval strengths as a means of furthering some economic deal which we are alleged by the American press, quite falsely, to be negotiating with Japan. It would help me to decide whether any further communication should be made on this subject to the USA or if I could know whether you have any reasons to think that there is in official quarters any misapprehension on the points mentioned above or other points connected with the naval negotiations.[79]

Those instructions concerning the 'gentleman's agreement' were accidentally passed on by the British embassy in Tokyo to the Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Panic swept through the Foreign Office now that the Japanese had the written evidence needed to paint the British as being false to the Americans. Craigie, in particular, who had all along argued that the Americans be kept fully informed of all British dealings with the Japanese, fired off a round of telegrams to try to stop the damage.[80] The document was eventually returned by the Japanese Foreign Office without further incident. However, while not causing an Anglo-American rupture, the mistake had exposed the Japanese Ambassador to his foreign office as being too cooperative with the British.[81] Still, the duplicity of the British position -- the need to try and keep both Japan and America in play -- had created panic because of the fear of ruining Anglo-American relations at a critical moment.[82]

The attitude of Foreign Office members and other British policy-makers towards the United States and its Far Eastern policy was improving steadily, however.[83] In fact, Sir John Simon reported to Lindsay that "There is, in fact, the closest co-operation between us all and all reports to the contrary should be scouted as preposterous."[84] Craigie, too, was optimistic about the Americans developing a lasting relationship with the British over Far Eastern matter, but knew that it would never be a formal entente. Referring to Roosevelt's talks with Lothian, Craigie summarized the reality of the situation:

> The President is quite right when he says that co-operation between the United States and Great Britain must rest on the fundamental identity of interests and ideals. His remark is useful for us as a reminder of the reality and what must long if not always remain the reality. It is obvious that now, as always hitherto, it is quite futile to expect United States co-operation with the United Kingdom on specific points, in specific ways,and in specific places. If we do not realize this but on the contrary think that we can safely let any of our calculations depend on United States co-operation in any specific situation we are deceiving ourselves, and laying up trouble between ourselves and the United States through disappointment with them at the pinch. If we expect nothing definite we are not disappointed and therefore not irritated. This does not mean that we must not on our side aim at co-operation in a large way or at a harmony of general aims. This we must do, always remembering at the same time that the benefits we can get from this are likely to be negative rather than positive. It would be quite unsafe at this moment to try to say whether the United States of America are likely to be a *really* powerful political or economic unit in this generation. The usefulness of any help they might give us (even if it were forthcoming at all) is therefore doubtful.[85]

At the same time, Craigie was also pressing for the British government, if the Japanese refused to negotiate, to move towards the United States and away from the Japanese during the remainder of the talks. He believed that earlier signals sent out to the Japanese, primarily from the Treasury and other economic sources, had created a belief among the Japanese naval authorities that all they needed to do to get the British to capitulate was sit tight and remain firm in their resolve to achieve parity.[86] The time had come to bring the Japanese back to reality, said Craigie, and he recommended that, at the upcoming meeting between Simon and Matsudaira, the opportunity should be taken to "mettre les choses au point," and that the Japanese Ambassador should be informed in no uncertain terms that "... we regard Japan's claim to eventual parity with the British Empire as unjustifiable on any ground of strategy or logic. Accordingly, there is no prospect at all of Japan's being able to secure any modification in the present relative strengths either by process of negotiation or of building."[87] Britain's chief negotiator was also sure that, if the

Japanese left the treaty system and went off on their own building program, then the United States and Great Britain would move closer and work together to counter that threat. The Prime Minister agreed with Craigie's views, and supported the idea that it was now time for some frank talk with the Japanese. MacDonald wanted the Foreign Office to remain in control of passing that message to the Japanese delegation in order to avoid giving the impression an Anglo-American bloc was forming.[88]

As the American and British delegations met to discuss their final approach to the Japanese, Sir John Simon told Davis that it was his belief that the Japanese would probably leave the treaty system.[89] That being the case, Simon needed to know what the American position would be regarding the British desire to retain its overaged cruiser tonnage, even if there was a 'gentleman's agreement' with Japan that it would not build beyond its allotted tonnage limits. Simon avoided Davis' attempts to get a firm commitment from the British that the initiative meant that there was to be an exclusive Anglo-American solution. The foreign secretary insisted that various formulas would continue to be presented to the Japanese, in an effort to get them involved in the process once more, but, when pushed hard, could not avoid admitting that it was indeed looking as if an agreement between Britain and the United States would be the final outcome of any naval conference in 1935.[90] Davis replied to Simon that the US was still not willing to sign a deal which created a tonnage increase, but also admitted that Admiral Standley and the USN were moving towards a position that understood Britain's cruiser needs. It was his view that if the treaty system broke down, then qualitative issues between the two powers would become academic.[91]

The Prime Minister also pressed Davis hard on the cruiser issue, telling him that since 1922 the British had hoped to get more out of cooperating with the Americans, but things had now changed drastically in the Pacific. MacDonald told Davis that he desired to establish a form of cooperation with the United States during his tenure as Prime Minister that would last after he was gone from that post. He wanted the Americans to realize that "... we have got a minimum requirement, a minimum requirement of the number of ships and a minimum requirement of capacity to carry out their job. If we can get an agreement to permit us to carry out those requirements, we are in the game."[92] Davis answered that he believed that the two powers would be able to work out an agreement that would satisfy both parties. But, he also stressed that the United States was not ready to consider a middle ground with Japan, one which would see either an end to the Open Door or a threat to American interests in the Far East by Japanese naval building. This suited the Prime Minister. MacDonald's view of the Pacific situation was that, if there was going to be trouble in that region with Japan, both the United States and Great Britain would be involved. His position remained

> Our eyes are primarily on the Pacific. What we want primarily is that we should both understand what is in our minds, that we are not for aggression, but for defense, and then quietly continue to bring pressure on Japan as to what she purposes to do, making it plain to them that both of us regard this as a very serious thing. This pressure should be separate, of course, and not give the impression of concerted action. But let us understand each other's minds.[93]

MacDonald wanted the two delegations to begin meeting more frequently now, in order to iron out any remaining difficulties and to build confidence in each other's position. Davis agreed with those sentiments. The British Government had come to a critical point in their strategic planning process: a choice now had to be made between the United States and Japan.

By now, the Admiralty were also convinced that no deal could be reached with Japanese. But, they were still unsure whether the Americans would agree to their cruiser and capital ship position. Chatfield and the Admiralty were worried about the Japanese building fast battlecruisers for raiding across the Pacific.[94] The Royal Navy was not interested in getting into an arms race in new types and desired some sort of limitation on them. Standley replied that there was no disagreement between the two services as to the dangers posed by unrestricted design and construction.

Both services were moving towards a better understanding of the other, but serious technical discussions would have to take place some time in 1935 before assurances about qualitative matters could be given.[95] At the same time, continued Japanese actions against British interests, especially British oil companies in Manchukuo, added to a growing sense of a common Anglo-American anti-Japanese vision.[96] That growing sense of empathy with the United States did not go unnoticed by the American delegation and State Department.

Norman Davis told President Roosevelt that, although a strong pro-Japanese faction did exist in the British Government, such sentiment had faded with the continued Japanese violation of British rights to trade in the Far East.[97] He was certain that the most influential group in Cabinet was

> ... definitely opposed to any deal with Japan that could be misinterpreted by the United States and that, after all, might not be lived up to by Japan. This hostility in Parliament towards the United States is one of soreness, which began during the Economic Conference and which has reached full expression as a result of the Johnson Resolution, which they look upon as a deliberate slap by the Administration to Great Britain, which was at least paying something, as a worse defaulter than France which had paid nothing on the debt. While the British still wish to be as conciliatory as possible with Japan, and avoid an absolute impasse, it is still my belief that, whenever they feel the situation demands the choice between standing with us on basic principles or of trying to conciliate Japan in such a way as to alienate us, they will choose the former.[98]

After his talks with the British delegation on November 14, Davis elaborated on his views of the split in the British Cabinet. It was still his contention that the pro-Japanese group were not in control of the naval negotiations, but merely that the realities of Britain's Imperial defence needs caused great concern about offending the Japanese in the Far East while fears of a possible European war grew.[99] It was his recommendation that the United States follow along with the British in trying to find some sort of "middle course" that would still include the Japanese in some from of agreement, even if it was a voluntary agreement not to build over established limits. Davis, still suspicious of British attempts to make some last-ditch effort to appease the Japanese, felt, however, that the American delegation could agree to talk to the Japanese with the British, for thus "...the British take the primary responsibility and we safeguard our position by preventing them from acting as mediator and later proposing something that would be embarrassing to us."[100] Assured by such high-ranking officials as Stanley Baldwin that he and others were willing to let Japan go rather than embarrass the British position by appeasing Tokyo, Davis was certain that informal, but solid, Anglo-American cooperation was underway.[101] That belief seemed to be confirmed on November 21, when the chief American negotiator reported that

> Neville Chamberlain, head of the group which has been in favor of a conciliatory policy towards Japan, has come to the conclusion that Great Britain should make no agreement with Japan to which the United States is not a party, that Anglo-American cooperation is a vital necessity to world peace and stability, that the Japanese are bluffing and that if and when it is necessary to call that bluff the United States and England should unhesitatingly do so together....I am informed that in a secret meeting of High Commissioners of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand with Simon, attended by Smuts a week ago the unanimous opinion was that cooperation with the United States...must be the cardinal policy of the British Empire.[102]

The direction and pace of negotiations towards the end of 1934 seemed to indicate that matters were moving in the American's favour. Roosevelt, not willing to let the British stray too far towards the Japanese, had reinforced his own position earlier in the month. The President had instructed Davis to let the British know that if they leaned towards the Japanese, Roosevelt would see to it that the United States would place great pressure on the Dominions, particularly Canada, to reject such action.[103] Now it appeared that the Dominions were themselves pressuring the British to commit to an Anglo-American bloc. Hull and the State Department were warmed by Davis' evaluation of the movement towards a common viewpoint now forming between the British and American delegations. These high-level talks with the British policy-makers caused them to believe that

> ...a definite and obvious common alignment of British and American viewpoints as a symbol of coincidence of view between them on the subject of naval limitation - which is the subject for consideration in these conversations - and of future cooperation between them offers greater promise of eventual success than any current search for a formula to salvage portions of the existing naval

treaties.[104]

The State Department did not favour discussing any "middle course" with the British. If the British were to do so, then it would only lead to increased suspicion and resentment on the part of isolationists and others groups already hostile to any cooperation with Britain. Furthermore, if such Anglo-Japanese talks did lead to a bilateral agreement, Japan would then move forward even more aggressively in the belief that any potential Anglo-American front had been split. Therefore, the State Department recommended that the talks in London be brought to a swift and open conclusion.[105]

Any thoughts on the part of the Americans that a simple Anglo-American open alliance against Japan would be the result of the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations were misguided. British strategic planners would not allow any such action to take place because of the risk of provoking a greater Japanese assault on British interests in the Far East, and because a real commitment to finding some workable solution to Anglo-Japanese tensions still existed, even among some of those who were inclined to want close Anglo-American cooperation. That cooperation could be close, but it could not be either overt or insulting to the Japanese on the world's stage. MacDonald had himself ordered Craigie to make sure that the Japanese Government would not enter 1935 mistaken or misinformed about Britain's intention to defend its Far Eastern empire. The Prime Minister was moved to such action, in part, by a sense of hope that if the Japanese had an absolutely crystal-clear idea of what denouncing the Washington Treaty would mean to Anglo-Japanese relations, they would re-examine their position. But, another part of him, the pragmatist, wanted to make sure that the Americans knew that the British government was not trying to make a deal with the Japanese, and, as they had argued to the Americans at the November series of meetings, were forcing the ball into the Japanese court.[106] He was very sure that the Americans were moving further and further towards the British view of naval arms limitation and "...the more they understand it the less able are they to refuse to agree to it."[107] The Prime Minister and Craigie would not allow British interests to be submerged merely for the sake of an Anglo-American agreement. And, they were not yet well enough assured of the American determination to remain a Pacific power to follow the American lead blindly. Allowing an overall increase in the size of the RN, working towards bringing Japan into some sort of agreement, and, if that were impossible, establishing a solid, yet informal working understanding with the Americans were the British goals.[108]

Shortly after Davis's extensive Anglo-American conversations with the British, Secretary Hull replied to statements made by MacDonald and Simon in the House of Commons concerning how well the American and British delegations were working together during the talks. Hull's statement in the American press reassured the British Government that he, too, held such sentiments and was happy to see the greater degree of cooperation.[109] Lindsay assured the Foreign Office that Hull had made a point of making such a statement both to express his genuine desire for closer Anglo-American cooperation and to arrest the vicious US press reports and attacks which had plagued the talks and created unnecessary tension and anxiety on both sides of the Atlantic.[110] Now a final attempt to include Japan in some agreement was to be made, and if that failed, then a conference that cemented the American and British cooperation, while at the same time giving full blame to the Japanese for the failure, was to be prepared.

Initial State Department wishes for the talks in London to be seen to be at a complete and utter end once Japan abrogated the Washington Treaty were not supported by Davis or Roosevelt.[111] In meetings with MacDonald, Craigie and Simon, Davis had pressed for a formal end to all talks and an open joint denunciation of the Japanese destruction of the naval arms limitation system, as instructed by the Department.[112] But, he was aware of the different public needs of the two governments over how the end of the process should be interpreted. The British delegation, not wanting to be blamed by the public for having either pushed Japan into a corner or forcing it to leave the talks, wanted to give Japan all the rope it required to hang itself by denouncing the Treaty. As well, there was the complicated question of, if the talks were allowed to die, who would be obliged to re-start them in a few months time. MacDonald was certain that it would not be he who would allow the Japanese to walk away only to invite them back to try once more, for this would give an impression of weakness and appeasement.[113] Other pressures affected the Americans. Davis and his delegation, as well as the State Department, were under increasing pressure from the American press to come home and not to associate with any "deal" brokered by the British.[114] Each delegation once more reassured the other that neither wanted anything other than solid cooperation with the other, even though it would not be in a formal or open fashion. Davis told the British members that he, as well as the present administration, were convinced that neither MacDonald, Baldwin nor Simon would ever willingly or unwisely do anything to rupture Anglo-American cooperation. Davis also implied that future British demands for more tonnage to meet Far Eastern and European strategic needs would not be seriously challenged, as the "...United States was in a very reasonable frame of mind." Impressed with the British attitude towards the American position and their rationale for allowing the talks to adjourn and not simply to end, Davis asked the State Department to abandon their policy in favour of a recess.[115]

Davis was now convinced that Anglo-American cooperation on the naval limitation issue was a viable reality. Calling off the talks in a manner not palatable to the British would only make matters worse in 1935, as the final fate of the conference already was determined. He believed that the British, even with their imperial defence problems and contending views on how to deal with the Far Eastern question, had no choice but to continue to rank Anglo-American cooperation higher than cooperation with Japan:

"Their [British] policy is, first and foremost, to cooperate with us in any event, but, second, to induce Japan as far as possible to co-operate with us both, which they are hopeful of achieving by making Japan realize that, there is not today a common Anglo-American front, there is a common point of view on fundamentals from which we will not depart."[116] He wrote to the President personally, telling Roosevelt that the British hesitation over how to end the talks was not related to any sort of duplicity. Mounting pressure was coming from the Dominions, all of it aimed at pressuring Whitehall to move towards some sort of Anglo-American arrangement. As for the important Cabinet members, such as MacDonald, Baldwin and Simon, he reported that they, and not the pro-Japanese forces, still held the upper hand in questions concerning Britain's strategic preparations. It was now only a matter of ironing out the tactics for dealing with the Japanese.[117] Simon, still considered in Washington as insincere and lacking in conviction, was credited by Davis as having worked faithfully and fully with the Americans during the naval talks:

> While he [Simon] undoubtedly wants to maintain if possible the most friendly relations with Japan, he thinks we could both restrain Japan and deal more effectively with her through a tri-partitie agreement. However, if the choice has to be made between alienating Japan or the United States, his choice I feel sure will be to go with us. He has I am sure dealt as frankly with me as is possible for him in his official position to do and he has assured me that they now have no agreement whatever with Japan and under no circumstances will they make one to which we are not a party or to which we can object.[118]

Davis also relayed information as to how Simon had worked to persuade Neville Chamberlain, the leader of the pro-Japanese British Cabinet ministers, that cooperation with the United States was of more value to the British Empire than a pact with Japan. Even though Chamberlain was not enthusiastic about an Anglo-American front, he had admitted that Japan's naval 'bluff' would have to be called by the cooperative efforts of the United States and Great Britain. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had reservations, however, that a rupture with Japan at that moment would lead it to seek any sort of assistance possible, even an understanding with Germany. Davis reassured FDR, that in the face of such efforts and with personal assurances by MacDonald and Simon that Britain would never do anything to jeopardize the growing sense of trust between the two great western powers, Britain could be trusted to talk to the Japanese without any danger of selling out the Americans.[119] Roosevelt, swayed by the argument put forward by the British and Davis, wrote to Hull on December 7, informing him that he was willing to allow the talks to continue.[120] Finally, the State Department agreed to an adjournment, after the expected Japanese denunciation was issued, with the British Government taking the responsibility for deciding when the talks would resume.[121] Both American and British policy-makers now retired to consider how the next stage of the process would continue, once Japan had formally denounced the idea of naval limitation. The nature the Anglo-American understanding that was being forged now had to be given texture.

The Foreign Office and Admiralty were still not as generous, in their praise for the American attitude towards the naval limitation issue and the Japanese, as Davis had been of the British position. Vansittart and the American Department as a whole were still irritated by what they saw as a lack of effort on the part of Secretary Hull to foster better relations.[122] They believed that American questioning of the sincerity of the Foreign Office's desire for closer cooperation was insulting, as such a desire was axiomatic in the American Department.[123] Despite this, however, the need to protect Britain's global position could not be sacrificed to the American interests any more than to those of Japan. For that reason, Vansittart still insisted that, in any future talks with the Americans over naval issues, both sides would have to make the running.[124] Officially, the Admiralty and Foreign Office claimed to be happy with how the talks in London had gone. It was their view that the Americans had indeed come a long way towards recognising the reasons why Britain required an increase in certain tonnages, especially in cruisers. A quantitative settlement between the United States and Great Britain was thought assured, as were some qualitative measures such as a limit on gun calibres for capital ships, a reduction in their size, the size of aircraft carriers, and some changes in the cruiser classes.[125] It was the United States, however, who would change the most from its original position in order to make Anglo-American relations closer.

Upon his return to the United States Davis move swiftly to push the Administration to continue to work towards finding common ground with Great Britain for the upcoming Conference. At a high-level meeting with Hull, Standley, Phillips, Moffat, Hornbeck, Eugene Dooman and various naval officers, Davis summed up his perceptions of the results of the last few months of talks with the British and Japanese. He repeated what he had told Roosevelt: that Britain would not throw Japan aside without a clear promise of an alliance from the United States to assist in the Far East. Without such a promise, the British would try to protect their interests by working to bring all three powers together into some face-saving arrangement. One of the principal benefits of the talks had been to force the pro-Japanese group in the British Cabinet into the open, he said, and thereby making those who favoured an Anglo-American approach work to crystalize their thoughts on how the two powers could come to a naval agreement.[126] He and the rest of the delegates reported that: "As a result the group favoring going along with the United States had been tremendously strengthened and Mr. Davis was satisfied that it would, in the long run, control British policy, although the small but powerful pro-Japanese group would still have to be reckoned with."[127]

That feeling of cautious optimism towards working more closely and openly with the British was present throughout the State Department as well, from Secretary Hull down through the various departments, but particulary in the Far Eastern Division and the Western European Division. Certainly, faith in Stanley Baldwin and a solid conviction in his belief in strong Anglo-American relations was seen as a pillar of and testament to the growing strength of the bond between the two nations. Moreover, faith in Baldwin and MacDonald compensated for the lingering doubts about the good faith of such other British leaders as Simon and Chamberlain.[128] Eugene Dooman, another State Department official with a long history of dealing with the British on naval arms limitation, also spread the good word around the Department and Washington about the changed face of the British and, in particular, Sir John Simon. The Far Eastern expert answered critics of the talks insightfully, pointing out that, while there may have been no great accomplishments to publish to the world, the level of understanding that had been established between the three parties was most beneficial. He defended the British need for flexibility in their foreign policy, because of their imperial interests, and was not shocked or dismayed that no permanent or formal agreement between the US and Great Britain had been reached. That was the nature of the British game, he said, and American policy-makers would be wise to accept that fact.[129]

Once the American delegation left London, Craigie and Atherton resumed their management of the situation, massaging departments and egos on both sides of the Atlantic, all in an effort to ensure that the two sides reached a naval agreement that year. Despite continued worries about Anglo-Japanese relations, the new involvement of Italy, France and eventually Russia into the process, Anglo-Italian tensions, and the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty in the summer of 1935, Anglo-American relations concerning how they would regard each another's navies remained fairly constant.[130] The change of Prime Ministers from MacDonald to Baldwin, and from Simon to Samuel Hoare (and then Anthony Eden in December, 1935) as foreign secretary also helped to ensure that better personal relations with the Americans continued.[131] These new British leaders continued to build on an already solid Anglo-American foundation in a belief that such a relationship was vital.

Over the summer and into the early fall of 1935, changes in the global strategic situation and in the British policy-making elite itself solidified Anglo-American trust over naval issues. Sir Ronald Lindsay told former under secretary of state William Castle that, even though there had been a chance some months previous of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that time had passed, and now Britain would not dare go that route.[132] Castle passed along this information to a relieved Secretary Hull, who had been somewhat worried that just such an event might still take place.[133] By mid-September, President Roosevelt was so comfortable with the British position and so confident of being able to work with them during the actual conference that he had no reservations about showing London the American 'hand' as far as future naval building programmes went. He was not happy to have to accommodate British desires on both capital ships and cruisers and was still concerned with having the 20% cut in tonnage that had been such an obstacle before, but the opposition to the British needs was feeble at best.[134] Admiral Standley was also happy to have been able to reach such an understanding with the British. He recognized the importance of close collaboration with Great Britain and the elimination of the naval rivalry that had plagued the two nations for almost nine years. To end such animosity and establish a new, more trusting relationship would be worth much to both nations and both navies in those troubling time.[135] Now that Great Britain had finally decided not to pursue a formal Anglo-Japanese pact, the Americans were happy to work on an informal, yet close and coordinated Anglo-American program of naval development with regard to the Far East. Britain would continue to try and make better relations with the Japanese, but Roosevelt and his Administration were confident it would not be at their expense.

The net result of events from January 1935 until the calling of the Second London Naval Conference on December 9 produced few surprises.[136] American and British officials remained unmoved by Japan's continued demands for parity. As the talks went on, until March 26, the two western powers worked out an agreement that closely mirrored the earlier British demands, with the resulting treaty preserving modified qualitative limitations.[137] Chatfield and the Admiralty became much more familiar with and understanding of their American counterparts, with firm, close ties growing out of the information which was shared about each navy's strategic planning and future programmes, even if for safety's sake the Royal Navy had to keep its distance from the USN.[138] All hope of quantitative limitations left with the Japanese. Without those quantitative issues to create tension and conflict, the two rival services could turn to re-establishing the close ties forged during World War I.[139] However, the real value of the entire two-year process lay in the creation of a new sense of openness and trust between the two countries.

In late January, 1936, Robert Craigie harkened back to the early commitment Davis had made in 1934, and repeated in October, 1935 that the US was prepared to proceed with a qualitative arrangement only if Japan would not participate. If such a reply had not been forthcoming, he doubted whether his government would have called the conference at all. That promise had held true, and his, as well as Norman Davis' and Ray Atherton's, belief that the two powers could find an agreement that would let each nation 'live and let live' to the benefit of all, had been made a reality. Now both nations were rewarded with praise from their respective populations for having tried to implement naval limitation. Even though the idea of a comprehensive naval agreement had been destroyed, because of the narrow and aggressive policies of Japan, no blame could be placed on either Administration. Both Britain and the United States had created the best solution for their own national security interests out of a crumbling and decaying naval arms limitation system. Each of the western powers had also obtained a renewed sense of common purpose and common ground with respect to the naval and Far Eastern aspects of the Anglo-American relationship that had not been evident since the Washington Conference itself.[140] As 1936 wore on, sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic began to see that a new era in Anglo-American relations had indeed been forged in the fires of the naval disarmament process.

Sir Robert Vansittart and the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1936, Viscount Monsell, were valuable examples of the changes that had taken place in those British policy-makers who did not really support the pro-Japanese tactics of Chamberlain and Fisher, but were still often incapable of seeing any good coming from fostering better relations with the United States. In the wake of the success of the Anglo-American naval talks, they had continued to predict that the USN and the Roosevelt Administration would resist Britain's request to keep the overaged cruiser tonnage required to meet Japan's naval expansion. When the expected American indignation and resistance did not materialize, Vansittart and Monsell began to understand that relations with the United States over Far Eastern matters where now cast in a different light. (Victor Wellesley was another convert).[141] On the American side, Pierrepont Moffat, a man well-connected in the State Department hierarchy, who was often reluctant to be generous to the British position had to admit in August, 1936, that "In matters of Pacific politics the British and ourselves are viewing matters more eye to eye,...".[142] These were the successes of the London Naval Conference process. There was a renewed sense of trust and cooperation between the US and Great Britain over naval issues, and thus, over how each was approaching the troubles brewing in the Far East.

The improvement in Anglo-American naval relations caused a major shift in the relations between the two nations that would have a profound effect on the balance of power in the Far East. That change in the balance of power had been achieved without fundamentally changing the existing policies of either state, therefore, without creating the appearance of a formal anti-Japanese coalition. On the British side, the no-bloc policy of the Foreign Office remained intact. Its attempt to balance the various Pacific powers in a system which would protect the Far Eastern parts of the Empire remained. The State Department's need to avoid any formal entangling alliances had been met and a new basis for American naval power established. But, there is no doubt that by the summer of 1936 more policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were favourably disposed to view the other with a sense of trust than had previously been the case. Each understood the other's strategic needs, even if they did not agree. An agreement that Japan, through its pursuit of increased naval arms building, was a violator of international peace had also been reached. How to solve the Japanese problem permanently, if such a thing could be done, had not. Both groups acknowledged that it was not yet possible to make a formal alliance to counter Japan. But each also now knew that informal consultation and cooperation, along parallel but not joint lines, could be a useful strategic reality. It was along that path that British and American foreign policy-makers now began to search further, in hopes of finding a solution for the problems in the Far East.

ENDNOTES

1.FO 371/17599/A6404/1938/45, FO memo by Eden, July 19, 1934.

2.Ibid.

3.Ibid, Craigie minute, August 2, 1934.

4.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Aug.10, 1934. See also FO 371/17599/A6233/1938/45, telegram from Washington embassy with report of press conference, Aug.1, 1934, and Vansittart minute, Aug.4, 1934.

5.FO 371/17599/A6474/1938/45, Secret letter from Clark to Craigie, Aug.8, 1934.

6.Ibid.

7.Ibid.

8.FO 371/17599/A6484/1938/45, FO minute by Craigie, Aug.7, 1934.

9.Ibid.

10.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Aug.8, 1934.

11.FO 371/17599/A6485/1938/45, record of telephone conversation between Craigie and Chatfield, Aug.9, 1934; FO 371/17599/A6501/1938/45, letter from Capt. Danckwerts to Gore-Booth, Aug.9, and Gore-Booth minute, Aug.16, 1934.

12.FO 371/18169/F5943/57/23, Very Confidential letter from Clive to Wellesley, Aug.23, 1934; FO 371/18177/F5809/316/23, FO memo by Richard Allen (clerk in Far Eastern Dept.), letter from Commander Shelley, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Oct.22, 1934; FO 371/18181/F4798/373/34, confidential despatch from Clive to FO, July 5, 1934; CAB 53/5, Minutes of COS meetings, No.132, July 24, 1934; CAB 29/147, NCM(35), Minutes of 5th Meeting, May 31, 1934; Kennedy, "1935", pp.204-206.

13.FO 371/17599/A7695/1938/45, note from Vansittart to Simon, Aug.14, and accompanying despatch from Clive to FO, dated July 5, 1934.

14.Ibid, letter from Simon to Vansittart, Aug.20, 1934.

15.Ibid.

16.Ibid, instructions to American and Far Eastern departments, Aug.22, 1934.

17.Ibid.

18.Ibid, minutes by Craigie, Aug.23, 1934; on the question of whether there were really any moderates in Japanese policy-making circles see Kennedy, "1935", pp.191-197.

19.FO 371/17599/A7695/1938/45, minutes by Orde, Aug.28, 1934.

20.CAB 24/248, CP 77(34) "Situation in the Far East, 1933-34," by Simon, Mar.15, 1934; ibid, CP 80(34), "Imperial Defence Policy", by Simon, Mar.16, 1934.

21.Ibid.

22.FO 371/17599/A7695/1938/45, Vansittart minute, Aug.25, 1934.

23.*Ibid*, Vansittart minute, Aug.29 and Mounsey minute, Aug.28, 1934.

24.*Ibid*, Vansittart minute to Secretary of State, Aug.29, 1934; see also Anthony Eden minute of Sept.2, which tries to find some sort of common ground but was not willing to let Japan have a free hand in China. Nor was he willing to let Japan's naval construction to go on unchecked. Thus, in the end Eden was really in agreement with Orde's views, except for the worth of Russia as a counter against Germany.

25.FO 371/17599/A7185/1938/45, Lothian memo, received on Sept.10, 1934.

26.*Ibid*, Vansittart minutes undated throughout.

27.FO 371/17599/A7186/1938/45, Vansittart minute, Sept.13, 1934.

28.*Ibid*, Craigie minute, Sept.7, 1934.

29.*Ibid*.

30.*Ibid*.

31.*Ibid*, Orde minute, Sept.11.

32.*Ibid*.

33.*Ibid*, Mounsey minute, Sept.12, Vansittart minute, Sept.13, 1934

34.*Ibid*, Vansittart minute, Sept.13.

35.FO 371/17603/A9942/1938/45, letter from Vansittart to Lindsay, Sept.24, 1934.

36.*Ibid*.

37.*Ibid*.

38.*Ibid*.

39.*Ibid*.

40.*Ibid*.

41.CAB 23/79, Minutes of 32 meeting, Sept.25, 1934.

42.CAB 24/250, CP 223(34), "The future of Anglo-Japanese relations", by Chamberlain and Simon, Oct.16, 1934; CAB 23/80, Minutes of 36th Meeting, Oct.24, 1934.

43.Trotter,*Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, pp.115-147; Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, pp.73-101.

44.FO 371/17599/A7695/1938/45, Craigie minute, Sept.27, 1934; FO 371/17600/A8313/1938/45, memo by Admiral Dickens (DNI), Oct.15, 1934.

45.FO 371/17600/A8313/1938/45, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Oct.8, 1934: Ibid, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Oct.18, 1934.

46.Ibid, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Oct.8, 1934.

47.President's Personal File (hereafter FDR-PPF), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, PPF 33, 33, folder - Norman H. Davis, letter from Davis to FDR, Aug. 30, 1934; Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp.126-136.

48.Davis MSS, Container 41, confidential letter from Moffat to Davis, Aug.22, 1934.

49.Davis MSS, container 2, letter from Atherton to Davis, Aug.29, 1934.

50.Hull MSS, container 37, letter from Bingham to Hull, July 23, 1934. Bingham sent this same message to FDR on May 8, see FDR-PSF, Britain 1933-36, letter and enclosed telegram from Bingham to FDR, May 8, 1934.

51.Davis MSS, Container 2, letter from Davis to Atherton, Sept.12, 1934.

52.The Foreign Office and Admiralty were happy with the appointment of Standley to the delegation, as both departments believed that he was well respected by the USN, and therefore would be able to carry the day against any opposition on that front. Also, he was thought to be friendly towards Great Britain, although he was a big navy advocate, which could mean trouble as far as quantitative agreements were concerned. See FO 371/17599/A7965/1938/45, Gore-Booth minute, Oct.9, 1934.

53.William D. Leahy Diary, (hereafter Leahy Diary), Library of Congress, entry for Oct.9, 1934; Moffat Diary, entries for Mar.5 and 9, and June 26 1934.

54.FDR-PSF, Japan, record of meeting between Hull, Phillips, Dunn, Hornbeck, Moffat, Standley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt, and Admiral Greenslade, Sept.26, 1934.

55.Ibid. On October 5, Rear Admiral Frank H. Schofield, now retired from the USN, prepared a memo for Admiral Standley on the limitation of armaments in relation to the upcoming naval talks. Schofield's memo vigorously rejected the theories of British naval planner, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who published an article on the topic in the October edition of Foreign Affairs. Schofield thought the only explanation for such ideas was that Richmond was either "dumb or dishonest." As Schofield knew that the British Admiral had been the President of the British equivalent of the Naval War College, it was the American's opinion that Richmond was the latter and that his article therefore was nothing more than propaganda. The rest of the memo was an articulate and informed explanation of American national interests and how those would have to be defended in the upcoming naval talks. Overall, it was a valuable document for Standley to use as the basis for future arguments with the British over capital ship size, cruiser numbers and strategic visions. See FDR-PSF, Box 142, Folder - London Naval Conference, 1934, Memo from Schofield to Standley, "Limitation of Armaments," Oct.5, 1934.

56.FDR-PSF, Japan, record of meeting between Hull, Phillips, Dunn, Hornbeck, Moffat, Standley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, and Admiral Greenslade, Sept.26, 1934.

57.Ibid.

58.The British Cabinet did not want Davis to arrive in London before the Japanese because Chamberlain had insinuated that talks with the Japanese would go better without Davis present. Craigie countered Chamberlain's suggestions to Simon, by pointing out that Davis did not want to attend British talks with the Japanese delegation, but merely wanted to be in London slightly before or at the same time as the Japanese arrived so as to be ready to begin tripartite talks immediately. Simon then reassured Ambassador Matsudaira that the British and Japanese delegations would meet without a third party being present for the first stage of talks. See FO 371/17599/A7708/1938/45, Craigie minutes, Oct.10, and Simon minutes, Oct.9, 1934; CAB 23/79, Minutes of 32nd meeting, Sept.25, 1934. Davis and his delegation did, however, finally arrive before the Japanese. The delegation consisted of Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the American Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference; Adm. William H. Standley, CNO, Principal Naval Adviser; Ray Atherton, adviser; Eugene H. Dooman, Foreign Service Officer and adviser; Commander Roscoe Schuirmann USN, Technical Adviser; Lt.Com. J.H. Duncan USN, Aide to Adm. Standley, Technical Adviser; Noel H. Field (Dept of State), Secretary of the Mission; Samuel Reber, Foreign Service Officer; and Robert Pell (public relations). The addition of Pell to the delegation caused some concern, as he was thought to be a source of leaks to the press. This was a danger because, due to his belief that the British were flirting with the Japanese, he would compromise the sensitive talks. See FO 371/17599/A7965/1938/45, Gore-Booth minute, Oct.9, 1934.

59.FO 371/18184/F6784/591/23, letter and attached record of conversation from Lindsay to Vansittart, Oct.12, 1934.

60.*Ibid*.

61.*Ibid*.

62.*Ibid*.

63.Stimson Diary, entry for Oct.8, 1934.

64.CSDCF, 711.41/280, Record of conversation between Lothian and Phillips, Oct.15, 1934.

65.FO 371/17600/A6006/1938/45, Craigie minute, Oct.12, 1934.

66.FO 371/17600/A8641/1938/45, record of conversation between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador, Oct.30, 1934; *Ibid*, FO 371/17600/A8410/1938/45, record of meeting, Oct.23, 1934.

67.FO 371/17602/A9844/1938/45, secret FO minute, by Craigie, Oct.29, 1934.

68.*Ibid*, Orde minute, Oct.30,; *ibid*, Wellesley minute, Nov.1; *ibid*, Pratt minute, Oct.31, all 1934.

69.*Ibid*, Pratt minute, Oct.31, 1934.

70.*FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Oct.19, 1934, pp.311-312.

71.For Japanese proposals, see CAB 24/251, CP 238 "Report on the Preliminary Naval Discussions which have taken place with the Japanese Representatives," Oct.30, 1934.

72.*FRUS*, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Oct.25, 1934, pp.312; *ibid*, telegram from Phillips (Acting Secretary of State) to Davis, Oct.26, 1934, pp.315-314; *ibid*, telegram from Davis to Phillips, Oct.26, 1934, pp.216-317.

73.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Phillips, Oct.27, 1934, p.317.

74.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Phillips, Oct.29, 1934, pp.318-321.

75.Ibid. See also CAB 24/251, CP 247 "Statement of the British position vis-a-vis the Japanese Proposals," Nov.7, 1934.

76.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Phillips, Oct.29, 1934, pp.318-321.

77.Ibid.

78.FO 371/17600/A9035/1938/45, Secret telegram from Simon to Clive, Nov.13, 1934.

79.Ibid. For the informing on Davis and the British plans see FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.9, 1934, pp.326; ibid, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.13, 1934, pp.327-328.

80.FO 371/17600/A9052/1938/45, secret Craigie minute, Nov.9, 1934; FO 371/17601/A9191/1938/45, private and secret telegram from Craigie to Clive, Nov.20, 1934.

81.FO 371/17601/A9262/45, telegram from Clive to FO, Nov.21, 1934.

82.The State Department was clearly concerned about how certain American newspapers were reporting the British attempts to find some sort of common ground with Japan. See FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.13, 1934, pp.327-328.

83.Relations between Simon and Davis remained strained, with neither man trusting the other to really give a full or fair hearing to the other's position. Simon in particular refused to talk to Davis without Atherton's being present, to act as a witness to the discussion and be an accurate reporter. The Foreign Office staff at all levels, except for Vansittart, had a great deal of faith in the ability of Atherton to give a complete and accurate rendition of any exchange. Atherton also kept Bingham in the 'loop', therefore ensuring that the American embassy remained a vital part of Anglo-American negotiations. See FO 371/17601/A9264/1938/45, Craigie minutes, with Simon minutes, Nov.17, and separate Simon minutes, Nov.18, 1934; FO 371/17601/A9379/1938/45, secret FO minute by Craigie, Nov.19, 1934.

84.Ibid, draft telegram from Simon to Lindsay, Nov.19, 1934. See also, FO 800/291, Simon Papers, PRO, Kew, London, note from Simon to MacDonald, Oct.3, 1934.

85.FO 371/18184/F6784/591/23, Craigie minute, Nov.19, 1934.

86.FO 371/17601/A9379/1938/45, Secret minute by Craigie, Nov.19, 1934.

87.Ibid.

88.FO 371/17601/A9379/1938/45, Craigie minute, Nov.19, 1934.

89.FRUS, vol.1, Minutes of meeting between British and American delegations, Nov.14, 1934, pp.334-350.

90.Ibid.

91.Ibid.

92.Ibid.

93.Ibid.

94.FO 371/17602/A9712/1938/45, FO minute and NC(D), minutes of 1st meeting, Nov.13, 1934.

95.FRUS, Vol.1, Minutes of meeting between British and American delegations, Nov.14, 1934, pp.334-350.

96.FO 371/18191/F7024/1659/23, FO minutes by Pratt, Orde, Wellesley and Craigie done at Simon's request, Nov.27, 1934.

97.Hull Papers, Container 37, letter from Davis to FDR, Nov.6, 1934.

98.Ibid.

99.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.16, 1934, pp.351-353.

100.Ibid.

101.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.21, 1934, pp.356-358.

102.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.21, 1934, pp.358-359.

103.FDR-PSF, Box 142, Folder - London Naval Conference, 1934, letter from FDR to Davis, Nov.9, 1934. Ambassador Bingham helped spread this message in the right circles, telling the influential Lady Astor that if the British did not choose the Americans over the Japanese, then they were putting their money on the wrong horse. It was Bingham's intention to ensure that the British Government was given a clear signal of the importance that the US were attaching to their future actions. Bingham Diary, entry for Nov.7, 1934.

104.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.17, 1934, pp.353-354.

105.Ibid. See also, FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.17, 1934, pp.355.

106.MacDonald Diary, entry for Nov.23, 1934.

107.Ibid.

108.Last-ditch efforts before the American delegation left for Washington to get a joint Anglo-American front established in the open against the Japanese were rebuffed by MacDonald in a meeting with Davis on Dec.13. Davis was annoyed and disgruntled at his failure to get such a formal position statement, but the Prime Minister informed him in no uncertain terms that "Once again, I asked him whether he would think we were anything but incompetent if we went into a dangerous situation in the Pacific knowing that the Americans would be likely to leave us to do the fighting and nearly added, and the paying. He knows quite well that I am right and asks us to trust them. They have let us down too often in recent negotiations." MacDonald Diary, entries for Dec.13 and Dec.19, 1934. See also FRUS, vol.1, Memo of Conversation in the Prime Minister's Office at the House of Commons on Nov.23, 1934, pp.368-374.

109.FO 371/17601/A9358/1938/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.24, 1934.

110.The State Department worked hard to keep the American isolationist press from scuttling the talks. Special efforts were made by Hull, Phillips and other high-ranking officials to ensure that no great public outcry or antagonism was allowed to be created in those newspapers. See 371/17601/A9360/1938/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.24, 1934; FRUS, vol.1, record of teletype conversation between Davis and Hull, Nov.22, 1934, pp.361-363; Ibid, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.22, 1934, p.363. No research into the actual influence of the press and reporters on these talks has been done to date, which is a pity as there is much to be done.

111.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, Nov.22, 1934, pp.364-365. The Department's attitude reflected the influence of Hornbeck and his desire to send a clear message to the Japanese that any further acts of aggression would be met with equal resolve by the United States. See FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Hull to Davis, Dec.8, 1934, pp.391-391, which has all the markings and phrases to indicate that Hornbeck was most influential in its drafting. Standley wanted a clear statement on the American position, followed by an immediate departure. See Bingham Diary, entry for Nov.16, 1934.

]112.FRUS, vol.1, Memo of conversation in PM's office at House of Commons, Nov.23, 1934.

113.Ibid. See also FRUS, vol.1, Memo of conversation between the American and British delegations at the House of Commons, Dec.4, 1934, pp.381-388.

114.FRUS, record of conversation in PM's office at the House of Commons, Nov.23, 1934.

115.FRUS, vol.1, telegram from Davis to Hull, Dec.3, 1934, pp.378-379; Ibid, telegram from Davis to Hull, Dec.7, 1934, pp.388-390.

116.Davis Papers, Container 51, strictly personal letter from Davis to FDR, Dec.14, 1934.

117.Davis Papers, Container 51, personal and confidential letter from Davis to FDR, Nov.27, 1934.

118.Ibid.

119.Ibid. See also Hull Papers, Container 37, personal and confidential letter from Davis to Hull and copy of strictly personal letter from Davis to FDR, both dated Dec.14, 1934.

120.FRUS, vol.1, note from FDR to Hull, Dec.7, 1934, pp.390-391.

121.For interpretations on the adjournment process, see Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp.141-143; Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp.172-174; Berg, "Second London Naval Conference", pp.216-220.

122.FO 371/18731/A343/22/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Jan.11, 1935. In October, 1935, Vansittart was still annoyed with the Americans and their Far Eastern policy, which he incorrectly appraised as moving towards a withdrawal from that region. See CAB 16/112, DRC Meeting No.17, Oct.10, 1935.

123.FO 371/18760/A531/531/45, Craigie minute, Jan.31, 1935.

124.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Jan.14, 1934.

125.FO 371/18731/A901/22/45, NCM(35) 46 "Survey of the Present Position of Naval Conversations and Recommendations as to Future Procedure," Jan.17, 1935.

126.FRUS, vol.1, "General", Memo of meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State with returned members of the American naval delegation, Jan.8, 1935, pp.64-66.

127.Ibid.

128.Castle Diary, entry for Dec.5, 1934.

129.Castle Diary, entry for Feb.25, 1935.

130.On the Anglo-German naval agreement and the inclusion of other countries into the naval negotiation process, see Charles Bloch, "Great Britain, German Rearmament, and the Naval Agreement of 1935," in Hans W. Gatke, ed., European Diplomacy between Two Wars, 1919-1939, (Chicago, 1972), pp.125-151; Wark, The Ultimate Enemy, Ch.6; D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," Journal of Modern History, vol.28, 1956, pp.155-175; G.Till, "Perceptions of Naval Power Between the War: The British Case," in P. Towle ed., Estimating Foreign Military Power, (London, 1972), pp.172-193; H.H. Hall III, "The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement," Historical Review, Vol.19, 1976, pp.477-499; Joseph A. Maiolo, "'I believe the Hun is Cheating': British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.11, 1996, pp.32-58; Roskill, Naval Policy, vol.II, pp.300-320; R.A. Best, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Aspect of Appeasement," Naval War College Review, vol.34, 1981, pp.68-85. Much has been written on Anglo-Italian relations in the inter war in the last 15 years. The best work for the purposes of this study is Lawrence Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939, (Cambridge, 1975), pp.1-63. Other works include, G.W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War, (Cambridge, 1967); D. Mack Smith, Mussolini, (New York, 1962), pp.188-195; R.A.C. Parker, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis," European History Review, vol.89, 1974, pp.293-332; J.C. Robertson, "The Hoare-Laval Plan," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.10, 1975, pp.433-465; S.U. Chukumba, The Big Powers against Ethiopia: Anglo-French-American Maneuvers during the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, 1934-1938, (Washington, 1977); M. Roi "'A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude': The British Foreign Office, American Neutrality, and the Hoare-Laval Plan," Canadian Journal of History, vol.29, 1994, pp.331-351; idem., "From the Stresa Front to the Triple Entente: Sir Robert Vansittart, the Abyssinian Crisis and the Containment of Germany," vol.6, 1995, pp.61-90; Reynolds M. Salerno, "Multilateral Strategy and Diplomacy: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Mediterranean Crisis, 1935-1936," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.17, 1994, pp.39-78; Rosaria Quartararo, "Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July-October 1935)," The Historical Journal, vol.20, 1977, pp.185-220; Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis, American Historical Review, vol.75, 1970, pp.1327-1356.

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131.CAB 23/82, Cabinet Minutes, meeting 54(35), Dec.11, 1935; FO 371/19804/A243/4/45, LNC (London Naval Conference)(35)(UK) 9, record of discussion between Eden and Davis, Jan.9, 1936; CAB 23/83, meeting 11(36), Feb.26, 1936; Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, vol.2, (London, 1960-65), pp.315-327.

132.Castle Diary, entry for July 27, 1935. See also, FO 371/18769/A7224/3169/45, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Aug.8, 1935.

133.Castle Diary, entry for July 28, 1935.

134.FRUS, vol.1, memo by Noel H. Field, Sept.17, 1935, pp.112-113; ibid, memo by Noel H. Field of the Division of Western European Affairs of a meeting held at the executive office of the White House, Nov.19, 1935, pp.144-149.

135.Hugh R. Wilson Papers, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa, Container 1, Folder - Norman Davis, letter from Wilson to Davis, Feb.29. 1936. Also, FO 371/19805/A773/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)21, Jan.23, 1936; ibid, LNC(35)(UK)26, Jan.29, 1936; ibid, LNC(35)(UK)28, Feb.3, 1936; Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, pp.70-72.

136.FRUS, vol.1, memo of conversation of State Department and USN officials, Sept.14, 1935, pp.110-112; FO 371/18740/A8758/22/45, NCM(35) 72 and minutes, Oct.11, 1935; FO 371/18740/A9070/22/45, Craigie minute, Oct.18, 1935.

137.Eden MSS, FO 954/6, PRO, Kew, London, 'The Far East', FE 36/1, memo by Eden of conversation with Davis, Jan.10, 1936; ibid, FE 36/4, memo by Eden of conversation with Davis, Jan.18, 1936; FO 371/19804/A234/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)9, record of discussion between Eden and Davis, Jan.9, 1936.

138.FO 371/19809/A2020/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)92, Mar.10, 1936; FO 371/19813/A3416/4/45, letter from Capt. Phillips to Craigie, April 9, 1936; CAB 23/83, meeting 20(36), Mar.16, 1936; ibid, meeting 21(36), Mar.18, 1936; CAB 24/261, CP102(36), "Programme of New Construction for 1936," April 7, 1936.

139.Berg, "Second London Naval Conference", p.220. Also FO 371/19804/A243/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)12, Jan.13, 1936; FO 371/19804/A234/4/45, LNC(35)(UK) 13, Jan.14, 1936; FO 371/19804/A234/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)19, Jan.17, 1936.

140.FO 371/19805/A773/4/45, LNC(35)(UK)26, Jan.29, 1935.

141.See FO 371/19819/A7766/4/45, Vansittart minute, Sept.25, 1936; FO 371/19820/A8791/4/45, FO minute by Craigie, Oct.30, 1936; CAB 2/6, CID Minutes, Meeting 278, May 12, 1936.

142.See Hugh Wilson Papers, Container 1, Folder - Pierrepont Moffat, letter from Moffat to Wilson, August 21, 1936.

CHAPTER SEVEN

"Parallel but not necessarily joint": The Foreign Office and State Department, 1937-1939

> American neutrality must be accepted by his Majesty's Government as something that it is useless to call in question. It and the native suspiciousness of foreign effort to influence it must dictate the action of His Majesty's Government in their desire to make the best of the situation.
> --Sir Ronald Lindsay, Mar.22, 1937 [1]

> It will be seen then that in the Far East co-operation is not ruled out, though the desire to reduce commitments is evident; towards Europe, on the other hand, and towards the League as being in the United States view a mainly European institution, the ancient tradition of no entanglements has full sway.[2]

Between 1935 and 1939, the Administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and in particular the State Department, under Secretary of State Cordell Hull, developed close, informal relations with Great Britain in order to work in a coordinated fashion against Japanese aggression in the Far East.[3] On the British side, the main forces pushing for the continued recognition of the centrality of Anglo-American relations for the safeguarding of British interests in the Far East were, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Anthony Eden; the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald C. Lindsay; the American and Far Eastern Departments of the Foreign Office; the permanent under secretary (PUS), Sir Robert Vansittart; and the British Ambassador to China, Sir Alexander Cadogan (who later succeeded Vansittart as PUS in 1938). The Treasury and its Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain (later Prime Minister), did not control the conduct and formulation of Britain's Far Eastern foreign policy, although they were a nuisance to those responsible for that policy.[4] Anglo-American relations regarding the Far East during this period were a convoluted mix of departmental communication, public education and informal strategic planning. Was this situation an improvement over the way the two countries had viewed Far Eastern matters before 1935? The short answer is yes. But, the continuing reality was that the United States and Great Britain had many self-interests and restraints, both international and domestic, that, by even mid-1937, continued to prevent the two from working openly and quickly against

Japanese expansion.[5]

As the two institutional bodies responsible for the ongoing development of Anglo-American relations, the Foreign Office (in particular Far Eastern (FED) and American (AD) Departments) and the State Department (in paricular the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (DFEA) were the key organizational links between the two nations. How these two groups viewed one another on a personal level, how they viewed Japan and the Far Eastern situation in general, and how they viewed the direction that Anglo-American relations should develop determined whether there was any 'special relationship' between these two countries with regard to things oriental. Between 1935 and September 1939, their mental maps, those images of the issues, were solidified by the close cooperation of the State Department and Foreign Office. The result was an informal understanding between the two that allowed strategic planners on both sides of the Atlantic to assume with some confidence that Japan ran a great risk of starting a general war in the Pacific if she attacked either the United States' or Great Britain's interests in that region.

The man most responsible for the formulation of American Far Eastern policy, the Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, Stanley K. Hornbeck, had a very good understanding of the British view of the Far Eastern situation. Because the United States was not able to commit to a formal alliance, Britain would not be able to give public support to any American initiatives for fear of provoking Japan. However, Hornbeck was assured by the American embassy in London that the Foreign Office was most favourably inclined to working quietly with the Americans to counter further Japanese aggression.[6] He agreed with that assessment, and thought that the American charge d'affaires, a nine-year veteran of the London embassy, Ray Atherton, was one of the most important sources of information about and insight into Great Britain's Far Eastern policy. Hornbeck also agreed with Atherton that Britain's Far Eastern policy, as was American policy, was based on self-interests, which were roughly similar to those of Washington. But, each nation could appreciate the reasons, largely political ones, that sometime made a joint approach to the region impractical.[7] By the end of 1935, Hornbeck was telling his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, some truths about American foreign policy in the Far East. First, the United States had to ensure that Great Britain did not become frustrated with America because no formal agreement and joint relationship was forthcoming. The chief of the Far Eastern Division advised Hull to be certain that American expressions of sympathy for the British position in the Far East were made often and to as many different policy-making groups as possible, including the press. Second, the reality of the strategic situation facing both the United States and Great Britain had to be recognized. It was Hornbeck's opinion that neither power was prepared, at that moment, to use force to defend China. China may indeed have had an intention to use force to defend itself, but would not unless it could get the support of either of the western powers. In matters relating to China, it was imperative to Hornbeck that the United States be seen to be acting on its own, without following any British lead. To be seen as a puppet to British interests would only make the isolationists stronger and make the American public suspicious of any relations with Great Britain. Even if parallel action with Great Britain was decided upon, the United States policy had to be seen as protecting American self-interests.[8] Hornbeck told Hull that

> There remains among the possibilities ... one course of action which might be advantageous: that is, to make a statement to the British Government. At all times in deciding upon courses of action with regard to Far Eastern matters, we should keep in mind the fact that where common interests are involved cooperative or parallel action on the part of the American and British Governments offers possibility of advantage. Experience has shown that it is difficult to have this cooperation. Both countries should, however, strive for it when and where possible.[9]

Those views were also shared with the American Ambassadors in China and Japan, respectively Nelson T. Johnson and Joseph Grew. Hornbeck informed both men that he wanted close cooperation and harmony with Britain, advocating that such American agencies and institutions as the embassies were to go out of their way to keep their British opposite numbers informed as to what was American policy and what was the thinking in Washington on any issue.[10] This was significant, for both Johnson and Grew were vital sources of information and reflection for Hornbeck. And, although governed by his own experiences and beliefs, the chief of the Far Eastern Division saw both Ambassadors as his trusted eyes and ears and could think of no better men to have in those positions.[11]

Both Ambassadors agreed with Hornbeck's attitude towards Great Britain. Johnson, in correspondence with former the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, concurred with Stimson that, in light of the talks about naval issues and the Far East which had occurred over the last year and a half, Britain was beginning to come alive to the fact that it needed to rearm. Still, while generally well disposed to the British empire and its position in the world, Johnson was concerned that, faced with German, Italian and Japanese aggression, which could present a concerted and possibly coordinated threat, Great Britain would need to look to a collective security arrangement for safety.[12] In that regard, Johnson was not opposed to the United States working in an informal and parallel manner with Great Britain against Japan, although Great Britain would of course have to take the lead.[13]

Grew was also happy with the way the Anglo-American naval talks had gone over the past two years. It was his opinion that

> So far as we can evaluate here the proceedings of the recent preliminary naval conversations in London, I am of the opinion that the most important and the most valuable result issuing therefrom has been the apparent tendency towards closer Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East. If we can count in future - again as a direct result of Japan's "bungling diplomacy" - on a solid and united front between the United States and Great Britain in meeting Japan's flaunting of treaty rights and her unrestrained ambitions to control East Asia, the future may well assume a brighter aspect for all of us.[14]

Grew and the British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir Robert Henry Clive, had worked steadily and closely together on Sino-Japanese issues during 1935, sharing sensitive information, as well as opinions on what the other's government was likely to do or be able to do in any given circumstance involving Japanese aggression.[15] Johnson had a similar relationship with Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Minister (soon to be Ambassador) in China.[16]

Both Grew and Johnson, like the members of the Far Eastern and American Departments of the Foreign Office, were also skeptical about the growth, or possibility of the growth, of any meaningful liberal movement in the Japanese government.[17] Grew summed up the views of all four observing bodies when he told Hull that

> It would seem unwise to predicate American policy in the Far East on the hope of democratic developments in this country. The military should be kept in mind as still the strongest single element in Japanese affairs. But the fact that the leaders are persons of military training is incidental only they are not primarily soldiers but are strong nationalists who, in a country in which the army is a popular institution which offers a career to talent, happen to have been trained as soldiers.[18]

The goodwill and cooperation between the British and American embassies in the Far East was repeated in London and Washington. The State Department's relations with Lindsay were at their apogee, with the former looking almost solely to the Ambassador to provide the British position and its interpretation.[19] As well, Lindsay had powerful allies, in the shape of former under secretary of state, William R. Castle Jr., working hard to persuade Cordell Hull that Great Britain was an ally that could be trusted and relied upon in the Far East.[20] Such efforts, the Secretary believed, by August, 1935, were necessary, because "... if an misunderstanding arose between England and America there would be no hope left of saving even a semblance of democracy anywhere."[21] Similarly, in London, Ray Atherton continued to be given access to the Foreign Office's inner sanctum in order to be able to express, clearly and confidently, the real British position on any Far Eastern matter, and to obtain sensitive material about Britain's Far Eastern policy.[22] He, along with Ambassador Robert W. Bingham and the latter's successor, Joseph Kennedy, kept intact the hard-won trust of the Foreign Office so that a clear picture could continue to be transmitted to Washington. The mechanisms for creating better Anglo-American relations at the foreign policy level were in place.[23] Thus, as 1935 drew to a end, the views and relationships between the American and British organs seemed to be moving along parallel, but not joint, lines.

In December 22, 1935, Anthony Eden took over as the Secretary of State, succeeding Sir Samuel Hoare. His move to that office was taken as a clear signal by the American embassy that continued improvement in Anglo-American relations could be expected. Bingham reported to Hull that Eden had informed him that "... at the basis of his [Eden's] policy was his purpose to cooperate in every possible way with the United States Government."[24] And for Eden, the primary threat to Great Britain's security came from the Far East. To meet that threat, in the face of a more aggressive Italy and a resurgent Germany, the United States had to be brought into a closer, cooperative relationship.[25] Therefore, following up the success of the Anglo-American naval talks held from 1934 to 1936 was an important part of Eden's Far Eastern policy. Norman Davis, the chief American naval negotiator, saw immediately that Eden was most desirous of making better Anglo-American naval relations blossom into something more. Davis invited Eden to come to the United States to visit the President at Hyde Part and to help educate the American public about the realities of the circumstances of international relations. The newly-appointed Foreign Secretary reacted cautiously, and showed good sense in eliciting the opinion of the most able Foreign Office observer of America, Lindsay, as to whether to pursue the matter. Lindsay told Eden that it was hard to believe that Davis would have made such an advance without it being on FDR's behalf. The Ambassador assured the Foreign Secretary that the President was "... fundamentally friendly to Great Britain, though of course he is not going to give anything away for less than its value..."[26] The American Department was anxious that not too much cold water was poured on the idea, for fear that future talks with the Americans about trade agreements and economic cooperation be disqualified.[27] However, the head or the American Department, Robert Craigie, cautioned against any such visit occurring until after the fall Presidential elections took place. If FDR won, then his Administration would be stronger, and a more productive and aggressive attitude towards the Far East could be forthcoming in any such talks.[28] Vansittart, still fearful of being left in the lurch by the Americans, pushed Eden not to "run after" the United States because of its unreliability.[29] Eden, not wanting to overstep his own position within the Cabinet, and fearing his visit would be used by American isolationists as an example of British propaganda aimed at drawing America into a war, politely declined the offer, assuring Vansittart that there was no question of British policy "running after" the US.[30] Moreover, Eden first had other fights to wage within his own government before he could move in such a bold fashion.

Many of these involved the other departments that wished to influce foreign policy. Like Hoare, the new Foreign Secretary supported the Far Eastern Department's efforts to thwart the Treasury and War Office's cries to accommodate and appease Japanese aggression. Eden's predecessor had been doubtful of Japan's willingness to work cooperatively with Great Britain in the future, and had sought to come to a better understanding with the Americans on Far Eastern plans. In a conversation with Ambassador Bingham, Hoare had confided that

> ... it was his policy as far as possible to strengthen the liberal element in Japan, if there was any such element left; but that he thought there was grave danger of further action by Japan which would flagrantly violate the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and because he thought this was probable, he thought that we should try in advance to clear our minds as to what action, if any, could be taken in the face of the situation which would arise, and which probably would arise in the comparatively near future, and that meanwhile he was trying, as he had said, to strengthen the liberal element in Japan if there was any liberal element left.[31]

Fed a steady diet of pro-Japanese intelligence and viewpoints by Major General F.S.G. Piggot, the British Military Attache in Tokyo and a confirmed Japanophile and Foreign Office irritant, the War Office and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Archibald A. Montgomery-Massingberd, also promoted the view that, considering the global strategic situation facing the empire, it was better to give Japan what it wanted than risk a conflict.[32] When pressed by the CIGS in Cabinet to move towards a more accommodating approach to Japan, Eden responded that he, too, would like to be able to improve relations with Japan. However, desiring such a circumstance and facing the reality were two different things, and Eden, aware of the need to avoid giving the United States the impression that Britain was willing to 'cut a deal' with the Japanese over China, politely rebuffed the idea of any sort of Anglo-Japanese understanding being possible in the foreseeable future.[33]

His rejection of the War Office-Treasury proposal was based partly on such information given to him by Charles Orde, the head of the Far Eastern Department. Aside from considerations of the animosity that such an agreement would create with China, Orde's approach was influenced prominently by thought of the United States. Although skeptical of the exact usefulness of America and its willingness to stay engaged in the Pacific, and more concerned about how such an agreement would endanger the vital Anglo-Soviet relationship, Orde believed that "The United States of America would look on us as selfish opportunists who had left the path of rectitude, and League circles, official and unofficial, would regard us in the same light and as traitors to the cause of international morality."[34] Vansittart, Sir Victor Wellesley, the deputy under secretary of state responsible for overseeing the Far Eastern Department, and Sir John Simon, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, all agreed with Orde's analysis.[35] As a result of the naval talks and the other movements toward closer Anglo-American relations which were occurring simultaneously, Eden was certain to consult and coordinate any major move in Britain's Far Eastern policy with the United States.

Eden acquired a new and qualified ally in his fight against the Treasury and War office with the transfer of Sir Alexander Cadogan from China to London, where he became deputy under secretary. Cadogan brought with him to London some useful first-hand experiences of the Far East, as well as the benefit of having had a close and productive relationship with

Ambassador Johnson. As he prepared to leave China, Cadogan held some finals talks with Johnson on British and American commitments in China. The British Ambassador had tried to discourage the Chinese from expecting open military support against Japan. While Johnson pointed out that, given the British support for Ethiopia, the Chinese perhaps had some grounds for thinking that Britain would do the same for them, Cadogan replied that

> ... the Chinese ought to be able to see that the two situations are entirely different; in Europe it was possible for Great Britain to enlist the joint support of other nations, whereas in the Far East there would be no nation to join Great Britain in opposing Japan's encroachments on China. He pointed out that it would be impossible for Great Britain to exert any military strength of its own in the Far East. I [Johnson] assented to his general view and admitted that the nearest Great Power, the United States, would be extremely unlikely to take any part in the matter, since American participation in any way is enormously more expensive than participation by any other nations, and there were no American interests in China which would seem to warrant the colossal expenditure that past experience indicated would probably be necessary.[36]

The American Ambassador was also very appreciative of Cadogan's knowledge of the Far East, telling the latter that he believed him to possess a "...thorough comprehension of the psychological factors which mould political events in the Far East and the details were more or less inconsequential."[37] On his return to Great Britain, Cadogan shared his views on Britain's Far Eastern policy with Atherton, who was about to go home on leave. The deputy under secretary's views were the same as those he had expressed to Ambassador Johnson. He repeated that Britain would not fight for China and neither would the United States. As well, Cadogan did not support making a deal with Japan for the exploitation of China; nor was he willing to provoke Japan by any unnecessary efforts at alliance building against its actions in China. Finally, the former Ambassador to China impressed Atherton with the idea that neither he nor the British government desired to create a thoroughgoing Anglo-American front. Such a formal and open bloc would only make the Japanese harder to work with. Atherton agreed with those views, telling Cadogan that a fear of possible Anglo-American cooperation was likely to make the Japanese more willing to accommodate both western nations.[38] With Cadogan in London to assist him, Eden would be able both to counter opposition to the FO's hardline approach to Japan and, at the same time, to conduct an insightful and comprehensive campaign to solidify Anglo-American trust on Far Eastern matters. Both men believed in the need to safeguard Britain's imperial needs first, but both were also willing to acknowledge the need for American support in the Far East to protect them.

By May, 1936, the evidence of the effect of that 'parallel but not joint' union of American and British interests on a number of issues was beginning to be seen in the Japanese reactions to both nations. On May 29, Grew reported that Japan was terrified at the prospect of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East. He supported the idea of continuing the policy of issuing similar if not joint representations, as he saw the great advantage being produced by such actions.[39] Clive shared Grew's assessment, and reported thusly to the Foreign Office. When charged by the Japanese that there was Anglo-American pressure being brought to bear on them, Clive denied the existence of any such pressure. He rebutted the allegations by stating there had been no joint action or combined pressure (a blatant stretching of the truth) and that each government had acted in defence of its own interests.[40] This creation of an uncertainty in Japan's ability to judge accurately the Anglo-American relationship in the Far East was beneficial to both western powers, as it acted as a brake on the Japanese. They, faced with an uncertainty on one hand and a certainty -- the animosity of the Soviet Union -- on the other, were forced to take stock of their strategic position. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office and State Departments continued to work at strengthening Anglo-American ties, for both offices had certain lingering suspicions and uncertainties about the other's Far Eastern policy that needed clarification and explication.[41]

In London, Vansittart, now more impressed with the need for maintaining better Anglo-American relations, began a public relations campaign aimed at educating the American Mid-West about Britain's strategic position in the Far East. When Ronald Tree, an MP for Harborough, returned from a visit to the American Mid-West he gave the American Department a briefing on the views he found there towards Great Britain.[42] The PUS was suitably impressed, both with Tree's opinion that the Mid-West had been too long ignored by foreign representatives and with the idea that Lindsay should arrange for a tour through that region.[43] Lindsay's reply revealed one of the major problems facing British attempts to 'educate' the American public from 1936 to 1941: a fear that such actions would be seen as propaganda aimed at 'trapping' the United States in a compromising position. Lindsay argued that, along with the physical effort required for such a trip, the State Department was emphatic that anything remotely resembling propaganda be absolutely avoided.[44] Craigie and the American Department argued that Lindsay was overstating the case and should be ordered to conduct the tour, but, as usual, the Ambassador's views on American attitudes won the day.[45] Lindsay continued to warn off FO attempts to re-create the propaganda campaign of the First World War, knowing full well the deep resentment felt in certain areas of the American mentality towards that episode in Anglo-American relations. Furthermore, nothing along such lines could really be considered until the results of the fall Presidential election were known.

Throughout the late summer and fall, British Far Eastern policy makers had had to deal with proposals put forward by the new Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Shigeru Yoshida, about the possibility of a renewed Anglo-Japanese understanding. The talks had created some embarrassment and discomfort for the Foreign Office, as no one there really believed that Yoshida had either the authority or the political power to achieve the necessary agreement. Furthermore, in seeking to circumvent the Far Eastern experts available in the Foreign Office, the Ambassador had sought to bypass the normal channels of communication and had approached the pro-Japanese Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville

Chamberlain, directly with his proposals.[46] By the end of the year, however, the Foreign Office had disproved Yoshida's ability and dispelled the Cabinet of any idea that his initiatives would create better Anglo-American relations.[47] Similarly, by the end of 1936, the Japanese Ambassador in the United States, also was seen as being weak and ineffective.[48] Part of the reason for the decreased credibility of the Japanese embassies was the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan and the Keelung Incident (where British sailors and an officer were assaulted in the Japanese- controlled port of Keelung), both coming late in 1936. The incidents seemed to prove what those who argued against being able to trust Japan had proclaimed.

Also, both episodes had also strenghtened Anglo-American cooperation. American and British diplomatic organs had worked closely and shared sensitive information about both events, finding that their views on the Anti-Comintern Pact were almost identical. This working together helped build a sense of confidence and trust in Anglo-American Far Eastern relations, while at the same time discrediting the Japanese.[49] In the Keelung matter, the rapid and forceful British response and the subsequent Japanese apology and reaction enhanced Britain's prestige in the Far East.[50] The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the China Squadron, Admiral Sir Charles J.C. Little, had shared the Royal Navy's anger over the incident with his counter-part, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, the C-in-C of the US Asiatic Fleet, and had found a sympathetic ear. Ambassador Grew had also advised the State Department strongly to support the British position and to deprecate any visits of the US C-in-C to Japan. The State Department agreed with Grew.[51] Certainly American sympathy for the injustices being suffered by the British at the hands of the Japanese military was increasing.

The year 1936 also came to a close on a high note for Anglo-American naval relations. When asked by Vansittart and Eden for comment on an article dealing with Britain's sea power and the Pacific that Winston

Churchill was preparing for publication, Craigie replied to Churchill's theory that Britain did not care anymore what size fleet America built with an illuminating and absolutely accurate four-point summation of the state of Anglo-American naval relations:

> 1.If America were to increase her building programme beyond the point of parity with us and Japan were to follow (As she certainly would), this could not be immaterial to us, because we should have to follow in our turn. Whether we like it or not, the building of the three countries is therefore hopelessly interconnected. 2. Even if we do not mind much what America builds, the same is not true of the United States, which watches our building with the greatest care and regards parity not as an abstract theory but as a real necessity. 3. If the purpose of the article is to appeal to Japanese opinion, then it is perhaps a mistake to say that, so much do we trust America that we do not mind what she builds, but that we shall be most careful to watch and match every ship which you, Japan, build. This may be true, but there are certain facts which are better not insisted upon too much. 4. The chances of our bringing Japan into the new Naval Treaty will be diminished in proportion as she regards this as a frame-up between the Americans and ourselves.[52]

Cadogan was in full agreement with Craigie's analysis, believing that, while the idea of Anglo-American relations being closely coordinated and full of trust was indeed the reality, it was also a fact that neither nation desired to fling into Japan's face. The deputy under secretary did not object strenuously, however, to Churchill's tough tone towards Japan and its foreign policy of the last five years.[53]

Stanley Hornbeck echoed many of the sentiments expressed by Craigie as to the usefulness of the recent naval agreement. He, like Craigie, believed that the only way to ensure Japanese cooperation in international relations was to show a strong front. Hornbeck and Craigie also held similar views on the probability of Japan's returning to the bargaining table once it became obvious that Great Britain and the United States would not allow Japan to win any naval race. The chief of the Far Eastern Division was a strong supporter of naval preparedness, assuming that a reasonable Japan would see the futility in trying to out-produce the United States in armaments. Carefully watched, and faced with a united front, Japan would be forced by outside pressure to make an approach to the western nations, a path which would be more beneficial to the United

States.[54]

This close approximation of views led to an unusual occurrenc. Gradually, the State Department and the Foreign Office began to place more emphasis on what each other thought about Japan than they did on what was being reported to them through their own official diplomatic channels. This parallel shutting down of part of the traditional information-passing system occurred in both western powers simultaneously, making them both more reliant and receptive to the other's views on Japan. The shared information passing back and forth between the FO and the American embassy in London, and the material shared between the two embassies in Tokyo, became the key foundations upon which British and American assessments of Japan were created. During a conversation about the recently-completed naval talks, Ambassador Bingham and Robert Craigie displayed how that process worked when the topic shifted to the Far East and what each nation could do there. Bingham relayed the sentiments of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to Craigie, telling the latter that, due to the success of the naval talks, the opportunity to create closer Anglo-American relations in general had now arrived. Public opinion was moving along with FDR and Hull's view, said Bingham, and that view was certainly the one held by many Americans who held responsible positions. While the chances of an actual military alliance being created were non-existent, barring an emergency, there was now "...ample scope for the closest consultation and co-operation."[55] For his part, Craigie told the Ambassador that his government felt the same, but that there were of course differences as to the method of dealing with the Japanese question. Increasing pressures in Europe were making it more difficult for the British to act in the Far East, said Craigie, and there was the added question of whether the United States was going to stay engaged in the Philippines or abandon that responsibility. If these realities of the British strategic position could become more accepted by American policy makers, then, thought Craigie, any serious difference between the two nations over Far Eastern policy would be avoided. Craigie told Bingham that the constant exchange of full and frank views and information on that region had to be maintained, as that openness and trust was vital to the maintenance of the Anglo-American relationship. Bingham agreed entirely, assuring Craigie that the United States Administration fully recognised how the situation had changed over the last two years.[56] For their part, both Cadogan and Vansittart were anxious to play on that American desire for full and closer cooperation. A trade agreement was thought a logical next step in the process of eliminating areas of contention with the US, with both men also agreeing such a trade agreement would have strategic benefits for Britain's imperial defence problems.[57] This change of attitude towards Britain's global situation on the part of the United States also coincided with an initiative by President Roosevelt to hold a world peace conference.

Stronger on foreign policy matters after his re-election, Roosevelt then began floating the idea of summoning such a conference in order to force the "gangster powers", Italy, Germany and Japan out into the open. If those powers refused to participate or give way to the peaceful demands of the rest of the world, then the peace-loving nations would come together in a close agreement on how to further proceed against the outlaws.[58] FDR's plan received mixed reviews from the British government, with Eden and Neville Chamberlain, who would become Prime Minster in May, 1937, wanting the idea kept in play, while Vansittart and Craigie both objected to such a scheme. Because of their lack of faith in the American diplomatic machinery, the two junior partners felt Roosevelt's idea was dangerous. Their professional bias against American diplomats and negotiators caused them to believe that such a proposal was impulsive, displaying improper and insufficient preparation. Remembering the problems caused in the past by the failure of 'The Big' conference, both Craigie and Vansittart feared that if Roosevelt's conference failed it would drive America into a deeper isolationist mood. However, if preconference cooperation, similar to that which had occurred with the naval limitation talks, could be arranged between the United States and Great Britain, then a safe environment for such an event could be arranged.[59] Eden and Chamberlain rebuffed the idea that such a call by Roosevelt was 'dangerous'. Instead, both men were emphatic that the British response to FDR's initiative should avoid discouraging the President. In their minds, the President's move would allow a greater education of the American people to the dangers in the world. That could only help inspire sympathy for the British position in the Far East.[60]

Faced with strong political direction, Vansittart and Craigie quickly changed gears, with the former taking the matter up with Lindsay. The PUS agreed, when instructed by his ambassador, that to squash the American project was not the proper course to take. To do so would endanger the goodwill found in current Anglo-American relations and undo all the good done over the last three years. Instead, Lindsay should continue to point out the need for proper preparation and what the potential difficulties of calling such a conference would be. The attitude to be taken was one of concerned instruction, not outright disdain and rejection (Vansittart's natural reaction). Lindsay was both to ensure that he stayed in close contact with Hull on any future matters related to FDR's proposal and to avoid giving the appearance of discouraging the idea.[61] Despite this, Roosevelt's initiative eventually ran its course without any concrete result. The President was not willing to undertake any future action without first having a complete and full consultation with the British. He did, however, assure Eden that it was his desire to cooperate with Great Britain on foreign affairs and that he was "... not only ready but eager to help, that he would be ready to take an initiative if and when we thought the moment right, and that he would take none unless we were in accord as to its appropriateness."[62] The need to ensure close Anglo-American efforts at all levels on strategic issues was now beginning to dominate American and British policy makers in their formulation of a Far Eastern policy.

Not surprisingly, given the commonality of material available to the State Department and the Foreign Office, their attitudes, while not identical, certainly became similar. However, in 1937, changes in the strategic balance of power in the Far East and to the Tokyo embassy would disturb the peace of that region and, for a time, the coordination of that Anglo-American information sharing. This occurred when Sir Robert Craigie became Britain's Ambassador to Japan. His appointment and his ensuing handling of Anglo-Japanese relations created a resurgence of Grew's suspicion about what Britain's intentions towards Japan were.[63] Those suspicions were overridden, however, by the continued close workings of the Foreign Office and the State Department through the London and Washington embassies, as well as by a growing amount of direct contact.

The year 1937 began on a high note for Great Britain, as Ambassador Bingham issued a glowing report to President Roosevelt on that nation's relations with the United States. Bingham believed that the Empire was rearming in order to take a leading role in the maintenance of peace in the world, and was in the midst of a drive to establish closer relations with the United States.[64] In particular, Bingham believed that the policies of the two nations, in international affairs, were certainly moving along similar lines. Members of the British government, prominent public and private figures, various private and government committees, all were involved in trying to improve Anglo-American relations. Further, "Official orders have been given in the British Army and Navy that good relations with their American opposite numbers at home an abroad must be established and maintained."[65] Relations between the US embassy and the Foreign Office had a marked friendliness that could not go unnoticed, and the British press were working hard to make the American public more aware of the dangers being presented to Britain.[66]

At the same time, Norman Davis continued to add his voice to those advising FDR to make Britain's path to better Anglo-American relations an easier one. Faced with the need to find a solution to the naval building programmes of Germany, Italy, France and Japan, the United States could try to broker some sort of new plan to limit naval arms. However, as the likelihood of such an agreement was slim, the reality was a need for the USN to increase its own building. Above all else, argued Davis, if such a buildup were to take place then the Royal Navy was to be the standard to be reached. That did not mean, however, that Britain was to be the target of the building programme, In fact, Davis was insistent that Britain not be held responsible in any respect for the American need to build a bigger fleet. He lobbied Hull that ."... I think we should avoid even the appearance that it [increased American naval building] is because of the British but should make it clear that it is the world situation which impels the British to increase and for us to do likewise in order to maintain our nation's position and safeguard our interests."[67] Davis had been reaffirmed in his views by the actions of the ex-secretary of state for foreign affairs, Sir Samuel Hoare, now the First Lord of the Admiralty. Hoare was grateful that the US had been willing and able to talk openly and honestly about naval matters in such trying times. Because of the close understanding between the two nations "... he [Hoare] said that they were prepared to give us any information which we may seek. Our naval attache was delighted that I was able to get the information I did about the British plans because our navy had been most eager to get it and he had been unable to do so from any of the more subordinate officials."[68] Hoare also promised to let the Americans know anything about Japanese naval plans or building as soon as the British found out any details. In such fertile conditions, the pro-Britain lobby in the Roosevelt Administration grew quickly.

On the other side of the globe, intimate discussions with Clive had led Joseph Grew to report that Britain was improving its diplomatic leverage over Japan because of Japan's worsening relations with the Soviet Union and Great Britain's improved relations with the Russians. Both men agreed that, in such conditions the natural course of action for Japan would be to try to improve her relations with the US in order to alleviate Tokyo's isolation. Neither was convinced that Japan could be trusted, however, to make substantial changes in its aggressive foreign policy. Any changes would be cosmetic only, and based on the 'all take and no give' formulae of negotiations.[69] It was Grew's belief, as well as that of Ambassador Johnson in China, however, that Japan's new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Naotake Sato, would be far more accommodating than his predecessor, General Hayashi Senjuro Arita.[70] Still, both British and American expectations of any significant change in Japan's foreign policy were not high.[71] As a result of those limited expectations of Japan, American and British officials continued to share their views and plans for the Far East with one another in case an emergency arose in that region. Direct contact between British Cabinet members and high-ranking State Department officials was utilized in that information-sharing scheme.

Early in 1937, the President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, traveled to the United States as a precursor to serious Anglo-American trade negotiations. From there, he informed the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, that the American Administration was very much desirous of exchanging "information even of very secret nature" between various departments, most importantly of all, the foreign affairs departments, the two Treasuries, and the air forces.[72] Runciman was impressed by the genuine desire of Roosevelt to cooperate with the British on these matters, and urged Baldwin and Eden to do all they could to ensure swift and full cooperation. On January 23, the President of the Board of Trade had a private talk with the President at the White House. The two men talked a great deal about the international situation facing the democracies. When discussion turned to the Far East, FDR told Runciman that "The Japanese situation ... was causing him anxiety and he would welcome any joint action which we could undertake. After describing the

Far East as he saw it he asked whether it was not possible to have [a] closer examination of the situation by our two Governments so that if and when action is called for we could act in accordance with a consistent policy."[73] Craigie and Vansittart were sceptical of the President's earnestness, but Eden could not help but be impressed by the open discussion of the Far East that Roosevelt had initiated.[74] Besides such high-level, secret advances, aimed at creating a common strategic vision, more open but no less vital talks were taking place between the State Department and the Foreign Office over what actions to take towards Japan.

At the urging of Stanley Hornbeck, who desired some clarification on certain aspects of the British vision of the Far Eastern situation, Ray Atherton met with Cadogan. Cadogan had sent Hornbeck an outline of his views of the Far Eastern situation and asked Hornbeck to reply with his own opinions.[75] In addition to expressing his and Hornbeck's appreciation of the closeness of the cooperation and information sharing that had been occurring between the two organs, Atherton's visit signaled a beginning of an even greater move towards openness in that relationship. Atherton began by reading the text of Hornbeck's telegram on the world's international situation. As far as the Anti-Comintern Pact was concerned, Hornbeck thought it had done Japan more harm than good and had earned that nation the undying distrust of the Soviet Union. The embassy official also told Cadogan that Hornbeck understood the need Britain had to be aware of any reasonable opportunity that presented itself to make better relations with Japan. That being said, however, the State Department official wanted to know if the British had in mind any definite advantage that could be gained from better relations with Japan, and, if so, what was the Foreign Office's objective?[76] Cadogan replied first by re-stating that the British government was not getting ready to make any sort of deal with Ambassador Yoshida.[77] He continued that Britain's policy towards Japan was aimed at trying to maintain good terms, but at the same time trying to get that country to change its aggressive tactics towards China.

The British were willing to work with the Japanese to help China develop itself, because the development of the China market was in the interests of everyone concerned. When Atherton pressed him to put a priority on those objectives, and in particular asked if Britain would ever throw China over in order to make better relations with Japan, Cadogan gave an emphatic no.[78] The deputy under secretary told Atherton that to treat China in such a fashion would retard the development of China and taint Great Britain with the same odium that was at presently attached solely to Japan. Such a policy would benefit no one and could not be contemplated. He assured Atherton that "Really our whole aim was to try and influence Japan to drop her present tactics and join with us and the United States Government and other Governments interested in helping develop China...".[79] Cadogan also reiterated his commitment to the fact that Britain would undertake no new initiative with the Japanese without first conducting close and thorough consultations with the United States.[80] Atherton was pleased with that response, as was Eden, who congratulated Cadogan for having disabused the State Department of any baseless suspicions of Britain's unwillingness either to assist China or to punish an aggressive Japan.

The Foreign Secretary was also adamant that, on the Far Eastern issue, "We must continue to keep the US government informed of any subsequent developments."[81] To reinforce this, he sent his own message to Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt through Ambassador Bingham on March 20. During a luncheon meeting, the Foreign Secretary returned to items that he had discussed on March 11 with the Ambassador, particularly the issues of neutrality and the Far East. Eden told Bingham that he did in fact speak for the Cabinet, and even Neville Chamberlain, when he said that Britain desired good, close Anglo-American relations in the Far East. Bingham had other sources of information that confirmed that Eden was indeed speaking for the entire British Cabinet, and reported the full details of his exchange with Eden to Hull and FDR.[82] Eden was not going to allow the Far East to be the area of tension which would again create friction in Anglo-American relations. He was sure that, if any nation was certain to be ready to place odium on Great Britain for a betrayal of China, it was the United States. To go back now, or to give the US any reason to suspect that Britain was becoming 'soft' on the issue of Japan's treatment of China would spell disaster for the entirety of Imperial foreign policy, not just in the Far East. To be certain that he did not commit a critical error in his efforts to move Anglo-American relations closer, Eden turned to the man most trusted to gauge accurately the temperament and thinking processes of the Roosevelt Administration, Sir Ronald Lindsay.[83]

Thus, Eden requested Lindsay to prepare a special report on American attitudes towards a wide range of items: politics, foreign policy, economics, propaganda, exchanges of information, and so on, in order that he would have a comprehensive mental map of how the Roosevelt Administration was thinking and to what pressures it would be responding in any given circumstance. Eden also wanted Lindsay's recommendations on what attitude His Majesty's Government should take towards the US on these issues and what pitfalls to avoid. The Foreign Secretary saw the Ambassador as the most important bellwether on American behaviour and trusted his recommendations as to what courses of action to take.[84]

Lindsay's report became a classic within the foreign-policy-making elite, winning high praise from the American Department, as well as from other departments and from officials like Vansittart.[85] The Ambassador stressed that Anglo-American relations had been progressing extraordinarily well since around 1933 and commented on the myriad reasons why that was so.

> Never in history have Anglo-American relations been so friendly and cordial as now, except during the eighteen months when the two countries were associated together in war. This happy state of affairs is due in the first place to the elimination of sources of friction - to the disappearance of the Irish question, to the cessation of naval rivalry.... The next point of sympathy is democracy which in many countries of Europe has crashed to the ground, in some is tottering, but in England as in America continues

> to be the solid rock on which the structure of the State is raised. Can it be that in this country there is a lurking subconscious fear that if all Europe were to become totalitarian, the foundations of democratic liberty in America too might be menaced? Be that as it may the totalitarian philosophy rouses the most violent animosities in America, and Mr. Roosevelt himself has publicly and outspokenly expressed himself on the subject on more than one important occasion. Lastly it happens that on the broadest issue of foreign politics the desires of the United States and of the United Kingdom completely coincide. Neither has any acquisitive ambitions, or aggressive inclinations, neither wants anything but that the various countries of the world shall settle down to peaceful trade with each other. England is placed on a plane apart from that of other countries; she is regarded as the one country in Europe that has preserved its sanity, and her efforts as the only hope of peace.[86]

As for American isolationism, Lindsay had no doubt that the American public were not interested at all in becoming involved in European affairs and that there was really nothing that Britain could offer in terms of blandishments to draw the Americans onto such a path: "American neutrality must be accepted by his Majesty's Government as something that it is useless to call in question. It and the native suspiciousness of foreign effort to influence it must dictate the action of His Majesty's Government in their desire to make the best of the situation."[87] If war came, however, especially in the Far East, Roosevelt's approach to neutrality would favour Great Britain. American intervention was not likely, immediately, and even when she intervened it might not be to Britain's benefit, but then that action would be to save the entire world from destruction.

Lindsay advised that that British government would be wise to not launch any initiative on a major political issue, because to attempt to do so would excite the suspicions of groups who believed Britain to be trying to entangle America in war. This left the economic approach open, which, due to Democratic Party's traditions of low tariffs and the need for expression of that tradtion, as well as a desire to resume international trade, would allow progress in Anglo-American relations, provided always that no political implications were involved.[88]

On the issue of working closer with the Americans on foreign policy matters, especially the Far East, Lindsay considered it vital not to turn down any American overtures for cooperation, as such an action would be considered a snub in the manner of the 1932 Stimson-Simon exchange. The Ambassador acknowledged the need to caution against the Americans leading Great Britain on and then deserting them in the face of further aggression, but he also believed that such a situation could be avoided if

> When I advocate grasping the proffered hand when it is proffered, I do not recommend obsequious acquiescence. Officious assiduity is only less bad than the British standoffishness which offends every American instinct. I advocate a cordial response with a patent and earnest desire to do mutually satisfactory business.[89]

He also wisely and insightfully identified how and where British efforts to create closer relations would do the most good. Cooperation was easiest, he argued, with the Administration rather with than the Congress. The whole diplomatic machine was controlled by Roosevelt and this gave him great authority over everything short of a treaty:

> Let it be understood that the Administration, from the President downwards is well disposed towards us. The divisions of the State Department, except perhaps Latin America, are all friendly, and I think the same may be said of other Ministries including the Army and Navy. I consider that it would be politic to assume American friendliness, and to welcome or invite cooperation over departmental questions, always remembering that even in the Departments on this side politics and "interests" may intervene and obstruct, and postulating that as both we and the Americans will wish to hold up our own ends, we may have a certain number of failures. But I believe that where business is conducted away from the glare of publicity, the present cordiality is strong enough to stand a percentage of failures.[90]

As for exchanging secret information with the Americans, he repeated his view that as there was no fear of Britain going to war with the US, there was, therefore, nothing to fear from such exchanges. It was the embassy's opinion that the Army and Navy could be trusted to keep secrets. That sort of exchange would certainly foster goodwill and that was the most important element to keep in mind: the creation of more goodwill. As for suggestions as to how to approach the Americans on that issue, Lindsay was not definitive. His recommendation was that "...action is far the most difficult point on which to make recommendations, for America is the despair of the diplomat. In her remoteness, both physical and political, she resembles a prize fighter with a very long reach. He stands with his left arm stretched far out, and the opponent may dance round and round in the ring and never come to close quarters."[91] He did, however, make two suggestions as to possible courses of action open to Eden. The first was for the British government to spend a great deal of money and make a spectacular showing at the world fair in 1939. But more important, was the idea that some sort of trade agreement be concluded.[92]

Lindsay's response fell on fertile ground generally in the Foreign Office. The need for Great Britain to obtain American goodwill in order to be able to plan effectively for the defence of the empire was a theme which resonated well, in the American Department especially.[93] Further proof of America's desire to work closely with the British on Far Eastern matters came from Lindsay in early June, when he reported Cordell Hull's views on the situation in that region. Responding to statements made by the new Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, Hull concurred with the British opinion that orderly stability was desirable, and he believed that measures which might be expected to contribute toward ensuring harmony of purpose and action should be investigated by the US with other powers, especially Great Britain.[94] Hull did not, however, move beyond the idea of closer consultation and parallel representation whenever the two governments held similar views. He preferred the idea of similar action as opposed to the reality of such action. It was clear to the Foreign Office that America still intended to preserve its independence of action and would not assume any new defence obligations in that region. Cadogan and Vansittart were not surprised by Hull's limited response, knowing that, given the mood of American public opinion, the Secretary of State was unlikely to move too far ahead of Britain in Far Eastern matters.[95] Secretary Hull was pleased, however, with the manner by which the British were conducting their own Far Eastern policy. He informed Ambassador Grew that Cadogan had told Yoshida frankly and firmly that Great Britain would not be a partner to any Anglo-Japanese rehabilitation or protection programme for China. The deputy under secretary had emphasized Britain's desire to work with the US, China and Japan on the matter, but would not consider working solely with Japan.[96] While the Foreign Office were mildly frustrated at the American inability to move faster on developing a solid Far Eastern policy, the State Department was secure in its understanding of the British position.

Lindsay's brilliant dissection of the state of Anglo-American relations and Hull's affirmation of the Roosevelt Administration's desire to keep working on a more coordinated Far Eastern policy had barely worked their way through the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office, and other government offices before matters took a severe turn for the worse in the Far East. On July 7, 1937, an undeclared war began as Japanese troops invaded mainland China.[97] New pressures began to work on driving the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain closer together.

On July 13, Lindsay delivered a memorandum to Stanley Hornbeck outlining the British view of events in China. One of the items in that document was the question of whether the United States would consider the idea of a joint representation to the Japanese.[98] The British request created a stir within the Administration, a stir which reached from Hornbeck to the President himself. Roosevelt approved a State Department reply, drafted primarily by Hornbeck and Hull, with contributions from under secretary Sumner Welles and Norman Davis. This document was given to Lindsay that same night. The American reply stated that they were "... heartily in accord with the idea of there being made by British representatives in Japan and China representations such as outlined by Mr. Eden. It seems to us that this would be action parallel with though not identical with that which we have already taken here and which we intend to repeat."[99] When he came to the State Department to receive the American reply, Lindsay, after carefully reading the document asked Hornbeck if it meant that the US Government was not prepared to join in representations at Tokyo and Nanking. Already prepared with instructions as to how to answer such an enquiry, Hornbeck replied that

> ... it was fully the desire of this Government to cooperate with the British Government in the effort to discourage entry by the Japanese and Chinese upon serious hostilities, that is, effort to preserve peace; that this Government had already urged upon both the Japanese and the Chinese the importance of maintaining peace; that we hoped that the British Government would do likewise; that we intended to continue our efforts; and that we felt that cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations through our representatives in Japan and China along with representatives of Great Britain and other powers.[100]

Hornbeck emphasized for Lindsay that, during the conference at which the reply was created, there had been unanimity in the view that cooperation between British and American Governments toward the maintenance of peace was most desirable. Lindsay was reported to have smiled knowingly at Hornbeck's answer and seemed pleased as he left the meeting.[101] Eden responded gratefully to Hull the next day, and provided information on how the British Ambassadors in China and Japan were going to deliver their representations to their respective governments.[102] The foreign secretary was not satisfied, however, that the State Department was going far enough, and, so, a week later returned to the question of a joint proposal being put forward to the Japanese.[103] More vigorous attacks by the Japanese army against the Chinese led the Americans to move closer to the British on the idea of a joint petition, and, through to the end of 1937, Anglo-American cooperation grew closer.

On July 27, Vansittart told Ambassador Bingham that British intelligence sources were predicting a Japanese attack on Peiping. The PUS also informed the Ambassador of the proposed British plan to press the Japanese for moderation. He pointedly expressed to Bingham his hope that the United States Government would do the same.[104] The State Department did not take long to reply. That same day, Hull instructed Bingham to let Vansittart know that he had directed Johnson and Grew "... to confer immediately with the British Embassies and in their discretion to take action on lines parallel with the British action toward dissuading the Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger the lives of American nationals."[105]

The British were happy to receive this symbolic gesture from Hull. However, coordinated diplomatic pressure was one thing, a coordinated military plan or consensus on any actions to be taken against Japan was an entirely different issue.

Stanley Hornbeck once again summed up the strategic position of both the United States and Great Britain in the Far East as both nations watched Japan grow bolder in its designs every week.

> The issue so far as the powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, are concerned is whether pursuit of national policy by force, in contravention of treaty obligations and with complete indifference to the question of peace, is or is not to be objected to by those powers to whom it seems objectionable, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, then by what process. In the present instance, the United States and Great Britain, of course, find objectionable the prospect that Japan and China are about to enter upon serious hostilities. However, no mere words which either or both of these powers may utter by way of expostulation will prevent that eventuation as against whatever may be the deliberate intent of the Japanese or the Chinese in regard to the method of handling the issue between those two countries. Nothing short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great foreign powers that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the equation would appreciably affect the play of force (forces) which is now taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield. As neither Great Britain nor this country is prepared to throw in any kind of force (other than that of moral suasion), we need not expect that action on our part (use of words) is going to be in any way decisive. We have spoken on behalf of peace, and we probably should continue to do so. We are speaking on behalf of the safety of our nationals, and we are and will be warranted in speaking on that subject. We may have to speak, as the situation unfolds, emphatically on these and perhaps on some other subjects. We should take full account of the fact that once a stage of real and serious hostilities is embarked upon all sorts of interests of ours may, from time to time and increasingly, become involved. In what ever we say, we should take great care to say only those things which may tend to pacify and to avoid saying those things which may tend to inflame the parties directly in conflict. This Division shares the view expressed by Ambassador Grew... that "cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted" would not favourably affect developments (at this stage) - unless such action can carry some implication of a sanction.[106]

The idea of sanctions against Japan and how effectively to implement them became a topic for discussion between the State Department and the Foreign Office.

Chamberlain, responding to Roosevelt's correspondence concerning the need to prepare properly the diplomatic aspects of any Far Eastern policy, was of similar mind to Hornbeck, and had to admit that there was no need or opportunity for high-level conversations to take place. His view was as follows: "Perhaps the community of sentiment between our two countries as to the events in the Far East and the developments in the European situation may be doing something to create a favourable atmosphere and the conclusion of an Anglo[-]American commercial agreement when we have found ways of overcoming its obvious difficulties will undoubtedly be an important step in the right direction."[107] With neither nation possessing either the will or the military power to return the Far East to its pre-July status quo, working out a trade agreement in order to present Japan with a unified front seemed a logical next step. Chamberlain, like Hull, expected to obtain more leverage against Japan from an Anglo-American trade agreement than from a show of force. This view was reinforced by naval considerations. Great Britain, and in particular, the Royal Navy, were not enthusiastic about any ideas concerning sanctions. To make a sanction effective, vast amounts of sea power would be required, and, given the numerous threats to British sea lines of communication at that moment, the RN was unlikely to have the necessary vessels. Furthermore, any effective sanction would have to ensure that the United States cut off the supply at source. To make sanctions or an embargo system effective, American and British cooperation would have to come into the open and act as a clear challenge to Japan. Economic coordination between the two western powers would have to be improved as well.[108]

In China and Japan, the two sets of embassies kept up a constant and close exchange of information aimed at ensuring that each was fully appraised of the other's next move. However, both Grew and Johnson were reluctant to join openly with Britain in a formal protest or a set of actions aimed at Japan. But, some of that reluctance came from a professional distrust of British tactics, which both Americans felt had unnecessarily antagonised the Japanese in the past year.[109] Some of the renewed suspicion on the part of the Americans came from the statements made by the new British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, who had stopped in Ottawa on his way to Japan for a chat with State Department officials. In Ottawa, Craigie had at once created confusion by elaborating on the various views on the Far East held in the FO and the varying views of the degree of cooperation with the US that was desirable. He wanted the State Department to know that he had not stopped in Washington itself because he feared that such an exhibition would cause the Japanese to suspect an Anglo-American plot, and he had not wanted that to occur. His belief in liberal moderates being a useful force in the Japanese government, as well as his reserved attitude towards open Anglo-American cooperation were in marked contrast to the signals being sent by Eden, Cadogan and the American Department.[110] Craigie's early missteps created immediate problems with the State Department, and he also quickly became the object of much criticism from both the American and Far Eastern Departments at the FO. By the end of his first year as ambassador, his views were being all but ignored by those important information brokers.[111]

The reluctance to creat a greater sense of cooperation that Grew and Johnson displayed was overruled by Hull. Meeting twice a day to discuss the Far Eastern crisis with under secretary Judge R. Walton Moore and the chief of the Division of European Affairs, Jay Pierrepont Moffat -- all coached by Hornbeck --[112] Hull instructed his Ambassadors that

> ...our first solicitude will have to be not for the maintenance of unqualified good will toward us by either or both of the combatants; it will have to be for the welfare of our own people and the broad interests and general policies of the United States; it will be guided by laws and treaties, public opinion and other controlling considerations. I share your view that among our fundamental objectives there should be (1) to avoid involvement and (2) to protect the lives, property and rights of American citizens. I doubt whether we can pursue those objectives and at the same time expect to pursue the third of the objectives which you suggest. I therefore do not feel that we should make it a definite objective to solidify our relations with either of the combatant nations. We are opposed to the courses which they are pursuing, especially the course which Japan is pursuing. We have no desire to injure either country, we wish to be a good neighbor to both, but we should not permit ourselves to be hampered in the making of our decisions by being especially solicitous that what we do shall not be displeasing to one or the other or both of the combatant countries. We do not desire that the Japanese shall entertain any impression that this Government looks with less disapproval or less of apprehension upon

> the course which Japan is pursuing than does the British Government or that we condone Japan's course in any sense whatever.[113]

The Secretary of State was now using the British reaction as his benchmark for Far Eastern policy formulation. Hull informed the Ambassadors how public opinion in the United States had been outraged by the Japanese actions and was becoming increasingly critical of Japan. The Chinese were getting some opprobrium, too, for their bombing of the American passenger ship, PRESIDENT HOOVER, but not to the same degree. And, while not anxious to act as a mediator, Hull did expect his Ambassadors to let the Japanese government know at every opportunity that the United States looked upon their actions with great disapproval.[114]

Both Johnson and Grew agreed with Hull in that an Anglo-American united or concerted front should be presented diplomatically. Beyond that, however, both Ambassadors feared that Britain's lack of military power in the region would not allow that nation to take the lead against Japan, and, therefore, that Great Britain would try to get the United States to assume that role.[115] Grew prepared another response to Hull and Hornbeck's corrective to him in early November, a reply which was a forceful condemnation of both the administration's attitude towards Japan and of America's Far Eastern policy in general. However, realizing the futility of trying to woo Hull away from Hornbeck's influence and opinions, and the dangers that such a condemnation could pose to his own career, Grew did not send it.[116] In reality, the only formal attempt to form a unified, formal, public position on the crisis came in the first week in November 1937, at the Brussels Conference. The latter was mostly an exercise in public relations, where neither the American nor the British delegation expected much to change in their positions. Nor was either at all offended with the other's performance at the conference.[117]

Before the conference was convened, President Roosevelt took several steps on the international stage, which, while not aimed specifically at creating closer Anglo-American relations, actually did help to do so. His first act was his famous 'quarantine' speech in Chicago, on October 5.

While not mentioning any nations by name, he called on all civilized nations to respond and make a concerted effort to oppose the aggressive powers of Italy, Germany and Japan. Specifically he called on Americans to acknowledge that perhaps isolation would not be the safest route for the nation to take.[118] As well, the President made a veiled allusion to the idea of utilizing some sort of sanction against aggressor nations, but he was careful to send a message along to Anthony Eden that there were certain limits to his power to move the American masses.[119] The British embassy reported that FDR had indeed tried to point out the dangers of the world to his people, and had also agreed with the British view that neutrality and peace were not compatible. However, there were three things that he required of Britain's foreign policy regarding the United States if he were to be successful in positioning himself to be able to support Great Britain in the future. Those points were

> (1) It should not speak or think or act as though it were possible for me [Roosevelt] to be in any way an exponent of British Foreign Office policy.
> (2) It should never forget I cannot march ahead of our very difficult and restive American public opinion; and
> (3) It must not try to push me in any way to the front or to thrust leadership upon me....[120]

The President was supportive of the British cause, but he had to be allowed to play his own game in his own way on their behalf.

Prior to his public statement, Roosevelt had avoided implementing the neutrality laws available to the Administration during the crisis by arguing that there was no declared state of war between China and Japan.[121] FDR had done so in order that China might continue to have access to American supplies, an act of which the British Government thoroughly approved. British Far Eastern experts were less enthusiastic about the idea of sanctions being promoted in public, but on October 15 Chamberlain responded to Roosevelt's first steps with the assurance that "...the United States Government could be assured of the 'whole-hearted cooperation of the British Government at all times' in approaching a solution of the difficulties which had arisen in the Orient."[122] The

Brussels Conference and the preparations for it afforded the Americans and the British a chance to exchange their views on the situation and what each nation's position would be.[123]

Knowing Roosevelt's refusal to allow himself to be forced to take the lead in any Far Eastern exercise, made preparing for the Brussels Conference a very simple procedure for Anthony Eden. In late October the foreign secretary had a long chat with Ambassador Bingham to determine what exactly the President wanted to come out of the conference.[124] Although he was annoyed at the British press, which was trying to get him to clarify just what his Chicago speech had meant for American foreign policy, FDR knew that this was not an attempt on the part of the Foreign Office to trap him into a definitive statement.[125] Roosevelt's objectives for the conference were to repeat the successes of the Buenos Aires conference of 1936:

> There a large number of American States had been present, jealous nearly all of them and some mutually hostile. The United States had not played any role publicly greater than that of the smallest State present, and yet by her presence and by the atmosphere of cooperation, something in the nature of a common front had been created and the President truly believed that the risk of war on the American continent had now been wholly removed. And so at the Brussels Conference he hoped that we should not "rush ahead" for this would prove embarrassing for the United States, where the Administration was frequently accused of being dragged along at Britain's tail. At the same time the United States Government did not intend to take the lead. They hoped that some smaller Powers would begin discussions and that ultimately, as the result of Anglo-American cooperation, an important degree of unity would emerge.[126]

Eden was concerned that there was a great risk that, if neither the US or Britain were willing to take the lead, then the smaller Powers would certainly shy away from doing so. The result would be a failed conference, at which no nation had been willing to state its true sentiments about the Far Eastern crisis. Bingham, however, ignored this worry, and proposed that careful management would solve that problem. Eden managed to extract from the Ambassador a statement that FDR's main hope "... in this Conference was that it would familiarise the people of the United States with the idea of cooperating with H.M. government in international affairs. This had never been possible for them at Geneva, since the League had many enemies in the United States. It would be easier for them at Brussels."[127] Eden was even given the impression that the President thought "...it possible that out of the beginnings of this cooperation at Brussels might grow some larger organisation of world Powers." Happy with the assurance of close American cooperation, Eden told Bingham that the British government was ready and anxious to cooperate with the US. He also intimated to him that the Chicago speech had been well received in Britain, but Eden wanted to know just what quarantine actually meant. Did it mean that FDR was willing to sanction Japan? Bingham replied that the Adminstration was not that far along yet, but he was sure that the speech was intended to lay the foundation for future Anglo-American cooperation.[128] The American public's interest in the Far East was increasing, but there were definite limits of action for Roosevelt's administration. Eden and the Foreign Office respected those limits, but were intent on ensuring that the Americans did all they possibly could in the Far East. A cooperative and sympathetic manner was a good start, but solid support on a plan of action was what the British really desired.

Concrete action would not rise out of the efforts to bring peace to the Far East at Brussels.[129] Roosevelt instructed Norman Davis, the head of the American delegation to the conference, above all else, to ensure that the United States was not pushed into a leadership role in the Far East. His orders to Davis paralleled the views that he had passed to Eden through Ambassador Bingham: the US would not participate in a joint action with the League; the US would not suggest or take an initiative that would be seen by Japan as creating a bloc against it; and, at the same time the President did not want the British to create a circumstance where isolationists could accuse American Far Eastern policy being a tail to the British kite.[130] The President was very cautious about and wary of any British attempt to trap the American delegation into making too bold a commitment, and, therefore, emphasized to Davis that the British had to be made to understand the American situation. He qualified his point by adding that: "We naturally, because we have got a decent community of interest in the preservation of peace in the Far East and adherence to law, want to cooperate wholeheartedly with the British, but it must be an independent cooperation, neither one trying to force the other into something. This means that final resulting action can perfectly well be identical, though not necessarily joint."[131] Once more, the parallel but not joint nature of the balance of power in the Far East made its presence felt in the policy formulation arena.

Ambassadors Craigie and Grew had been in close contact, trying to collaborate on a set of proposals upon which the American and British positions at the conference could be based, One of the most important of these was that Japan might accept a mediation by either the United States or Great Britain but not both.[132] Each was trying to get his own government to move away from the cooperative and towards the individual approach in order to safeguard national interests. Both ambassadors had failed to realise that American and British Far Eastern policy was no longer really about Japan, so much as it was about ensuring that those Far Eastern policies did not prevent the other from being a potential ally in any possible conflict with Japan. Furhter, and besides the fact that it flew in the face of the efforts being made in London and Washington, Norman Davis had his own personal experiences and reasons for pouring cold water on the advice from Tokyo. His prior knowledge of Sir Robert Craigie and the tactics he had used as Britain's foremost naval negotiator, caused Davis to reject Grew and Craigie's proposal. He contended that

> I suggest that the opinion expressed to the effect that Japan would not accept mediation if offered jointly by Great Britain and the United States, but would be more likely to do so if it were offered by one or the other is something that Craigie would like to have us assume. I worked closely with Craigie and I know not only his strong pro-Japanese bias but how his mind functions; and his optimism with regard to the moderate element in Japan was clearly shown in the statements which Ottawa reported as having been made by him when there. Craigie probably calculates that the United States would not wish to undertake mediation alone, which I feel strongly we should never do, but that we might agree to have the British undertake it with the backing of the United States and other powers

> which I also feel would be a dangerous procedure for us to be connected with.[133]

Given the trust President Roosevelt placed in Davis's opinion and the direct and frequent communication that occurred between the two men, it is likely that Craigie was becoming a hinderance to the construction of a common Anglo-American mental map of the Far East.

Eden and Davis did nothing to embarrass the other's position during the actual conference. Each man told the other why, for strategic and political reasons, it was impossible for his nation to take a more active leadership in the Far East.[134] Both were also convinced that if Japan overstepped itself and began an actual war in the region, then Britain and the United States would join in a common front against Japan. When Davis argued that, if the Conference provoked a Japanese retaliation, then it would be primarily the United States that would have to use force against Tokyo, Eden responded quickly. The foreign secretary denied that such would be the case, and assured Davis that even though the Royal Navy was pre-occupied with the Mediterranean and Europe, Great Britain could and would send a fleet to the Far East to operate out of the recently-completed base at Singapore.[135] Eden summed up his views by promising Davis that not only would he not push the US into a leadership position, but "... that he could make us a promise that he would not only second any initiative of the United States during the Conference but that British policy would be based upon American policy during the present crisis."[136] Clearly, the need to maintain the balance of power in the Far East now dictated that British Far Eastern policy be a willing subordinate to that of the United States. Equally, while still hesitant to take an active role to save China, the US was now committed to presenting a much stronger face to the Japanese in the Pacific.

The conference ended with neither the Americans nor the British embarrassing or offending one another over the crisis: a feat of diplomatic trust, full of hope for future cooperation.[137] After conferring with Sumner Welles and other State Department officials, Lindsay called the conference a great success for Anglo-American relations.[138] He also acknowledged that the conference was a set-back for those who believed in the orderly conduct of international affairs and the system of collective security. However, because of the close coordination between the two western powers during the conference, the prospect of further, stronger and more tangible Anglo-American cooperation in the future was certain: "As international co-operation declined Anglo-American co-operation would arise." This was especially so now that the two powers were beginning to work, with great expectations of success, on an Anglo-American trade agreement.[139] Such optimism also was apparent on the American side. Norman Davis assured Hull and Roosevelt that he, too, was convinced that Eden and the British government had acted fairly and honestly during the conference. He was especially impressed by the fact that, given the great public pressure being put on the British delegates to find a solution to the crisis, compared to America's relatively passive approach, the Foreign Office personnel and other British officials had respected that difference and would not attempt to exploit the American 'soft' approach in their own policy formulations.[140]

That spirit of cooperation and intimacy which Lindsay observed was certainly evident, as 1937 drew to a close, in the actions of the State Department and the Foreign Office. However, others did not like this trend. Prolonged protests from Grew that American Far Eastern policy was getting too close to that of Britain and that the Japanese were equating one's policy with the other continued in the wake of the Brussels conference. He and his charge d'affaires, Eugene Dooman, another earlier antagonist of Craigie, blamed America's move towards Britain for the hardening of Japanese attitudes towards the United States. As well, neither American officer trusted the style and method of British diplomacy in Japan. Both men allowed their professional pride and territoriality to override the global considerations and strategic realities their government now faced.[141] The eventual result was that Cordell Hull and the State Department began to put less and less emphasis on the analyses being received from Tokyo. Instead, as the year came to a close, the Foreign Office, the American embassy in London, and the British embassy in Washington became the focus of Anglo-American Far Eastern relations and policy creation. Through those channels, more and more information was shared, both on possible Japanese intentions and on the Soviet Union and its role in the Far East. Such analysis was passed, often at the request of high-ranking officials, such as Secretary Hull himself, freely from American sources to British and vice versa.[142] The Foreign Office was reluctant, yet willing to do so, even at the risk of exposing some of their intelligence sources and revealing which foreign codes they could read.[143] For the Foreign Office, educating the State Department and ensuring that the mental maps on both sides of the Atlantic remained parallel, if not identical, was of primary importance.[144]

However, the anti-American sentiments and thoughtless foreign policy of Neville Chamberlain reared its head in early 1938, threatening the very fabric of the newly-established Anglo-American relationship. Chamberlain's disregard for the importance of the United States in Great Britain's foreign and defence policies eventually ended with the resignation of Anthony Eden and his replacement by Lord Halifax. The centre of this was the aftermath of the Abysinnian Crisis. Chamberlain's actions, Eden's reaction to Italy and the idea of appeasing Mussolini by offering de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, are well chronicled elsewhere.[145] However, the important issue for our purpose here is that the final straw that led to Eden's resignation was Chamberlain's refusal to appreciate the nature of the balance of power that had become the pillar of Britain's imperial defence policy. This led the two men down different paths. Eden agreed that appeasement was a legitimate foreign policy tactic, but was not certain that the ends would justify the means in the Italian case. If Roosevelt were snubbed by Chamberlain; if the Americans were made to believe that they could not trust the British on any issue, even if that issue was not directly involved with the Far Eastern situation, then the sense of trust and cooperation that had been established on Far Eastern issues would immediately be destroyed. If cooperation concerning and coordination on Far Eastern matters were destroyed, then there would be little hope for drawing the Americans into any closer cooperation in the European theatre either [146]

When commenting on a meeting held at All Souls College, Oxford to debate Great Britain's foreign policy choices, Eden had stated his belief that Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East was a vital part of Britain's foreign policy. His views were reflective of the consensus reached by that gathering, which came to the conclusion that, while America could not be counted on for immediate assistance in any conflict, when it did weigh into the fray that action, just as in 1917, would be decisive. Overall, their advice to Britain's foreign policy makers was that, if Britain led, America would follow in the Far East, but that the Americans would promise nothing in advance. Furthermore,

> it was felt that this risk was worth taking because: (a) It would settle the Japanese question. (b) More importantly, it would provide us with an affirmation of strength as regards Germany and the Berlin-Tokyo Axis. (c) It might encourage Germany to exchange Japanese friendship for Russian friendship. (d) It would be comparatively acceptable to our own opinion since London would not be bombed. (e) It would unite us with America.[147]

Eden took that message to Chamberlain at the end of 1937, telling the Prime Minister that although 1938 was going to be a difficult year for British diplomacy, one bright spot was cooperation with the United States. The foreign secretary was certain that real progress was being made, even if it was at times slow and difficult. His approach to the Americans in the new year would be to "...do everything we can privately to encourage the Americans."[148] The foreign secretary had also implied a tougher stance against the Japanese in the future to the new American Ambassador to Berlin, Hugh Wilson, knowing that such a posture would impress Roosevelt.[149] Eden's optimism had appeared to rub off on Chamberlain, who, in light of the American gunboat PANAY being sunk by the Japanese on the Yangtze River, thought that the Americans might indeed now be willing to do something more substantial than just talk.[150] By January, 1938, Chamberlain was considering asking the Americans to use their navy in conjunction with the Royal Navy to provide a show of force against the Japanese.[151] With critical trade negotiations under way, and their being a large part of the final steps required to obtain even more American goodwill, Eden felt betrayed when Chamberlain ignored Roosevelt's warning not to make a deal with the Italians over Abyssinia for fear of alienating American public opinion towards Britain.[152] For Eden, if that coordination of Anglo-American policy and sentiment were erased; if the American mental map of British foreign policy were torn apart, then Britain would find itself facing Japan, Italy and, quite possibly Germany, alone.[153] That had been the situation which every British foreign secretary from 1932 onwards had desperately tried to avoid. Eden was unwilling to allow such steps as Chamberlain proposed to go ahead without consequence, and, so, on February 20, resigned.[154] As a result of that sacrifice, relations between the State Department and the Foreign Office continued, in spite of Eden's leaving, to build on common Anglo-American perceptions of events in the Far East.

Eden's successor was Lord Halifax. He, like Eden and Cadogan, was resigned to the fact that concrete action from the United States in the Far East was not going to take place in the near future. As well, as long as Japan remained embroiled with China and fearful of Russia, the chances remained good that Tokyo would not move southward against British and American interests there.[155] Not enthusiastic about foreign policy, Halifax was willing to allow the Foreign Office professionals to present their cases to him. It was not long before he, too, realized the need to keep America happy in the Far East, especially after the Munich agreement that autumn.

Overall, 1938 was a year of stalemate and the maintenance of the status quo for Anglo-American Far Eastern relations, as each side drew back, rearmed, considered whether to apply sanctions to Japan, and continued to look for some signs of change in the balance of power in that region.[156] As had been the case for the past two years, the two departments were largely in accord. However, overcoming those last remaining differences, which still included a reluctant American public, would not come about before the end of the year.[157] In the meantime, the efforts of the State Department and the Foreign Office in the first half of the year reinforced for the British the impracticality of expecting the Americans to use force in the Far East. In May, after a frank and open exchange of information about and plans for the region, Cadogan advised Hornbeck that it was clear that powers were seeing the situation in the Far East from very different standpoints. He described Great Britain's consideration of using armed intervention to protect their interests as being something that the more detached US position would not allow.[158] Nonetheless, Cadogan was interested in the idea, brought up by the State Department, of taking commercial reprisals against those who interfered with US interests in the Far East.

> Hitherto our consideration of this question has been with a view to cooperation with other Powers in applying economic sanctions against Japan with the object of forcing her to cease hostilities. Like you, however, we are now turning our attention to the possibility of economic retaliation against the many insults and injuries to which our nationals and interests are being subjected and for which we have failed so far to obtain any reasonable satisfaction. As soon as we have come to any definite conclusions on the subject we shall be glad to inform you of them. Needless to say, we should be extremely interested to learn on what lines you have been working and what conclusions seem to be indicated by your enquiry so far; and we shall be happy to exchange information on Japan's economic position if that would be considered helpful.[159]

The two departments were committed to maintaining and increasing the Anglo-American informal relationship with respect to information and planning, even though there was no firm commitment from either side that they would be able to support the other. Still, the Foreign Office remained convinced that America's new-found goodwill was a vital component in the Far Eastern balance of power that protected Britain's interests.

Sir John Brenan, a notable Far Eastern expert in the Foreign Office, put that dynamic into words nicely in late July, summing up how the various nations involved in the Far East were linked in a complicated balancing act. Because Great Britain could not trust Japan's future motives and actions, and as the new Japanese Government had yet to perform any act of compromise or goodwill that would signal to British policy makers that there was indeed any point listening to Japanese pleas for trust and cooperation, British interests would be protected by the "stalemate" policy. That policy consisted of China and Russia proving to be too large a bite for Japan to be able to swallow comfortably. After exhausting itself on the Chinese mainland, Japan would be obliged to deal more amicably with its neighbors. America was important here because of its stiffening attitude towards Japan and the United States' decision to stay engaged in Pacific affairs.[160] Under those circumstances, Cadogan and the Foreign Office instructed Craigie to continue to cooperate totally with Grew in gathering, assimilating and transmitting information about Japan to the State Department.[161] Not coincidentally, Ambassador Johnson, when asked for his assessment of Japan's future in China, recommended the same approach to Cordell Hull as Brenan had to the FO. Johnson also believed that Japan was now committed to a war it could not win and, thus, would founder in China.[162]

Such cooperation served its purpose. The longstanding attempt to get Japanese observers and foreign policy makers to consider American and British actions and attitudes towards Japan as one had finally paid off. Not everyone was happy about this 'identity crisis'. Ambassador Grew, chagrined, continued to warn the State Department of the resultant dangers to America. Nonetheless, he reported to Secretary Hull that "... the predominant view in the [Japanese] Foreign Office is that the United States and Great Britain must be considered for all practical purposes in connection with the Far Eastern situation as one unit and that Japan cannot take aggressive measures against the interests of either nation without eventually becoming involved with the other."[163] This development was exactly the result that British foreign policy makers had been working towards for the last four years. Now it seemed, despite Grew's misgivings, as if the State Department was not concerned about Japan's developing that perception.[164] This reflected the advantage that such a perception had for Washington. In those circumstances, the balance of power in the Far East could easily contain Japan, so long as all the powers remained in play and Japan remained uncertain of their exact intentions and alliances.[165]

Such behind-the-scenes support from the United States became one of the main pillars of Britain's Far Eastern policy, especially as problems with Japan began to develop over the decision by officials in the British Concession at Tientsin to protect suspected Chinese assassins in the late fall of 1938.[166] Even Craigie acknowledged that, at Tientsin, the Japanese were pushing too far. It was only due to parallel American pressure that Japan hesitated to become more domineering over the matter.[167] Even Grew acknowledged that the two western powers were working on more than parallel lines on the issue. In fact, Craigie believed

> The recent stiff United States Note, to which the Japanese Government have not yet replied, has raised hopes that we shall be able to count upon the support of the United States Government, if we are ultimately provoked to take some economic retaliatory or perhaps, we should say, persuasive action against this country. Such joint or parallel action - or the threat of such action - represents the only certain way open to us of ensuring not only respect for existing foreign rights and interests in China but also the maintenance of the "open door" for the future. But, although opinion in the United States appears to be slowly evolving, it would be unwise to count on any resolute action from that quarter; the next best policy is to continue the present method of playing for time, protesting against infringements of our rights, withholding credits and hoping that a continued resistance by General Chiang Kai-shek, despite the fall of Hankow and Canton, may induce a more reasonable frame of mind among the Japanese. The establishment of a closer approximation of ideas on Far Eastern question between the four Great Western European Powers is a further objective to be kept in view...while watch should be continuously kept for any favourable opportunity to promote the conclusion of a fair and reasonable settlement of this most deplorable conflict.[168]

The Foreign Office, and especially the Far Eastern Department, were happy that Craigie had finally begun to get in step with the views and policy promoted by them for so long. Now, perhaps, a more concerted effort could be made to keep the pressure on the Japanese government. Indeed, the two Ambassadors to Japan, under instruction from home, became the model of cooperative energy in the last month of 1938.

Despite his continued suspicions that America was not willing to stick it out in the Far East, and his desire that some rapprochement be tried with the Japanese, Craigie now believed that Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East was the key to any successful opposition to Japan's expansion.[169] However, neither he nor Grew were genuine in their desire to form a united front between the two western powers.[170] The Foreign Office and State Departments, however, were not as reluctant to explore the question. Believing that the United States and its parallel approach was becoming more useful in the Far East, Cadogan and other members of the Foreign Office, including Halifax, once more prepared to sound out the State Department on what actions the US might be prepared to take in the region. Through the channels of Craigie and Grew, the State Department was asked for its opinion on possible courses of action.[171] As for Great Britain's probable policy, the permanent under secretary, Cadogan, summed up Britain's situation best. With growing troubles around the world, the Far East was the only certain region where the United States was at all engaged in helping to contain an aggressor power, even if only in an informal and parallel manner. Still, even without a formal alliance or a guarantee to 'absolutely' come to Britain's aid in the event of a war in the Far East, the potential of America to do more, and the lack of faith in Japan and its word meant that, for British policy for the region, "...the overriding consideration is the danger of alienating the U.S."[172] The United States, along with the Soviet Union, remained the two powers which, in conjunction with Great Britain, could halt any further Japanese expansion. Britain's Far Eastern policy now had to remain centred on the creation of an active and open, not just informal and secretive, Anglo-American cooperation in that region.[173]

One of the possible avenues for open cooperation was to impose sanctions on Japan, a method favoured by British strategic planners.[174] In early January 1939, Craigie was instructed to pass along to Ambassador Grew secret British documents concerning the "Possibility of Economic Counter Measures" for his and the State Department's consideration.[175] The Foreign Office hoped to educate the State Department about the benefits of and the limited retaliation which such action would have if applied to Japan. Grew objected once more. He reminded Hull that, if such measures were to be taken, then, the United States was obliged to do so in the knowledge that the use of force might well be involved.[176] Grew's view was countered by Hornbeck, who painted a stronger case in favour of supporting the British idea of sanctions. Hornbeck's argument swayed the Secretary of State to approve of the use of sanctions against Japan. By early February, Sumner Welles was able to inform the Washington embassy that, while sanctions were not going to be imposed immediately, Hull had reached the conclusion that the State Department's attitude towards the idea was more or less the same as the Foreign Office's.[177] Henry Morgenthau Jr., the US secretary of the Treasury, was also in favour of working with Britain in applying sanctions against Japan, not only to apply a brake to Japan's aggression, however, but also as "... a test of English sincerity as to whether or not they meant business in regard to Germany and Italy."[178] The newly-forged bonds of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East were being tested.

The goodwill and closeness of spirit surrounding Anglo-American cooperation was openly discussed and accepted within the halls of the Foreign Office as 1939 dawned, but it was still not a sentiment that could be voiced in public. For example, in February a parliamentary question was put to Chamberlain about whether the government consulted the United States on all matter concerning Britain's relations with totalitarian states, in order to ensure that no difference of opinion threatened to damage Anglo-American relations. In this question, the Far East was singled out for special attention.[179] The answers reflected both the delicacy of the situation and an awareness that all replies would be carefully scrutinised in the United States. William Strang, the head of the FO's Central Department, suggested the following answer to this potentially embarrassing query:

> So far as Central Department are concerned, the U.S. Government are kept informed, on the same general lines as the Dominion Prime Ministers, about all our major acts of foreign policy. They are not, as a general rule, consulted. [underline in original] The question might be answered by saying that we naturally maintain close contact with the Government of the United States on matters of interest to the two Governments, unless this would be too much for the Middle West to stomach.[180]

E.M.B Ingram, head of Southern Department, insisted that his department did not "... consult the U.S. Govt. about Italian policy but keep them informed of any major issues which we think may interest them or require a little preparation of the ground from the point of view of American opinion."[181] It was only in the Far East where anything approaching consultation took place. Indeed, R.G. Howe, head of the Far Eastern Department, reported that in fact "We do consult the U.S. Govt. on certain aspects of Far Eastern policy but I do not think it would be advisable to say so in Parliament. I agree with the last para of Mr. Strang's minute."[182] Overall, the Foreign Office, and particularly the American Department, were convinced by April, 1939, that if Japan moved to take advantage of a European war then the United States would do more than consult with the British: it would side with the British in a Far Eastern war.[183] Even in the face of calls in the summer of 1939, by the new American Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, who took over from Bingham in late 1937, for the United States not to help the Empire if it were attacked by Japan, Foreign Office opinion remained solid that the Americans would arrive at the eleventh hour.[184]

Much of that confidence had evolved from observations and discussions with the Americans during the ongoing Tientsin Crisis, which had continued on from late 1938. Taking a firm stand was not always easy, nor was it accepted by everyone. Craigie disapproved of the Foreign Office's choice of battleground for drawing a line in the sand for the Japanese.[185] Equally, the Royal Navy's inability to provide sufficient force to support Britain's position left very little choice for the Foreign Office in its selection of tactics. Without the ability to show force, negotiation was required, and that meant the reluctant use of Craigie in handling the matter. However, London remained firm. Halifax made it clear to Ambassador Kennedy that Great Britain had no intention of creating another 'Munich' by which America could judge its resolve, but if President Roosevelt and his administration could assist in any way it would help ensure Britain was not embarrassed in the Far East.[186] In Washington, Lindsay, in one of his final triumphs, equally demanded that the Foreign Office not allow the Japanese to create another Munich. His disgust at the Chamberlain government's handling of the Far Eastern situation over the last year boiled over during discussions with Sumner Welles over Tientsin. Foregoing his usual calm and professional demeanour, and fearing that there was a good possibility that a mishandling of this matter could cause irreparable damage to Anglo-American relations in the Far East, Lindsay exploded.

> For the first time the Ambassador spoke with ill-concealed impatience and even indignation of the foreign policy pursued by his own government. Until recent months in his conversations with me he had always supported very enthusiastically Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy. During the last two or three months he has made no reference to it other than to carry out his instructions as they were given to him. Today he spoke with considerable vehemence of the situation in which England found herself and said that there came a time in the affairs of any country when, if it had any self-respect, it had to fight even if it had to fight alone. He said this with immediate reference to the Far Eastern situation.[187]

Lindsay's views echoed throughout the British foreign-policy-making-machine, and every effort was made to avoid an 'agreement' with Japan that would insult the Americans, even if some thought the US had not been overly helpful during the crisis.[188] A choice had to be made and made at that moment: was Britain's destiny tied to Japan or to American goodwill? If a deal were struck with the Japanese, all the gains made in the last four years in Anglo-American relations would be lost. That was the choice facing Great Britain's Far Eastern policy in the summer of 1939.

Without American assistance, however, Britain's prestige in the region would have suffered another serious blow. Cooperation from the State Department and President Roosevelt allowed Great Britain to save face in the nasty exchange with Japan over Tientsin. This support was not only of British making. Morgenthau also pressured Roosevelt to take a firmer line and to cooperate with the Chinese, British and French in a united front against Japanese aggression.[189] On July 1, Cordell Hull informed the Tokyo embassy that the United States was preparing a strong note, one which would leave little doubt that the United States would not take lightly the embarrassment of Great Britain.[190] Worried about the Japanese response to such a move, and that the British would now take this as carte blanche to expect further American protection in the Far East, Grew and Dooman warned Hull and the State Department against any formal or regular method of delivering such a statement. Instead, they advocated that, while Hull made public noises about the United States' being concerned about Japan's attitude towards American interests in the Far East, interests which seemed much like Britain's interests, Dooman would utilize his extensive network of important Japanese contacts to spread the word informally and unofficially that the US would not tolerate any abuse of Great Britain in the Tientsin case. Such a campaign was certain to catch the ear of the Japanese foreign minister, Arita, and have the desired effect.[191] Roosevelt, Hull and the rest of the State Department apparatus agreed. They instructed Dooman to be certain to impress upon the Japanese that, because of Tientsin, the United States would not condone giving Japan a free hand in China. By July 23, Dooman reported that his efforts had reached the ears of Prince Konoye, Baron Harada Saeto, Prince Saionji and Mr. Fujii, personal advisor to the Prime Minister. It was his opinion that the Roosevelt Administration's message had been effective in achieving its purpose.[192] When asked by the

Japanese foreign minister whether the United States would intervene in Tientsin, Dooman replied

> ... that the American Government is concerned over the difficulties which have arisen between the British and the Japanese over questions arising within the British concession and hopes that they can be speedily solved, but that I could not indicate what its attitude would be if there arose that more serious situation which the Foreign Minister envisaged [Arita feared that military extremists would seek to eliminate the British Concession as a refuge for national currency, the continued circulation of which in North China offered an effective obstacle to the success of the Japanese currency scheme]. I added that I assumed he did not expect that the American Government would assist the Japanese military in establishing their currency in North China to the prejudice of the interests of all except the Japanese.[193]

Confident that the Japanese were now fearful that the United States, if pushed too far, would assist the British, the State Department reinforced the message, instructing Dooman to inform the Japanese Foreign Office orally that the State Department was becoming very tired of the anti-foreigner agitation being instigated at Tientsin.[194]

With that informal, yet vital support, the British Foreign Office continued to take a firm stand against Japan.[195] This was further strengthened in July by the American denunciation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. The Japanese were thrown completely off balance by that action, causing Lord Halifax and Alexander Cadogan great glee. Worried as to whether this signaled the beginning of the dreaded Anglo-American bloc moving against it, Japan now had to stop and take stock of the situation. This applying of a brake to Japan was seen as another parallel but not joint act of support from the Roosevelt Administration, and it was much appreciated by the Foreign Office heads.[196] Even Craigie read the American termination in a similar light, informing London that Dooman had intimated to him that

> he [Dooman] had himself been unable so far to penetrate the "smoke screen" which surrounded the recent American action. He believed that it was intended as a support to us in our present difficult negotiations and by no means as a mark of disapproval such as some American newspapers implied. He gave private and confidential reasons for this view which seemed to me valid. In general he felt that while it was impossible for the United States Government to co-operate with us openly in these matters at present, they were constantly seeking means by which our joint interests could be served without the appearance of collaboration or even prior

> consultation. Speaking very privately he said that he was unable yet to make out whether this step impled an intention to adopt any form of retaliatory action, but that his personal opinion was that it did not; the intention was he thought to obtain some redress of American grievances in China by process of delaying commencement of negotiations for a new treaty and generally keeping Japan guessing rather than by threatening reprisals. My own view is that this is a clever move designed to put pressure on Japan without involving United States in any serious risk of trouble with this country, such risk as there is being minimized by excellent feeling prevailing in Japan towards United States.[197]

The Far Eastern Department thought Dooman's assessment a shrewd guess, and believed that the Japanese good feeling towards the United States was simply an attempt by the Japanese to split the Americans away from the British, by showing preferential treatment. But, as usual, London found Craigie's views too critical of the Americans and not worth considering in any fashion that would deter Great Britain from falling into line with the Americans.[198] Slowly but surely, American and British Far Eastern strategies were being drawn together. Now it was up to Halifax and the British government to see if they would follow the new American lead.

Fears of the 'failure' to support Stimson's lead in 1932 still haunted the minds of Foreign Office officials as the options were weighed. Frank Ashton Gwatkin, an economics and Far Eastern expert, met with the Secretary of the US embassy to inquire as to what the US Government now would like Great Britain to do. Opinion was split amongst the FO officials, with men like Ashton Gwatkin and Nigel Ronald from the Far Eastern Department recommending close, immediate consultation with the Americans. Others, like Sir George A. Mounsey, an assistant under secretary who oversaw the Far Eastern Department, recommended consultation but opposed inquiring of the Americans as to what Britain was to do next.[199] The Foreign Office's deliberations were all being made within the context of also knowing that Roosevelt and his administration would react more favourably to evidence of a strong British stance and committment towards China.[200] A firm opinion on how to appease the American expectations was prepared, however, before the war intervened in September and changed the entire system. As war broke out, the Foreign

Office was committed to following the American lead in the Far East because of its strengthened belief in the United States' commitment to act in that theatre in the event of a major Japanese attack. As well, Japan had no allies at the FO, nor in other areas, who could effectively argue why it should be trusted or be given any further leniency.[201] A new plan would now have to be constructed taking into account the new strategic realities. There was no doubt, however, that in the summer of 1939 the actions of the United States had ushered in a new age of Anglo-American relations in the Far East. That new age held out the promise of an even closer and more productive Anglo-American policy of cooperation in that region.

Evidence for this appeared on the eve of the European war when the new British Ambassador to the United State, Lord Lothian, informed the Foreign Office, that the President now felt so strongly about the Far East because

> ... he thought government and public opinion here were profoundly shocked by Russo-German agreement. He thought it would probably lead to fundamental realignment of Japanese policy to the direction of coming to terms with China with the assistance of Britain and the United States. He thought our attitude should be friendly but that we should display no eagerness. If Japan became hostile again he had two more methods of pressure "in the locker". First was to send aircraft carriers and bombers to the Aleutian Islands about 700 miles from Japanese northern islands. Second was to move American fleet to Hawaii.[202]

Those words, as well as the apparent American preparations for a more vigorous development of their Far Eastern naval strength and bases, buoyed the Foreign Office's hopes to the point that the head of the American Department now believed that "The President can be relied upon to give the right lead to US public opinion and he is also ready, if need be, to assist in holding the ring in the Far East."[203] With the President of the United States in the possession of a mental map that was almost identical to that held in the Foreign Office, with his impulsive act of terminating the 1911 Treaty, thereby initiating a growing economic pressure through embargo, a clear demonstration of America's resolve to act in the Far East had been made.[204] British foreign policy makers had good reason to believe that strong Anglo-American relations regarding that region had been formed.[205] Under the new pressures created during the summer of 1939, only time would tell if such confidence in America's parallel interests and goodwill towards Britain's dilemma in the Far East would be justified in an actual crisis.[206]

ENDNOTES

1.FO 371/20651/38/45, confidential despatch from Lindsay to Eden, Mar.22, 1937.

2.FO 371/20661/A4808/228/45, draft copy of Secretary of State, Anthony Eden's address to the Imperial Conference, as amended by Sir Robert Vansittart, July 8, 1937.

3.Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols., (New York, 1948); Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, (New York, 1944); Benjamin D. Rhodes, "Sir Ronald Lindsay and the British view from Washington, 1930-1939," in Clifford L. Egar and Alexander W. Knott eds., Essays in Twentieth Century American Diplomatic History dedicated to Professor Daniel H. Smith, (Washington, D.C., 1982); Sir Robert Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask, (London, 1946).

4.On Eden and Vansittart, see: Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators; Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942, (Oxford, 1993); Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office, (London, 1965); idem., The Chamberlain Cabinet, (London, 1971); Ritchie Ovendale, 'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of Appeasement, 1937-1939, (Cardiff, 1975); Sidney Aster, Anthony Eden, (New York, 1976); V.H. Rothwell, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, (Manchester, 1992); David Dutton, "Simon and Eden at the Foreign Office, 1931-1935," Review of International Studies, vol.20, 1994, pp.35-52; R.R. James, Anthony Eden, (London, 1986); N. Rose, "The Resignation of Anthony Eden", Historical Journal, vol.25, 1982, pp.911-931.

Some of the works which erroneously put the Treasury, and/or Neville Chamberlain, before the Foreign Office in conducting British foreign policy are listed below. The bulk of the work is usually concerned with Europe and does not understand the interconnected relationship with the Far East that British strategic planners had to face. Others, including those who are involved with the specious appeasement debate, who credit Neville Chamberlain with directing British foreign policy, but again conveniently have little or nothing to say about the Far East beyond the odd mention of Hong Kong or Singapore, are: G. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939, (Edinburgh, 1979); R. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, (Princeton, 1977); Bruce Strang, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Nevile Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938-39," Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.5, 1994, pp.107-137; R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1993); idem., "Economics, Rearmament and Foreign Policy: The United Kingdom before 1939 - A Preliminary Study," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.10, 1975; R.J.Q Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39, (London, 1993); John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (London, 1989); William R. Rock, Appeasement on Trial: British Foreign Policy and Its Critics, 1938-1939, (Archon books, 1966); Gaines Post Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937, (Ithaca, 1993); Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939, (London, 1972); Anthony Howard, RAB: The Life of R.A. Butler, (London, 1987); David Dutton, Simon, (London, 1992); James Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1937-1941, (Chapel Hill, 1977); William Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United States, 1937-1940, (Columbus, 1988); Malcolm Murfett, Fool-Proof Relations, (Singapore, 1984); David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation, (London, 1981); idem., Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940, (Philadelphia, 1983); William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945, (Oxford, 1978); Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937, (Cambridge, 1975); Peter Lowe, Britain in the Far East, (London, 1981); idem., Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937-1941, (Oxford, 1977); Aron Shai, Origins of the

War in the East, (London, 1976); Stephen Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937, (Vancouver, 1975); R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones, British Business in Asia since 1860, (Cambridge, 1989); Donald Cameron Watt, "Chamberlain's Ambassador's", in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher eds., Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950, (Cambridge, 1996), pp.136-170; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, (London, 1995).

5.J. Connell, The 'Office': A Study of British Foreign Policy and Its Makers, 1919-1951, (London, 1958); John Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British strategic Policy, 1919-1926, (Ithaca, 1989); B.J.C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy, (Cambridge, 1984); idem., "Wealth, Power and the New International Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s," Diplomatic History, vol.12, 1988, pp.411-41; David French, "'Perfidious Albion' Faces the Powers," Canadian Journal of History, vol.28, 1993, pp.177-88; Gordon Martel, "The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain," International History Review, vol.13, 1991, pp.662-694; Roberta A. Dayer, "Anglo-American Monetary Policy and Rivalry in Europe and the Far East, 1919-1931," in B.J.C. McKercher ed., Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, (London, 1991), pp.158-186; Michael Roi, "'A Completely Immoral and Cowardly Attitude': The British Foreign Office, American Neutrality and the Hoare-Laval Plan," Canadian Journal of History, vol.29, 1994, pp.331-351; B.J.C. McKercher, "'Our Most Dangerous Enemy': Great Britain Pre-eminent in the 1930s", The International History Review, vol.13, 1991, pp.751-83; idem., "No Eternal Friends or Enemies: British Defence Policy and the Problem of the United States, 1919-1939," Canadian Journal of History, Vol.28, 1993, pp.257-294; idem., "A Greater and Higher Ideal," in M.G. Fry ed., Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt, (London, 1992), pp.107-143; Dorthy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938, (Cambridge, 1964); D.C. Watt, "America and the British Foreign-Policy-Making Elite, from Joseph Chamberlain to Anthony Eden, 1895-1956," in D.C. Watt ed., Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (South Bend, 1965), pp.83-99; Priscilla Roberts, "The First World War and the Emergence of American Atlanticism, 1914-1920," Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.5, 1994, pp.569-619; idem., ed., Sino-American Relations since 1900, (Hong Kong, 1991); Arthur P. Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present, (New York, 1992); William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (Cleveland, 1959); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933, (Ithaca, 1984); Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923, (Pittsburgh, 1969); Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of America-East Asian Relations, (1967); David Reynolds "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," International Affairs, Vol.65, 1988/9, pp.89-111; Selig Addler, The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars, (New York, 1965); Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull, 1933-1944, 2 vols., (New York, 1964); Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, (Chicago, 1962); William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, (New York, 1952); Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: A Study in Responsibilities, (New Haven, 1946); idem., President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, (New Haven, 1948); Allan Nevins, The New Deal in World Affairs, 1933-1945, (New Haven, 1950); Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941, (Ann Arbor, 1955); Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy, (New York, 1951); Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, (Chicago, 1952); Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York, 1948); Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Boston, 1943); Louis Halle, Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1959); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, (Chicago, 1951); Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation, (Chicago, 1953); William A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A study of the Growth and

Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society, (New York, 1969); Robert F. Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942," in B.J. Berstein ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History, (New York, 1968); Wayne Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationist, 1932-45, (Lincoln, 1983); Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941, (Santa Barbara, 1974); Manfred Jona, "The United States and the Failure of Collective Security in the 1930s," in John Braemen, Robert Bremner, and David Brody, eds., Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy, (Columbus, 1971), pp.241-193; James C. Thomson Jr., "The Role of the Department of State," in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, (New York, 1973), pp.81-106; Akira Iriye, "The Role of the United States Embassy in Tokyo," in Dorthy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto eds., Pearl Harbor as History, (New York, 1973), pp.107-126.

6.Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), vol.III, "The Far East", letter from Ray Atherton (counsellor at US embassy in London) to Hornbeck, Jan.29, 1935, pp.28-29.

7.FRUS, vol.III, letter from Hornbeck to Atherton, Feb.19, 1935, pp.59-60; ibid, memo by Hornbeck, Aug.8, 1935, pp.328-330.

8.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Hornbeck, Dec.2, 1935, pp.462-467; Nelson T. Johnson Papers (hereafter NTJ), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 27, folder L-Z, copy of a policy statement from the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, "Far East: United States Policy: Desiderata," Nov.17, 1935.

9.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Hornbeck, Dec.2, 1935, pp.463-467.

10.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Hornbeck, Jan.3, 1935, pp.829-828.

11.William R. Castle Jr. Diary (hereafter Castle Diary), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, entry for Oct.7, 1935; NTJ Papers, container 17, folder A-L, letter from Hornbeck to Grew, June 2, 1933.

12.NTJ Papers, container 27, folder L-Z, letter from Stimson to Johnson, Oct.23, 1935; NTJ Papers, container 27, folder L-Z, letter from Johnson to Stimson, Dec.9, 1935.

13.NTJ Papers, container 27, folder L-Z, report from Johnson to Hull, Oct.9, 1935.

14.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Dec.27, 1935, pp.821-829.

15.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, June 15, 1935, p.248; ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, June 18, 1935, pp.262-263; Hugh R. Wilson Papers (hereafter Wilson Papers), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, container 1, folder - Joseph Grew, section of Grew Diary, Feb.22, 1933, shows that Grew liked and worked closely with Clive's predecessor, Sir Francis O. Lindley; Greg Kennedy, "1935: A Snapshot of British Imperial Defence in the Far East," in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy eds., Far Flung Lines, (London, 1997), pp.190-216.

16.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Johnson, Oct.24, 1935, pp.376-378.

17.For FO view see Kennedy, "1935".

18.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, May 3, 1935, pp.148-151.

19.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Phillips of conversation with Lindsay, June 17, 1935, pp.256-257; ibid, memo by Phillips, July 1, 1935, pp.283-284.

20.Castle Diary, entries for May 29, July 23 and July 27, all 1935.

21.Castle Diary, entry for Aug.2, 1935.

22.Confidential State Department Central Files (hereafter CSDCF), on microfilm, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 711.41/306, despatch from Bingham to Hull, May 28, 1935.

23.Within the State Department itself a number of the experts on Far Eastern matters kept in touch with one another's thinking through an exchange of diaries. Grew sent copies of his diary to his son-in-law, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, as well as to Hornbeck, Johnson, Castle and the Minister to the League of Nations, Hugh R. Wilson. Those men in turn responded to the diaries or sent copies of their own journals to one another creating a very thorough and informal network serving to discuss Far Eastern matters and to present possible solutions for Hull and FDR to consider. In many cases, American Far Eastern policy evolved from this process and not from the formal organization in the State Department.

24.CSDCF, 711.41/325, telegram from Bingham to Hull, Jan.6, 1936.

25.Anthony Eden MSS (hereafter Eden MSS), FO 954/7, PRO, Kew, London, memo from Hankey to Eden, Aug.11, 1936. Hankey felt that Eden would probably disagree with this memo on imperial defence because Hankey had rated Germany as the first priority as far as potential enemies went, and called for a reliance on a balance of power between Japan and Russia to safeguard British interests in the Far East.

26.FO 371/19829/A2130/180/45, private letter from Lindsay to Eden, Mar.3, 1936.

27.Ibid,J.M Troutbeck minute (Troutbeck would become acting head of the American Dept. when Craigie left to become Ambassador to Japan in late 1937), Mar.14, 1936.

28.Ibid, Craigie minute, Mar.24, 1936.

29.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Mar.27, 1936.

30.FO 371/19807/A1355/4/36, despatch from FO to Lindsay, Feb.14, 1936; FO 371/19829/A2130/180/45, Eden minute, Mar.27, 1936.

31.Robert W. Bingham Diary (hereafter Bingham Diary), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., entry for July 9, 1935.

32.The full story of how Piggott, with good reasons, was marginalized by the FO has yet to be told. Some works which are sympathetic to the man and his views are: Carmen Blacker, "Two Piggotts: Sir Frances Taylor Piggott (1852-1925) and Major General F.S.G. Piggott (1883-1966)," in Sir Hugh Cortazzi and Gordon Daniels eds., Britain and Japan, 1859-1991: Themes and Personalities, (London, 1991), pp.118-128; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, pp.50-51; D.C. Watt, "Chamberlain's Ambassadors,", pp.166; F.S.G. Piggott, Broken Thread: An Autobiography, (Aldershot, 1950). For the War Office's official view, see CAB 24/259, Cabinet Papers, PRO, Kew, London, CP 12(36), "The Importance of Anglo-Japanese Friendship", submitted by Secretary of State for War, A. Duff Cooper, Jan.17, 1936.

33.CAB 23/83, Minutes of Cabinet Meetings (hereafter CAB 23/), PRO, Kew, London, meeting no.3, Jan.29, 1936.

34.FO 371/20279/F701/89/23, Orde minute, Jan.22, 1936.

35.Ibid, Wellesley minute, Jan.22; Simon minute, Jan.23; and Vansittart minute, Jan.25, all 1936.

36.FRUS, vol.IV, "The Far East", despatch from Johnson to Hull, Apr.1, 1936. pp.95-98.

37.Ibid.

38.FRUS, vol.IV, memo by Atherton, July 13, 1936, pp.241-243.

39.FRUS, vol.IV, despatch from Grew to Hull, May 29. 1936, pp.177-180. The Hungarian Ambassador to the United States had been suspicious of an Anglo-American rapprochement as well, see Castle Diary, entry for Jan.25, 1936.

40.FO 371/20279/F3476/89/23, despatch from Clive to FO, May 21, 1936.

41.FRUS, vol.IV, despatch from Grew to Hull, Aug.6, 1936, pp.261-264; ibid, despatch from Johnson to Hull, Sept.11, 1936, pp.288-291; ibid, memo by Assistant chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Maxwell Hamilton, Sept.30, 1936. pp.319-320; ibid, telegram from Hull to Dickover (Charge d'Affairs, Tokyo), Sept.30, 1936, pp.321-322; FO 371/20279/F6511/89/23, Cadogan minute, Oct.29; Eden minute, Oct.30; Vansittart minute, Oct.29, all 1936.

42.FO 371/19829/A9241/180/45, Troutbeck minute, Nov.11, 1936.

43.Ibid, draft telegram from Vansittart to Lindsay, Nov.23, 1936.

44.FO 371/20651/A842/38/45, letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Dec.19, 1936.

45.Ibid, Craigie minute, Jan.9; Troutbeck minute, Jan.8, both 1937.

46.FO 371/20279/F6826/89/23, record of conversation between Eden and Yoshida, Nov.6, 1936; FO 371/20279/F6861/89/23, Cadogan minute, Nov.11, 1936; FO 371/20279/F6511/89/23, Treasury memo and all minutes, Oct.29, 1936; FO 371/20279/F6724/89/23, telegram from Clive to FO, Nov.4, 1936; FO 371/20279/F7302/89/23, Treasury memo and all minutes, Nov.27, 1936.

47.FO 371/20279/F7660/89/23, record of conversation between Yoshida and Craigie, Dec.4, 1936; FO 371/20287/F7427/553/23, Cadogan minute, Dec.9, 1936; FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", memo by Norman Davis of conversation with Cadogan, Apr.27, 1937, pp.975-978. See also S. Olu Agbi, "The Foreign Office and Yoshida's Bid for Rapprochement with Britain in 1936-37: A Critical Reconsideration of the Anglo-Japanese Conversations", Historical Journal, vol.21, 1978, pp.173-179.

48.Castle Diary, entry for Nov.26, 1937; CSDCF, 741.94/78, telegram from Hull to Bingham, Nov.20, 1936.

49.CAB 23/86, minutes of meeting 66(36), Nov.18, 1936; FO 371/20279/F7661/89/23, FO minute by Craigie, Nov.25, 1936; FO 371/20279/F7818/89/23, Cadogan minute and Orde minute, both Dec.21, 1936; FO 371/20279/F7928/89/23, record of conversation between Eden and Yoshida and minutes, Dec.22, 1936; FO 371/20286/F7504/303/45, Secret FO memo by N.B. Ronald and minutes, Dec.4, 1936; FO 371/20286/F7926/303/23, record of conversation between Atherton and Cadogan, Dec.17, 1936; CAB 24/267, Cabinet Papers, CP 45, "The Keelung Incident", memo by Eden, Feb.1, 1937; FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Bingham to Hull, Nov.25, 1936, p.389; ibid, despatch from Dickover to Hull, Nov.26, 1936, pp.394-396; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, Dec.16, 1936, pp.426-429; CSDCF, 741.94/69, memo from Johnson to Hull and covering notes by the Far Eastern Division, Sept.11, 1936.

50.FRUS, vol.III, "The Far East", despatch from Grew to Hull, April 16, 1937, pp.64-66. For another incident which reveals more about Anglo-Japanese tensions, see, Brian Bridges, "Britain and Japanese Espionage in Pre-War Malaya: The Shinozaki Case", Journal of Contemporary History, vol.21, 1986, pp.23-36.

51.FO 371/21035/F455/1417/23, confidential telegram from Clive to FO, N.B. Ronald minute, Cadogan minute, all Jan.25, 1937. When Ronald suggested that the American department send along a few words of appreciation for the support through the American naval attache in London, Orde rejected the idea, illustrating the unofficial nature of true Anglo-American Far Eastern relations when he wrote: "I think I would not. Too much appearance of influence is not desirable.". Cadogan and Vansittart concurred with that approach, but were grateful to the Americans for the help. ibid, Orde minute, Cadogan minute, Vansittart minute, all Mar.26, 1937.

52.FO 371/20287/F6829/553/23, Craigie minute, Oct.30, 1936.

53.Ibid, Cadogan minute, Nov.2, 1936.

54.NTJ Papers, letter from Hornbeck to Johnson, Container 31, folder A-K, Dec.31, 1936.

55.FO 371/19829/A9447/180/45, confidential despatch from Eden to Lindsay, Dec.1, 1936.

56.Ibid.

57.FO 371/19829/A9447/180/45, Cadogan minute, Nov.24, Vansittart minute, Nov.25, both 1936; D.F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull", in Norman Graebner ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, (New York, 1961); I. Drummond and Norman Hillmer, Negotiating Freer Trade. The United Kingdom, The United States, Canada and the Trade Agreements of 1938, (Waterloo, 1989); A.W. Schatz, "The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull's Search for Peace, 1936-1938, Journal of American History, vol.57, 1970, pp.85-103; R.A. Harrison, "The Runciman Visit to Washington in January 1937: Presidential Diplomacy and the Non-Commercial Implications of Anglo-American Trade Negotiations," Canadian Journal of History, vol.19, 1984, pp.217-239.

58.FO 371/19827/A8860/103/45, confidential telegram from Sir E. Phipps (British Ambassador in Berlin) to FO, Nov.6, 1936.

59.FO 371/19827/A8860/103/45, Craigie and Vansittart minutes, Nov.13, 1936.

60.FO 371/19827/A8860/103/45, Eden minute, Nov.12, and Chamberlain minute, Dec.1, 1936.

61.Ibid, Vansittart minute, Nov.14, 1936.

62.FO 371/20651/A2197/38/45, confidential draft telegram from Eden to Lindsay, Mar.20, 1937.

63.See: S. Olu Agbi, "The Strategic Factor in British Far Eastern Diplomacy, 1937-41", Nigerian Journal of International Studies, vol.2, 1978, pp.41-54; idem., "The Pacific War Controversy in Britain: Sir Robert Craigie Versus the Foreign Office", Modern Asian Studies, vol.17, 1983, pp.489-517; Antony Best, "Sir Robert Craigie as Ambassador to Japan 1937-1941", in Ian Nish ed., Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, (Kent, 1994), pp.238-251.

64.Hull MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., container 40, letter from Bingham to FDR, Jan.5, 1937.

65.Ibid.

66.Bingham's attitude had changed quickly on this matter, see President's Private Secretary Files (hereafter FDR-PSF), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park Library, New York, Bingham Correspondence, letter from Bingham to FDR, Dec.18, 1936.

67.Hull MSS, container 40, letter from Davis to Hull, Feb.22, 1937.

68.Hull MSS, container 41, letter Davis to Hull, Apr.22, 1937.

69.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Jan.1, 1937, pp.1-11.

70.NTJ Papers, container 31, folder A-K, letter Grew to Johnson, May 17, 1937; ibid, letter from Johnson to Grew, June 4, 1937; FO 371/21028/F1428/28/23, despatch from Clive to FO, Mar.9, 1937; FO 371/21038/F1310/233/23, letter from Cadogan to Sir George Clerk, Mar.23, 1937; Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, pp.215-217.

71.FO 371/21040/F2117/414/23, despatch from Clive to FO, April 12, 1937; FO 371/21040/F2388/414/23, confidential letter from Clive to Orde, Mar.22, 1937.

72.FO 371/20651/A665/38/45, secret telegram from Runciman to Prime Minister, Jan.26, 1937.

73.FO 371/20656/A1059/93/45, secret letter from Runciman to Eden, Feb.8, 1937; Harrison, "The Runciman Visit to Washington", pp.229-235.

74.Ibid, Craigie and Vansittart minutes, both Feb.15, 1937.

75.CSDCF, 741.94/88, report of conversation between Atherton and Cadogan for Hull, Mar.25. 1937.

76.FO 371/21029/F1633/28/23, FO minute by Cadogan, Mar.12, 1937.

77.CSDCF, 741.94/88, Atherton's record of conversation, Mar.25, 1937

78.Ibid.

79.Ibid.

80.Ibid.

81.FO 371/21029/F1633/28/23, Eden minute, Mar.29. 1937.

82.Hull MSS, container 40, letter from Bingham to FDR, Mar.24, 1937. Davis was also reporting Chamberlain's shift in attitude and his desire for Anglo-American cooperation in order to check Japan. "Chamberlain insisted, however, that Japan would cause no trouble if she believed that the United States and Great Britain were standing together. The more Japan could see that our two countries were collaborating the more she would wish to cooperate in promoting economic recovery and peace in China and the Pacific." CSDCF, 711.41/350, covering note on telegram from Davis to Hull, Apr.29, 1937.

83.See, FO 371/20651/A1925/38/45, telegram from Eden to Lindsay, Mar.10, 1937.

84.Ibid.

85.FO 371/20651/A2378/38/45, W.D. Allen (AD clerk) minute, Apr.1, and Vansittart minute, Apr.4, both 1937.

86.Ibid.

87.Ibid.

88.Ibid.

89.Ibid.

90.Ibid.

91.Ibid.

92.Ibid.

93.FO 371/20659/A2847/228/45, FO minute by Allen and various minutes, Mar.15, 1937; FO 371/20659/A2970/228/45, FO minute by Troutbeck and various minutes, Apr.5, 1937.

94.FO 371/20660/A4165/228/45, secret memo from Lindsay to FO, June 1, 1937.

95.FO 371/20660/A4165/228/45, Troutbeck minute, June 17; Orde minute, June 19; Cadogan and Vansittart minutes, June 23, all 1937.

96.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Hull to Grew, June 24, 1937, p.117.

97.Lee, Sino-Japanese War, pp.23-49; Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War, pp.14-32.

98.FRUS, vol.III, note from Hornbeck to Hull, July 13, 1937, p.159.

99.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 14, 1937, p.159-160.

100.Ibid.

101.Ibid.

102.FRUS, memo by Maxwell Hamilton of Conversation with Broadmead (First Secretary of British embassy in Washington), July 14, 1937, p.164.

103.FRUS, vol.III, note from British Embassy to the State Department, July 20, 1937, p.226.

104.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Bingham to Hull, July 27, 1937, pp.271-272.

105.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Hull to Bingham, July 27, 1937, p.272.

106.FRUS, memo by Hornbeck, July 27, 1937, pp.278-280.

107.FDR-PSF, Britain, letter Roosevelt to Chamberlain, July 28; letter from Chamberlain to Roosevelt, Sept.28, 1937, both 1937.

108.CAB 2/7, minutes of meetings of Committee of Imperial Defence (hereafter CID), meeting no.301, Nov.18, 1937; CAB 2/7, CID meeting no. 303, Dec.2, 1937; CAB 53/7, minutes of meeting of the Chiefs of Staff (hereafter COS), meeting no.209, June 1, 1937; CAB 53/32, COS Papers, no.596, "Appreciation of the Situation in the Far East," June 14, 1937; CAB 4/26, CID Papers, no.1365-B, "Economic Sanctions Against Japan,", Nov.5, 1937; FRUS, vol.III, note from the British Embassy to the Department of State, and Aide-Memoire, Oct.1, 1937, pp.560-561.

109.FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Aug.6, 1937, pp.340-341; ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, Aug.27, 1937, pp.485-488; NTJ Papers, container 33, folder D-G, letter from Johnson to Grew, Nov.10, 1937.

110.FRUS, vol.III, memo of conversation by the Second Secretary of Legation in Canada (Mr.Key), Aug.13, 1937, pp.401-404.

111.FO 371/21040/F8754/414/23, Vansittart and Cadogan minutes, both Nov.1, 1937; FO 371/21030/F10443/28/23, letter from Craigie to Cadogan, Dec.3, 1937; FRUS, vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Oct.8, 1937, pp.590-593. Grew's initial impression of Craigie was that he thought the new British Ambassador was willing to cooperate to the limit. Both Grew and Craigie were of a mind that separate lines of advance for their nations would be of the greatest benefit when dealing with Japan on foreign policy matters, so there was a certain commonality of view between the two Ambassadors. Both were also at odds with their departments at home because of those attitudes. Wilson Papers, container 1, folder Joseph Grew, letter from Grew to Wilson, Sept.30, 1937.

112.Wilson Papers, container 1, folder Joseph Grew, letter from Wilson to Grew, Aug.28, 1937.

113.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Hull to Grew, Sept.2, 1937, pp.505-508; FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Hull to Grew, Oct.2, 1937, pp.572-573.

114.Ibid.

115.NTJ Papers, container 33, folder D-G, letter from Grew to Hull, Sept.15, 1937; FRUS, vol.III, letter from Grew to Hull, Sept.15, 1937, pp.525-530.

116.Wilson Papers, container 1, folder Joseph Grew, personal and private letter from Wilson to Grew, Nov.16, 1937.

117.For varying views see, Lee, Sino-Japanese War, pp.70-78; P. Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War, pp.30-31; Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp.399--441. On September 13, the Chinese government approached the League of Nations where, under British pressure, its appeal was directed to a standing Far Eastern Advisory Committee rather than the Council or Assembly itself. In light of events surrounding the Abysinian crisis, London did not believe that America would support any League sanctions. So, on October 5, the Advisory Committee issued two reports. Neither report labelled the Japanese as an "aggressor" as the Lytton Report had in 1934. However, the Committee sympathised with China and found Japan's reaction excessive given the minor nature of the Marco Polo Bridge incident (the supposed reason for the Japanese attack). One of the recommendations from the reports, however, supported an Australian proposal made in late September for a conference of the Washington Nine-Power signatories to search for a settlement. Thus, the Brussels Conference came to be.

118.Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, p.389; idem., "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech", Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol.72, 1957, pp.405-33; Edgar B. Nixon ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, (Cambridge, 1969), pp.10-21.

119.FO 371/20663/A7441/228/45, letter from Wickham Steed (from British embassy) to Vansittart, Oct.13, 1937.

120.Ibid.

121.Robert Dallek, Franklin D.Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, (New York, 1979), pp.146-147.

122.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Sumner Welles, Oct.14, 1937, pp.608-609.

123.Previous to this, Eden had tried to get some idea of what FDR had meant by the 'quarantine' speech from the State Department and to know whether it meant that the US was ready to sanction Japan. Eden also wanted to know if the American realized that if sanctions were imposed there was a very good chance that the Japanese would react violently and probably against British interests, as Japan was tending not to see any difference between American and British policy. The British were informed that there was no desire to put on sanctions at that time. See FRUS, vol.III, memo by Sumner Welles, Oct.12, 1937, pp.600-602; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, Oct.2, 1937, pp.574-577.

124.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Bingham to Hull, Oct.28, 1937, pp.114-116.

125.FO 371/20663/A7748/228/45, record of conversation between Eden and Bingham, Oct.28, 1937.

126.Ibid.

127.Ibid.

128.Ibid; FRUS, vol.III, memo by Assistant Secretary of State (Wilson) of conversation with British charge d'Affaires (Mallet), Oct.5, 1937, pp.582-583.

129.For particulars of the conference, which also included representatives from France, Italy, the Soviet Union, China, see Nancy H. Hooker ed., The Moffat Papers, (Cambridge, 1956), pp.152-188.

130.FRUS, vol.III, undated memo from file of President's Private Secretary, 1937, pp.85-86.

131.Ibid.

132.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Oct.30, 1937, pp.124-125; Hooker, The Moffat Papers, pp.159-161.

133.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.1, 1937, pp.131-132.

134.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.2, 1937, pp.145-147; Hooker, The Moffat Papers, pp.162-165.

135.Ibid.

136.Ibid.

137.Hooker, The Moffat Papers, pp.181-183.

138.FRUS, vol.III, memo by Welles of conversation with Lindsay, Nov.13, 1937, pp.152-155.

139.FO 371/20664/A8259/288/45, telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.16, 1937.

140.FRUS, telegram from Davis to Hull, Nov.21, 1937, pp.221-224.

141.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Nov.16, 1937, pp.189-193; Ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, Nov.17, 1937, p.202; Oral History of Eugene Dooman, (hereafter Dooman Oral History), Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, pp.51, 66, 67, and 98.

142.FO 371/21028/F9655/26/23, very secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.16, 1937; ibid, most secret telegram from FO to Lindsay, Nov.24, 1937; FO 371/21028/10616/26/23, most secret telegram from Lindsay to FO, Nov.30, 1937; ibid, most secret telegram, Lindsay to FO, Nov.30, 1937; ibid, secret letter from Lindsay to Vansittart, Nov.30, 1937; ibid, draft of most secret telegram from FO to Lindsay, Dec.4, 1937; FO 371/21525/A651/64/45, secret despatch from Lindsay to FO, Jan.26, 1938.

143.FO 371/21028/F10616/26/23, Nigel B. Ronald minutes, Dec.2; Orde minute, Dec.2; and Cadogan minute, Dec.2, all 1937.

144.FO 371/21041/F11265/615/23, Frank Ashton Gwatkin (FO financial and FE expert) minute, Jan.4; J. Balfour (now head of the American Department) minute, Jan.8; Nigel B. Ronald (FE Dept.) minute, Jan.12; Cadogan (now PUS) minute, Jan.16, all 1938.

145.Ovendale, 'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World, pp.66-116; N.Rose, "The Resignation of Anthony Eden"; Dallek, FDR and American Foreign Policy p.157; Watt, How War Came.

146.Eden MSS, FO 954/6, "The Far East", letter from Eden to the King, undated Nov., 1937.

147.Eden MSS, FO 954/7, record of meeting at All Souls College, Dec.18, 1937.

148.Eden MSS, 954/7, letter from Eden to Chamberlain, Dec.31, 1937.

149.FRUS, "The Far East", vol.III, telegram from Johnson charge d'affaires in London) to Hull, Feb.4, 1938, p.69.

150.Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p.297, note 29.

151.Eden MSS, FO 954/6, letter from Cadogan to Eden, Jan.12, 1938.

152.FRUS, "General", vol.1, letter from FDR to Chamberlain, Jan.17, 1938, pp.120-122; FO 371/21490/A556/1/45, FO minute by Ashton Gwatkin, Jan.21, 1938; ibid, J. Balfour minute, Jan.31, 1938; FRUS, "The Far East", vol.III, memo of conversation between Hull and Lindsay, Jan.20, 1938.

153.David Dilks ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1939, (London, 1971), pp.35-55.

154.A full account of the American influences on Eden and his resignation are found in the extensive file, FO 371/21526/A2127/64/45, FO memo, Mar.24, 1938. See also, FO 371/21547/A1409/1409, despatch from FO to Lindsay, Feb.22, 1938.

155.FO 371/22180/F4462/71/23, draft telegram from FO to Craigie, May 7, 1938; Paul Haggie, Britannia at Bay, (Oxford, 1981), pp.130-132; Anthony Howard, RAB, pp.70-87; Andrew Roberts, 'The Holy Fox': A Biography of Lord Halifax, (London, 1991), pp.82-139; The Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax, (London, 1965), pp.375-426; Paul Stafford, "Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R.A. Butler at the Foreign Office, 1938-1939," The Historical Journal, vol.28, 1985, pp.901-922.

156.FRUS, vol.III, letter and attached memo from Cadogan to Hornbeck, Feb.14, 1938, pp.89-93; ibid, letter from Hornbeck to Cadogan, Apr.13, 1938, pp.141-153.

157.FO 371/21527/A7504/64/45, most secret and important telegram from Lindsay to FO, Sept.19, 1938. Lindsay had been invited to talk privately with FDR, a situation that not even the State Department was made aware of. The President had informed Lindsay of his views of the situation forming in Europe, and proposed to look at blockade issues and perhaps to summon a conference in the mid-Atlantic. Roosevelt recognized the dangers for the Far East if Germany threatened England, for Japan might feel that it could move unhindered. When Lindsay asked FDR if the United States would do anything if Hong Kong were attacked, the President was unsure whether the nation would be ready for that sort of act, and, even if it were, such action would take a good deal of time.

158.FRUS, vol.III, letter from Cadogan to Hornbeck, May 23, 1937, pp.172-173.

159.Ibid.

160.FO 371/22181/F8961/71/23, Brenan minute, Aug.8, 1938; ibid, secret letter from Cadogan to Craigie, Sept.15, 1938; FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, July 27, 1938, pp.239-141.

161.FO 371/22181/F10611/71/23, Nigel B. Ronald minute, Oct.12; R.G. Howe (new head of the Far Eastern Department) minute, Oct.12; telegram from FO to Craigie, Oct.13, [illegible] 1938; FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Aug.18, 1938, pp.265-266.

162.Hull Papers, container 42, letter from Johnson to Hull, Feb.17, 1938; ibid, letter from Johnson to Hull, May 27, 1938.

163.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Sept.9, 1938, pp.282; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, Nov.1, 1938, pp.354-356.

164.NTJ Papers, container 34, folder H-I, letter from Maxwell Hamilton to Johnson, Sept.15, 1938.

165.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Sept.20, 1938, pp.296-297; ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, Sept.27, 1938, pp.298-299.

166.Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, pp.71-112.

167.FO 371/22181/F12972/71/23, confidential despatch from Craigie, Nov.4, 1938.

168.Ibid.

169.FO 371/22181/F13894/71/23, very confidential despatch from Craigie to FO, Dec.2, 1938.

170.FRUS, "The Far East", vol.IV, telegram from Grew to Hull, Oct.15, 1938, pp.67-72.

171.FO 371/22186/F11672/152/23, Cadogan minute, Nov.10, 1938; Halifax minute, Nov.10, both 1938; FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Grew to Hull, Nov.2, 1938, pp.357-358; ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, Dec.1, 1938, pp.400-402.

172.FO 371/22181/F13894/71/23, Cadogan minute, Jan.16, 1939; Halifax agreed with Cadogan and the FO's assessment of the issue as did the Admiralty, see FO 371/23555/F2134/176/23, letter from Captain T.S.V. Phillips (Director of Plans), Mar.2, 1939.

173.FO 371/23555/F779/176/23, telegram from Sir A. Clark Kerr (British Ambassador to China) to FO, Jan.23, 1939; ibid, Nigel B. Ronald minute, Jan.25; R.G. Howe minute, Jan.31; Brenan minute, Jan.25; Cadogan minute, Jan.31, all 1939.

174.FO 371/23560/F3478/456/23, FO minute by N.B. Ronald and all minutes, Feb.28, 1939; CAB 24/284, CP 76(39), "Situation in the Far East", Halifax, Mar.30, 1939.

175.FRUS, "The Far East", vol.III, despatch from Grew to Hull, Jan.7, 1939, pp.478-481.

176.Ibid.

177.FRUS, vol.III, memo by John Carter Vincent of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Jan.20, 1939, pp.483-485; ibid, memo by Hornbeck, Jan.25, 1939, pp.489-490; ibid, aide-memoire from the British embassy to the State Dept., Jan.25, 1939, pp.490-493; ibid, telegram from Grew to Hull, Jan.31, 1939, pp.497-500; ibid, memo of conversation by Welles, Feb.3, 1939, p.501; ibid, memo by Grew, Mar.13, 1939, pp.516-519; ibid, despatch from Grew to Hull, Mar.15, 1939, pp519-521.

178.Morgenthau Presidential Diaries (hereafter Morgenthau Diaries), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York, entry for Apr.11, 1939.

179.FO 371/22812/A1274/98/45, Parliamentary question, Feb.16, 1939.

180.Ibid, Strang minute, Feb.9, 1939.

181.Ibid, Ingram minute, Feb.9, 1939.

182.Ibid, Howe minute, Feb.10, 1939.

183.FO 371/22829/A2856/1292/45, FO memo by J. Balfour, Apr.14, 1939.

184.FO 371/22815/A4991/98/45, FO minute by the Earl of Perth, July 12, 1939. In many instances the Foreign Office's faith in Roosevelt was confirmed, as in the instance when he accelerated the Congressional process so that Britain would not be embargoed from purchasing material in the US after the war broke out. See, FDR-PSF, Great Britain, letter from FDR to Chamberlain, Sept.11, 1939.

185.FRUS, "The Far East", vol.IV, telegram from Dooman to Hull, June 15, 1939, pp.181-182.

186.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Kennedy to Hull, June 19, 1939, pp.185-186; ibid, telegram from Kennedy to Hull, June 27, 1939, pp.205-206; ibid, telegram from Dooman to Hull, June 30, 1939, pp.208-209.

187.FRUS, vol.IV, memo by Welles of conversation with Lindsay, June 23, 1939, pp.194-195.

188.CAB 23/99, meeting 31(39), June 7, 1939; ibid, meeting 32(39), June 14, 1939; CAB 23/100, meeting 33(39), June 21, 1939; ibid, meeting 34(39), June 28, 1939; ibid, meeting 37(39), July 12, 1939; ibid, meeting 36(39), July 19, 1939; ibid, meeting 39(39) July 26, 1939; ibid, meeting 40(39), Aug.2, 1939.

189.Morgenthau Diary, entry for Oct.17, 1938.

190.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Hull to Dooman, July 1, 1939, pp.213-215.

191.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Dooman to Hull, July 3, 1939, pp.215-217; ibid, letter from Maxwell Hamilton to Grew, July 4, 1939, pp.217-218; ibid, telegram from Dooman to Hull, July 5, 1939, p.219; ibid, memo by Grew, July 6, 1939, pp.220-221.

192.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Dooman to Hull, July 23, 1939, p.227.

193.Ibid.

194.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Hull to Dooman, July 25, 1939, p.356.

195.FRUS, vol.IV, telegram from Dooman to Hull, Aug.25, 1939, pp.238-239.

196.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Charge (Johnson) in London to Hull, Aug.17, 1939, pp.570-573.

197.FO 371/23569/F8388/1236/23, very confidential telegram from Craigie to FO, Aug.5, 1939.

198.Ibid, Ashley Clarke minute, Aug.5, 1939.

199.FO 371/23569/F8284/1236/23, FO memo, Aug.2, 1939; CAB 23/100, meeting 40(39), Aug.2, 1939; FO 371/13569/F8392/1236/23, FO minute by Ashton Gwatkin, Aug.2, 1939; ibid, Ronald and Mounsey minutes, both Aug.8, 1939.

200.FDR himself had told Professor Roger B. Merriman that "I wish the British would stop this "We who are about to die, salute thee" attitude. Lord Lothian was here the other day, started the conversation by saying he had completely abandoned his former belief that Hitler could be dealt with as a semi-reasonable human being, and went on to say that the British for a thousand years had been the guardians of Anglo-Saxon civilization - that the sceptre or the sword or something like that had dropped from their palsied fingers - that the U.S.A. must snatch it up - that F.D.R. alone could save the world - etc., etc. I got mad clear through and told him that just so long as he or Britishers like him took that attitude of complete despair, the British would not be worth saving anyway. What the British need today is a good stiff grog, inducing not only the desire to save civilization but the continued belief that they can do it. In such an event they will have a lot more support from their American cousins ...." See FDR-PSF, Great Britain, letter from FDR to Merriman, Feb.15, 1939; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p.37; FO 371/23568/F4981/1236/23, M.E. Dening (Far Eastern Dept.), May 26; Nigel B. Ronald minute, May 26; R.G. Howe minute, May 27; George Mounsey minute, May 30, all 1939.

201.The British Ambassador in China, now Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, was a strong opponent of Craigie's plan to deal with Japan's moderates, but did agree that Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East was vital. His view on Anglo-American relations in the Far East, made through close consultation with Ambassador Johnson, carried the day in the Foreign Office. His advice was "Sir Robert Craigie goes on ... to say that it has long been clear that the United States will not proceed beyond protests. The recent granting of credits to China fortifies me in this hope. Indeed it seems to us here that the Americans are now taking the lead and that we are failing to keep pace with them. It is impossible to say how far it is representative of the views of Washington, but, for what it is worth, local American opinion suggests that, if we could convince the United States of our determination not only to uphold but to support China also, we would find them more than ready to go with us." FO 371/23555/F1402/176/23, confidential despatch from Clark Kerr to FO, Feb.13, 1939; FO 371/23555/F1534/176/23, despatch from V.A. Mallet (Charge in Washington) to FO, Feb.16, 1939; FO 371/23568/F5037/1236/23, Brenan minute, May 31; Mounsey minute, June 2; Cadogan minute, June 2, Vansittart minute, June 2, and Halifax minute, June 3, all 1939; FO 371/23555/F4419/176/23, see all minutes, especially those of Cadogan, Vansittart, and Halifax, May 20, 1939.

202.FO 371/22815/A5899/98/45, record of conversation between Lothian and FDR, Aug.30, 1939.

203.Ibid, Balfour minute, Sept.1, 1939.

204.FO 371/23568/F8077/1236/23, telegram from Lindsay to FO, July 29, 1939.

205.FRUS, vol.III, telegram from Charge in London (Johnson) to Hull, Aug.17, 1939, pp.570-573; ibid, telegram from Welles to Charge in London, Aug.22, 1939, p.557; FO 371/22799/A7345/26/45, FO memo by Graham Hutton (American Dept.), Oct.18, 1939.

206.The literature on Anglo-American relations between 1939 and 1945 is far too extensive to list here. A brief outline of some of the issues is found in Peter Boyle, "Reversion to Isolationism? The British Foreign Office View of American Attitudes to Isolationism and Internationalism during World War II", Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol.8, 1997, pp.168-183; David Reynolds, "Roosevelt, Churchill and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-45," in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull eds., The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945, (Oxford, 1986), pp.17-44; Thorne, Allies of a Kind.

CONCLUSION

When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, informal Anglo-American cooperation with respect to strategic foreign policy was already a reality. This did not occur solely because of concerns over European issues. In fact, the Far East had been the venue where the American and British strategic interests had intersected to create parallel but not joint policies. Far Eastern demands had forged a close Anglo-American relationship modeled on the principles of competitive cooperation well before a formal alliance was declared after December 7, 1941.

The two nations had, over six long years, overcome the feelings of suspicion, abandonment, and dishonesty that had plagued those relations from 1927 to 1933. Mutual trust and confidence in Anglo-American relations had been achieved in the Far East, despite differences caused by events in Europe. Out of the Far Eastern situation came feelings of trust, honesty, commitment, integrity and openness that created an informal, yet no less valuable and vital form of Anglo-American cooperation. Throughout that period, Anglo-American relations in the two theatres were analogous to a set of train tracks. When viewed from one angle the two tracks could be seen to be running as two separate, distinct lines, but if that perspective is shifted -- say to the view as seen from Tokyo -- those same tracks merged into what appeared to be one, solid, single line, not two separate paths. Anglo-American strategic foreign policy relations were that sort of relationship: it depended on the perspective, or mental map, that each nation possessed of the other.

It was in Far Eastern matters and through the close observation of British conduct regarding foreign and naval policies towards that region that American policy-makers would find answers to a number of questions. Was Albion perfidious? Would London make a deal with the Japanese to protect the British empire at the expense of the Chinese and American interests? Would the British commit military forces to the region in any sizeable number in a conflict? And, could the British be trusted not to deceive the Americans into pulling their chestnuts out of the fire with Washington gaining no visible return for its efforts? The answers were provided from 1933 to 1939. On maritime and naval issues, on questions of diplomacy and attitudes towards Japan, and even on how each nation viewed the balance of power with respect to the Soviet Union, common ground, common values and common ties were established from 1933 to 1939 so as to make Britain and the United States into what Christopher Thorne later termed were "Allies of a Kind". That alliance was built, however, before December 7, 1941.

After the war in Europe began, a new set of strategic imperatives came into play. The appreciations and assumptions made from 1933 to 1939 were now subject to change. After September 1, 1939, the pre-war beliefs blurred, as new actors (Lothian, Churchill, Stimson, and Knox, to name just a few) claimed the spotlight on the stage of Anglo-American relations. Those earlier evaluations, while still useful, at times seemed nonsensical when extended into a period when much had changed. Without the same fundamentals -- political, strategic, and economic -- to consider, Anglo-American relations in the Far East naturally had to evolve. And, while the basis for Anglo-American strategic relations had been created in the Far Eastern context, that theatre now took on a less important status as the realities of the European war unfolded. The Pact of Steel, the Soviet-German Pact, the Soviet-Japanese Pact, the fall of France, the entry of Italy into the war, British naval problems, and, finally, the German attack on the Soviet Union, all changed the strategic thinking. So, too, did the increase in British and American armaments production and this, combined with the mobilisation of both nations, had implications for Japan. Faced with the rapid growth of Britain's and America's war readiness, the Japanese could not delay, as soon both Western powers would out-strip Tokyo's ability to wage war. After September 1939, Japan had only a limited window of opportunity in which to utilize her limited force to best purpose before its impact was rendered nugatory. And this limitation was enhanced by the success of the Foreign Office's 'no bloc' policy. Fearing that the two Western powers were in fact allied, Japanese policy-makers were forced to hesitate. Within the context of such a perception, then, the Japanese decision to attack the more powerful United States, rather than pick apart the pieces of Great Britain's Far Eastern empire, becomes much more comprehensible. Japan attacked the United States first because by the middle of 1941 the Japanese believed that the Americans would defend British interests in the region.[1]

A consideration of Anglo-American relations in the Far East also has some implications for any wider judgement of British foreign policy. The role of Neville Chamberlain and the interference of the British Treasury in the conduct of Great Britain's strategic foreign policy was more disruptive than constructive.[2] Chamberlain and his circle were uninformed amateurs in foreign policy, who distracted the Foreign Office from conducting a sensible and pragmatic foreign policy - based on Realpolitik and the balance of power - in the Far East. Lord Lothian summed up Chamberlain's capabilities best, when he told the American under secretary of state, William Phillips, that "Chamberlain represented a purely local point of view; he was not internationally minded and, although a brilliant man, could not be counted upon to favour cooperation with the United States."[3] Chamberlain's distrust of the United States, forged through the decades over continued clashes with the Americans over monetary and economic policies, blinded the man to the realities of the balance of power structure that was vital to Britain's survival, not only in the Far East, but the world. Forced to waste valuable time and resources, as well as to suffer interminable delays over policy decisions while the Treasury was educated in the reality of Britain's imperial interests and needs, the Foreign Office, with the support of the Admiralty, nonetheless stayed in command of the formulation of Great Britain's foreign policy in the Far East from 1933 until the outbreak of the Second World War. The superiority of the Foreign Office's vision was evident in the Far East. Unlike Europe, where Chamberlain's influence on foreign policy was paramount, there was no Far Eastern Munich.

The Foreign Office was the only decision-making body capable of gathering, processing and successfully utilizing the overwhelming amount of data required to create a comprehensive Imperial strategic policy. People, finances, domestic affairs, defence matters, and economics were all grist to the mill of the Foreign Office. Staffed by a number of clever, insightful and experienced observers of the Far East and America, the Foreign Office and diplomatic service created an intricate mental map of Japan, the United States, and Russia. This mental map enabled them to formulate and coordinate a British Far Eastern policy that worked masterfully within the context of the balance of power in the Far East. The Foreign Office also was able to project this mental map to the Americans for their consideration, in a confidence-building exercise designed to create support for the British position in the Far East. It is important to note that the Foreign Office did not make decisions on the basis of racial or national stereotypes; those decisions and policies were driven by the strategic realities in the Far East.

How did both nations see the balance of power scheme which was created for the Far East? Given the vast literature which exists on Anglo-Japanese, American-Japanese, Sino-Anglo, and Sino-American relations in this period, very little space has been given over here to the question of whether the Americans and the British had the same mental map of China and Japan.[4] There is, however, certainly a sub-text developed in this study which elaborates on how certain British and American policy-making groups came to have similar views of Japan. However, despite the similarity of the Anglo-American view of Japan, it is important to remember that neither country could control either Japanese foreign or military policy. Only the Japanese could do that. Both western powers could rattle sabres, offer compromises, threaten sanctions or ignore

Japanese actions and go on about their own business in the Far East. Nevertheless, Japan would do what Japan would do.

The Soviet Union and its military capacity were central to both American and British evaluations of the balance of power in the Far East. This fact had several implications. First, the timing of such Japanese strategic movements as the attack on China in the summer of 1937 and the launching of the attack on Pearl Harbor, can be understood only if the role of the Soviets in the Far East balance of power is appreciated. Second, the Anglo-American assessments of the Far Eastern situation were influenced by considerations of Soviet power and the policy of both nations was made accordingly. Finally, and tangentially, the need to consider the Russian bear before the creation of the bi-polar world in 1945 should suggest that studies of Soviet post-war involvement in the Far East must look back at least to 1933 if it is to be placed in its rightful context.

The Far East, where American interests came into direct contact with British Imperial interests, presented an opportunity for the British to bring the United States into a strategic system. The Foreign Office did not fail to exploit that situation, to the everlasting benefit of Great Britain and its Empire. Both administrations, in Great Britain and the United States, did not desire a formal alliance aimed at the containment of a rogue Japan. The British, because of their extensive Imperial interests and military vulnerability to a Japanese attack, did not wish to give any formal or public expression to a policy that was aimed at encircling or containing Japanese expansion for fear of provoking an attack. Yet, London worked to create in the mind of the Japanese an appearance of unity between American and British interests. For, if the Japanese thought that the Americans (or even the Russians) would assist the British against a Japanese attack, then Japanese aggression could be deterred.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Roosevelt, the State Department, and the USN, had no desire to appear before the American public as defenders of British Imperial interests in the Far East. Thus, Washington also wanted no formal alliance. Such an alliance would have caused enormous problems in Congress for Roosevelt, with respect both to his domestic and foreign policies, to say nothing of the reaction that would have resulted among the general public. On the other hand, if the relationship could be kept at the informal level, and left to the professional diplomats, assistant secretaries, Ambassadors, and counsellors, out of sight of the public, then all would be well. It should come as no surprise, then, that it was only after the re-election of FDR, in the autumn of 1936, that the US Administration began to move slowly, but more boldly, in this informal manner, towards the creation of an Anglo-American cooperative relationship. Here, the Roosevelt Adminstration proved itself to be well ahead of the general public in its desire to participate on the world's stage, in cooperation with Great Britain, as the policemen of the world. The education of the American public to that reality, and to an acceptance of a level of Anglo-American cooperation, was a principal goal for the President and his Government from 1936 to 1939.

Much of British policy in the Far East flowed from the fact that Britain was the centre of an empire, with global interests. Here, David French's use of the term "The British Way in Warfare" explains much about how Anglo-American relations worked in the Far East. As Britain's resources were stretched, she needed to co-opt as much of America's power as possible, even into a shadowy and undeclared alliance, to maintain a balance of power. This was no different than what, as French points out, Britain had done in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to preserve its primacy in the European Great Powers system.[5]

Empire had yet another effect on Britain's policy. This was in the realm of administration and bureaucracy. The machinery for the maintenance of ties between parts of the empire had an obvious role in the creation of a defence plan that utilized the entire resource base of that empire. These bodies, both civilian and military, had close ties to all policy-making that was concerned with strategic planning. In this capacity, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), in conjunction with the Treasury and the Colonial Office (CO), all coordinated through the Foreign Office, played a vital role. These bodies assessed attitude of friendly and not so friendly nations towards British foreign policy and created an imperial response. This unique system explains why a wide range of topics must be investigated in order to understand what Anglo-American relations in the Far East really portended for the "British Way in Warfare" generally. When that system is understood in detail, the picture of informal, yet confident, cooperation between Britain and the United States also becomes clearer.

Geography was fundamental to the development of the Anglo-American relationship. This results from the fact that it was only in the Far East where American and British policy-makers had either conflicting or comparable interests that created a need or basis for cooperation. This led to a relationship based on specific issues, not on generalities, and one which, in most cases, was not transferable from the Far Eastern to the European context until well after 1936.[5] Even so, much of that relationship was informal or institutional, in that it took place at levels below that of President, Prime Minister or even Secretary of State. Both nations were joined by Realpolitik because only that could deal with the strategic problems created in the Far East. But Realpolitik took on differing British and American shapes. The concerns of an empire ran headlong into those of a relatively insular power whose governing body and public could be enticed only slowly out of their isolationist shell. The Far East was the crossroads where these two national systems met. The result, after a lengthy process of confidence-building, was that British and American Far Eastern policy travelled along the same path, forming a solid and unified Anglo-American relationship. The basis of the Grand

Alliance had been formed in the Far East by the events of 1933 to 1939.

ENDNOTES

1.Captain A.H. McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence in 1941, wrote to Admiral H.E. Kimmel that six days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor he had prepared a memo for the CNO which pointed out that Japan was likely to attack soon, given the state of readiness of its fleet. Interestingly, his first choice of target for such an attack was Singapore, although he qualified it with the statement "... and possibly in other directions as well..." McCollum's first instinct however, was to assume that the Japanese would indeed start a war in the Pacific with an attack on the British. This attack was seen by him as being an act which would cause the USN to begin combat operations. See John F. Shafroth Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, container 1, letter from McCollum to Kimmel, May 21, 1944. See also the opinion of Vice Admiral Charles A. Pownall, who was the commander of the USS Enterprise when war broke out in Europe. Pownall was sure that he and his ships were going to be sent to Singapore to counter any Japanese movements. See, Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Charles A. Pownall, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Oral History Collection, pp.97-99.

2.This is in direct contrast to the unlikely arguments put forth by John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace, (London, 1989). For a further dissection of Charmley, see David Reynolds, "Churchill the Appeaser? Between Hitler, Roosevelt and Stalin in World War Two", in Michael Dockrill and B.J.C. McKercher eds., Diplomacy and World Power, (Cambridge, 1996), pp.197-220.

3.Confidential U.S. State Dept. Central Files, Great Britain 1933-1939, confidential letter and memo from Phillips to Robert W. Bingham (US Ambassador to Britain), Oct.17, 1934. Reel 22.

4.In addition to the literature on Japan already mentioned in the various chapters above, see W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, (Oxford, 1987); Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Pre-War Japan, (Princeton, 1986); Gordon M. Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan: 1931-1941, (Princeton, 1977); Kaoru Sugihara, "The Economic Motivations behind Japanese Aggression in the late 1930s: Perspectives of Freda Utley and Nawa Toichi," Journal of Contemporary History, vol.32, 1997, pp.259-280; David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, (New York, 1971); Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945, (Berkley, 1957); Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy, China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War 1, (Santa Barbara, 1978); Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, (Cambridge, 1965); Ian Nish, Japan's Foreign Policy: 1869-1942, (London, 1977); John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945, (New York, 1970); Brian Bridges, "Yoshizawa Kenkichi and the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression Pact Proposal", Modern Asian Studies, vol.14, 1980, pp.111-127; Laura E. Hein, "Free-Floating Anxieties on the Pacific: Japan and the West Revisited", Diplomatic History, vol.20, 1996, pp.411-437; Shin'ichi Kitaoka, "The Army as a Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited", The Journal of Military History, vol.57, Special Issue, 1993, pp.67-86; Kyozo Sato, "Japan's Position before the Outbreak of the European War in September 1939", Modern Asian Studies, vol.14, 1980, pp.129-143.

On China, see Arthur Waldon, "War and the Rise of Nationalism in Twentieth-Century China", The Journal of Military History, vol.57, Special Issue, 1993, pp.87-104; Paul A. Varg, "Sino-American Relations Past and Present", Diplomatic History, vol.4, 1980, pp.101-112.

5.For further insights into French's definition of the 'British Way in Warfare,' and its applicability to the defence of the realm, see his British Way in Warfare, (London, 1990) pp.175-201; idem., British Economic and Strategic

Planning, 1905-1915, (London, 1982); idem., British Strategy and War Aims, (London, 1986); Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply, (London, 1984). For the best discussion of the term strategic foreign policy, see John Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy, (Ithaca, 1989), pp.31-52.

6.For a discussion of this idea of issue specific polices and Anglo-American relations in the period 1914-1933, see Priscilla Roberts, "The Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic Alliance, 1914-1933", Diplomatic History, vol.21, 1997, pp.333-364.

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